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- Patrick Henry's First Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention Against the Constitution
June 4th, 1788 Mr. Chairman, the public mind, as well as my own, is extremely uneasy at the proposed change of government. Give me leave to form one of the number of those who wish to be thoroughly acquainted with the reasons of this perilous and uneasy situation, and why we are brought hither to decide on this great national question. I consider myself as the servant of the people of this commonwealth, as a sentinel over their rights, liberty, and happiness. I represent their feelings when I say that they are exceedingly uneasy at being brought from that state of full security, which they enjoyed, to the present delusive appearance of things. A year ago, the minds of our citizens were at perfect repose. Before the meeting of the late federal Convention at Philadelphia, a general peace and a universal tranquillity prevailed in this country; but, since that period, they are exceedingly uneasy and disquieted. When I wished for an appointment to this Convention, my mind was extremely agitated for the situation of public affairs. I conceived the republic to be in extreme danger. If our situation be thus uneasy, whence has arisen this fearful jeopardy? It arises from this fatal system; it arises from a proposal to change our government–a proposal that goes to the utter annihilation of the most solemn engagements of the states–a proposal of establishing nine states into a confederacy, to the eventual exclusion of four states. It goes to the annihilation of those solemn treaties we have formed with foreign nations. The present circumstances of France–the good offices rendered us by that kingdom–require our most faithful and most punctual adherence to our treaty with her. We are in alliance with the Spaniards, the Dutch, the Prussians; those treaties bound us as thirteen states confederated together. Yet here is a proposal to sever that confederacy. Is it possible that we shall abandon all our treaties and national engagements?–and for what? I expected to hear the reasons for an event so unexpected to my mind and many others. Was our civil polity, or public justice, endangered or sapped? Was the real existence of the country threatened, or was this preceded by a mournful progression of events? This proposal of altering our federal government is of a most alarming nature! Make the best of this new government–say it is composed by any thing but inspiration–you ought to be extremely cautious, watchful, jealous of your liberty; for, instead of securing your rights, you may lose them forever. If a wrong step be now made, the republic may be lost forever. If this new government will not come up to the expectation of the people, and they shall be disappointed, their liberty will be lost, and tyranny must and will arise. I repeat it again, and I beg gentlemen to consider, that a wrong step, made now, will plunge us into misery, and our republic will be lost. It will be necessary for this Convention to have a faithful historical detail of the facts that preceded the session of the federal Convention, and the reasons that actuated its members in proposing an entire alteration of government, and to demonstrate the dangers that awaited us. If they were of such awful magnitude as to warrant a proposal so extremely perilous as this, I must assert, that this Convention has an absolute right to a thorough discovery of every circumstance relative to this great event. And here I would make this inquiry of those worthy characters who composed a part of the late federal Convention. I am sure they were fully impressed with the necessity of forming a great consolidated government, instead of a confederation. That this is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the danger of such a government is, to my mind, very striking. I have the highest veneration for those gentlemen; but, sir, give me leave to demand, What right had they to say, We, the people? My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, Who authorized them to speak the language of, We, the people, instead of, We, the states? States are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If the states be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great, consolidated, national government, of the people of all the states. I have the highest respect for those gentlemen who formed the Convention, and, were some of them not here, I would express some testimonial of esteem for them. America had, on a former occasion, put the utmost confidence in them–a confidence which was well placed; and I am sure, sir, I would give up any thing to them; I would cheerfully confide in them as my representatives. But, sir, on this great occasion, I would demand the cause of their conduct. Even from that illustrious man who saved us by his valor [George Washington], I would have a reason for his conduct: that liberty which he has given us by his valor, tells me to ask this reason; and sure I am, were he here, he would give us that reason. But there are other gentlemen here, who can give us this information. The people gave them no power to use their name. That they exceeded their power is perfectly clear. It is not mere curiosity that actuates me: I wish to hear the real, actual, existing danger, which should lead us to take those steps, so dangerous in my conception. Disorders have arisen in other parts of America; but here, sir, no dangers, no insurrection or tumult have happened; every thing has been calm and tranquil. But, notwithstanding this, we are wandering on the great ocean of human affairs. I see no landmark to guide us. We are running we know not whither. Difference of opinion has gone to a degree of inflammatory resentment in different parts of the country, which has been occasioned by this perilous innovation. The federal Convention ought to have amended the old system; for this purpose they were solely delegated; the object of their mission extended to no other consideration. You must, therefore, forgive the solicitation of one unworthy member to know what danger could have arisen under the present Confederation, and what are the causes of this proposal to change our government. Source: https://www.redhill.org/primary-sources/we-the-people-or-we-the-states/
- Supreme Reforms
Supreme Reforms By Mark Shubert The Supreme Court is an institution that very few talk about reforming other than the National Constitution Center which I encourage you guys to check out. The court was established when our constitution was ratified in 1788 but its enumerated structure and power didn’t include much to it and so Congress passed the Judiciary Acts during the Washington administration which determined the number of justices, what they did, and also establishes lower federal courts including the circuit and district courts. Apart from the number of justices, the Supreme Court has not changed since then which is interesting because you would expect the vague parts of the constitution to be the most interpretable and therefore the most reformed part. Despite this lack of considering different judicial systems in the general discord of politics, I propose reforms regarding the size and election of Supreme Court Justices. Concepts to consider when amending this position: The leg & exec branches’ elections are not contingent on the other branches Senate and Presidency politicize the Supreme Court Prevent lobbying by ensuring a life appointment in the circuit courts they originate from Age floor and ceiling Term limits Replacement process Increasing the size of the Court and the number of Circuit Courts Elections on the circuit court level for supreme court justices Judicial Review Process To start, we should increase the number of justices to 13 while only requiring nine justices to hear a case. If only 9 justices per case participate then this will increase the number of cases heard by 40% since the number of combinations of nine justices increases. Cases can be heard by courts of 9, 11, or 13 justices, the justices decide how many will hear a case based on availability and interest. If only 9 wish to hear a case then they can and the other 4 do not have to. Those four who do not hear the case cannot participate in the official decision of the court. If ten wish to hear a case they will either have to convince one of the disinterested three to hear the case or one will have to recuse themselves. We should increase the number of circuit courts to 13. Currently there are 11, not including DC, and here is the current and a proposed map of 13 circuit courts. Current Proposed Have each circuit court, either from the state legislatures or the people, elect supreme court justices instead of the president while the senate is not needed to approve or deny them. DC will still have its own circuit court but will not send someone to the Supreme Court. At the start of this change, justices will be elected by the state legislatures of all of the states in the respective circuit. The state legislatures of each circuit can change this electoral process with unanimity to a general election within the circuit court. Each state in the circuit can nominate justices and this process should be determined by the states in the circuit. For example, states can nominate the same number or by population so the more populous states nominate more justices. The campaigns of those nominated will be entirely funded by the state that nominates them and no donations from people or businesses are allowed to go to the candidate; the state legislature will run the campaign and each of the circuit court nominees will receive equal funds agreed upon by all the states in the circuit. Each circuit will send two people, a justice and a replacement (suffect justice), the suffect justice will not be able to act as judge until the justice resigns or expires and they will no longer be suffect once the term is over. The justices and their suffects sent must have passed the BAR and have served in any kind of court as a judge for at least one full year, and never had their law license or judge license suspended or removed. Tenure for each justice and their replacement is 13 years, once a circuit court elects a justice they cannot be recalled. Only an impeachment by the House of Representatives and trial held by the Senate can remove justices if convicted. Minimum age for Justices should be 40 and the oldest age for someone to start their term as justice is whatever the minimum age of federally recognized retirement is (currently 62). Term limit of just one term, after serving they will be allowed a seat on their respective circuit court for life on good behavior so they do not have to worry about finding work after their term on the supreme court ends. There will be a cycle where one circuit court will be up for electing a justice every year in order of the circuit courts. By removing the President and Senate from the process of adding new justices this will help depoliticize the position and also the two other branches will not be distracted from the process of choosing new justices which often takes an irresponsible amount of time and effort away from their other duties. It also gives states and the people more say in who is sent to the Supreme Court which is, in turn, more representative. Regarding Judicial Review I believe that when justices make a decision against a statute then that ruling should be sent to Congress for review in a Joint Committee to decide what to do next, either nothing, amend the statute to make it constitutional, or repeal it since they know that the court will just side with any defendant of the law. The Chief Suffect (Suffect of the Chief Justice) should be the one to send these decisions to Congress. The specific statutes in review don’t have to be the entire act but just a severed section or even just a clause which the court has deemed to be unconstitutional. My thought process about making judicial review more procedural is that both Executive and Judicial branches are supposed to be a check on the legislative, a check means to be a negative or to be a force that blocks legislative actions. The president is a proactive negative since they can veto a bill before it becomes law, while I view the Supreme Court to be a reactive negative since they have to wait for someone to sue the government about the statute in order to determine whether or not it is constitutional. Just as the presidential veto can be overturned by congress with ⅔ support from both houses, so too should judicial review against a statute be overturned with ¾ support from both houses, and the president should not get involved with the judicial review just as the court does not get involved with the presidential veto. There are also some aesthetic changes including the name that I propose. Rename the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court or the Federal Court or the National Court of Appeals or another suggestion that is agreed upon by Congress. Outside of the Supreme Court should be a statue of Justia or Lady Justice with the motto Pari Iustitia Sub Lege (Equal Justice Under Law) , current motto of the Supreme Court but in latin.
- Annotated Constitution
The Constitution of the United States of America currently consists of many parts that no longer apply either because they were repealed via amendment or expired. I annotated the Constitution to show what it would look like if those parts which no longer applies were removed and what it might look like if all of the amendments were placed in the main body of the text as opposed to being placed in a separate section. I used the Shubert Style in this annotation which is the same style that mock bills on the Forum are written. The Shubert Style consists of multiple versions of the same document which shows the original text and the contemporary status of the document. The contemporary status shows only the parts that are active today and it excludes the parts that have been repealed or expired. This cuts out any unnecessary text. The contemporary status also includes all amendments within the main body of the text as opposed to being in a separate section. For example, any amendments concerning the office of the president have been added to Article II since that article is what establishes the office of the president. The Bill of Rights has been added to its own section labeled Article VIII and it includes any part of the original or amended constitution which discusses individual rights. The original text section colorized shows the full original constitution but with certain sections colorized to show the reader what was done with clauses. The original text without color is exactly what the name suggests. Below is the link to the annotated Constitution, enjoy. https://docs.google.com/document/u/1/d/e/2PACX-1vSRXsY1t-v8gfsR0ojCNtbPiTDi_HS8eqpNO9xFwskAOd_N5VJgtUg5xIGeIJApnp8xBjYEoHOy7fLs/pub
- Lincoln's Response to Dred Scott
Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857 FELLOW CITIZENS: – I am here to-night, partly by the invitation of some of you, and partly by my own inclination. Two weeks ago Judge Douglas spoke here on the several subjects of Kansas, the Dred Scott decision, and Utah. I listened to the speech at the time, and have read the report of it since. It was intended to controvert opinions which I think just, and to assail (politically, not personally,) those men who, in common with me, entertain those opinions. For this reason I wished then, and still wished then, and still wish, to make some answer to it, which I now take the opportunity of doing. I begin with Utah. If it prove to be true, as is probable, that the people of Utah are in open rebellion in the United States, then Judge Douglas is in favor of repealing their territorial organization, and attaching them to the adjoining States for judicial purposes. I say, too, if they are in rebellion, they ought to be somehow coerced to obedience; and I am not now prepared to admit or deny that the Judge’s mode of coercing them is not as good as any. The Republicans can fall in with it without taking back anything they have ever said. To be sure, it would be a considerable backing down by Judge Douglas from his much vaunted doctrine of self-government for the territories; but this is only additional proof of what was very plain from the beginning, that that doctrine was a mere deceitful pretense for the benefit of slavery. Those who could not see that much in the Nebraska act itself, which forced Governors, and Secretaries, and Judges on the people of the territories, without their choice or consent, could not be made to see, though one should rise from the dead to testify. But in all this, it is very plain the Judge evades the only question the Republicans have ever pressed upon the Democracy in regard to Utah. That question the Judge well knows to be this: ‘If the people of Utah shall peacefully form a State Constitution tolerating polygamy, will the Democracy admit them into the Union?’ There is nothing in the United States Constitution or law against polygamy; and why is it not a part of the Judge’s ‘sacred right of self-government’ for that people to have it, or rather to keep it, if they choose? These questions, so far as I know, the Judge never answers. It might involve the Democracy to answer them either way, and they go unanswered. As to Kansas. The substances of the Judge’s speech on Kansas is an effort to put the free State men in the wrong for not voting at the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. He says: ‘There is every reason to hope and believe that the law will be fairly interpreted and impartially executed, so as to insure to every bona fide inhabitant the free and quiet exercise of the elective franchise.’ It appears extraordinary that Judge Douglas should make such a statement. He knew that, by the law, no one can vote who has not been registered; and he knows that the free State men place their refusal to vote on the ground that but few of them have been registered. It ispossible this is not true, but Judge Douglas knows it is asserted to be true, but Judge Douglas knows it is asserted to be true in letters, newspapers and public speeches, and borne by every mail, and blown by every breeze to the eyes and ears of the world. He knows it is boldly declared that the people of many whole counties, and many whole neighborhoods in others, are left unregistered; yet, he does not venture to contradict the declaration, nor to point out how they can vote without being registered; but he just slips along, not seeming to know there is any such question of fact, and complacently declares: ‘There is every reason to hope and believe that the law will be fairly and impartially executed, so as to insure to every bona fide inhabitant the free and quiet exercise of the elective franchise.’ I readily agree that if all had a chance to vote, they ought to have voted. If, on the contrary, as they allege, and Judge Douglas ventures not to particularly contradict, few only of the free State men had a chance to vote, they were perfectly right in staying from the polls in a body. By the way since the Judge spoke, the Kansas election has come off. The Judge expressed his confidence that all the Democrats in Kansas would do their duty – including ‘free state Democrats’ of course. The returns received here as yet are very incomplete; but so far as they go, they indicate that only about one sixth of the registered voters, have really voted; and this too, when not more, perhaps, than on half of the rightful voters have been registered, thus showing the thing to have been altogether the most exquisite farce ever enacted. I am watching with considerable interest, to ascertain what figure ‘the free state Democrats’ cut in the concern. Of course they voted – all democrats do their duty – and of course they did not vote for slave-state candidates. We soon shall know how many delegates they elected, how many candidates they had, pledged for a free state; and how many votes were cast for them. Allow me to barely whisper my suspicion that there were no such things in Kansas ‘as free state Democrats’ – that they were altogether mythical, good only to figure in newspapers and speeches in the free states. If there should prove to be one real living free state Democrat in Kansas, I suggest that it might be well to catch him, and stuff and preserve his skin, as an interesting specimen of that soon to be extinct variety of the genus, Democrat. An now as to the Dred Scott decision. That decision declares two propositions – first, that a negro cannot sue in the U.S. Courts; and secondly, that Congress cannot prohibit slavery in the Territories. It was made by a divided court – dividing differently on the different points. Judge Douglas does not discuss the merits of the decision; and, in that respect, I shall follow his example, believing I could no more improve on McLean and Curtis, than he could on Taney. He denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent resistance to it. But who resists it? Who has, in spite of the decision, declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over him? Judicial decisions have two uses – first, to absolutely determine the case decided, and secondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be decided when they arise. For the latter use, they are called ‘precedents’ and ‘authorities.’ We believe, as much as Judge Douglas, (perhaps more) in obedience to, and respect for the judicial department of government. We think its decisions on Constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendment of the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself. More than this would be revolution. But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it, has often over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it to over-rule this. We offer no resistance to it. Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with common sense, and customary understanding of the legal profession. If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had been in no part, based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent. But when, as it is true we find it wanting in all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country – But Judge Douglas considers this view awful. Hear him: ‘The courts are the tribunals prescribed by the Constitution and created by the authority of the people to determine, expound and enforce the law. Hence, whoever resists the final decision of the highest judicial tribunal, aims a deadly blow to our whole Republican system of government – a blow to our who Republican system of government – a blow, which if successful would place all our rights and liberties at the mercy of passion, anarchy and violence. I repeat, therefore, that if resistance to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a matter like the points decided in the Dred Scott case, clearly within their jurisdiction as defined by the Constitution, shall be forced upon the country as a political issues, it will become a distinct and naked issue between the friends and the enemies of the Constitution – the friends and the enemies of the supremacy of the laws.’ Why this same Supreme court once decided a national bank to be constitutional; but Gen. Jackson, as President of the United States, disregarded the decision, and vetoed a bill for a re-charter, partly on constitutional ground, declaring that each public functionary must support the Constitution, ‘as he understand it.’ But hear the General’s own words. Here they are, taken from his veto message: ‘It is maintained by the advocates of the bank, that its constitutionality, in all its features, ought to be considered as settled by precedent, and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To the conclusion I cannot assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding question of constitutional power, except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled. So far from this being the case on this subject, an argument against the bank might be based on precedent. One Congress in 1791, decided in favor of a bank; another in 1811, decided against it. One Congress in 1815 decided against a bank; another in 1816 decided in its favor. Prior to the present Congress, therefore the precedents drawn from that source were equal. If we resort to the States, the expressions of legislative, judicial and executive opinions against the bank have been probably to those in its favor as four to one. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the act before me.’ I drop the quotations merely to remark that all there ever was, in the way of precedent up to the Dred Scott decision on the points therein decided, had been against that decision. But hear Gen. Jackson further– ‘If the opinion of the Supreme court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the co-ordinate authorities of this Government. The Congress, the executive and the court, must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer, who takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.’ Again and again have I heard Judge Douglas denounce that bank decision, and applaud Gen. Jackson for disregarding it. It would be interesting for him to look over his recent speech, and see how exactly his fierce philippics against us for resisting Supreme Court decisions, fall upon his own head. It will call to his mind a long and fierce political war in this country, upon an issue which, in his own language, and, of course, in his own changeless estimation, was ‘a distinct and naked issue between the friends and the enemies of the Constitution,’ and in which war he fought in the ranks of the enemies of the Constitution. I have said, in substance, that the Dred Scott decision was, in part; based on assumed historical facts which were not really true; and I ought not to leave the subject without giving some reasons for saying this; I therefore give an instance or two, which I think fully sustain me. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the majority of the Court, insists at great length that negroes were not part of the people who made, or for whom was made, the Declaration of Independence, or the Constitution of the United States. On the contrary, Judge Curtis, in his dissenting opinion, shows that in five of the then thirteen states, to wit, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina, free negroes were voters, and, in proportion to their numbers, had the same part in making the Constitution that the white people had. He shows this with so much particularity as to leave no doubt of its truth; and, as a sort of conclusion on that point, holds the following language: ‘The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States, through the action, in each State, of those persons who were qualified by its laws to act thereon in behalf of themselves and all other citizens of the State. In some of the States, as we have seen, colored persons were among those qualified by law to act on the subject. These colored persons were not only included in the body of ‘the people of the United States,’ by whom the Constitution was ordained and established; but in at least five of the States they had the power to act, and doubtless, did act, by their suffrages, upon the question of its adoption.’ Again, Chief Justice Taney says: ‘It is difficult, at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted.’ And again, after quoting from the Declaration, he says: ‘The general words above quoted would seem to include the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day, would be so understood.’ In these the Chief Justice does not directly assert, but plainly assumes, as a fact, that the public estimate of the black man is more favorable now than it was in the days of the Revolution. This assumption is a mistake. In some trifling particulars, the condition of that race has been ameliorated; but, as a whole, in this country, the change between then and now is decidedly the other way; and their ultimate destiny has never appeared so hopeless as in the last three or four years. In two of the five States – New Jersey and North Carolina – that then gave the free negro the right of voting, the right has since been taken away; and in a third – New York – it has been greatly abridged; while it has not been extended, so far as I know, to a single additional State, thought the number of the States has more than doubled. In those days, Legislatures held the unquestioned power to abolish slavery in their respective States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for State Constitutions to withhold that power from the Legislatures. In those days, by common consent, the spread of the black man’s bondage to new countries was prohibited; but now, Congress, decides that it will not continue the prohibition, and the Supreme Court decides that it could not if it would. In those days, our Declaration of the Independence was held sacred by all, and thought to include all; but now, to aid in making the bondage of the negro universal and eternal, it is assailed, and sneered at, and construed, and hawked at, and torn, till, if its framers could rise from their graves, they could not at all recognize it. All the powers of earth seem rapidly combining against him. Mammon is after him; ambition follows; and philosophy follows, and the Theology of the day is fast joining the cry. They have him in his prison house; they have searched his person, and left no prying instrument with him. One after another they have closed the heavy iron doors upon him, and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key; the keys in the hands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a hundred different and distinct places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and matter, can be produced to make the impossibility of his escape more complete than it is. It is grossly incorrect to say or assume, that the public estimate of the negro is more favorable now that it was at the origin of the government. Three years and a half ago, Judge Douglas brought forward his famous Nebraska bill. The country was at once in a blaze. He scorned all opposition, and carried it through Congress. Since then he has seen himself superseded in a Presidential nomination, by one indorsing the funeral doctrine of his measure, but at the same time standing clear of the odium of its untimely agitation, and its gross breach of national faith; and he has seen that successful rival Constitutionally elected, not by the strength of friends, but by the division of adversaries, being in a popular minority of nearly four hundred thousand votes. He has seen his chief aids in his own State, Shields and Richardson, politically speaking, successively tried, convicted, and executed, for an offense not their own, but his. And now he sees his own case, standing next on the docket for trial. There is a natural disgust in the minds of nearly all white people, to the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black races; and Judge Douglas evidently is basing his chief hope, upon the chances of being able to appropriate the benefit of this disgust to himself. If he can, by much drumming and repeating, fasten the odium of that idea upon his adversaries, he thinks he can struggle through the storm. He therefore clings to this hope, as a drowning man to the last plank. He makes an occasion for lugging it in from the opposition to the Dred Scott decision. He finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of Independence includes ALL MEN, black as well as white; and forthwith he boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to argue gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because they want to vote, and eat, and sleep, and marry with negroes. He will have it that they cannot be consistent else. Now I protest against that counterfeit logic which concludes that, because I do not want a black woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either, I can just leave her alone. In some respects she certainly is not my equal; but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own hands without asking leave of any one else, she is my equal, and the equal of all others. Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, admits that the language of the Declaration is broad enough to include the whole human family, but he and Judge Douglas argue that the authors of that instrument did not intend to include negroes, by the fact that they did not at once, actually place them on an equality with the whites. Now this grave argument comes to just nothing at all, by the other fact, that they did not at once, or ever afterwards, actually place all white people on an equality with one or another. And this is the staple argument of both the Chief Justice and the Senator, for doing this obvious violence to the plain unmistakable language of the Declaration. I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did consider all men crated equal – equal in ‘certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ This they said, and this meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere. The assertion that ‘all men are created equal’ was of no practical use in effecting our separation from Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that, but for future use. Its authors meant it to be, thank God, it is now proving itself, a stumbling block to those who in after times might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism. They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and they meant when such should re-appear in this fair land and commence their vocation they should find left for them at least one hard nut to crack. I have now briefly expressed my view of the meaning and objects of that part of the Declaration of Independence which declares that ‘all men are created equal.’ Now let us hear Judge Douglas’ view of the same subject, as I find it in the printed report of his late speech. Here it is: ‘No man can vindicate the character, motives and conduct of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, except upon the hypothesis that they referred to the white race alone, and not to the African, when they declared all men to have been created equal – that they were speaking of British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in Great Britain – that they were entitled to the same inalienable rights, and among them were enumerated life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The Declaration was adopted for the purpose of justifying the colonists in the eyes of the civilized world in withdrawing their allegiance from the British crown, and dissolving their connection with the mother country.’ My good friends, read that carefully over some leisure hour, and ponder well upon it – see what a mere wreck – mangled ruin – it makes of our once glorious Declaration. ‘They were speaking of British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in Great Britain!’ Why according to this, not only negroes but white people outside of Great Britain and America are not spoken of in that instrument. The English, Irish and Scotch, along with white Americans, were included to be sure, but the French, Germans and other white people of the world are all gone to pot along with the Judge’s inferior races. I had thought the Declaration promised something better than the condition of British subjects; but no, it only meant that we should be equal to them in their own oppressed and unequal condition. According to that, it gave no promise that having kicked off the King and Lords of Great Britain, we should not at once be saddled with a King and lords of our own. I had thought the Declaration contemplated the progressive improvement in the condition of all men everywhere; but no, it merely ‘was adopted for the purpose of justifying the colonists in the eyes of the civilized world in withdrawing their allegiance from the British crown, and dissolving their connection with the mother country.’ Why, that object having been effected some eighty years ago, the Declaration is of no practical use now – mere rubbish – old wadding left to rot on the battle-field after the victory is won. I understand you are preparing to celebrate the ‘Fourth,’ tomorrow week. What for? The doings of that day had no reference to the present; and quite half of you are not even descendants of those who were referred to at that day. But I suppose you will celebrate; and will even go so far as to read the Declaration. Suppose after you read it once in the old fashioned way, you read it once more with Judge Douglas’ version. It will then run thus: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident that all British subjects who were on this continent eighty-one years ago, were created equal to all British subjects born and then residing in Great Britain.’ And now I appeal to all – to Democrats as well as others, – are you really willing that the Declaration shall be thus frittered away?– thus left no more at most, than an interesting memorial of the dead past? thus shorn of vitality, and practical value; and left without the germ or even the suggestion of the individual rights of man in it? But Judge Douglas is especially horrified at the thought of the mixing blood by the white and black races: agreed for once – a thousand times agreed. There are white men enough to marry all the white women, and black men enough to marry all the black women; and so let them be married. On this point we fully agreed with the Judge; and when he shall show that his policy is better adapted to prevent amalgamation than ours we shall drop ours, and adopt his. Let us see. In 1840 there were in the Untied States, 405,751, mulattoes. Very few of these are the offspring of white and free blacks; nearly all have sprung from black slaves and white masters. A separation of the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation but as an immediate separation is impossible the next best thing is to keep them apart where they are not already together. If white and black people never get together in Kansas, they will never mix blood in Kansas. That is at least one self-evident truth. A few free colored persons may get into the free States, in any event, but their number is too insignificant to amount to much in the way of mixing blood. In 1850 there were in the free states, 56,649 mulattoes; but for the most part they were not born there – they came from the slave States, ready made up. In the same year the slave States had 348,874 mulattoes all of home production. The proportion of free mulattoes to free blacks – the only colored classes in the free states — is much greater in the slave than the free states. It is worthy of note too, that among the free states those which make the colored man the nearest to equal the white, have, proportionably the fewest mulattoes the least of amalgamation. In New Hampshire, the State which goes farthest towards equality between the races, there are just 184 Mulattoes while there are in Virginia– how many do you think? 79,775, being 23,126 more than in all the free States together. These statistics show that slavery is the great source of amalgamation; and next to it, not the elevation, but the degeneration of the free blacks. Yet Judge Douglas dreads the slightest restraints on the spread of slavery, and the slightest human recognition of the negro, as tending horribly to amalgamation. This very Dred Scott case afford a strong test as to which party most favors amalgamation, the Republicans or the dear Union-saving Democracy. Dred Scott, his wife and two daughters were all involved in the suit. We desired the court to have held that they were citizens so far at least as to entitle them to a hearing as to whether they were free or not; and then, also, that they were in fact and in law really free. Could we have had our way, the chances of these black girls, ever mixing their blood with that of white people, would have been diminished at least to the extent that it could not have been without their consent. But Judge Douglas is delighted to have them decided to be slaves, and not human enough to have a hearing, even if they were free, and thus left subject to the forced concubinage of their masters, and liable to become the mothers of mulattoes in spite of themselves– the very state of case that produces the nine tenths of all the mulattoes – all the mixing of blood in the nation. Of course, I state this case as an illustration only, not meaning to say or intimate that the master of Dred Scott t and his family, or any more than a per centage of masters generally, are inclined to exercise this particular power which they hold over their female slaves. I have said that the separation of the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation. I have no right to say all the members of the Republican party are in favor of this, nor to say that as a party they are in favor of it. There is nothing in their platform directly on the subject. But I can say a very large proportion of its members are for it, and that the chief plank in their platform – opposition to the spread of slavery – is most favorable to that separation. Such separation, is ever effected at all, must be effected by colonization; and no political party, as such, is now doing anything directly for colonization. Party operations at present only favor or retard colonization incidentally. The enterprise is a difficult one; but ‘when there is a will there is a way;’ and what colonization needs most is a hearty will. Will springs from the two elements of moral sense and self-interest. Let us be brought to believe it is morally right, and, at the same time, favorable to, or, at least, not against, our interest, to transfer the African to his native clime, and we shall find a way to do it, however great the task may be. The children of Israel, to such numbers as to include four hundred thousand fighting men, went out of Egyptian bondage in a body. How differently the respective courses of the Democratic and Republican parties incidentally bear on the question of forming a will – a public sentiment – for colonization, is easy to see. The Republicans inculcate, with whatever of ability they can, that the negro is a man; that his bondage is cruelly wrong, and that the field of his oppression ought not to be enlarged. The Democrats deny his manhood; deny, or dwarf to insignificance, the wrong of his bondage; so far as possible, crush all sympathy for him, and cultivate and excite hatred and disgust against him; compliment themselves as Union-savers for doing so; and call the indefinite outspreading of his bondage ‘a sacred right of self-government.’ The plainest print cannot be read through a gold eagle; and it will be ever hard to find many men who will send a slave to Liberia, and pay his passage while they can send him to a new country, Kansas for instance, and sell him for fifteen hundred dollars, and the rise. Source: http://www.mrlincolnandfreedom.org/pre-civil-war/dred-scott/speech-at-springfield-june-26-1857/
- Khaldun’s Curve, Non Negotium, and the 76 Exemption
Taxes Khaldun’s Curve, Non Negotium, and the 76 Exemption By Mark Shubert This essay tackles the question of taxation and suggests a dynamic tax code based on total tax revenue. First is the issue of how to view taxation in general. This paper only covers taxation or government revenue and not the issue of expenditures which is usually brought up in this discussion; expenditures only complicates an already complicated topic and since people disagree more about expenditures that tends to get in the way of people agreeing on a sound tax policy. To further simplify this topic the main prescriptions made will be in regards to the Federal Income Tax, but the same reasoning can apply to all types of taxes. There is an opinion on the left that views higher taxes as a necessity and even a noble goal. They want to raise taxes for the sake of raising taxes under the presumption that it will disproportionately affect the bourgeoisie or capitalist class which will then be spent on the general welfare. There is an opinion on the right that views lowering taxes as a necessity and even a noble goal. They want to lower taxes for the sake of lowering taxes under the presumption that it will raise the water for all boats, so to speak, which will then increase the general welfare. These two opinions view raising or lowering taxes as the focal point or end goal which could then be used to reach the intended end of increasing the general welfare. This leads to the first exhortation of the essay. That raising or lowering the tax rate should not be the main perspective on this issue but instead the maximization of total tax revenue or TTR should be the main consideration. Increasing the tax rate may increase or decrease TTR and decreasing the tax rate may increase or decrease TTR. The point is that simply increasing or decreasing the tax rate may or may not have its intended outcome. This concept is best illustrated by the Khaldun Curve also known as Laffer's Curve. There is a certain tax rate that maximizes TTR and that should be the goal of tax policy, not the aforementioned opinions. This goal should exist especially when there is a deficit but even in general since it can maximize the amount of money the state can invest in infrastructure that businesses on their own can't afford even if their corporate taxes were lower. The issue is that we do not know for certain which tax rate maximizes TTR and there are many variables that obfuscate its discovery. It is reasonable to address those variables in short. The main variables that get in the way are the policies that make taxes inegalitarian. These include tax deductions, exemptions and subsidies. If a wide range of successful companies or individuals don't have to pay taxes, or can get away with decreasing the tax rate they are bound to pay, then that will affect which rates increase or decrease TTR. The second exhortation is to abolish these variables as much as possible in order to have a more egalitarian tax program and to better observe the effectiveness of certain tax policies with less variables getting in the way. Besides, the existence of tax exemptions is just the freeloader problem and it puts the tax burden on other people. A quick analogy. Say there are ten people who make the same income of $100 each and there is a government budget of $100 and the government is fiscally responsible so no deficit spending. In a fair and egalitarian society each person would be taxed $10 or 10% of their income. If one of the people gets an exemption simply because they are religious or a non-profit, then they are not taxed $10. The budget is still the same $100 but now there are only nine people taxed and they are taxed $11.11 or 11.11% of their income. This has now created an inequality, since that one person who no longer pays taxes has more money than everyone else after taxes are collected. This person now has the incentive to lobby the government to increase the budget and in turn increase taxes on everyone else since they benefit from more government spending and don’t have to contribute; this person also now has more money that they can use to have a higher standard of living or to invest that extra money to make even more money than what is possible for everyone else. This idea that no establishment or industry or individual should receive benefits such as exemptions and deductions to taxes is a piece to what I call Non Negotium or the separation between business and state. This will not only create a fair tax code which will spread out the tax burden but it will also decrease spending and therefore the need for taxes for everyone, but let's not get bogged down talking about expenditures! There is just one exemption to this rule and that is the 76 exemption. This is the idea that income of $76,000 or less should not be taxed. This $76,000 is the buying power at October 1, 2019 (the start of the fiscal year of 2020), and inflation since then should be taken into consideration, so the $76,000 is the real value at that time not a fixed amount. The more inflation there is with no increase in wages means that less people have to pay taxes, which would encourage the government to have low inflation in order to tax more. The tax brackets would start at $76,000.01. The idea behind this is to help Americans get off their feet and could decrease spending by decreasing the necessity of government programs if the average American has more money at the end of the year. The cost of paying taxes, for the average American, both mentally and fiscally, outweighs the benefits of government programs designed to alleviate the lack of money people have. Why tax the average American when the government spends that taxed income on fulfilling the needs of the very same Americans who cannot fulfill their own needs because they don't have money because they are taxed? If someone made $76,000 in 2021 then they paid $12,468.50 ($76,000 is in the third tax bracket so a 22% tax on income above $40,525 up to $76,000, which means that 35,475 is taxed at 22% which equals $7,804.5 plus $4,664 from the first two brackets equals a total income tax of $12,468.50) in income tax alone which is a huge chunk of money, nearly 16.5% of their income. Besides, the money that won't be taxed directly from the average American will be taxed indirectly because they will spend that money which will trickle up to businesses and wealthier people who are taxed. An idea like trickle down economics but instead reversed so its trickle up economics. Clearing up these variables leads to the third exhortation where we experiment to find the point of maximizing TTR. We need to have brackets that are more numerous and clear on what they represent. In 2021, for single filers there were seven brackets each representing a fixed amount and each having a tax rate from 10% to 37%. Whatever the number of brackets we choose and whatever they represent, we need to do the following to find the point of maximizing TTR. In the first year of this tax policy, all brackets could be set to the same tax rate, I know this would make the flat tax supporters really happy. For simplicity let’s have the first year tax rate be 10%. This will be our control year. Then for the next year we increase the tax rate by 10% of the tax rate. That means that the second year tax rate will be 11% since 10% of 10% is 1% and that is how much we will be increasing. Then we compare both years and see which brackets increased and which decreased TTR. The brackets where increasing the tax rate ended up increasing TTR are the brackets where we continue increasing the tax rate by 10% so those brackets would be taxed 12.1% (11% plus 1.1% or 10% of 11%) for the third year. The brackets where increasing the tax rate ended up decreasing TTR are the brackets where we decrease the tax rate to the same as the previous year for the third year and for the fourth year we decrease them further by 10% until the TTR starts to decrease. In short, for each bracket we increase the tax rate until TTR starts to decrease. When TTR starts to decrease that is when we start to decrease the tax rate for TTR to increase until the TTR starts to decrease again and repeat. This dynamic tax system will eventually get as close to the point of maximizing TTR as possible. In summation: tax policy should be based on maximizing total tax revenue (Khaldun’s/Laffer's Curve), instead of a righteous belief in increasing or decreasing taxes for the sake of increasing or decreasing taxes; everyone should pay taxes and no individual or establishment should be given deductions, exemptions, or subsidies, in order to spread the tax burden and know the true effects a tax rate has on a given bracket of income; the average American should not have to pay federal income tax so income at $76,000 or below should not be taxed. The issue of maximizing total tax revenue is necessary when the state has a deficit and or a debt. The brackets should be more numerous and clear on what they are taxing and the rates should fluctuate steadily until they get close to the point of maximizing total tax revenue. For you economists out there, this Tax Curve that I am proposing is not the same as Khaldun'/Laffer's Curve in two main ways. Firstly, Laffer proposed a single tax rate for everyone while I am proposing we increase the number of income brackets where each one will have its own tax rate. This is because different brackets will be affected by different rates so it is naïve to assume that a single tax rate will maximize TTR for each bracket. Secondly, Laffer proposed a static tax rate, he believed that there was just one rate that maximizes TTR. I do not believe that the point that maximizes TTR is static since income and spending changes year over year. I hope I gave a convincing argument and decent reasons as to why our tax policy should be determined by dynamic tax calculation - I haven't thought of a name for it - let me know what you all think!
- The Tea Act
May 10, 1773, British Parliament An act to allow a drawback of the duties of customs on the exportation of tea to any of his Majesty's colonies or plantations in America; to increase the deposit on bohea tea to be sold at the India Company's sales; and to impower the commissioners of the treasury to grant licences to the East India Company to export tea duty-free. WHEREAS by an act, made in the twelfth year of his present Majesty's reign, (intituled, An act for granting a drawback of part of the customs upon the exportation of tea to Ireland, and the British dominions in America; for altering the drawback upon foreign sugars exported from Great Britain to Ireland; for continuing the bounty on the exportation of British-made cordage; for allowing the importation of rice from the British plantations into the ports of Bristol, Liverpoole, Lancaster, and Whitehaven, for immediate exportation to foreign parts; and to impower the chief magistrate of any corporation to administer the oath, and grant the certificate required by law, upon the removal of certain goods to London, which have been sent into the country for sale;) it is amongst other things, enacted, That for and during the space of five years, to be computed from and after the fifth day of July, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-two, there shall be drawn back and allowed for all teas which shall be sold after the said fifth day of July, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-two, at the publick sale of the united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies, or which after that time shall be imported, by licence, in pursuance of the said therein and hereinafter mentioned act, made in the eighteenth year of the reign of his late majesty King George the Second, and which shall be exported from this kingdom, as merchandise, to Ireland, or any of the British colonies or plantations in America, three-fifth parts of the several duties of customs which were paid upon the importation of such teas; which drawback or allowance, with respect to such teas as shall be exported to Ireland, shall be made to the exporter, in such manner, and under such rules, regulations, securities, penalties, and forfeitures, as any drawback or allowance was then payable, out of the duty of customs upon the exportation of foreign goods to Ireland; and with respect to such teas as shall be exported to the British colonies and plantations in America, the said dreawback or allowance shall be made in such manner, and under such rules, regulations, penalties, and forfeitures, as any drawback or allowance payable out of the duty of customs upon foreign goods exported to foreign parts, was could, or might be made, before the passing of the said act of the twelfth year of his present Majesty's reign, (except in such cases as are otherwise therein provided for:) and whereas it may tend to the benefit and advantage of the trade of the said united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies, if the allowance of the drawback of the duties of customs upon all teas sold at the publick sales of the said united company, after the tenth day of May, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-three, and which shall be exported from this kingdom, as merchandise, to any of the British colonies or plantations in America, were to extend to the whole of the said duties of customs payable upon the importation of such teas; may it therefore please your Majesty that it may be enacted; and be it enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That there shall be drawn back and allowed for all teas, which, from and after the tenth day of May, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-three, shall be sold at the publick sales of the said united company, or which shall be imported by licence, in pursuance of the said act made in the eighteenth year of the reign of his late majesty King George the Second, and which shall, at any time hereafter, be exported from this kingdom, as merchandise, to any of the British colonies or plantations in America, the whole of the duties of customs payable upon the importation of such teas; which drawback or allowance shall be made to the exporter in such manner, and under such rules, regulations, and securities, and subject to the like penalties and forfeitures, as the former drawback or allowance granted by the said recited act of the twelfth year of his present Majesty's reign, upon tea exported to the said British colonies and plantations in America was, might, or could be made, and was subject to by the said recited act, or any other act of parliament now in force, in as full and ample manner, to all intents and purposes, as if the several clauses relative thereto were again repeated and re-enacted in this present act. And whereas by one other act made in the eighteenth year of the reign of his late majesty King George the Second, (intituled, An act for repealing the present inland duty of four shillings per pound weight upon all tea sold in Great Britain; and for granting to his Majesty certain other inland duties in lieu thereof; and for better securing the duty upon tea, and other duties of excise; and for pursuing offenders out of one county into another,) it is, amongst other things, enacted, That every person who shall, at any publick sale of tea made by the united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies, be declared to be the best bidder for any lot or lots of tea, shall, within three days after being so declared the best bidder or bidders for the same, deposit with the said united company, or such clerk or officer as the said company shall appoint to receive the same, forty shillings for every tub and for every chest of tea; and in case any such person or persons shall refuse or neglect to make such deposit within the time before limited, he, she, or they, shall forfeit and lose six times the value of such deposit directed to be made as aforesaid, to be recovered by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information, in any of his Majesty's courts of record at Westminster, in which no essoin, protection, or wager of law, or more than one imparlance, shall be allowed; one moiety of which forfeiture shall go to his Majesty, his heirs and successors, and the other moiety to such person as shall sue or prosecute for the same; and the sale of all teas, for which such deposit shall be neglected to be made as aforesaid, is thereby declared to be null and void, and such teas shall be again put up by the said united company to publick sale, within fourteen days after the end of the sale of teas at which such teas were sold; and all and every buyer or buyers, who shall have neglected to make such deposit as aforesaid, shall be, and is and are thereby rendered incapable of bidding for or buying any teas at any future publick sale of the said united company: and whereas it is found to be expedient and necessary to increase the deposit to be made by any bidder or bidders for any lot or lots of bohea teas, at the publick sales of teas to be made by the said united company; be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That every person who shall, after the tenth day of May, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-three, at any publick sale of tea to be made by the said united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies, be declared to be the best bidder or bidders for any lot or lots of bohea tea, shall, within three days after being so declared the best bidder or bidders for the same, deposit with the said united company, or such clerk or officer as the said united company shall appoint to receive the same, four pounds of lawful money of Great Britain for every tub and for every chest of bohea tea, under the same terms and conditions, and subject to the same forfeitures, penalties, and regulations, as are mentioned and contained in the said recited act of the eighteenth year of the reign of his said late Majesty. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That it shall and may be lawful for the commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, or any three or more of them, or for the high treasurer for the time being, upon application made to them by the said united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies for that purpose, to grant a licence or licences to the said united company, to take out of their warehouses, without the same having been put up to sale, and to export to any of the British plantations in America, or to any parts beyond the seas, such quantity or quantities of tea as the said commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, or any three or more of them, or the high treasurer for the time being, shall think proper and expedient, without incurring any penalty or forfeiture for so doing; any thing in the said in part recited act, or any other law, to the contrary notwithstanding. And whereas by an act made in the ninth and tenth years of the reign of King William the Third, (intituled, An act for raising a sum not exceeding two millions, upon a fund, for payment of annuities, after the rate of eight pounds per centum per annum; and for settling the trade to the East Indies,) and by several other acts of parliament which are now in force, the said united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies are obliged to give security, under their common seal, for payment of the duties of customs upon all unrated goods imported by them, so soon as the same shall be sold; and for exposing such goods to sale, openly and fairly, by way of auction, or by inch of candle, within the space of three years from the importation thereof: and whereas it is expedient that some provision should be made to permit the said company, in certain cases, to export tea, on their own account, to the British plantations in America, or to foreign parts, without exposing such tea, to sale here, or being charged with the payment of any duty for the same; be it therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after the passing of this act, it shall and may be lawful for the commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, or any three or more of them, or the high treasurer for the time being, to grant a licence or quantity of licences to the said united company, to take out of their warehouses such quantity or quantities of tea as the said commissioners of the treasury, or any three or more of them, or the high treasurer for the time being, shall think proper, without the same having been exposed to sale in this kingdom; and to export such tea to any of the British colonies or plantations in America, or to foreign parts, discharged from the payment of any customs or duties whatsoever; any thing in the said recited act, or any other act to the contrary notwithstanding. Provided always, and it is hereby further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That a due entry shall be made at the custom-house, of all such tea so exported by licence, as aforesaid, expressing the quantities thereof, at what time imported, and by what ship; and such tea shall be shipped for exportation by the proper officer for that purpose, and shall, in all other respects, not altered by this act, be liable to the same rules, regulations, restrictions, securities, penalties, and forfeitures, as tea penalties, &c. exported to the like places was liable to before the passing this act: and upon the proper officer's duty, certifying the shipping of such tea to the collector and comptroller of his Majesty's customs for the port of London, upon the back of the licence, and the exportation thereof, verified by the oath of the husband or agent for the said united company, to be wrote at the bottom of such certificate, and sworn before the said collector and comptroller of the customs, (which oath they are hereby impowered to administer,) it shall and may be lawful for such collector and comptroller to write off and discharge the quantity of tea so exported from the warrant of the respective ship in which such tea was imported. Provided nevertheless, That no such licence shall be granted, unless it shall first be made to appear to the satisfaction of the commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, or any three or more of them, or the high treasurer for the time being, that at the time of taking out such teas, for the exportation of which licence or licences shall be granted, there will be left remaining in the warehouses of the said united company, a quantity of tea not less than ten millions of pounds weight; any thing herein, or in any other act of parliament, contained to the contrary thereof notwithstanding. Source: https://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/teaact.html
- Early State Constitutions and how they Influenced the National Constitutional Convention of 1787
Martkos Terentilius Tarpeia Preamble For some reason many historians and American political theorists leave out the state constitutions that existed prior to the Philadelphia Convention when researching the federal Constitution. This is an academic error given that many of the delegates to the National Constitutional Convention participated in their respective State Constitutional Conventions. The essential experience and all of the political concepts of statecraft which the national delegates implemented into the federal Constitution can be seen in those state conventions. Their abilities to disquisition, to discuss, and to deliberate, developed from their prior experiences were instituted into the Constitution which means leaving out those state constitutions in your study will leave a serious gap in your knowledge on the subject. There were eleven state constitutions active among the several states that influenced the National Constitutional Convention of 1787. Each constitution is summarized and organized into three parts: The first part covers the constitution’s preamble, if there is one; the second part describes the state governmental structure; the third part describes the relationship between the government and the people mainly through a Bill of Rights, if there is one. The preamble sections are a piece of the overall picture to understand the intent of each document. The structure-of-the-government sections describe the offices, separation of powers, checks and balances, authorities, and terms within the state governments. The relationship-between-the-Government-and-people sections describe the rights of individuals, whether or not slavery was legal and how it was regulated, and who had suffrage explicitly protected. The primary sources are the official constitutions created and ratified by each of the states respectively. Eleven of the thirteen states wrote their constitution after King George III declared war on the rebellious colonies in August of 1775. The first State to write its constitution was the State of New Hampshire on January 5, 1776, and the last State to ratify its own constitution by 1787 was Massachusetts in 1780. Two of the thirteen states were still using their royal charters as their constitutions. Connecticut was using its 1662 Royal Charter and did not write its constitution until 1818. Rhode Island was using its 1663 Royal Charter and did not write its constitution until 1843. This paper leaves out the two states that had Royal Charters since this paper compares the constitutions that the states made and how the delegates of those conventions were impacted by that experience when writing the U.S. Constitution in 1787; any state constitution before 1776 and after 1787 is not included. By 1787, two of the states were already on their second (post 1775) constitutions. South Carolina in 1778 and New Hampshire in 1784. These second constitutions are in this paper and not the first ones since these constitutions influenced the Philadelphia Convention more so than their predecessors. For example, New Hampshire's first constitution proclaimed continued loyalty to the British monarch that will "never" break in its preamble. That "never" lasted six months as the State joined the others in declaring independence. Because of this, the first constitution of New Hampshire will not be looked at in this paper since the people held back their authentic design of a self-governing State in order to placate a monarch, while their second constitution is more faithful to the State's idea of a proper government. The exact state constitutions included are Virginia's, New Jersey's, Delaware's, Pennsylvania's, Maryland's, North Carolina's all of 1776, Georgia's and New York's of 1777, South Carolina's of 1778, Massachusetts' of 1780, and New Hampshire's of 1784. The states of Virginia and Delaware wrote their Bill of Rights in a separate document but still was part of their constitutions, so they are included; other states have their Bill of Rights enumerated in their constitution directly; some, like Georgia and South Carolina, don't even have a Bill of Rights but do have some individual rights recognized throughout their constitutions. As mentioned earlier, each state constitution is divided into three parts: preamble, structure, and bill of rights. These state constitutions will be compared to the U.S. Constitution to show what was common among the states and what was enumerated into the federal constitution. Only one of these state constitutions is still in effect today, that being the constitution of Massachusetts of 1780, which is older than the federal constitution. Virginia’s Constitution June 29, 1776 Virginia's Declaration of Rights June 12, 1776 Preamble Virginia’s preamble begins with a declaration of independence from Great Britain with a list of repeated injuries similar to that of the Declaration of Independence (hint: Thomas Jefferson was from Virginia). The preamble ends with: We therefore, the delegates and representatives of the good people of Virginia, having maturely considered the premises, and viewing with great concern the deplorable conditions to which this once happy country must be reduced, unless some regular, adequate mode of civil polity is speedily adopted, and in compliance with a recommendation of the general Congress, do ordain and declare the future form of government of Virginia to be as followeth: The preamble to Virginia’s Declaration of Rights includes the following assertion, “…which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of government.” To Virginia, certain individual rights were viewed as necessary to a properly regulated government which rights are listed in the Bill of Rights section. Structure of Government Virginia established a trilateral government composed of a bicameral legislature, an executive and Council, and a supreme court. The Legislature is called the General Assembly, which comprises a House of Delegates and a Senate. For delegates, there are two per county and one for cities with large populations. Delegates are annually elected by the men, who are 21 years old, who own property and are residents of the county they vote in. The requirements to be a delegate include being a man, a resident of the county they are running in, 25 years old, and owning land. The power of the House of Delegates includes electing their speakers, appointing officers, creating procedures, filling vacancies, beginning all bills, approving or rejecting the Senate's amendments, and impeaching the governor or judges. The Senate consists of 24 members, one from each district. The terms are four years with a rotation of ¼ of the Senate annually. The electors and requirements are the same as the delegates. The power of the Senate consists of electing a speaker, appointing officers, creating procedures, filling vacancies, and rejecting house bills or amending them with the consent of the house except for money bills which can only be rejected not amended by the Senate. Joint power includes appointing treasurers and secretaries. Executive power resides in a governor, a lieutenant governor who will act as president of the Council, and an executive council. The general assembly annually elects the governor for no more than three consecutive terms and afterward has to wait another four years. The general assembly determines requirements. The governor's power includes granting pardons unless prosecuted by the General Assembly, calling the assembly to meet, appointing military officers and holding military courts, and is the commander in chief in times of war. Council of State, or Privy Council, is made of 8 members, with an annual rotation of two members elected by the General Assembly. They also appoint a state secretary and approve county sheriffs and coroners. The power of the Council includes electing its president, who is also the lieutenant governor. Judicial power resides in the courts, with a supreme court as the highest court of appeals. Both houses appoint all levels of judges, from county courts to the supreme court. Terms are for life on good behavior. Their power includes appointing county constables. Notable mentions are that oaths are not mentioned, no establishment of religion, no holding multiple offices are mentioned, slavery is not mentioned, an amending process is not mentioned. Bill of rights Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; Government of and by the people; right to reform; no titles of nobility; regular elections; right of suffrage depends on land ownership, and so no property taxes since property taxes threatens ownership; no one in office can prevent the law from being enforced; fair trial, cause, accusers, witnesses, evidence, speedy, jury, no self-incrimination; no excessive bail or cruel and unusual punishments; no unwarranted searches and seizures; in cases regarding property (slaves) there will be a trial by jury (of the white men "victim"); freedom of the press; maintain a well-regulated militia, but no standing armies; county governments should be of uniform structure; lastly, freedom of religion. New Jersey’s Constitution July 2, 1776 Preamble New Jersey’s preamble asserted that the authority of kings is derived from the people for the interest of the entire society. Since the current king was not interested in the entire society but only interested in enforcing his and his Parliament’s dominion, that is just cause for the subjugated people to secede from British despotism. The key principle is reciprocity which is needed to maintain society, “allegiance and protection are, in the nature of things, reciprocal ties; each equally depending upon the other, and liable to be dissolved by the others being refused or withdrawn.” A constitution was necessary to organize and unite the people of the newly freed state for their common defense against an enemy which seeks to subjugate them. Structure of Government Bilateral with a bicameral legislature and a governor. The Legislature consisted of the general assembly and legislative Council. The general assembly was made up of 3 members per county, annually elected, and must be free, resident of their county, own property in the county, and be valued at 500 pounds. Electors will be men and women who are, 21 years old, valued at 50 pounds, property owner, and resident of the county they vote in. The power of the general assembly consisted of electing a speaker, appointing necessary officers, and proposing bills and starting money bills that cannot be rejected or altered by the legislative Council. The Legislative Council consisted of one member from each county, annually elected by the same voters as the general assembly. Legislative councilors required that they be free, a resident of the county, worth 1,000 pounds, and own property in the county. The legislative Council's power included proposing bills and electing a vice president. Joint legislative power includes passing laws with a majority of each house, can change the number of assembly members but no less than 39, appointing generals and other high-ranking officers, and appointing the state treasurer annually. Executive power was held by the governor, who was annually elected by both houses, and the requirements to become governor were the same as the legislative Council. There is no second in command, and any vacancy resulted in a special election. The governor's power included convening the Legislature, being president of the Legislative Council and could cast votes in the legislative Council, being the commander in chief of the state militia, and counseled by three or more councilors. No executive council is mentioned. Judicial power was put into two high courts, the high court of appeals, which was made up of the governor and seven legislative councilors where pardons were granted, and a Supreme Court which was in charge of all other lower courts and had terms of seven years while lower court justices had terms of five years, all appointed by the governor and approved by the general assembly. Notable mentions include oaths, no established religion, no holding multiple offices, sheriffs and coroners were annually elected by the counties with three consecutive terms allowed. Slavery is not mentioned. An amending process is not mentioned. Bill of Rights A Bill of Rights is not included, but some rights are added throughout the constitution; The rights to address witnesses and to legal counsel; the property of the deceased goes to heirs, not the State; freedom of religion, freedom from religion, no religious taxes, no public funds to build or repair churches, or for ministry; no religious tests; restrictions on corruption, no person in any public office can be seated in the assembly; rights of trial by jury which will not be repealed ever. Delaware’s Constitution September 10, 1776 Delaware’s Declaration of Rights September 11, 1776 Preamble Delaware’s preamble just says that the freemen of the state chose the delegates for the purpose of establishing a system of government. No preamble for their declaration of rights. Structure of Government Trilateral but with lots of overlapping offices between branches despite declaring a separation of powers. The legislative branch is called the general assembly, bicameral with a House Assembly and a legislative council. The House Assembly consisted of seven annually elected members from each county; the electors and requirements for this house included freeholders, property owners who had no debt on the property they owned. The power of this house includes electing a speaker, and necessary officers, setting procedures, filling vacancies, and impeaching members; all money bills start here, will act as vice president, adjourn themselves, elect 24 justices of the peace for each county serving for seven years, impeaches the president once out of office, appoints the attorney general. The Legislative Council consisted of nine triennially elected members, three from each county, with a rotation of three every year. The electors and requirements for councilors included being freeholders and above the age of 25. The power of the legislative Council included electing a speaker and necessary officers, setting procedures, filling vacancies and impeaching members, can amend or reject money bills, acting as vice president, and adjourning themselves. Joint power included overturning county court decisions, appointing generals and other high ranking officers Executive power resides in the president, no second in command is mentioned, but there is an executive council, not to be confused with the legislative Council. The term for president is three years, and the electors will be both houses of the general assembly. The president's power included requesting funds, laying temporary embargoes, granting pardons to convicts, not from the general assembly, can call privy council meetings, will act as commander in chief with the privy council, convening the general assembly, with the privy council appointing secretary. Other state officers with terms of 5 years appoint 12 justices of the peace for each county serving for seven years, appoint low ranking officers not appointed by the Legislature, fill vacancies. The executive Council or Privy Council was made up of four members with terms of four years with a rotation of two members every two years. Each house will elect two members, and the rotation will include one member who was elected by each house. The powers of the Executive Council included appointing sheriffs and coroners annually to each county. Judicial power resides in courts, and the highest court of appeal was made up of seven members, including the president, three legislative councilors, and three house assembly members, with the state secretary as the clerk. County courts had three members plus a chief justice, elected by the president and general assembly. Terms for justices were lifelong on good behavior. The county courts could appoint their clerks and other necessary officers. Notable mentions include oaths that required the recognition of Jesus and God, no establishment of religion, no holding multiple offices including religious ministers, no one can be armed near the elections, no one who entered the State after the constitution was ratified can be a slave, but those already born or brought before can remain a slave, there was an amending process. Bill of Rights Government of the people; freedom of and from religion; that all persons professing the Christian religion ought forever to enjoy equal rights and privileges in this state, unless, under color of religion, any man disturb the peace, the happiness or safety of society; equal treatment of citizens; right for the people to rebel or reform and start a new government; property owners have a right to vote and participate in the government; that no power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, ought to be exercised unless by the Legislature; that for redress of grievances, and for amending and strengthening of the laws, the Legislature ought to be frequently convened; that every man hath a right to petition the Legislature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and orderly manner; that every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expense of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto; but no part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him or applied to public uses without his own consent or that of his legal Representatives: Nor can any man that is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms in any case be justly compelled thereto if he will pay such equivalent; that retrospective laws, punishing offenses committed before the existence of such laws, are oppressive and unjust, and ought not to be made; that every freeman for every injury done him in his goods, lands or person, by any other person, ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right for the injury done to him freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the law of the land; that trial by jury of facts where they arise is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people; that in all prosecutions for criminal offenses, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him, to be allowed counsel, to be confronted with the accusers or witnesses, to examine evidence on oath in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty; that no man in the courts of Common Law ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself; that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted; that all warrants without oath to search suspected places, or to seize any person or his property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected, or to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or describing the place or any person in special, are illegal and ought not to be granted; that a well regulated militia is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free government; that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up without the consent of the Legislature; that in all cases and at all times the military ought to be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power; that no soldier ought to be quartered in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner; and in time of war in such manner only as the Legislature shall direct; that the independency and uprightness of judges are essential to the impartial administration of justice, and a great security to the rights and liberties of the people; that the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved. Pennsylvania’s Constitution September 28, 1776 Preamble The preamble begins with the purpose of government being “instituted and supported for the security and protection of the community…enable the individuals… to enjoy their natural rights…” When the government fails at this trust then the people have a right with common consent to change it through any means necessary to promote their safety and happiness. This commonwealth pledged allegiance with the British monarch for its protection and since that monarch has withdrawn that protection to declare a tyrannical war of subjugation in favor of the despotic Parliament; the colony therefore dissolves its fealty and assumes back the legitimate authority once granted to the British government. All colonies, for their welfare and safety, ought to be free and independent states founded on proper forms of government derived from and founded on the authority of the people only. The representatives of Pennsylvania created this constitution by common consent, without violence, and with deliberateness to form a government for the happiness of the people, their posterity, and to provide the means for future improvements without partiality to a particular class, sect, or denomination. Structure of Government Bilateral government with a unicameral legislature and an executive with a council. The Legislature is called the Assembly of Representatives, which is made up of annually elected members, six per county, including Philadelphia; any more is based on population. Census every seven years. Term limits of four out of seven years. The electors will be those over the age of 21, tax paying and owning property, and their sons over the age of 21 but not owning property or paying taxes can still vote. Requirements include being a resident of the county they are elected in. The power of the assembly included choosing a speaker, treasurer, and other necessary offices, making rules of proceedings, making bills and laws, impeaching members, no double jeopardy for the exact cause in the same session, swearing oaths for witnesses, redress grievances, granting charters for towns, boroughs, cities, and counties, but no altering, adding, or infringing any part of this constitution. Executive power resided in a president, vice president, and Council. The president and vice president have one-year terms, elected by the assembly and Council, and the electors made the requirements. The powers of the president included appointing judges, officers both military and civil, appointing a secretary, preparing for war, sitting as judges in the supreme court, granting pardons, calling funds and temporary embargoes, can call the assembly but not adjourn them, and will act as commander in chief of militia forces, but cannot command in person. The Executive Council consisted of 12 members, one for each county, with three years with a rotation of 1/3rd per year and a four-year gap between terms. Judicial power is not on the State but instead the county level where the assembly appoints justices with seven years. Notable mentions include oaths that have to recognize God, no mention of establishing a religion, no holding multiple offices, all men were trained for military service, and the militiamen elect low ranking officers. The county voters elect sheriff's coroners. No mention of slavery. No mention of an amending process. Proceedings will be posted publicly weekly. All bills will be open to the public before voting to ratify the bill into law, except in times of emergency. Every office can be impeached during or after. Bill of rights Equality of rights, life, liberty, property, pursuit of happiness; freedom of and from religion; citizens of the State have the right to regulate the state government; power comes from the people and therefore officers are trustees and servants; self interest of an individual or few is illegitimate governing; right to recall officers or representatives or re-election; free elections, property owners will have suffrage and the right to run for office; right to life, liberty, property, and has to contribute to the protection of those rights, but with their consent nor those who are morally against taking up arms should be forced to; right to counsel, cause, witnesses, evidence, speedy, public trials, by an impartial jury, unanimity, no self incrimination, nor deprived of their liberty except by law and peers; no illegal searches and seizures; cases of property, or between two people, should be trials by jury; free speech, press; right to bear arms, no standing armies and civilian controlled military; the people ought to voice their concerns all the time; right to emigrate; right of assembly, petition or advise their representatives a redress of grievances; trial by jury; excessive bail shall not be exacted for bailable offenses: And all fines shall be moderate; elections will be by ballot, accessible, and voluntary. No bribery of voters, and if any is caught, their vote will be forfeit, and anyone running for office trying to bribe a voter will be removed from the ballot; freedom of the press to print proceedings of the Legislature; everyone ought to have a job that can provide him necessary wages, and if the Government requires a person to serve to take him away from his profession, he shall be compensated, and any position with high salaries that encourages men to run for office just for those high salaries, the Legislature will decrease the salaries; punishments will be proportional to the crime; for minor crimes, the punishment should be manual labor, not imprisonment, as reparations to the public; no taxes will be imposed, unless approved by the Legislature and after it has been presented to the people; immigrants who swear an oath to the State shall be treated equally as any other citizen. They need to be a resident of the State for two years before being able to be elected to office; hunting during specific seasons will be a right for their own land and land not owned by a private citizen; schools will be established in each county; laws of virtue and morality will be enforced, and religious ministers will be protected and granted privileges; declaration of rights will be a part of this constitution and cannot be violated; Council of Censors, elected by each county, every seven years, to debate for no more than one year, on the effectiveness of the constitution to protect the rights of the people. Any proposals they make will be brought to the assembly to be passed into law. Maryland’s Constitution November 11, 1776 Preamble Maryland’s preamble only discusses its declaration of rights. Mentions the Declaratory Act by parliament which declared parliament's authority to raise taxes without colonial representation (virtual representation). Parliament used force of arms to subjugate the colonies to its will which went against the consent of the colonists. Therefore, Maryland seceded from the British society and established this constitution for its independence and secure thereof. Structure of Government Bilateral with a bicameral legislature and an executive with Council. The Legislature was called the general assembly and made up of a house of delegates and a senate. The house of delegates consisted of 4 members per county who were annually elected. The electors included men, 21 of age, owning property over 30 pounds, and a resident in the county they vote in. The requirements to become a delegate included being a man, 21 of age, owning 50 acres of land, and a resident in the county they run in. The power of the house of delegates included originating money bills, proposing bills to the Senate, amending senate bills, calling witnesses, hearing complaints, committing people to jail, impeaching members, and imposing taxes. The House of Delegates will appoint treasurers and commissioners. The Senate consisted of 15 members total, elected for five-year terms, and had the requirements of being over 25 years old and having a value of 1000 pounds. The electors will be elected by the same as the voters for the house of delegates for five-year terms with two per county, assessing candidates and choosing members for the Senate. The powers of the Senate included passing bills, rejecting money bills, filling their vacancies, and electing a president of the Senate. Both houses can fill the vacancy of the governor. The executive powers resided in the governor and a council. The governorship had one-year terms with three consecutive terms being the limit and was elected by both houses. Requirements included being over 25 years old, a resident, and having a value of 5,000 pounds. The power of the governor consisted of appointing temporary officers, being commander in chief of the militia, granting pardons, laying embargoes for less than 30 days, and enforcing quarantine for vessels during plagues. Appoint one sheriff per county appoints the Chancellor, judges, and justices, the attorney general, military officers, surveyors. The Council was made up of 5 members, with terms of five years, elected by both houses, required candidates to be 25 years old and valued at 1,000 pounds. The Council's power included advising the governor and filling their own vacancies. Judicial power was put into county courts regulated by the general assembly. County justices appointed their own clerks, and the highest chancery court will have one Chancellor. Notable mentions include oaths that required recognizing the Christian God and denouncing England. No mention of establishing a state religion. No multiple holding offices, including religious ministers. The sheriffs were elected by their counties—no mention of slavery. The amending process included getting a majority in the general assembly three months before the next election. Bill of Rights Power originates from the people for the public good; the people have a right to regulate the government and police; citizens have the rights to several common laws of England including trial by Jury, and other rights made by the assembly; accountability to public officers, the people may recall members, or reform the government, or abolish it completely, as the people have a right to resist; people have a right to participate in the government, elections will be free, frequent, and suffrage will be granted to all who own property; separation of powers between the three branches; no power to suspend laws; freedom of speech, in the legislature will be impeached; meeting place will be fixed, convenient, public; legislature should meet frequently to amend laws; right to petition in a peaceful manner; no taxes without consent of the legislature; no poll tax, taxes should be done proportionate to individual wealth; no cruel or unusual punishments; no retrospective laws; no laws to attain people of treason or felony should exist; every person should be compensated for injuries and a right to a speedy trial; trial with evidence; all criminals will be informed of their crime, allowed counsel, confront witnesses, include supportive witnesses, examine witnesses on oath, speedy trial by an impartial jury, with unanimous consent; no self incrimination; no imprisonment, or violations of his liberty, property, or exile or outlawed, or life without legal process; no excessive bail, no cruel or unusual punishments; no illegal searches or seizures; no property taken unless for the crimes of murder, treason and only after conviction; state militia; no standing armies without consent of the legislature; military ought to be under civil authority; no quartering of troops; no person, except active military officers, be punished under martial law; impeachments of partial judges, by the governor and general assembly, by 2/3rds vote, and salaries should be modest, and no judge should hold any other office; frequent rotation of executive members; no public officer should hold multiple offices; freedom of religion, no disturbance of the peace is justified by religion, freedom from religion, other than an equal tax for the Christian religion, where taxpayers decide which church their religious tax goes to. No taxes for the building and repairing of new churches; no religious tests except for the general oath of the Christian faith; some denominations can swear an oath they are accustomed to; freedom of the press; monopolies are outlawed; no titles of nobility; amendments to the constitution can be made. North Carolina’s Constitution December 18, 1776 Preamble No preamble for its Bill of Rights but one for its structure. “WHEREAS allegiance and protection are, in their nature, reciprocal, and the one should of right be refused when the other is withdrawn:” Since the late King declared war on these colonies, he is no longer our protector and since he is no longer our protector we no longer owe our allegiance. Now that the state is detached from British protection and society, the state needs to establish its own society by the creation of a government authorized by the people for their happiness and prosperity. Structure of Government Bilateral, consisting of a bicameral legislature and a governor with an executive council. The Legislature consisted of a general assembly and a senate. The general assembly consisted of two annually elected representatives from each county. The electors were citizens over the age of 21, residents of the county, and a taxpayer. The requirements for candidates included being a resident of the county and owning 100 acres of land. The powers of the general assembly included electing their speaker, appointing necessary officers, passing bills, and filling their vacancies. The Senate was made up of annually elected members, one per county. The electors for senators were residents over the age of 21 and owned 50 acres of land. The senatorial requirements included being a resident and owning 300 acres of land in the State. The powers of the Senate included electing their own speaker and other necessary officers, passing bills, and filling their own vacancies. Joint responsibilities include reading bills three times and signing by speakers, elect judges, military leaders, annually elect treasurer, impeach all officers, appoint secretary for three-year terms, and purchasing native land. The executive powers of the State reside in a governor, a lieutenant governor, and a governor's Council. The president of the Senate was the lieutenant governor. The governorship had one-year terms and was allowed fewer than three terms in six years. The governor was elected by the general assembly and had to have been 30 years old, a resident of the State, and valued at 1,000 pounds. The powers of the governorship included being commander in chief, calling funds supported by the general assembly, lay embargoes for 30 days, grant pardons for crimes not convicted by the general assembly, and enforce executive authority restricted by the constitution, fill vacancies. The governor's Council was made up of seven members, annually elected by the general assembly, which had the power to advise the governor. Judicial powers are not mentioned. Notable mentions include oaths that required religious recognition, no establishment of religion or religious taxes. No multiple holding offices, including religious ministers. No mention of slavery or an amending process. Anyone who received money from the State had to pay it back in full before running for office. Bill of rights All political power is vested in and derived from the people only; the people have the right to regulate the Government; equal rights; the three branches ought to be separate; any government force not sanctioned by the representatives of the people is illegitimate; that elections of members, to serve as Representatives in General Assembly, ought to be free; right to trials of evidence, witnesses and no self incrimination; people cannot be charged unless indictment or impeached; trial by jury vote unanimous; no excessive fines nor cruel or unusual punishments; no illegal searches and seizures; no arrests unless warranted by law; compensation for unlawful treatment; trial by jury; free press; no taxation without representation; right to bear arms for the State, no standing armies; right to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; freedom of religion; frequent elections, redress of grievances and amending the political system; preserve liberty; no titles of nobility; no monopolies; no retrospective laws and punishments; right to property and that this Declaration of Rights shall not prejudice any nation or nations of Indians, from enjoying such hunting-grounds. Georgia's Constitution February 5, 1777 Preamble Georgia does not have a Bill of Rights but they do have a preamble to their structure. This preamble mentions the Declaratory Act which declared Parliament’s authority to raise taxes and pass other laws on the colonies without the consent (direct representation) of the governed. Due to this violation of social trust, Americans must oppose oppression to assert their natural and reasonable rights and privileges. The Continental Congress, being made of representatives of the people of the states, asked each state, ...where no government, sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs, hath been hitherto established, to adopt such government as may, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular and America in general;” That Georgia along with her sister states are independent from British authority. The preamble ends with, “We, therefore, the representatives of the people, from whom all power originates, and for whose benefit all government is intended, by virtue of the power delegated to us, do ordain and declare, and it IS hereby ordained and declared, that the following rules and regulations be adopted for the future government of this State: Structure of Government Trilateral, consisting of a unicameral legislature, an executive with a cabinet, and a supreme court. The Legislature is called the House of Assembly, which comprises eight annually elected members per county. The electors were explicitly white, male, 21, resident, taxpayer, and valued at 10 pounds. Requirements included being a resident, being protestant, 21, and owning 250 acres of land valued at over 250 pounds. The assembly's powers include electing the governor, passing laws, filling vacancies, electing a speaker, and establishing superior courts in each county. Executive power resides in a governor and a cabinet. The lieutenant governor was also the president of the Council. Governors are elected annually by the assembly. Governor's power includes enforcing executive authority, granting pardons, convening house vacancies and commissions coming from the governor, can sit with the Council unless the Council is discussing house bills, and being the commander in chief. The cabinet was made up of two members from each county, elected by the housing assembly. The power of the assembly included advising bills before they were passed and electing a councilor president from their members. Judicial power resides in a supreme court consisting of a chief justice and three judges from each county. Notable mentions include no Bill of Rights, oaths of office, no establishing a state religion, no holding multiple offices, including religious ministers. Slavery is not mentioned. There is an amending process where the majority of the counties need to approve—no titles of nobility. Mandatory voting with a fine for those who don’t vote. Trials have to be held near the crime, trial by jury, schools funded in each county: freedom of religion, no excessive trial fines, maintaining habeas corpus, and freedom of the press. New York’s Constitution April 20, 1777. Preamble The tyranny of the British King and Parliament against the rights and liberties of the people necessitates independence and self-governance. The inconveniences of this conflict has led to the creation of an emergency government. New York’s preamble includes verbatim resolutions passed by the Second Continental Congress following the Proclamation of War by the King, along with the Declaration of Independence. The separation and reclamation of rights from Britain has stored to the people their natural rights which they now relinquish through their suffrage to institute and establish a government made to secure their rights and liberties most conducive of the happiness and safety of them and of America in general. Structure of Government Trilateral with a bicameral legislature, a governor with a council, and a supreme court. The Legislature is made up of an assembly and a senate. The assembly was made up of 70 members with different representatives per county depending on population; the census was taken every seven years. The terms were seven years; the electors were the male residents who owned 20 pounds worth of land. The requirements included being a freeholder and being valued at 1,000 pounds. The powers of the assembly included electing a speaker, passing bills, and starting money bills. The senate proportions were based on districts, of which there were four, and three had six senators while the southern, NYC, district had 9. The senatorial term was four years, with at least one senator from each district up for election every year. The joint power of the Legislature included electing a treasurer originating in the assembly, appointing sheriffs annually with no more than four consecutive terms, and holding a monopoly with buying native land. The executive power of the State resided in a governor, a lieutenant governor, and a council. The lieutenant governor was also the president of the Senate. Gubernatorial terms were three years. The electors were the same as for the assembly, and requirements were not mentioned. Powers of the governor included being the commander in chief, granting particular pardons, calling the Legislature temporarily, giving State of the state addresses, and appointing military officers. The Council included the governor, the Chancellor, and the supreme court. The power of the Council was to assess and approve laws passed by the Legislature. The judicial power was divided between the Chancellor and the supreme court. The Chancellor was the chief justice of the chancery courts, while the supreme court was the highest court of appeals. Courts appointed their clerks and other necessary officers of the court. The impeachment court was made up of the president of the Senate, senators, Chancellor, and supreme court justices. Notable mentions include oaths that needed to be taken by politicians and voters, no establishment of religion, no holding multiple offices including religious ministers, no mention of slavery, no mention of an amending process. A bill of rights was not included, but some rights were put in the constitution on various points, including protecting property and rights, proceedings open to the public, freedom of religion for Christian denominations, a well-regulated militia made by every man except Quakers, trial by jury. South Carolina’s Constitution March 19, 1778. Preamble The first constitution established in March of 1776 as a temporary government waiting for the resolution to the conflict between the colonies and Great Britain became obsolete with the Declaration of War by the King and with the Declaration of Independence by the Congress; therefore a new constitution is needed. The freemen of this state have agreed to this new constitution. Structure of Government Bilateral with a bicameral legislature and a divided executive. The Legislature was made up of a house of representatives and a senate. House proportions were based on the taxpaying population, with a census occurring every 14 years. Terms for house seats were two years and were elected by explicitly white men, protestant, 21 years old, resident of the county, owned 50 acres and was a taxpayer. Requirements to be a house member included being protestant, resident of the county, clear of debt, and owning land valued at 3,500 pounds. The house's power included passing bills, starting money bills that cannot be altered by the Senate, electing a speaker, filling vacancies, and impeaching other officers. The Senate included one from each parish and district and was elected annually. Electors were the same as a house, but the requirements included being protestant, 30 years old, resident of the parish or district, clear of debt, and owning 2,000 pounds of land value. The power of the Senate included passing bills, electing a president of the Senate, filling vacancies, and trying impeachment cases. The joint powers included electing justices of the peace for each county, and all other judge positions, sheriffs and other lower executive officers, and high military officers are elected by the Legislature for two-year terms, declare war, or make peace. Executive power resided in a governor, lieutenant governor, and a privy council. Gubernatorial terms were two years, and no consecutive terms were allowed. Electors were the Legislature. Requirements were being protestant, resident of the State, clear of debt, valued at 10,000 pounds. Powers of the executive included being commander in chief, appointing lower-ranked military officers, and laying temporary embargoes. The privy council was made up of the lieutenant governor and eight other members chosen by the Legislature with a rotation of half the Council up for election every year. The only explicit requirement for the Council was that members had to be Protestant. The power of the Council included choosing a lieutenant governor if a vacancy occurred and that the Council was the chancery court. Judicial power was regulated by the legislative branch on the county level. Notable mentions include oaths that denounced England, an establishment of the protestant religion, no multiple holding offices including religious ministers, no mention of slavery, and no mention of an amending process. There was no bill of rights, but some rights were added throughout the constitution, including the right of Christians to worship, punishment should be proportional to the crime, free press, no illegal seizures or imprisonments, and reparations had to be given when violations occurred. Massachusetts’ Constitution June 15, 1780 Preamble The preamble asserts, The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of government is to secure the existence of the body-politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it with the power of enjoying, in safety and tranquility, their natural rights and the blessings of life; and whenever these great objects are not obtained the people have a right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary for their safety, prosperity, and happiness. The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good. It is the duty of the people, therefore, in framing a constitution of government, to provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an impartial interpretation and a faithful execution of them; that every man may, at all times, find his security in them. We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts, acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the great Legislator of the universe, in affording us, in the course of His providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud, violence, or surprise, of entering into an original, explicit, and solemn compact with each other, and of forming a new constitution of civil government for ourselves and posterity; and devoutly imploring His direction in so interesting a design, do agree upon, ordain, and establish the following declaration of rights and frame of government as the constitution of the commonwealth of Massachusetts. Structure of Government Trilateral with a bicameral legislature, bicameral executive, and a supreme court. The Legislature, called the general court, consisted of a House of Representatives and a Senate. House proportions were based on population, and each town was allowed at least one representative. House members were annually elected. Electors were men, 21 years old, had a salary of 3 pounds, and were residents of the town. The power of the house consisted of impeaching, starting money bills, and passing bills. The Senate consisted of members from districts based on tax revenue with no more than 6 per district. Senators were annually elected by freeholders above the age of 21, valued at 60 pounds, and a resident. Requirements to be a senator included being a freeholder, a resident of the district, and valued at 600 pounds. The powers of the Senate included filling the vacancy of the lieutenant governor, electing their own president, impeachments, and passing bills. Joint powers include overturning vetoes, interpreting laws, electing the secretary and treasurer of the State. Executive power resides in the governor, lieutenant governor, and Council. The lieutenant governor was elected by the people, the same as the house. Freeholders annually elected the governorship, residents of seven years, and 1,000 pounds in land value. The governor's power included veto power, hearing appeals, calling council meetings, with Council can dissolve the general court temporarily, commander in chief, grant pardons, appoint high ranking officers, with Council, take funds for defense. The Council consisted of nine members annually elected by the Legislature and chosen by the legislative body. Their power included advising the enforcing executive authority. Judicial power in a supreme court whose justices had lifelong appointments by the governor and Council on good behavior, the power of the supreme court was to hear appeals and advise the other branches. Notable mentions include oaths that recognize religion and denounce England. No establishment of religion, no multiple holding offices, including religious ministers. Low-ranking military officers are elected by their troops—no mention of slavery. There is an amending process—the protection of habeas corpus and the establishment of a university. Bill of rights All men are born free and equal, have the right to self-defense, and to the right to property; religious freedom to worship the creator of the Universe provided it does not disturb the peace; the people can invest in their Legislator to institute specific communities to provide a place of worship. The Legislature may legislate that there must be a teacher in said parish or communities that must attend. The money provided may go to the teacher and support him and his parish denomination alone. All denominations of Christians have equal rights under the law so be that they are peaceful; outside of what the American congress decides, the people of this State have a right to self-determination delegated through the State; the offices of this Government are subject to the will of the people; no man shall possess a title that gives him an advantage or a title that he may pass on to his children; the Government exists to serve the happiness of the people, and they may amend and reform it as they see fit; to protect against tyranny the seats of the Government will be subject to election via the people; all elections should be free, and everyone may vote or run for office on equal grounds; everyone has the right to liberty and happiness, and their property can not be confiscated from them by the State, unless the people or publicly declare it so. In this case, the property taken for public use requires compensation towards the individual for his property confiscation; everyone has protection under the laws equally and may seek compensation via them, and this should not be barred via payments or taxes; everyone has a right to trial by the court, to be read their charges, and have access to legal defense. No citizen can be punished by the legislation without trial save for those in the army and navy; in criminal prosecution obtaining facts are vital to the protection of the citizen; every citizen is protected from starches of his property and person unless it is ordained by court or law that a warrant should be granted to the authorities to do so; property disputes will be settled in court via jury, save for maritime disputes, unless altered by Legislature; freedom of the press shall not be impeached; the people have a right to bear arms in peacetime that shall not be infringed, but all military authority be subject to civil authority; the people have a right to observe their Legislator and to instruct them on what they require of them in the Government; the people have a right to assembly and to address their representatives; the power of suspending the laws is to be exercised only by the Legislator or via it's permission; debate used in the Legislator may not be brought against an individual in prosecution in court; the Legislature ought to assemble frequently to address matters of law; no tax or tariff can be leveled against the people without their consent or that of the Legislator; laws may not punish actions committed before that law's creation; the Legislator can not declare someone guilty; no magistrate or court of law can demand cruel and excessive punishments; in peace no soldier can be quartered in any one's home without their consent, and in times of war this action requires legislation; martial law may not be app[lied to those not in the armed forces, and the Militia shall be disciplined by the Legislature; everyone has the right to trial by a fair and unbiased court; the branches of executive, legislative, and Judicial shall never exercise the others power. New Hampshire’s Constitution October 31, 1784 Preamble The preamble only states, “All men are born equally free and independent; therefore, all government of right originates from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good.” Structure of Government Trilateral with a bicameral legislature, a two-sectioned executive, and a supreme court. The Legislature is made up of a general court and a senate. The general court is proportionate to the population of men who are 21 years old in each town. The terms are annual, and representatives are elected by men, 21 years old, pay a poll tax, and are residents of the town. The general court's power included impeachment, and money bills can be amended by the Senate, propose laws, elect speakers and state secretaries, and appoint necessary officers. The Senate is based on counties that contributed 12 senators, and the rest were from districts based on tax revenue. Senators held annual positions and were elected by the same electors as the general court. Both requirements were that candidates had to be protestants, free of debt, 30 years old, resident for several years prior, and be valued at 200 pounds. The power of the Senate included appointing officers, determining proceedings, trying impeachments. The senior senator was the president pro tempore. Jointly, the Legislature established lower courts, passed laws, elected military and civil officers, made necessary arrangements for the defense of the State, and took a census every five years. Executive power was placed into a president and cabinet. The president served annual terms and was elected by the voting population. Requirements to become a president included being 30 years old, resident of the State for several years prior, protesting, and valuing 500 pounds. The power of the president included breaking ties in the Senate, temporarily adjourning the general court, commander in chief, granting pardons, all officers not in the general court will be appointed by the president, and can use state funds for defense with permission from the general court. The cabinet was made up of two senators and three representatives annually by the two houses, respectively. Judicial power was established in a supreme court and lower courts. All justices were elected by the general court and held life-long terms on good behavior. The courts had the power to appoint clerks and other necessary officers. Notable mentions include oaths, no establishment of religion, no holding multiple offices including religious ministers, no mention of slavery and amending process, encouraged education, and protected habeas corpus. Bill of rights Consent of the governed; all men have a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; when men enter into a state of society, they surrender up some of their natural rights to that society in order to ensure the protection of others; and, without such an equivalent, the surrender is void; of this kind are the rights of conscience; freedom of religion; right to establish churches and other religious institutions. No taxes will be imposed for religious establishments No state religion; the people rule the Government; no titles of nobility; Government of the public good and the right to resist tyranny; free elections, terms and conditions may apply; because everyone has a right to life, liberty, and property, therefore they must contribute to protect those rights, but no property will be taken for public use without their consent; no one will be forced to bear arms but they must pay to support the arms of the State; compensation for wrongdoing; right to criminal information, no self incrimination, meet witnesses, provide evidence, question witnesses, fully heard in their defense, receive Council, and no arrests, seizing of property, are taking of liberties and life unless done so via due process; no double jeopardy, and no capital punishment unless under military courts; trials will be held where the crimes are committed; fair punishments, punishments should reform not exterminate; no illegal searches and seizures; trial by jury; appropriate jury; freedom of the press; no retrospective laws; a well regulated militia is the proper, natural, and sure defense of a state; no standing armies; civilian controlled military; no quartering of troops in private homes; no taxation without representation; no suspending laws; freedom of speech in the Legislature; right to protest and petition the Government; no excessive fines nor cruel or unusual punishments; no martial law except in the military; just justices; three branches of Government that are separate; government proceedings ought to be recorded. In summation Six of eleven states had a clear and separated trilateral structure and the rest had bilateral governments with their legislative or executive branches with judicial functions. Nine of eleven states had a bicameral legislature, and the rest had a unicameral legislature. Only two states had something like a unitary executive, New Jersey, and New York. For New Jersey, there was no executive council and so there was only a president, while for New York the Executive Council included the president, Chancellor, and supreme court where the president ran the Council. The rest of the states had a bicameral executive where the president or governor was separated from the Council. For nine of the eleven states, the chief executive was elected by the Legislature and not directly by the people. Only four states had a separate judicial branch on the state level. Most had county courts as the highest court of appeals, while a council made up of legislative and executive officers made up for other types of courts. The most common type of suffrage included property or wealth requirements, all above the age of 21, and had to be a resident of a county in the State for a certain number of years. Some states explicitly required voters to be white and male; some states required voters to be Protestant. Georgia was the only State to have mandatory voting. South Carolina was the only one to establish a state religion, the Protestant religion, while some states had oaths of offices that included the recognition of God. Only one State, Delaware, explicitly mentions slavery to restrict the importation of slaves. Most had an amending process. Some states had representatives based on both population and equal representation of the counties. Some states did not include a bill of rights but did incorporate individual rights which significantly varied between them. There seems to be nothing novel about the U.S. Constitution, given that there is nothing unique about it relative to the sum of the state constitutions. All political concepts of statecraft present in the federal Constitution can be found in the states prior to 1787. This defends the reasoning for writing this paper; that properly understanding the Constitution requires studying the state constitutions since many of those who wrote and ratified the Constitution participated in their respective state constitutional conventions. More can and should be added to this study including the state ratifying conventions for the Constitution, the Philadelphia convention itself, and how several of the states would rewrite their state constitutions following the ratification of the federal constitution. Axioms of a Civil Polity Based on the principles and structures of these constitutions and the Constitution we can extrapolate a probity for a civil polity. This probity should be understood and used by those who wish to study statecraft; they are as follows: Consent of the Governed Consent of the governed is the princeps of principles; the first among equals of this probity. It is the start of the social contract necessary for a society, especially a civil society, to form & continue existing. The consent of the governed can only be properly given & transpires through suffrage since voting is the only existing institution that gathers consent. This means that the only way the government can be legitimate is if the people elect the highest government offices. This is the idea of direct representation and anything that is not direct is virtual and therefore illegitimate. The highest authorities in government ought to be elected while their subordinate offices do not since those subordinates only hold delegated powers from their superiors. Without this proper consent, the government is despotic since it is acting arbitrarily and the people are placed into a state of nature. The only civil means of escaping that state of nature is the creation of a new society created by the people as a whole, one that is more civil than its despotic predecessor. Separation of Powers As a safeguard from arbitrary & despotic governments, the powers relinquished from & by the people and granted to the government in trust must be separated into unique parts. This separation should include at least three parts for more stability and they include a legislature, executive, and a judiciary. A separation of powers includes the nonintervention of one power over the other when it comes to the appointment of officers. For example, the executive should not be able to barricade new appointments to the legislature and likewise the legislature ought not to prevent the proper election of the executive. This separation of powers, if consistently applied in our government structure would also be applied to the judiciary, however, at the moment it is not since both the executive & the legislature has an active role in the appointments of justices. This separation of powers can also be applied within each branch; an example would be the current legislature which is bicameral and consists of two separated but complementary houses. Checks and Balances Once the powers are separated, they should check & balance each other. A check is a negative of one branch on the power of another. An example would be the executive veto. Similarly the legislature can block any proposed bills from the executive. The judiciary, just like with the separation of powers, was not fully developed in the Constitution but if the principle of checks and balances is to be consistent then it too would have a check or negative on the other two branches. De facto, the judiciary has judicial review where it can interpret a statute passed by the legislature or enforced by the executive as constitutional and therefore null in void. This judicial review power should be enumerated in the constitution. Although the executive can veto a bill passed through the legislature, the legislature can override the veto which means that the branches are not coequal but instead coordinate under the legislature. Another argument for this legislative supremacy is the fact that the legislature can impeach and remove either executive or judicial officers while neither the executive nor judiciary can impeach or remove any legislature. Just as the legislature can override an executive negative on its power so too should the legislature be able to override a judicial negative on its power. This means that any judicial review that decides a statute unconstitutional and therefore nullified, the legislature should be able to override that judicial review in a process similar to overriding a veto, perhaps it should be called legislative review. Enumerated Powers The power of the government is limited to what the people relinquish from themselves and grant to the government. This can only be known if said powers were enumerated or in other words written down. The reason for enumeration is to prevent arbitrary governance which is the definition of despotism, and despotism is something civil society ought to prevent. After all the root of the term legitimate is legi which means to read and the only way to read is to have something written down. Therefore the only legitimate power is power written down while anything not written down is less legitimate; if there is a power that the people consent to then it is best for that power to be enumerated instead of leaving it out and held in common. Federalism Federalism is a specific type of separation of powers where the powers are not separated between branches within the same level but instead between different levels of government. This does a number of things. First, it establishes specialization as a local government is best suited to deal with local issues than larger levels of government; however, federalism allows for higher levels of government to intervene when the lower levels fail to fulfill their responsibilities. If a local government fails to protect the people then the state government has the power and ought to step in and make the necessary changes to better secure the people. Likewise, if the state government fails to protect the people then the federal government can intervene and the reason for this is because no government at any level has the right nor were instituted to fail. Second, federalism creates multiple constituencies that an individual can be apart of and be represented by. If a minority in a locality is not properly represented by their local government then they can appeal to their state government but only if each constituency directly represents the people. If the federal government is instituted by states and the states subjugate the people how can the federal government look after the interests of the people? In that situation it wouldn’t because it is not representing the people but instead the states. So each level and also each branch of the government needs to directly represent the people; this is the concept of direct representation mentioned earlier. The people would therefore elect their local, state, and federal officers themselves and no level would have the right to create another level; only the people should create and give power to different levels of government as they see fit necessary to their happiness. A state cannot declare its own authority, only the people in the state can relinquish their power and grant it to the state; the same applies to all levels of government and each branch in each level. Bill of Rights Similarly to the concept of enumeration which properly lists government authority and which rights or powers the people relinquish & grant to the government; there are many rights that the people do not relinquish and therefore do not grant to the government. These retained rights are civil rights, the rights the people have in a civil society. These also need to be enumerated especially when conflict arises regarding which rights should be kept by the people. The rights of the people are not limited to the Bill of Rights but are best known and defended when they are enumerated. If there is a right held in common and questioned threatened by the government, then it is safe to enumerate it into the supreme charter of the polity. Amendments No enumerated rights, structures, powers, or procedures, is perfect and so in order for the perpetual development of a more perfect society future generations need to be able to amend what is enumerated or add to it. This amending process cannot be impossible nor compromise stability lest the entire political system loses its trust and therefore consent of its constituents endangering everyone in a state of nature. Works Cited US Constitution 1787 https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSBTliXbqFB1JIBqe4RDWq8X3EzSBlshT8LSAAOIq_ratZNatq2jZHxqFouNceLY2IK4E0oYrsFpTRa/pub Virginia Constitution (1776) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vQIjZWUpGrcxidVOnw_EDyd0yg0KeSozOoxJ6jRYR2z-HA-e85VOmlHUtnlJ6T72PRPcGVP_6RSX5TR/pub Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vRzwEHY4i3CexHkUil_Xwgz6zzL90JS2JK1OQvk7QcexJyZHuQrYvEhY7q_mYRhbBBlfrNeO8kfxXBK/pub New Jersey Constitution (1776) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vRa3UNXS-jdmu25M84OmlXiNF9wUvKrRhT_TLfOFQxa2JOyodj87ol9CODOZ97oPMXGUYYHe2Xxn6YT/pub Delaware Constitution (1776) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSeabDI6LYBZHqDgsONbR___8zeG47yP1u80Owqm8j9MlcrQ-Nkz91X8B5CqU702n8vNOfhdQSx8uo3/pub Delaware declaration of rights (1776) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vTbpPfkbDY1ipJJrqzoGyv5nZNDcBGkNUUhNglWNRGML0cqSmr1A_b0RS259wCb5E0Ld8GQ8OT_mGy0/pub Pennsylvania Constitution (1776) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vRR25f8YOnGNfMyFE8xj--az74ax7-d5lT4RuPlIdE8PFfnjzYJOVyw-qIciloh6v6JZVs_PI1DE6Jj/pub Maryland Constitution (1776) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vQbjh9sHw8_RIYDW296l6AV7egi7b3l-quABlkDucJEdnwEuv_t4K4cj3NZQ_6couuuAFdLUP9WzPwe/pub North Carolina Constitution (1776) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSqR99BiCNZUgjkWRBiTm3t3aWVwd7OaAqkt5SSblRAMy96G_oTDnt6sVqMX3dB7xkbGwn0CyJqjG-9/pub Georgia’s Constitution (1777) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vQvthyOdKSFvnj6YeW-Hi9Q6cDV-7NBkub-LnsJyGbwrivlm6HZDDJ80nZ82BQ5YxFI1shD_rDEqQFi/pub New York Constitution (1777) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vT3QX2a57m4bPN-ueNmTaWqK4rJXb4m_-CE5QolPe6uziCCkO-9tJowJfNz5yQmqYh2YtOOq5UZzQHx/pub South Carolina Constitution (1778) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vRwXsd0w9N-nkdpSvBHum8A2nRHX6bKuqfzpWayR7sq1lP1FPDmK3cEvXPQzkvX7JKSt8vvEMEyRAEN/pub Massachusetts Constitution (1780) https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vQbCP0VIxn--cT_-nbyXjQuRDiZXPnBjiwpGDtM8ZtAt_nRTfcLasQWlw-G0MjGhaPFvbPFBssa_HQ7/pub New Hampshire Constitution (1784)https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vRU-NDkz7PC7G6hHPPeL5CMf7eroP-1tL8EtxveAG5gPo9tFgOIX2PZE-Zea65jClOj47huONolPAwS/pub
- Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1765
BOSTON, June 8, 1765. SIR, THE House of Representatives of this Province, in the present Session of the General Court, have unanimously agreed to propose a Meeting, as soon as may be, of COMMITTEES, from the Houses of Representatives or Burgesses of the several British Colonies on this Continent to consult together on the present Circumstances of the Colonies, and the Difficulties to which they are, and must be reduced, by the Operation of the Acts of Parliament for levying Duties and Taxes on the Colonies; and to consider of a general, and united, dutiful, loyal and humble Representation of their Condition, to his Majesty and the Parliament, and to implore Relief. The House of Representatives of this Province, have also Voted to propose, That such Meeting be at the City of New-York, in the Province of New-York, on the first Tuesday in October next; and have appointed a Committee of Three of their Members, to attend that Service, with such as the other Houses of Representatives, or Burgesses, in the several Colonies, may think fit to appoint to meet them. And the Committee of the House of Representatives of this Province, are directed to repair to said New-York, on said first Tuesday in October next, accordingly. If therefore, your Honourable House should agree to this Proposal, it would be acceptable, that as early Notice of it as possible, might be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of this Province. SAMUEL WHITE, Speaker. Source: https://www.americanhistorycentral.com/documents/stamp-act-congress-massachusetts-circular-letter-text/
- Commission of Sir Edmund Andros for the Dominion of New England.
Commission of Sir Edmund Andros for the Dominion of New England. April 7, 1688 James the Second by the Grace of God King of England, Scotland France and Ireland Defender of the Faith &c. To our trusty and welbeloved Sr Edmund Andros Knt Greeting: Whereas by our Commission under our Great Seal of England, bearing date the third day of June in the second year of our reign wee have constituted and appointed you to be our Captain Generall and Governor in Chief in and over all that part of our territory and dominion of New England in America known by the names of our Colony of the Massachusetts Bay, our Colony of New Plymouth, our Provinces of New Hampshire and Main and the Narraganset Country or King's Province. And whereas since that time Wee have thought it necessary for our service and for the better protection and security of our subjects in those parts to join and annex to our said Government the neighboring Colonies of Road Island and Connecticutt, our Province of New York and East and West Jersey, with the territories "hereunto belonging, as wee do hereby join annex and unite the same to our said government and dominion of New England. Wee therefore reposing especiall trust and confidence in the prudence courage and loyalty of you the said Sir Edmund Andros, out of our especiall grace certain knowledge and meer motion, have thought fit to constitute and appoint as wee do by these presents constitute and appoint vou the said Sr Edmund Andros to be our Captain Generall and Governor in Cheif in and over our Colonies of the Massachusetts Bay and New Plymouth, our Provinces of New Hampsllire and Main, the Narraganset country or King's Province, our Colonys of Road Island and Connecticutt our Province of New York and East and West Jersey, and of all that tract of land circuit continent precincts and limits in America lying and being in breadth from forty degrees of Northern latitude from the Equinoctiall Line to the River of St. Croix Eastward, and from thence directly Northward to the river of Canada, and in length and longitude by all the breadth aforesaid and throughout the main land from the Atlantick or Western Sea or Ocean on the East part, to the South Sea on the West part, with all the Islands, Seas, Rivers, waters, rights, members, and appurtenances, thereunto belonging (our province of Pensilvania and country of Delaware only excepted), to be called and known as formerly by the name and title of our territory and dominion of New England in America. And for your better guidance and direction Wee doe hereby require and command you to do & execute all things in due manner, that shall belong unto the said office and the trust wee have reposed in you, according to the severall powers instructions and authoritys mentioned in these presents, or such further- powers instructions and authoritys mentioned in these presents, as you shall herewith receive or which shall at any time hereafter be granted or appointed You under our signet and sign manual or by our order in our Privy Councill and according to such reasonable lawes and statutes as are now in force or such others as shall hereafter be made and established within our territory & dominion aforesaid. And our will and pleasure is that You the said Sr Edmund Andros having, after publication of these our Letters Patents, first taken the Oath of duly executing the office of our Captain Generall and Governor in Cheif of our said territory and dominion, which our Councill there or any three of them are hereby required authorized and impowered to give and administer unto you, you shall administer unto each of the members of our Councill the Oath for the due execution of their places and trusts. And Wee do hereby give and grant unto you full power and authority to suspend any member of our Councill from sitting voting and assisting therein, as you shall find just cause for so doing. And if it shall hereafter at any time happen that by the death, departure out of our said territory, or suspension of any of our Counselors, or otherwise, there shall be a vacancy in our said Councill, (any five whereof wee do hereby appoint to be a Quorum) Our will and pleasure is that you signify the same unto us by the first oppurtunity, that Wee may under our Signet and Sign Manuall constitute and appoint others in their room. And Wee do hereby give and grant unto you full power and authority, by and with the advise and consent of our said Councill or the major part of them, to make constitute and ordain lawes statutes and ordinances for the public peace welfare and good governmt of our said territory & dominion and of the people and inhabitants thereof, and such others as shall resort thereto, and for the benefit of us, our heires and successors. Which said lawes statutes and ordinances, are to be, as near as conveniently may be, aggreeable to the lawes & statutes of this our kingdom of England: Provided that all such lawes statutes and ordinances of what nature or duration soever, be within three months, or sooner, after the making of the same, transmitted unto Us, under our Seal of New England, for our allowance or disapprobation of them, as also duplicates thereof by the next conveyance. And Wee do by these presents give and grant unto you full power and authority by and with the advise and consent of our said Councill, or the major part of them, to impose assess and raise and levy rates and taxes as you shall find necessary for the support of the government within our territory and dominion of New England, to be collected and leveyed and to be imployed to the uses aforesaid in such manner as to you & our said Councill or the major part of them shall seem most equall and reasonable. And for the better supporting the charge of the governmt of our said Territory and Dominion, our will and pleasure is and wee do by these presents authorize and impower you the sd Sr Admund Andros and our Councill, to continue such taxes and impositions as are now laid and imposed upon the Inhabitants thereof; and to levy and distribute or cause the same to be levyed and distributed to those ends in the best and most equall manner, untill you shall by & with the advise and consent of our Councill agree on and settle such other taxes as shall be sufficient for the support of our government there, which are to be applied to that use and no other. And our further will and pleasure is, that all publick money raised or to be raised or appointed for the support of the government within our said territory and dominion be issued out by warrant or order from you by & with the advise and consent of our Councill as aforesaid. And our will and pleasure is that you shall and may keep and use our Seal appointed by Us for our said territory and dominion. And wee do by these presents ordain constitute and appoint you or the Commander in Cheif for the time being, and the Councill of our said territory & dominion for the time being, to be a constant and setled Court of Record for ye administration of justice to all our subjects inhabiting within our said Territory and Dominion, in all causes as well civill as Criminall with full power and authority to hold pleas in all cases, from time to time, as well in Pleas of the Crown and in all matters relateing to the conservation of the peace and punishment of offenders, as in Civill causes and actions between party and party, or between us and any of our subjects there, whether the same do concerne the realty and relate to any right of freehold & inheritance or whether the same do concerne the personality and relate to matter of debt contract damage or other personall injury; and also in all mixt actions which may concern both realty and personalty; and therein after due and orderly proceeding and deliberate hearing of both sides, to give judgement and to award execution, as well in criminall as in Civill cases as aforesaid, so as always that the forms of proceedings in such cases and the judgment thereupon to be given, be as consonant and agreeable to the lawes and statutes of this our realm of England as the present state and condition of our subjects inhabiting within our said Territory and Dominion and the circumstances of the place will admit. And Wee do further hereby give and grant unto you full power and authority with the advise and consent of our said Councill to erect constitute and establish such and so many Courts of Judicature and public Justice within our said Territory and Dominion as you and they shall think fit and necessary for the determining of all causes as well Criminall as Civill according to law and equity, and for awarding of execution thereupon, with all reasonable and necessary powers authorities fees and privileges belonging unto them. And Wee do hereby give and grant unto you full power and authority to constitute and appoint Judges and in cases requisite Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, & all other necessary Officers and Ministers within our said Territory for the better administration of Justice and putting the lawes in execution, & to administer such oath and oaths as are usually given for the due execution and performance of offices and places and for the cleering of truth in judiciall causes. And our further will and pleasure is and Wee doe hereby declare that all actings and proceedings at law or equity heretofore had or don or now depending within any of the courts of our said Territory, and all executions thereupon, be hereby confirmed and continued so fare forth as not to be avoided for want of any legall power in the said Courts; but that all and every such judiciall actings, proceeding and execution shall be of the same force effect and virtue as if such Courts had acted by a just and legall authority. And wee do further by these presents will and require you to permit Appeals to be made in cases of Error from our Courts in our said Territory and Dominion of New England unto you, or the Commander in Cheif for the time being and the Council, in Civill causes: Provided the value appealed for do exceed the sum of one hundred pounds sterling, and that security be first duly given by the Appellant to answer such charges as shall be awarded in case the first sentence shall be affirmed And whereas Wee judge it necessary that all our subjects may have liberty to Appeal to our Royall Person in cases that may require the same: Our will and pleasure is that if either party shall not rest satisfied with the judgement or sentence of you (or the Commander in Cheif for the time being) and the Councill, they may Appeal unto Us in our Privy Councill: Provided the matter in difference exceed the value and summ of three hundred pounds stern and that such Appeal be made within one fortnight after sentence, and that security be likewise duly given by the Appellant to answer such charges as shall be awarded in case the sentence of you (or the Commander in Cheif for the time being) and the Councill be confirmed; and provided also that execution be not suspended by reason of any such appeal unto us. And Wee do hereby give and graunt unto you full power where You shall see cause and shall judge any offender or offenders in capitall and criminall matters, or for any fines or forfeitures due unto us, fit objects of our mercy, to pardon such offenders and to remit such fines & forfeitures, treason and wilfull murder only excepted, in which case you shall likewise have power upon extraordinary occasions to grant reprieves to the offenders therein untill and to the intent our pleasure may Fe further known. And Wee do hereby give and grant unto you the said Sr Edmd Andros by your self your Captains and Commanders, by you to be authorized, full power and authority to levy arme muster command or employ, all persons whatsoever residing within our said Territory and Dominion of New England, and, as occasion shall serve, them to transfers from one place to another for the resisting and withstanding all enemies pyrats and rebells, both at land and sea, and to transfers such forces to any of our Plantations in America or the Territories thereunto belonging, as occasion shall require for the defence of the same against the invasion or attempt of any of our enemies, and then, if occasion shall require to pursue and prosecute in or out of the limits of our said Territories and Plantations or any of them, And if it shall so please God, them to vanquish; and, being taken, according to the law of arms to put to death or keep and preserve alive, at your discretion. And also to execute martiall law in time of invasion insurrection or warr, and during the continuance of the same, and upon soldiers in pay, and to do and execute all and every other thing which to a Captain Generall doth or ought of right to belong, as fully and amply as any our Captain Generall doth or hath usually don. And Wee do hereby give and grant unto you full power and authority to erect raise and build within our Territory and Dominion aforesaid, such and so many forts, platformes, Castles, cities, boroughs, towns, and fortifications as you shall judge necessary; and the same or any of them to fortify and furnish with ordnance ammunition and all sorts of armes, fit and necessary for the security & defence of our said territory; and the same again or any of them to demolish or dismantle as may be most convenient. And Wee do hereby give and grant unto you the said Sr Edmund Andros full power and authority to erect one or more Court or Courts Admirall within our said Territory and Dominion, for the hearing and determining of all marine and other causes and matters proper therein to be heard & determined, with all reasonable and necessary powers, authorities fees and priviledges. And you are to execute all powers belonging to the place and office of Vice Admirall of and in all the seas and coasts about your Government; according to such commission authority and instructions as you shall receive from ourself under the Seal of our Admiralty or from High Admirall of our Foreign Plantations for the time being. And forasmuch as divers mutinies & disorders do happen by persons shipped and imployed at Sea, and to the end that such as shall be shipped or imployed at Sea may be better governed and ordered; Wee do hereby give and grant unto you the said Sr Edmund Andros our Captain Generall and Governor in Cheif, full power and authority to constitute and appoint Captains, Masters of Ships, and other Commanders, commissions to execute the law martial, and to use such proceedings authorities, punishment, correction and execution upon any offender or offenders who shall be mutinous seditious, disorderly or any way unruly either at sea or during the time of their abode or residence in any of the ports harbors or bays of our said Territory and Dominion, as the Cause shall be found to require, according to martial law. Provided that nothing herein conteined shall be construed to the enabling you or any by your authority to hold plea or have jurisdiction of any offence cause matter or thing committed or don upon the sea or within any of the havens, rivers, or creeks of our said Territory and Dominion under your government, by any Captain Commander Lieutenant Master or other officer seaman soldier or person whatsoever, who shall be in actuall service and pay in and on board any of our ships of War or other vessels acting by immediat commission or warrant from our self under the Seal of our Admiralty, or from our High Admirall of England for the time being; but that such Captain Commander Lieut Master officer seaman soldier and other person so offending shall be left to be proceeded against and tryed, as the merit of their offences shall require, either by Commission under our Great Seal of England as the statute of 28 Henry VIII directs, or by commission from our said High Admirall, according to the Act of Parliament passed in the 13th year of the reign of the late King our most dear and most intirely beloved brother of ever blessed memory (entituled An Act for the establishing articles and Orders for the regulating and better governmt of His Matys navys, shipps or warr, and Forces by sea) and not otherwise. Saving only, that it shall and may be lawfull for you, upon such Captains and Commanders refusing or neglecting to execute. Or upon his negligent or undue execution of any the written orders he shall receive from You for our service, & the service of our said Territory and Dominion. to suspend him the said Captain or Commander from the exercise of the said office of Commander and commit him safe custody, either on board his own ship or elsewhere, at the discretion of you, in order to his being brought to answer for the same by commission either under our Great Seal of England or from our said High Admirall as is before expressed. In which case our will and pleasure is that the Captain or Commander so by you suspended shall during his suspension and commitmt be succeeded in his said office, by such commission or Warrant Officer of our said ship appointed by our self or our High Admirall for the time being, as by the known practice and discipline of our Navy doth and ought next to succeed him, as is case of death sickness of other ordinary disability hapning to the Commander of any of our ships & not otherwise; you standing also accountable to us for the truth & importance of the crimes and misdemeanours for which you shall so proceed to the suspending of such our said Captain or Commander. Provided also that all disorders and misdemeanors committed on shore by any Captain Commander, Lieutent, Master, or other officer seaman soldier or person whatsoever belonging to any of our ships of warr or other vessel acting by immediate commission or warrt from our self under the Great Seal of our Admiralty or from our High Admll from England for the time being may be tryed & punished according to the lawes of the place where any such disorders off'ences and misdemeanors shall be so committed on shore, notwithstanding such offender be in our actuall service and borne in our pay on board any such out shipps of warr or other vessels acting by immediate Commission or warrant from ourself or our High Admirall as aforesaid; so as he shall not receive any protection (for the avoiding of justice for such offences committed on shore) from any presence of his being improved in our service at sea. And Wee do likewise give and grant unto you full power and authority by and with the advice and consent of our said Councill to agree with the planters and inhabitants of our said Territory and Dominion concerning such lands, tenements & hereditaments as now are or hereafter shall be in our power to dispose of, and them to grant unto any person or persons for such terms and under such moderat Quit Rents, Services and acknowledgements to be thereupon reserved unto us as shall be appointed by us. Which said grants are to pass and be sealed by our Seal of New England and (being entred upon record by such officer or officers as you shall appoint thereunto, shall be good and effectual in law against us, our heires and successors. And Wee do hereby give you full power and authority to appoint so many faires martes and markets as you with the advise of the said Councill shall think fitt. As likewise to order and appoint within our said Territory such and so many ports harbors, bayes havens and other places for the convenience and security of shipping, and for the better loading and unloading of goods and merchandise as by you with the advice and consent of our Councill shall be thought flit and necessary; and in them or any of them to erect nominal and appoint Cuxtom houses ware houses and officers relating thereto; and them to alter change, place, or displace from time to time, as with the advice aforesaid shall be thought fitt. And forasmuch as pursuant to the lawes & customes of our Colony of the Massachusetts Bay and of our other Colonies and Probes aforementioned, divers marriages have been made and performs by the Magstrats of our said territory; Our royall will and please is hereby to confirm all the said marriages and to direct that they be held good and valid in the same manner to all intents and purposes whatsoever as if they had been made and contracted according to the lawes established within our kingdom of England. And Wee do hereby require and command all officers and ministers, civill and military and all other inhabitants of our said Territory and Dominion to be obedient aiding and assisting unto you the said Sr Edmd Andros in the execution of this our commission and of the powers and authorityes therein contained, and upon your death or absence out of our said Territory unto our Lieut. Governor, to whom wee do therefore by these presents give and grant all and singular the powers and authorityes aforesaid to be exercised and enjoyed by him in case of your death or absence during our pleasure, or untill your arrival within our said Territory and Dominion; as Wee do further hereby give and grant full power and authority to our Lieut. Governor to do and execute whatsoever he shall be by you authorized and appointed to do and execute, in pursuance of and according to the powers granted to you by this Commission. And if in the case of your death or absence there be no person upon the place, appointed by us to be Commander in Cheif; our will and pleasure is, that the then' present Councill of our Territory aforesaid, do take upon them the administration of the Governmt and execute this commission and the severall powers and authoritys herein contained; and that the first Counselor who shall be at the time of yor death or absence residing within the same, do preside in our said Councill, with such powers and preheminencies as any former President hath used and enjoyed within our said territory, or any other our plantations in America, untill our pleasure be further known, or your arrivall as aforesaid. And lastly, our will and pleasure is that you the said Sr Edmund Andros shall and may hold exercise and enjoy the office and place of Captain Generall and Governor in Cheif in and over our Territory and Dominion aforesaid, with all its rights members and appurtenances'whatsoever, together with all and singular the powers and authorityes hereby granted unto you, for and during our will and pleasure. In Witness whereof Wee have caused these our letters to be made Patents. Witness our self at Westminster the seventh day of Aprill in the fourth year of our reign. By Writ of Privy Seal Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/mass06.asp This organization ended three years later in 1689 when the Stuart Dynasty ended and the individual colonies took back their relative independence from each other.
- Galloway's Plan for Union
Resolution submitted by Joseph Galloway: Resolved, That the Congress will apply to his Majesty for a redress of grievances under which his faithful subjects in America labour; and assure him, that the Colonies hold in abhorrence the idea of being considered independent communities on the British government, and most ardently desire the establishment of a Political Union, not only among themselves, but with the Mother State, upon those principles of safety and freedom which are essential in the constitution of all free governments, and particularly that of the British Legislature; and as the Colonies from their local circumstances, cannot be represented in the Parliament of Great-Britain, they will humbly propose to his Majesty and his two Houses of Parliament, the following plan, under which the strength of the whole Empire may be drawn together on any emergency, the interest of both countries advanced, and the rights and liberties of America secured. A Plan of a proposed Union between Great Britain and the Colonies. That a British and American legislature, for regulating the administration of the general affairs of America, be proposed and established in America, including all the said colonies; within, and under which government, each colony shall retain its present constitution, and powers of regulating and governing its own internal police, in all cases whatsoever. That the said government be administered by a President General, to be appointed by the King, and a grand Council, to be chosen by the Representatives of the people of the several colonies, in their respective assemblies, once in every three years. That the several assemblies shall choose members for the grand council in the following proportions, viz. New Hampshire. ____ Massachusetts-Bay. ____ Rhode Island. ____ Connecticut. ____ New-York. ____ New-Jersey. ____ Pennsylvania. ____ Delaware Counties. ____ Maryland. ____ Virginia. ____ North Carolina. ____ South-Carolina. ____ Georgia. ____ Who shall meet at the city of ________ for the first time, being called by the President-General, as soon as conveniently may be after his appointment. That there shall be a new election of members for the Grand Council every three years; and on the death, removal or resignation of any member, his place shall be supplied by a new choice, at the next sitting of Assembly of the Colony he represented. That the Grand Council shall meet once in every year, if they shall think it necessary, and oftener, if occasions shall require, at such time and place as they shall adjourn to, at the last preceding meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at, by the President-General, on any emergency. That the grand Council shall have power to choose their Speaker, and shall hold and exercise all the like rights, liberties and privileges, as are held and exercised by and in the House of Commons of Great-Britain. That the President-General shall hold his office during the pleasure of the King, and his assent shall be requisite to all acts of the Grand Council, and it shall be his office and duty to cause them to be carried into execution. That the President-General, by and with the advice and consent of the Grand-Council, hold and exercise all the legislative rights, powers, and authorities, necessary for regulating and administering all the general police and affairs of the colonies, in which Great-Britain and the colonies, or any of them, the colonies in general, or more than one colony, are in any manner concerned, as well civil and criminal as commercial. That the said President-General and the Grand Council, be an inferior and distinct branch of the British legislature, united and incorporated with it, for the aforesaid general purposes; and that any of the said general regulations may originate and be formed and digested, either in the Parliament of Great Britain, or in the said Grand Council, and being prepared, transmitted to the other for their approbation or dissent; and that the assent of both shall be requisite to the validity of all such general acts or statutes. That in time of war, all bills for granting aid to the crown, prepared by the Grand Council, and approved by the President General, shall be valid and passed into a law, without the assent of the British Parliament. Source: Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774--1789. Edited by Worthington C. Ford et al. 34 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904--37.
- Edmund Burke's Plan for Conciliation
Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies 22 Mar. 1775 I hope, Sir, that notwithstanding the austerity of the Chair, your good nature will incline you to some degree of indulgence towards human frailty. You will not think it unnatural that those who have an object depending, which strongly engages their hopes and fears, should be somewhat inclined to superstition. As I came into the House full of anxiety about the event of my motion, I found, to my infinite surprise, that the grand penal bill, by which we had passed sentence on the trade and sustenance of America, is to be returned to us from the other House. I do confess I could not help looking on this event as a fortunate omen. I look upon it as a sort of providential favor, by which we are put once more in possession of our deliberative capacity upon a business so very questionable in its nature, so very uncertain in its issue. By the return of this bill, which seemed to have taken its flight forever, we are at this very instant nearly as free to choose a plan for our American Government as we were on the first day of the session. If, Sir, we incline to the side of conciliation, we are not at all embarrassed (unless we please to make ourselves so) by any incongruous mixture of coercion and restraint. We are therefore called upon, as it were by a superior warning voice, again to attend to America; to attend to the whole of it together; and to review the subject with an unusual degree of care and calmness. Surely it is an awful subject, or there is none so on this side of the grave. When I first had the honor of a seat in this House, the affairs of that continent pressed themselves upon us as the most important and most delicate object of Parliamentary attention. My little share in this great deliberation oppressed me. I found myself a partaker in a very high trust; and, having no sort of reason to rely on the strength of my natural abilities for the proper execution of that trust, I was obliged to take more than common pains to instruct myself in everything which relates to our Colonies. I was not less under the necessity of forming some fixed ideas concerning the general policy of the British Empire. Something of this sort seemed to be indispensable, in order, amidst so vast a fluctuation of passions and opinions, to concentre my thoughts, to ballast my conduct, to preserve me from being blown about by every wind of fashionable doctrine. I really did not think it safe or manly to have fresh principles to seek upon every fresh mail which should arrive from America. At that period I had the fortune to find myself in perfect concurrence with a large majority in this House. Bowing under that high authority, and penetrated with the sharpness and strength of that early impression, I have continued ever since, without the least deviation, in my original sentiments. Whether this be owing to an obstinate perseverance in error, or to a religious adherence to what appears to me truth, and reason, it is in your equity to judge. Sir, Parliament having an enlarged view of objects, made, during this interval, more frequent changes in their sentiments and their conduct than could be justified in a particular person upon the contracted scale of private information. But though I do not hazard anything approaching to a censure on the motives of former Parliaments to all those alterations, one fact is undoubted—that under them the state of America has been kept in continual agitation. Everything administered as remedy to the public complaint, if it did not produce, was at least followed by, an heightening of the distemper; until, by a variety of experiments, that important country has been brought into her present situation—a situation which I will not miscall, which I dare not name, which I scarcely know how to comprehend in the terms of any description. In this posture, Sir, things stood at the beginning of the session. About that time, a worthy member of great Parliamentary experience, who, in the year 1766, filled the chair of the American committee with much ability, took me aside; and, lamenting the present aspect of our politics, told me things were come to such a pass that our former methods of proceeding in the House would be no longer tolerated: that the public tribunal (never too indulgent to a long and unsuccessful opposition) would now scrutinize our conduct with unusual severity: that the very vicissitudes and shiftings of Ministerial measures, instead of convicting their authors of inconstancy and want of system, would be taken as an occasion of charging us with a predetermined discontent, which nothing could satisfy; whilst we accused every measure of vigor as cruel, and every proposal of lenity as weak and irresolute. The public, he said, would not have patience to see us play the game out with our adversaries; we must produce our hand. It would be expected that those who for many years had been active in such affairs should show that they had formed some clear and decided idea of the principles of Colony government; and were capable of drawing out something like a platform of the ground which might be laid for future and permanent tranquillity. I felt the truth of what my honorable friend represented; but I felt my situation too. His application might have been made with far greater propriety to many other gentlemen. No man was indeed ever better disposed, or worse qualified, for such an undertaking than myself. Though I gave so far in to his opinion that I immediately threw my thoughts into a sort of Parliamentary form, I was by no means equally ready to produce them. It generally argues some degree of natural impotence of mind, or some want of knowledge of the world, to hazard plans of government except from a seat of authority. Propositions are made, not only ineffectually, but somewhat disreputably, when the minds of men are not properly disposed for their reception; and, for my part, I am not ambitious of ridicule—not absolutely a candidate for disgrace. Besides, Sir, to speak the plain truth, I have in general no very exalted opinion of the virtue of paper government; nor of any politics in which the plan is to be wholly separated from the execution. But when I saw that anger and violence prevailed every day more and more, and that things were hastening towards an incurable alienation of our Colonies, I confess my caution gave way. I felt this as one of those few moments in which decorum yields to a higher duty. Public calamity is a mighty leveller; and there are occasions when any, even the slightest, chance of doing good must be laid hold on, even by the most inconsiderable person. To restore order and repose to an empire so great and so distracted as ours, is, merely in the attempt, an undertaking that would ennoble the flights of the highest genius, and obtain pardon for the efforts of the meanest understanding. Struggling a good while with these thoughts, by degrees I felt myself more firm. I derived, at length, some confidence from what in other circumstances usually produces timidity. I grew less anxious, even from the idea of my own insignificance. For, judging of what you are by what you ought to be, I persuaded myself that you would not reject a reasonable proposition because it had nothing but its reason to recommend it. On the other hand, being totally destitute of all shadow of influence, natural or adventitious, I was very sure that, if my proposition were futile or dangerous—if it were weakly conceived, or improperly timed—there was nothing exterior to it of power to awe, dazzle, or delude you. You will see it just as it is; and you will treat it just as it deserves. The proposition is peace. Not peace through the medium of war; not peace to be hunted through the labyrinth of intricate and endless negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal discord fomented, from principle, in all parts of the Empire, not peace to depend on the juridical determination of perplexing questions, or the precise marking the shadowy boundaries of a complex government. It is simple peace; sought in its natural course, and in its ordinary haunts. It is peace sought in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific. I propose, by removing the ground of the difference, and by restoring the former unsuspecting confidence of the Colonies in the Mother Country, to give permanent satisfaction to your people; and (far from a scheme of ruling by discord) to reconcile them to each other in the same act and by the bond of the very same interest which reconciles them to British government. My idea is nothing more. Refined policy ever has been, the parent of confusion; and ever will be so, as long as the world endures. Plain good intention, which is as easily discovered at the first view as fraud is surely detected at last, is, let me say, of no mean force in the government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is an healing and cementing principle. My plan, therefore, being formed upon the most simple grounds imaginable, may disappoint some people when they hear it. It has nothing to recommend it to the pruriency of curious ears. There is nothing at all new and captivating in it. It has nothing of the splendor of the project which has been lately laid upon your table by the noble lord in the blue ribbon. It does not propose to fill your lobby with squabbling Colony agents, who will require the interposition of your mace, at every instant, to keep the peace amongst them. It does not institute a magnificent auction of finance, where captivated provinces come to general ransom by bidding against each other, until you knock down the hammer, and determine a proportion of payments beyond all the powers of algebra to equalize and settle. The plan which I shall presume to suggest derives, however, one great advantage from the proposition and registry of that noble lord's project. The idea of conciliation is admissible. First, the House, in accepting the resolution moved by the noble lord, has admitted, notwithstanding the menacing front of our address, notwithstanding our heavy bills of pains and penalties—that we do not think ourselves precluded from all ideas of free grace and bounty. The House has gone farther; it has declared conciliation admissible, previous to any submission on the part of America. It has even shot a good deal beyond that mark, and has admitted that the complaints of our former mode of exerting the right of taxation were not wholly unfounded. That right thus exerted is allowed to have something reprehensible in it, something unwise, or something grievous; since, in the midst of our heat and resentment, we, of ourselves, have proposed a capital alteration; and in order to get rid of what seemed so very exceptionable, have instituted a mode that is altogether new; one that is, indeed, wholly alien from all the ancient methods and forms of Parliament. The principle of this proceeding is large enough for my purpose. The means proposed by the noble lord for carrying his ideas into execution, I think, indeed, are very indifferently suited to the end; and this I shall endeavor to show you before I sit down. But, for the present, I take my ground on the admitted principle. I mean to give peace. Peace implies reconciliation; and where there has been a material dispute, reconciliation does in a manner always imply concession on the one part or on the other. In this state of things, I make no difficulty in affirming that the proposal ought to originate from us. Great and acknowledged force is not impaired, either in effect or in opinion, by an unwillingness to exert itself. The superior power may offer peace with honor and with safety. Such an offer from such a power will be attributed to magnanimity. But the concessions of the weak are the concessions of fear. When such a one is disarmed, he is wholly at the mercy of his superior; and he loses forever that time and those chances, which, as they happen to all men, are the strength and resources of all inferior power. The capital leading questions on which you must this day decide are these two: First, whether you ought to concede; and secondly, what your concession ought to be. On the first of these questions we have gained, as I have just taken the liberty of observing to you, some ground. But I am sensible that a good deal more is still to be done. Indeed, Sir, to enable us to determine both on the one and the other of these great questions with a firm and precise judgment, I think it may be necessary to consider distinctly the true nature and the peculiar circumstances of the object which we have before us; because after all our struggle, whether we will or not, we must govern America according to that nature and to those circumstances, and not according to our own imaginations, nor according to abstract ideas of right—by no means according to mere general theories of government, the resort to which appears to me, in our present situation, no better than arrant trifling. I shall therefore endeavor, with your leave, to lay before you some of the most material of these circumstances in as full and as clear a manner as I am able to state them. The first thing that we have to consider with regard to the nature of the object is—the number of people in the Colonies. I have taken for some years a good deal of pains on that point. I can by no calculation justify myself in placing the number below two millions of inhabitants of our own European blood and color, besides at least five hundred thousand others, who form no inconsiderable part of the strength and opulence of the whole. This, Sir, is, I believe, about the true number. There is no occasion to exaggerate where plain truth is of so much weight and importance. But whether I put the present numbers too high or too low is a matter of little moment. Such is the strength with which population shoots in that part of the world, that, state the numbers as high as we will, whilst the dispute continues, the exaggeration ends. Whilst we are discussing any given magnitude, they are grown to it. Whilst we spend our time in deliberating on the mode of governing two millions, we shall find we have millions more to manage. Your children do not grow faster from infancy to manhood than they spread from families to communities, and from villages to nations. I put this consideration of the present and the growing numbers in the front of our deliberation, because, Sir, this consideration will make it evident to a blunter discernment than yours, that no partial, narrow, contracted, pinched, occasional system will be at all suitable to such an object. It will show you that it is not to be considered as one of those minima which are out of the eye and consideration of the law; not a paltry excrescence of the state; not a mean dependent, who may be neglected with little damage and provoked with little danger. It will prove that some degree of care and caution is required in the handling such an object; it will show that you ought not, in reason, to trifle with so large a mass of the interests and feelings of the human race. You could at no time do so without guilt; and be assured you will not be able to do it long with impunity. But the population of this country, the great and growing population, though a very important consideration, will lose much of its weight if not combined with other circumstances. The commerce of your Colonies is out of all proportion beyond the numbers of the people. This ground of their commerce indeed has been trod some days ago, and with great ability, by a distinguished person at your bar. This gentleman, after thirty-five years—it is so long since he first appeared at the same place to plead for the commerce of Great Britain—has come again before you to plead the same cause, without any other effect of time, than that to the fire of imagination and extent of erudition which even then marked him as one of the first literary characters of his age, he has added a consummate knowledge in the commercial interest of his country, formed by a long course of enlightened and discriminating experience. Sir, I should be inexcusable in coming after such a person with any detail, if a great part of the members who now fill the House had not the misfortune to be absent when he appeared at your bar. Besides, Sir, I propose to take the matter at periods of time somewhat different from his. There is, if I mistake not, a point of view from whence, if you will look at the subject, it is impossible that it should not make an impression upon you. I have in my hand two accounts; one a comparative state of the export trade of England to its Colonies, as it stood in the year 1704, and as it stood in the year 1772; the other a state of the export trade of this country to its Colonies alone, as it stood in 1772, compared with the whole trade of England to all parts of the world (the Colonies included) in the year 1704. They are from good vouchers; the latter period from the accounts on your table, the earlier from an original manuscript of Davenant, who first established the Inspector-General's office, which has been ever since his time so abundant a source of Parliamentary information. The export trade to the Colonies consists of three great branches: the African—which, terminating almost wholly in the Colonies, must be put to the account of their commerce,—the West Indian, and the North American. All these are so interwoven that the attempt to separate them would tear to pieces the contexture of the whole; and, if not entirely destroy, would very much depreciate the value of all the parts. I therefore consider these three denominations to be, what in effect they are, one trade. The trade to the Colonies, taken on the export side, at the beginning of this century, that is, in the year 1704, stood thus:— Exports to North America and the West Indies. L483,265 To Africa. .................................. 86,665 ———— L569,930 In the year 1772, which I take as a middle year between the highest and lowest of those lately laid on your table, the account was as follows:— To North America and the West Indies ...... L4,791,734 To Africa. ................................ 866,398 To which, if you add the export trade from Scotland, which had in 1704 no existence .. 364,000 ————— L6,022,132 From five hundred and odd thousand, it has grown to six millions. It has increased no less than twelve-fold. This is the state of the Colony trade as compared with itself at these two periods within this century;—and this is matter for meditation. But this is not all. Examine my second account. See how the export trade to the Colonies alone in 1772 stood in the other point of view; that is, as compared to the whole trade of England in 1704:— The whole export trade of England, including that to the Colonies, in 1704. ................ L6,509,000 Export to the Colonies alone, in 1772 ......... 6,024,000 ————— Difference, L485,000 The trade with America alone is now within less than L500,000 of being equal to what this great commercial nation, England, carried on at the beginning of this century with the whole world! If I had taken the largest year of those on your table, it would rather have exceeded. But, it will be said, is not this American trade an unnatural protuberance, that has drawn the juices from the rest of the body? The reverse. It is the very food that has nourished every other part into its present magnitude. Our general trade has been greatly augmented, and augmented more or less in almost every part to which it ever extended; but with this material difference, that of the six millions which in the beginning of the century constituted the whole mass of our export commerce, the Colony trade was but one-twelfth part, it is now (as a part of sixteen millions) considerably more than a third of the whole. This is the relative proportion of the importance of the Colonies at these two periods, and all reasoning concerning our mode of treating them must have this proportion as its basis, or it is a reasoning weak, rotten, and sophistical. Mr. Speaker, I cannot prevail on myself to hurry over this great consideration. IT IS GOOD FOR US TO BE HERE. We stand where we have an immense view of what is, and what is past. Clouds, indeed, and darkness, rest upon the future. Let us, however, before we descend from this noble eminence, reflect that this growth of our national prosperity has happened within the short period of the life of man. It has happened within sixty-eight years. There are those alive whose memory might touch the two extremities. For instance, my Lord Bathurst might remember all the stages of the progress. He was in 1704 of an age at least to be made to comprehend such things. He was then old enough acta parentum jam legere, et quae sit potuit cognoscere virtus. Suppose, Sir, that the angel of this auspicious youth, foreseeing the many virtues which made him one of the most amiable, as he is one of the most fortunate, men of his age, had opened to him in vision that when in the fourth generation the third Prince of the House of Brunswick had sat twelve years on the throne of that nation which, by the happy issue of moderate and healing counsels, was to be made Great Britain, he should see his son, Lord Chancellor of England, turn back the current of hereditary dignity to its fountain, and raise him to a higher rank of peerage, whilst he enriched the family with a new one—if, amidst these bright and happy scenes of domestic honor and prosperity, that angel should have drawn up the curtain, and unfolded the rising glories of his country, and, whilst he was gazing with admiration on the then commercial grandeur of England, the genius should point out to him a little speck, scarcely visible in the mass of the national interest, a small seminal principle, rather than a formed body, and should tell him: "Young man, there is America—which at this day serves for little more than to amuse you with stories of savage men, and uncouth manners; yet shall, before you taste of death, show itself equal to the whole of that commerce which now attracts the envy of the world. Whatever England has been growing to by a progressive increase of improvement, brought in by varieties of people, by succession of civilizing conquests and civilizing settlements in a series of seventeen hundred years, you shall see as much added to her by America in the course of a single life!" If this state of his country had been foretold to him, would it not require all the sanguine credulity of youth, and all the fervid glow of enthusiasm, to make him believe it? Fortunate man, he has lived to see it! Fortunate, indeed, if he lives to see nothing that shall vary the prospect, and cloud the setting of his day! Excuse me, Sir, if turning from such thoughts I resume this comparative view once more. You have seen it on a large scale; look at it on a small one. I will point out to your attention a particular instance of it in the single province of Pennsylvania. In the year 1704 that province called for L11,459 in value of your commodities, native and foreign. This was the whole. What did it demand in 1772? Why, nearly fifty times as much; for in that year the export to Pennsylvania was L507,909, nearly equal to the export to all the Colonies together in the first period. I choose, Sir, to enter into these minute and particular details, because generalities, which in all other cases are apt to heighten and raise the subject, have here a tendency to sink it. When we speak of the commerce with our Colonies, fiction lags after truth, invention is unfruitful, and imagination cold and barren. So far, Sir, as to the importance of the object, in view of its commerce, as concerned in the exports from England. If I were to detail the imports, I could show how many enjoyments they procure which deceive the burthen of life; how many materials which invigorate the springs of national industry, and extend and animate every part of our foreign and domestic commerce. This would be a curious subject indeed; but I must prescribe bounds to myself in a matter so vast and various. I pass, therefore, to the Colonies in another point of view, their agriculture. This they have prosecuted with such a spirit, that, besides feeding plentifully their own growing multitude, their annual export of grain, comprehending rice, has some years ago exceeded a million in value. Of their last harvest I am persuaded they will export much more. At the beginning of the century some of these Colonies imported corn from the Mother Country. For some time past the Old World has been fed from the New. The scarcity which you have felt would have been a desolating famine, if this child of your old age, with a true filial piety, with a Roman charity, had not put the full breast of its youthful exuberance to the mouth of its exhausted parent. As to the wealth which the Colonies have drawn from the sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter fully opened at your bar. You surely thought those acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your envy; and yet the spirit by which that enterprising employment has been exercised ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised your esteem and admiration. And pray, Sir, what in the world is equal to it? Pass by the other parts, and look at the manner in which the people of New England have of late carried on the whale fishery. Whilst we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits, whilst we are looking for them beneath the arctic circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen Serpent of the south. Falkland Island, which seemed too remote and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting-place in the progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. We know that whilst some of them draw the line and strike the harpoon on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude and pursue their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil. No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries; no climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise ever carried this most perilous mode of hardy industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people; a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood. When I contemplate these things; when I know that the Colonies in general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that they are not squeezed into this happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious government, but that, through a wise and salutary neglect, a generous nature has been suffered to take her own way to perfection; when I reflect upon these effects, when I see how profitable they have been to us, I feel all the pride of power sink, and all presumption in the wisdom of human contrivances melt and die away within me. My rigor relents. I pardon something to the spirit of liberty. I am sensible, Sir, that all which I have asserted in my detail is admitted in the gross; but that quite a different conclusion is drawn from it. America, gentlemen say, is a noble object. It is an object well worth fighting for. Certainly it is, if fighting a people be the best way of gaining them. Gentlemen in this respect will be led to their choice of means by their complexions and their habits. Those who understand the military art will of course have some predilection for it. Those who wield the thunder of the state may have more confidence in the efficacy of arms. But I confess, possibly for want of this knowledge, my opinion is much more in favor of prudent management than of force; considering force not as an odious, but a feeble instrument for preserving a people so numerous, so active, so growing, so spirited as this, in a profitable and subordinate connection with us. First, Sir, permit me to observe that the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again; and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered. My next objection is its uncertainty. Terror is not always the effect of force, and an armament is not a victory. If you do not succeed, you are without resource; for, conciliation failing, force remains; but, force failing, no further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and authority are sometimes bought by kindness; but they can never be begged as alms by an impoverished and defeated violence. A further objection to force is, that you impair the object by your very endeavors to preserve it. The thing you fought for is not the thing which you recover; but depreciated, sunk, wasted, and consumed in the contest. Nothing less will content me than WHOLE AMERICA. I do not choose to consume its strength along with our own, because in all parts it is the British strength that I consume. I do not choose to be caught by a foreign enemy at the end of this exhausting conflict; and still less in the midst of it. I may escape; but I can make no insurance against such an event. Let me add, that I do not choose wholly to break the American spirit; because it is the spirit that has made the country. Lastly, we have no sort of experience in favor of force as an instrument in the rule of our Colonies. Their growth and their utility has been owing to methods altogether different. Our ancient indulgence has been said to be pursued to a fault. It may be so. But we know if feeling is evidence, that our fault was more tolerable than our attempt to mend it; and our sin far more salutary than our penitence. These, Sir, are my reasons for not entertaining that high opinion of untried force by which many gentlemen, for whose sentiments in other particulars I have great respect, seem to be so greatly captivated. But there is still behind a third consideration concerning this object which serves to determine my opinion on the sort of policy which ought to be pursued in the management of America, even more than its population and its commerce—I mean its temper and character. In this character of the Americans, a love of freedom is the predominating feature which marks and distinguishes the whole; and as an ardent is always a jealous affection, your Colonies become suspicious, restive, and untractable whenever they see the least attempt to wrest from them by force, or shuffle from them by chicane, what they think the only advantage worth living for. This fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in the English Colonies probably than in any other people of the earth, and this from a great variety of powerful causes; which, to understand the true temper of their minds and the direction which this spirit takes, it will not be amiss to lay open somewhat more largely. First, the people of the Colonies are descendants of Englishmen. England, Sir, is a nation which still, I hope, respects, and formerly adored, her freedom. The Colonists emigrated from you when this part of your character was most predominant; and they took this bias and direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas, and on English principles. Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found. Liberty inheres in some sensible object; and every nation has formed to itself some favorite point, which by way of eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness. It happened, you know, Sir, that the great contests for freedom in this country were from the earliest times chiefly upon the question of taxing. Most of the contests in the ancient commonwealths turned primarily on the right of election of magistrates; or on the balance among the several orders of the state. The question of money was not with them so immediate. But in England it was otherwise. On this point of taxes the ablest pens, and most eloquent tongues, have been exercised; the greatest spirits have acted and suffered. In order to give the fullest satisfaction concerning the importance of this point, it was not only necessary for those who in argument defended the excellence of the English Constitution to insist on this privilege of granting money as a dry point of fact, and to prove that the right had been acknowledged in ancient parchments and blind usages to reside in a certain body called a House of Commons. They went much farther; they attempted to prove, and they succeeded, that in theory it ought to be so, from the particular nature of a House of Commons as an immediate representative of the people, whether the old records had delivered this oracle or not. They took infinite pains to inculcate, as a fundamental principle, that in all monarchies the people must in effect themselves, mediately or immediately, possess the power of granting their own money, or no shadow of liberty can subsist. The Colonies draw from you, as with their life-blood, these ideas and principles. Their love of liberty, as with you, fixed and attached on this specific point of taxing. Liberty might be safe, or might be endangered, in twenty other particulars, without their being much pleased or alarmed. Here they felt its pulse; and as they found that beat, they thought themselves sick or sound. I do not say whether they were right or wrong in applying your general arguments to their own case. It is not easy, indeed, to make a monopoly of theorems and corollaries. The fact is, that they did thus apply those general arguments; and your mode of governing them, whether through lenity or indolence, through wisdom or mistake, confirmed them in the imagination that they, as well as you, had an interest in these common principles. They were further confirmed in this pleasing error by the form of their provincial legislative assemblies. Their governments are popular in an high degree; some are merely popular; in all, the popular representative is the most weighty; and this share of the people in their ordinary government never fails to inspire them with lofty sentiments, and with a strong aversion from whatever tends to deprive them of their chief importance. If anything were wanting to this necessary operation of the form of government, religion would have given it a complete effect. Religion, always a principle of energy, in this new people is no way worn out or impaired; and their mode of professing it is also one main cause of this free spirit. The people are Protestants; and of that kind which is the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion. This is a persuasion not only favorable to liberty, but built upon it. I do not think, Sir, that the reason of this averseness in the dissenting churches from all that looks like absolute government is so much to be sought in their religious tenets, as in their history. Every one knows that the Roman Catholic religion is at least co-eval with most of the governments where it prevails; that it has generally gone hand in hand with them, and received great favor and every kind of support from authority. The Church of England too was formed from her cradle under the nursing care of regular government. But the dissenting interests have sprung up in direct opposition to all the ordinary powers of the world, and could justify that opposition only on a strong claim to natural liberty. Their very existence depended on the powerful and unremitted assertion of that claim. All Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent in our Northern Colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance; it is the dissidence of dissent, and the protestantism of the Protestant religion. This religion, under a variety of denominations agreeing in nothing but in the communion of the spirit of liberty, is predominant in most of the Northern Provinces, where the Church of England, notwithstanding its legal rights, is in reality no more than a sort of private sect, not composing most probably the tenth of the people. The Colonists left England when this spirit was high, and in the emigrants was the highest of all; and even that stream of foreigners which has been constantly flowing into these Colonies has, for the greatest part, been composed of dissenters from the establishments of their several countries, who have brought with them a temper and character far from alien to that of the people with whom they mixed. Sir, I can perceive by their manner that some gentlemen object to the latitude of this description, because in the Southern Colonies the Church of England forms a large body, and has a regular establishment. It is certainly true. There is, however, a circumstance attending these Colonies which, in my opinion, fully counterbalances this difference, and makes the spirit of liberty still more high and haughty than in those to the northward. It is that in Virginia and the Carolinas they have a vast multitude of slaves. Where this is the case in any part of the world, those who are free are by far the most proud and jealous of their freedom. Freedom is to them not only an enjoyment, but a kind of rank and privilege. Not seeing there, that freedom, as in countries where it is a common blessing and as broad and general as the air, may be united with much abject toil, with great misery, with all the exterior of servitude; liberty looks, amongst them, like something that is more noble and liberal. I do not mean, Sir, to commend the superior morality of this sentiment, which has at least as much pride as virtue in it; but I cannot alter the nature of man. The fact is so; and these people of the Southern Colonies are much more strongly, and with an higher and more stubborn spirit, attached to liberty than those to the northward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths; such were our Gothic ancestors; such in our days were the Poles; and such will be all masters of slaves, who are not slaves themselves. In such a people the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible. Permit me, Sir, to add another circumstance in our Colonies which contributes no mean part towards the growth and effect of this untractable spirit. I mean their education. In no country perhaps in the world is the law so general a study. The profession itself is numerous and powerful; and in most provinces it takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies sent to the Congress were lawyers. But all who read, and most do read, endeavor to obtain some smattering in that science. I have been told by an eminent bookseller, that in no branch of his business, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many books as those on the law exported to the Plantations. The Colonists have now fallen into the way of printing them for their own use. I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries in America as in England. General Gage marks out this disposition very particularly in a letter on your table. He states that all the people in his government are lawyers, or smatterers in law; and that in Boston they have been enabled, by successful chicane, wholly to evade many parts of one of your capital penal constitutions. The smartness of debate will say that this knowledge ought to teach them more clearly the rights of legislature, their obligations to obedience, and the penalties of rebellion. All this is mighty well. But my honorable and learned friend on the floor, who condescends to mark what I say for animadversion, will disdain that ground. He has heard, as well as I, that when great honors and great emoluments do not win over this knowledge to the service of the state, it is a formidable adversary to government. If the spirit be not tamed and broken by these happy methods, it is stubborn and litigious. Abeunt studia in mores. This study readers men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defence, full of resources. In other countries, the people, more simple, and of a less mercurial cast, judge of an ill principle in government only by an actual grievance; here they anticipate the evil, and judge of the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They augur misgovernment at a distance, and snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze. The last cause of this disobedient spirit in the Colonies is hardly less powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral, but laid deep in the natural constitution of things. Three thousand miles of ocean lie between you and them. No contrivance can prevent the effect of this distance in weakening government. Seas roll, and months pass, between the order and the execution, and the want of a speedy explanation of a single point is enough to defeat a whole system. You have, indeed, winged ministers of vengeance, who carry your bolts in their pounces to the remotest verge of the sea. But there a power steps in that limits the arrogance of raging passions and furious elements, and says, SO FAR SHALL THOU GO, AND NO FARTHER. Who are you, that you should fret and rage, and bite the chains of nature? Nothing worse happens to you than does to all nations who have extensive empire; and it happens in all the forms into which empire can be thrown. In large bodies the circulation of power must be less vigorous at the extremities. Nature has said it. The Turk cannot govern Egypt and Arabia and Kurdistan as he governs Thrace; nor has he the same dominion in Crimea and Algiers which he has at Brusa and Smyrna. Despotism itself is obliged to truck and huckster. The Sultan gets such obedience as he can. He governs with a loose rein, that he may govern at all; and the whole of the force and vigor of his authority in his centre is derived from a prudent relaxation in all his borders. Spain, in her provinces, is, perhaps, not so well obeyed as you are in yours. She complies, too; she submits; she watches times. This is the immutable condition, the eternal law of extensive and detached empire. Then, Sir, from these six capital sources—of descent, of form of government, of religion in the Northern Provinces, of manners in the Southern, of education, of the remoteness of situation from the first mover of government—from all these causes a fierce spirit of liberty has grown up. It has grown with the growth of the people in your Colonies, and increased with the increase of their wealth; a spirit that unhappily meeting with an exercise of power in England which, however lawful, is not reconcilable to any ideas of liberty, much less with theirs, has kindled this flame that is ready to consume us. I do not mean to commend either the spirit in this excess, or the moral causes which produce it. Perhaps a more smooth and accommodating spirit of freedom in them would be more acceptable to us. Perhaps ideas of liberty might be desired more reconcilable with an arbitrary and boundless authority. Perhaps we might wish the Colonists to be persuaded that their liberty is more secure when held in trust for them by us, as their guardians during a perpetual minority, than with any part of it in their own hands. The question is, not whether their spirit deserves praise or blame, but—what, in the name of God, shall we do with it? You have before you the object, such as it is, with all its glories, with all its imperfections on its head. You see the magnitude, the importance, the temper, the habits, the disorders. By all these considerations we are strongly urged to determine something concerning it. We are called upon to fix some rule and line for our future conduct which may give a little stability to our politics, and prevent the return of such unhappy deliberations as the present. Every such return will bring the matter before us in a still more untractable form. For, what astonishing and incredible things have we not seen already! What monsters have not been generated from this unnatural contention! Whilst every principle of authority and resistance has been pushed, upon both sides, as far as it would go, there is nothing so solid and certain, either in reasoning or in practice, that has not been shaken. Until very lately all authority in America seemed to be nothing but an emanation from yours. Even, the popular part of the Colony Constitution derived all its activity and its first vital movement from the pleasure of the Crown. We thought, Sir, that the utmost which the discontented Colonies could do was to disturb authority; we never dreamt they could of themselves supply it—knowing in general what an operose business it is to establish a government absolutely new. But having, for our purposes in this contention, resolved that none but an obedient Assembly should sit, the humors of the people there, finding all passage through the legal channel stopped, with great violence broke out another way. Some provinces have tried their experiment, as we have tried ours; and theirs has succeeded. They have formed a government sufficient for its purposes, without the bustle of a revolution or the formality of an election. Evident necessity and tacit consent have done the business in an instant. So well they have done it, that Lord Dunmore—the account is among the fragments on your table—tells you that the new institution is infinitely better obeyed than the ancient government ever was in its most fortunate periods. Obedience is what makes government, and not the names by which it is called; not the name of Governor, as formerly, or Committee, as at present. This new government has originated directly from the people, and was not transmitted through any of the ordinary artificial media of a positive constitution. It was not a manufacture ready formed, and transmitted to them in that condition from England. The evil arising from hence is this; that the Colonists having once found the possibility of enjoying the advantages of order in the midst of a struggle for liberty, such struggles will not henceforward seem so terrible to the settled and sober part of mankind as they had appeared before the trial. Pursuing the same plan of punishing by the denial of the exercise of government to still greater lengths, we wholly abrogated the ancient government of Massachusetts. We were confident that the first feeling if not the very prospect, of anarchy would instantly enforce a complete submission. The experiment was tried. A new, strange, unexpected face of things appeared. Anarchy is found tolerable. A vast province has now subsisted, and subsisted in a considerable degree of health and vigor for near a twelvemonth, without Governor, without public Council, without judges, without executive magistrates. How long it will continue in this state, or what may arise out of this unheard-of situation, how can the wisest of us conjecture? Our late experience has taught us that many of those fundamental principles, formerly believed infallible, are either not of the importance they were imagined to be, or that we have not at all adverted to some other far more important and far more powerful principles, which entirely overrule those we had considered as omnipotent. I am much against any further experiments which tend to put to the proof any more of these allowed opinions which contribute so much to the public tranquillity. In effect we suffer as much at home by this loosening of all ties, and this concussion of all established opinions as we do abroad; for in order to prove that the Americans have no right to their liberties, we are every day endeavoring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit of our own. To prove that the Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to depreciate the value of freedom itself; and we never seem to gain a paltry advantage over them in debate without attacking some of those principles, or deriding some of those feelings, for which our ancestors have shed their blood. But, Sir, in wishing to put an end to pernicious experiments, I do not mean to preclude the fullest inquiry. Far from it. Far from deciding on a sudden or partial view, I would patiently go round and round the subject, and survey it minutely in every possible aspect. Sir, if I were capable of engaging you to an equal attention, I would state that, as far as I am capable of discerning, there are but three ways of proceeding relative to this stubborn spirit which prevails in your Colonies, and disturbs your government. These are—to change that spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the causes; to prosecute it as criminal; or to comply with it as necessary. I would not be guilty of an imperfect enumeration; I can think of but these three. Another has indeed been started,—that of giving up the Colonies; but it met so slight a reception that I do not think myself obliged to dwell a great while upon it. It is nothing but a little sally of anger, like the forwardness of peevish children who, when they cannot get all they would have, are resolved to take nothing. The first of these plans—to change the spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the causes—I think is the most like a systematic proceeding. It is radical in its principle; but it is attended with great difficulties, some of them little short, as I conceive, of impossibilities. This will appear by examining into the plans which have been proposed. As the growing population in the Colonies is evidently one cause of their resistance, it was last session mentioned in both Houses, by men of weight, and received not without applause, that in order to check this evil it would be proper for the Crown to make no further grants of land. But to this scheme there are two objections. The first, that there is already so much unsettled land in private hands as to afford room for an immense future population, although the Crown not only withheld its grants, but annihilated its soil. If this be the case, then the only effect of this avarice of desolation, this hoarding of a royal wilderness, would be to raise the value of the possessions in the hands of the great private monopolists without any adequate cheek to the growing and alarming mischief of population. But if you stopped your grants, what would be the consequence? The people would occupy without grants. They have already so occupied in many places. You cannot station garrisons in every part of these deserts. If you drive the people from one place, they will carry on their annual tillage, and remove with their flocks and herds to another. Many of the people in the back settlements are already little attached to particular situations. Already they have topped the Appalachian Mountains. From thence they behold before them an immense plain, one vast, rich, level meadow; a square of five hundred miles. Over this they would wander without a possibility of restraint; they would change their manners with the habits of their life; would soon forget a government by which they were disowned; would become hordes of English Tartars; and, pouring down upon your unfortified frontiers a fierce and irresistible cavalry, become masters of your governors and your counsellors, your collectors and comptrollers, and of all the slaves that adhered to them. Such would, and in no long time must be, the effect of attempting to forbid as a crime and to suppress as an evil the command and blessing of providence, INCREASE AND MULTIPLY. Such would be the happy result of the endeavor to keep as a lair of wild beasts that earth which God, by an express charter, has given to the children of men. Far different, and surely much wiser, has been our policy hitherto. Hitherto we have invited our people, by every kind of bounty, to fixed establishments. We have invited the husbandman to look to authority for his title. We have taught him piously to believe in the mysterious virtue of wax and parchment. We have thrown each tract of land, as it was peopled, into districts, that the ruling power should never be wholly out of sight. We have settled all we could; and we have carefully attended every settlement with government. Adhering, Sir, as I do, to this policy, as well as for the reasons I have just given, I think this new project of hedging-in population to be neither prudent nor practicable. To impoverish the Colonies in general, and in particular to arrest the noble course of their marine enterprises, would be a more easy task. I freely confess it. We have shown a disposition to a system of this kind, a disposition even to continue the restraint after the offence, looking on ourselves as rivals to our Colonies, and persuaded that of course we must gain all that they shall lose. Much mischief we may certainly do. The power inadequate to all other things is often more than sufficient for this. I do not look on the direct and immediate power of the Colonies to resist our violence as very formidable. In this, however, I may be mistaken. But when I consider that we have Colonies for no purpose but to be serviceable to us, it seems to my poor understanding a little preposterous to make them unserviceable in order to keep them obedient. It is, in truth, nothing more than the old and, as I thought, exploded problem of tyranny, which proposes to beggar its subjects into submission. But remember, when you have completed your system of impoverishment, that nature still proceeds in her ordinary course; that discontent will increase with misery; and that there are critical moments in the fortune of all states when they who are too weak to contribute to your prosperity may be strong enough to complete your ruin. Spoliatis arma supersunt. The temper and character which prevail in our Colonies are, I am afraid, unalterable by any human art. We cannot, I fear, falsify the pedigree of this fierce people, and persuade them that they are not sprung from a nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates. The language in which they would hear you tell them this tale would detect the imposition; your speech would betray you. An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery. I think it is nearly as little in our power to change their republican religion as their free descent; or to substitute the Roman Catholic as a penalty, or the Church of England as an improvement. The mode of inquisition and dragooning is going out of fashion in the Old World, and I should not confide much to their efficacy in the New. The education of the Americans is also on the same unalterable bottom with their religion. You cannot persuade them to burn their books of curious science; to banish their lawyers from their courts of laws; or to quench the lights of their assemblies by refusing to choose those persons who are best read in their privileges. It would be no less impracticable to think of wholly annihilating the popular assemblies in which these lawyers sit. The army, by which we must govern in their place, would be far more chargeable to us, not quite so effectual, and perhaps in the end full as difficult to be kept in obedience. With regard to the high aristocratic spirit of Virginia and the Southern Colonies, it has been proposed, I know, to reduce it by declaring a general enfranchisement of their slaves. This object has had its advocates and panegyrists; yet I never could argue myself into any opinion of it. Slaves are often much attached to their masters. A general wild offer of liberty would not always be accepted. History furnishes few instances of it. It is sometimes as hard to persuade slaves to be free, as it is to compel freemen to be slaves; and in this auspicious scheme we should have both these pleasing tasks on our hands at once. But when we talk of enfranchisement, do we not perceive that the American master may enfranchise too, and arm servile hands in defence of freedom?—a measure to which other people have had recourse more than once, and not without success, in a desperate situation of their affairs. Slaves as these unfortunate black people are, and dull as all men are from slavery, must they not a little suspect the offer of freedom from that very nation which has sold them to their present masters?—from that nation, one of whose causes of quarrel with those masters is their refusal to deal any more in that inhuman traffic? An offer of freedom from England would come rather oddly, shipped to them in an African vessel which is refused an entry into the ports of Virginia or Carolina with a cargo of three hundred Angola negroes. It would be curious to see the Guinea captain attempting at the same instant to publish his proclamation of liberty, and to advertise his sale of slaves. But let us suppose all these moral difficulties got over. The ocean remains. You cannot pump this dry; and as long as it continues in its present bed, so long all the causes which weaken authority by distance will continue. "Ye gods, annihilate but space and time, And make two lovers happy!" was a pious and passionate prayer; but just as reasonable as many of the serious wishes of grave and solemn politicians. If then, Sir, it seems almost desperate to think of any alterative course for changing the moral causes, and not quite easy to remove the natural, which produce prejudices irreconcilable to the late exercise of our authority—but that the spirit infallibly will continue, and, continuing, will produce such effects as now embarrass us—the second mode under consideration is to prosecute that spirit in its overt acts as criminal. At this proposition I must pause a moment. The thing seems a great deal too big for my ideas of jurisprudence. It should seem to my way of conceiving such matters that there is a very wide difference, in reason and policy, between the mode of proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals, or even of bands of men who disturb order within the state, and the civil dissensions which may, from time to time, on great questions, agitate the several communities which compose a great empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic to apply the ordinary ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people. I cannot insult and ridicule the feelings of millions of my fellow-creatures as Sir Edward Coke insulted one excellent individual (Sir Walter Raleigh) at the bar. I hope I am not ripe to pass sentence on the gravest public bodies, intrusted with magistracies of great authority and dignity, and charged with the safety of their fellow-citizens, upon the very same title that I am. I really think that, for wise men, this is not judicious; for sober men, not decent; for minds tinctured with humanity, not mild and merciful. Perhaps, Sir, I am mistaken in my idea of an empire, as distinguished from a single state or kingdom. But my idea of it is this; that an empire is the aggregate of many states under one common head, whether this head be a monarch or a presiding republic. It does, in such constitutions, frequently happen—and nothing but the dismal, cold, dead uniformity of servitude can prevent its happening—that the subordinate parts have many local privileges and immunities. Between these privileges and the supreme common authority the line may be extremely nice. Of course disputes, often, too, very bitter disputes, and much ill blood, will arise. But though every privilege is an exemption, in the case, from the ordinary exercise of the supreme authority, it is no denial of it. The claim of a privilege seems rather, ex vi termini, to imply a superior power; for to talk of the privileges of a state or of a person who has no superior is hardly any better than speaking nonsense. Now, in such unfortunate quarrels among the component parts of a great political union of communities, I can scarcely conceive anything more completely imprudent than for the head of the empire to insist that, if any privilege is pleaded against his will or his acts, his whole authority is denied; instantly to proclaim rebellion, to beat to arms, and to put the offending provinces under the ban. Will not this, Sir, very soon teach the provinces to make no distinctions on their part? Will it not teach them that the government, against which a claim of liberty is tantamount to high treason, is a government to which submission is equivalent to slavery? It may not always be quite convenient to impress dependent communities with such an idea. We are, indeed, in all disputes with the Colonies, by the necessity of things, the judge. It is true, Sir. But I confess that the character of judge in my own cause is a thing that frightens me. Instead of filling me with pride, I am exceedingly humbled by it. I cannot proceed with a stern, assured, judicial confidence, until I find myself in something more like a judicial character. I must have these hesitations as long as I am compelled to recollect that, in my little reading upon such contests as these, the sense of mankind has at least as often decided against the superior as the subordinate power. Sir, let me add, too, that the opinion of my having some abstract right in my favor would not put me much at my ease in passing sentence, unless I could be sure that there were no rights which, in their exercise under certain circumstances, were not the most odious of all wrongs and the most vexatious of all injustice. Sir, these considerations have great weight with me when I find things so circumstanced, that I see the same party at once a civil litigant against me in point of right and a culprit before me, while I sit as a criminal judge on acts of his whose moral quality is to be decided upon the merits of that very litigation. Men are every now and then put, by the complexity of human affairs, into strange situations; but justice is the same, let the judge be in what situation he will. There is, Sir, also a circumstance which convinces me that this mode of criminal proceeding is not, at least in the present stage of our contest, altogether expedient; which is nothing less than the conduct of those very persons who have seemed to adopt that mode by lately declaring a rebellion in Massachusetts Bay, as they had formerly addressed to have traitors brought hither, under an Act of Henry the Eighth, for trial. For though rebellion is declared, it is not proceeded against as such, nor have any steps been taken towards the apprehension or conviction of any individual offender, either on our late or our former Address; but modes of public coercion have been adopted, and such as have much more resemblance to a sort of qualified hostility towards an independent power than the punishment of rebellious subjects. All this seems rather inconsistent; but it shows how difficult it is to apply these juridical ideas to our present case. In this situation, let us seriously and coolly ponder. What is it we have got by all our menaces, which have been many and ferocious? What advantage have we derived from the penal laws we have passed, and which, for the time, have been severe and numerous? What advances have we made towards our object by the sending of a force which, by land and sea, is no contemptible strength? Has the disorder abated? Nothing less. When I see things in this situation after such confident hopes, bold promises, and active exertions, I cannot, for my life, avoid a suspicion that the plan itself is not correctly right. If, then, the removal of the causes of this spirit of American liberty be for the greater part, or rather entirely, impracticable; if the ideas of criminal process be inapplicable—or, if applicable, are in the highest degree inexpedient; what way yet remains? No way is open but the third and last,—to comply with the American spirit as necessary; or, if you please, to submit to it as a necessary evil. If we adopt this mode,—if we mean to conciliate and concede,—let us see of what nature the concession ought to be. To ascertain the nature of our concession, we must look at their complaint. The Colonies complain that they have not the characteristic mark and seal of British freedom. They complain that they are taxed in a Parliament in which they are not represented. If you mean to satisfy them at all, you must satisfy them with regard to this complaint. If you mean to please any people you must give them the boon which they ask; not what you may think better for them, but of a kind totally different. Such an act may be a wise regulation, but it is no concession; whereas our present theme is the mode of giving satisfaction. Sir, I think you must perceive that I am resolved this day to have nothing at all to do with the question of the right of taxation. Some gentlemen start—but it is true; I put it totally out of the question. It is less than nothing in my consideration. I do not indeed wonder, nor will you, Sir, that gentlemen of profound learning are fond of displaying it on this profound subject. But my consideration is narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question. I do not examine whether the giving away a man's money be a power excepted and reserved out of the general trust of government, and how far all mankind, in all forms of polity, are entitled to an exercise of that right by the charter of nature; or whether, on the contrary, a right of taxation is necessarily involved in the general principle of legislation, and inseparable from the ordinary supreme power. These are deep questions, where great names militate against each other, where reason is perplexed, and an appeal to authorities only thickens the confusion; for high and reverend authorities lift up their heads on both sides, and there is no sure footing in the middle. This point is the great "Serbonian bog, Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, Where armies whole have sunk." I do not intend to be overwhelmed in that bog, though in such respectable company. The question with me is, not whether you have a right to render your people miserable, but whether it is not your interest to make them happy. It is not what a lawyer tells me I MAY do, but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I OUGHT to do. Is a politic act the worse for being a generous one? Is no concession proper but that which is made from your want of right to keep what you grant? Or does it lessen the grace or dignity of relaxing in the exercise of an odious claim because you have your evidence-room full of titles, and your magazines stuffed with arms to enforce them? What signify all those titles, and all those arms? Of what avail are they, when the reason of the thing tells me that the assertion of my title is the loss of my suit, and that I could do nothing but wound myself by the use of my own weapons? Such is steadfastly my opinion of the absolute necessity of keeping up the concord of this Empire by an unity of spirit, though in a diversity of operations, that, if I were sure the Colonists had, at their leaving this country, sealed a regular compact of servitude; that they had solemnly abjured all the rights of citizens; that they had made a vow to renounce all ideas of liberty for them and their posterity to all generations; yet I should hold myself obliged to conform to the temper I found universally prevalent in my own day, and to govern two million of men, impatient of servitude, on the principles of freedom. I am not determining a point of law, I am restoring tranquillity; and the general character and situation of a people must determine what sort of government is fitted for them. That point nothing else can or ought to determine. My idea, therefore, without considering whether we yield as matter of right, or grant as matter of favor, is to admit the people of our Colonies into an interest in the Constitution; and, by recording that admission in the journals of Parliament, to give them as strong an assurance as the nature of the thing will admit, that we mean forever to adhere to that solemn declaration of systematic indulgence. Some years ago the repeal of a revenue Act, upon its understood principle, might have served to show that we intended an unconditional abatement of the exercise of a taxing power. Such a measure was then sufficient to remove all suspicion, and to give perfect content. But unfortunate events since that time may make something further necessary; and not more necessary for the satisfaction of the Colonies than for the dignity and consistency of our own future proceedings. I have taken a very incorrect measure of the disposition of the House if this proposal in itself would be received with dislike. I think, Sir, we have few American financiers. But our misfortune is, we are too acute, we are too exquisite in our conjectures of the future, for men oppressed with such great and present evils. The more moderate among the opposers of Parliamentary concession freely confess that they hope no good from taxation, but they apprehend the Colonists have further views; and if this point were conceded, they would instantly attack the trade laws. These gentlemen are convinced that this was the intention from the beginning, and the quarrel of the Americans with taxation was no more than a cloak and cover to this design. Such has been the language even of a gentleman of real moderation, and of a natural temper well adjusted to fair and equal government. I am, however, Sir, not a little surprised at this kind of discourse, whenever I hear it; and I am the more surprised on account of the arguments which I constantly find in company with it, and which are often urged from the same mouths and on the same day. For instance, when we allege that it is against reason to tax a people under so many restraints in trade as the Americans, the noble lord in the blue ribbon shall tell you that the restraints on trade are futile and useless—of no advantage to us, and of no burthen to those on whom they are imposed; that the trade to America is not secured by the Acts of Navigation, but by the natural and irresistible advantage of a commercial preference. Such is the merit of the trade laws in this posture of the debate. But when strong internal circumstances are urged against the taxes; when the scheme is dissected; when experience and the nature of things are brought to prove, and do prove, the utter impossibility of obtaining an effective revenue from the Colonies; when these things are pressed, or rather press themselves, so as to drive the advocates of Colony taxes to a clear admission of the futility of the scheme; then, Sir, the sleeping trade laws revive from their trance, and this useless taxation is to be kept sacred, not for its own sake, but as a counterguard and security of the laws of trade. Then, Sir, you keep up revenue laws which are mischievous, in order to preserve trade laws that are useless. Such is the wisdom of our plan in both its members. They are separately given up as of no value, and yet one is always to be defended for the sake of the other; but I cannot agree with the noble lord, nor with the pamphlet from whence he seems to have borrowed these ideas concerning the inutility of the trade laws. For, without idolizing them, I am sure they are still, in many ways, of great use to us; and in former times they have been of the greatest. They do confine, and they do greatly narrow, the market for the Americans; but my perfect conviction of this does not help me in the least to discern how the revenue laws form any security whatsoever to the commercial regulations, or that these commercial regulations are the true ground of the quarrel, or that the giving way, in any one instance of authority, is to lose all that may remain unconceded. One fact is clear and indisputable. The public and avowed origin of this quarrel was on taxation. This quarrel has indeed brought on new disputes on new questions; but certainly the least bitter, and the fewest of all, on the trade laws. To judge which of the two be the real radical cause of quarrel, we have to see whether the commercial dispute did, in order of time, precede the dispute on taxation? There is not a shadow of evidence for it. Next, to enable us to judge whether at this moment a dislike to the trade laws be the real cause of quarrel, it is absolutely necessary to put the taxes out of the question by a repeal. See how the Americans act in this position, and then you will be able to discern correctly what is the true object of the controversy, or whether any controversy at all will remain. Unless you consent to remove this cause of difference, it is impossible, with decency, to assert that the dispute is not upon what it is avowed to be. And I would, Sir, recommend to your serious consideration whether it be prudent to form a rule for punishing people, not on their own acts, but on your conjectures? Surely it is preposterous at the very best. It is not justifying your anger by their misconduct, but it is converting your ill-will into their delinquency. But the Colonies will go further. Alas! alas! when will this speculation against fact and reason end? What will quiet these panic fears which we entertain of the hostile effect of a conciliatory conduct? Is it true that no case can exist in which it is proper for the sovereign to accede to the desires of his discontented subjects? Is there anything peculiar in this case to make a rule for itself? Is all authority of course lost when it is not pushed to the extreme? Is it a certain maxim that the fewer causes of dissatisfaction are left by government, the more the subject will be inclined to resist and rebel? All these objections being in fact no more than suspicions, conjectures, divinations, formed in defiance of fact and experience, they did not, Sir, discourage me from entertaining the idea of a conciliatory concession founded on the principles which I have just stated. In forming a plan for this purpose, I endeavored to put myself in that frame of mind which was the most natural and the most reasonable, and which was certainly the most probable means of securing me from all error. I set out with a perfect distrust of my own abilities, a total renunciation of every speculation of my own, and with a profound reverence for the wisdom of our ancestors who have left us the inheritance of so happy a constitution and so flourishing an empire, and, what is a thousand times more valuable, the treasury of the maxims and principles which formed the one and obtained the other. During the reigns of the kings of Spain of the Austrian family, whenever they were at a loss in the Spanish councils, it was common for their statesmen to say that they ought to consult the genius of Philip the Second. The genius of Philip the Second might mislead them, and the issue of their affairs showed that they had not chosen the most perfect standard; but, Sir, I am sure that I shall not be misled when, in a case of constitutional difficulty, I consult the genius of the English Constitution. Consulting at that oracle—it was with all due humility and piety—I found four capital examples in a similar case before me; those of Ireland, Wales, Chester, and Durham. Ireland, before the English conquest, though never governed by a despotic power, had no Parliament. How far the English Parliament itself was at that time modelled according to the present form is disputed among antiquaries; but we have all the reason in the world to be assured that a form of Parliament such as England then enjoyed she instantly communicated to Ireland, and we are equally sure that almost every successive improvement in constitutional liberty, as fast as it was made here, was transmitted thither. The feudal baronage and the feudal knighthood, the roots of our primitive Constitution, were early transplanted into that soil, and grew and flourished there. Magna Charta, if it did not give us originally the House of Commons, gave us at least a House of Commons of weight and consequence. But your ancestors did not churlishly sit down alone to the feast of Magna Charta. Ireland was made immediately a partaker. This benefit of English laws and liberties, I confess, was not at first extended to all Ireland. Mark the consequence. English authority and English liberties had exactly the same boundaries. Your standard could never be advanced an inch before your privileges. Sir John Davis shows beyond a doubt that the refusal of a general communication of these rights was the true cause why Ireland was five hundred years in subduing; and after the vain projects of a military government, attempted in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, it was soon discovered that nothing could make that country English, in civility and allegiance, but your laws and your forms of legislature. It was not English arms, but the English Constitution, that conquered Ireland. From that time Ireland has ever had a general Parliament, as she had before a partial Parliament. You changed the people; you altered the religion; but you never touched the form or the vital substance of free government in that kingdom. You deposed kings; you restored them; you altered the succession to theirs, as well as to your own Crown; but you never altered their Constitution, the principle of which was respected by usurpation, restored with the restoration of monarchy, and established, I trust, forever, by the glorious Revolution. This has made Ireland the great and flourishing kingdom that it is, and, from a disgrace and a burthen intolerable to this nation, has rendered her a principal part of our strength and ornament. This country cannot be said to have ever formally taxed her. The irregular things done in the confusion of mighty troubles and on the hinge of great revolutions, even if all were done that is said to have been done, form no example. If they have any effect in argument, they make an exception to prove the rule. None of your own liberties could stand a moment, if the casual deviations from them at such times were suffered to be used as proofs of their nullity. By the lucrative amount of such casual breaches in the Constitution, judge what the stated and fixed rule of supply has been in that kingdom. Your Irish pensioners would starve, if they had no other fund to live on than taxes granted by English authority. Turn your eyes to those popular grants from whence all your great supplies are come, and learn to respect that only source of public wealth in the British Empire. My next example is Wales. This country was said to be reduced by Henry the Third. It was said more truly to be so by Edward the First. But though then conquered, it was not looked upon as any part of the realm of England. Its old Constitution, whatever that might have been, was destroyed, and no good one was substituted in its place. The care of that tract was put into the hands of Lords Marchers—a form of government of a very singular kind; a strange heterogeneous monster, something between hostility and government; perhaps it has a sort of resemblance, according to the modes of those terms, to that of Commander-in-chief at present, to whom all civil power is granted as secondary. The manners of the Welsh nation followed the genius of the government. The people were ferocious, restive, savage, and uncultivated; sometimes composed, never pacified. Wales, within itself, was in perpetual disorder, and it kept the frontier of England in perpetual alarm. Benefits from it to the state there were none. Wales was only known to England by incursion and invasion. Sir, during that state of things, Parliament was not idle. They attempted to subdue the fierce spirit of the Welsh by all sorts of rigorous laws. They prohibited by statute the sending all sorts of arms into Wales, as you prohibit by proclamation (with something more of doubt on the legality) the sending arms to America. They disarmed the Welsh by statute, as you attempted (but still with more question on the legality) to disarm New England by an instruction. They made an Act to drag offenders from Wales into England for trial, as you have done (but with more hardship) with regard to America. By another Act, where one of the parties was an Englishman, they ordained that his trial should be always by English. They made Acts to restrain trade, as you do; and they prevented the Welsh from the use of fairs and markets, as you do the Americans from fisheries and foreign ports. In short, when the Statute Book was not quite so much swelled as it is now, you find no less than fifteen acts of penal regulation on the subject of Wales. Here we rub our hands.—A fine body of precedents for the authority of Parliament and the use of it!—I admit it fully; and pray add likewise to these precedents that all the while Wales rid this Kingdom like an incubus, that it was an unprofitable and oppressive burthen, and that an Englishman travelling in that country could not go six yards from the high road without being murdered. The march of the human mind is slow. Sir, it was not until after two hundred years discovered that, by an eternal law, providence had decreed vexation to violence, and poverty to rapine. Your ancestors did however at length open their eyes to the ill-husbandry of injustice. They found that the tyranny of a free people could of all tyrannies the least be endured, and that laws made against a whole nation were not the most effectual methods of securing its obedience. Accordingly, in the twenty-seventh year of Henry the Eighth the course was entirely altered. With a preamble stating the entire and perfect rights of the Crown of England, it gave to the Welsh all the rights and privileges of English subjects. A political order was established; the military power gave way to the civil; the Marches were turned into Counties. But that a nation should have a right to English liberties, and yet no share at all in the fundamental security of these liberties—the grant of their own property—seemed a thing so incongruous that, eight years after, that is, in the thirty-fifth of that reign, a complete and not ill-proportioned representation by counties and boroughs was bestowed upon Wales by Act of Parliament. From that moment, as by a charm, the tumults subsided; obedience was restored; peace, order, and civilization followed in the train of liberty. When the day-star of the English Constitution had arisen in their hearts, all was harmony within and without— "—simul alba nautis Stella refulsit, Defluit saxis agitatus humor; Concidunt venti, fugiuntque nubes, Et minax (quod sic voluere) ponto Unda recumbit." The very same year the County Palatine of Chester received the same relief from its oppressions and the same remedy to its disorders. Before this time Chester was little less distempered than Wales. The inhabitants, without rights themselves, were the fittest to destroy the rights of others; and from thence Richard the Second drew the standing army of archers with which for a time he oppressed England. The people of Chester applied to Parliament in a petition penned as I shall read to you: "To the King, our Sovereign Lord, in most hunible wise shewen unto your excellent Majesty the inhabitants of your Grace's County Palatine of Chester: (1) That where the said County Palatine of Chester is and hath been always hitherto exempt, excluded, and separated out and from your High Court of Parliament, to have any Knights and Burgesses within the said Court; by reason whereof the said inhabitants have hitherto sustained manifold disherisons, losses, and damages, as well in their lands, goods, and bodies, as in the good, civil, and politic governance and maintenance of the commonwealth of their said county; (2) And forasmuch as the said inhabitants have always hitherto been bound by the Acts and Statutes made and ordained by your said Highness and your most noble progenitors, by authority of the said Court, as far forth as other counties, cities, and boroughs have been, that have had their Knights and Burgesses within your said Court of Parliament, and yet have had neither Knight ne Burgess there for the said County Palatine, the said inhabitants, for lack thereof, have been oftentime touched and grieved with Acts and Statutes made within the said Court, as well derogatory unto the most ancient jurisdictions, liberties, and privileges of your said County Palatine, as prejudicial unto the commonwealth, quietness, rest, and peace of your Grace's most bounden subjects inhabiting within the same." What did Parliament with this audacious address?—Reject it as a libel? Treat it as an affront to Government? Spurn it as a derogation from the rights of legislature? Did they toss it over the table? Did they burn it by the hands of the common hangman?—They took the petition of grievance, all rugged as it was, without softening or temperament, unpurged of the original bitterness and indignation of complaint—they made it the very preamble to their Act of redress, and consecrated its principle to all ages in the sanctuary of legislation. Here is my third example. It was attended with the success of the two former. Chester, civilized as well as Wales, has demonstrated that freedom, and not servitude, is the cure of anarchy; as religion, and not atheism, is the true remedy for superstition. Sir, this pattern of Chester was followed in the reign of Charles the Second with regard to the County Palatine of Durham, which is my fourth example. This county had long lain out of the pale of free legislation. So scrupulously was the example of Chester followed that the style of the preamble is nearly the same with that of the Chester Act, and, without affecting the abstract extent of the authority of Parliament, it recognizes the equity of not suffering any considerable district in which the British subjects may act as a body, to be taxed without their own voice in the grant. Now if the doctrines of policy contained in these preambles, and the force of these examples in the Acts of Parliaments, avail anything, what can be said against applying them with regard to America? Are not the people of America as much Englishmen as the Welsh? The preamble of the Act of Henry the Eighth says the Welsh speak a language no way resembling that of his Majesty's English subjects. Are the Americans not as numerous? If we may trust the learned and accurate Judge Barrington's account of North Wales, and take that as a standard to measure the rest, there is no comparison. The people cannot amount to above 200,000; not a tenth part of the number in the Colonies. Is America in rebellion? Wales was hardly ever free from it. Have you attempted to govern America by penal statutes? You made fifteen for Wales. But your legislative authority is perfect with regard to America. Was it less perfect in Wales, Chester, and Durham? But America is virtually represented. What! does the electric force of virtual representation more easily pass over the Atlantic than pervade Wales,—which lies in your neighborhood—or than Chester and Durham, surrounded by abundance of representation that is actual and palpable? But, Sir, your ancestors thought this sort of virtual representation, however ample, to be totally insufficient for the freedom of the inhabitants of territories that are so near, and comparatively so inconsiderable. How then can I think it sufficient for those which are infinitely greater, and infinitely more remote? You will now, Sir, perhaps imagine that I am on the point of proposing to you a scheme for a representation of the Colonies in Parliament. Perhaps I might be inclined to entertain some such thought; but a great flood stops me in my course. Opposuit natura. —I cannot remove the eternal barriers of the creation. The thing, in that mode, I do not know to be possible. As I meddle with no theory, I do not absolutely assert the impracticability of such a representation; but I do not see my way to it, and those who have been more confident have not been more successful. However, the arm of public benevolence is not shortened, and there are often several means to the same end. What nature has disjoined in one way, wisdom may unite in another. When we cannot give the benefit as we would wish, let us not refuse it altogether. If we cannot give the principal, let us find a substitute. But how? Where? What substitute? Fortunately I am not obliged, for the ways and means of this substitute, to tax my own unproductive invention. I am not even obliged to go to the rich treasury of the fertile framers of imaginary commonwealths—not to the Republic of Plato, not to the Utopia of More, 52 not to the Oceana of Harrington. It is before me—it is at my feet, "And the rude swain Treads daily on it with his clouted shoon." I only wish you to recognize, for the theory, the ancient constitutional policy of this kingdom with regard to representation, as that policy has been declared in Acts of Parliament; and as to the practice, to return to that mode which a uniform experience has marked out to you as best, and in which you walked with security, advantage, and honor, until the year 1763. My Resolutions therefore mean to establish the equity and justice of a taxation of America by GRANT, and not by IMPOSITION; to mark the LEGAL COMPETENCY of the Colony Assemblies for the support of their government in peace, and for public aids in time of war; to acknowledge that this legal competency has had a DUTIFUL AND BENEFICIAL EXERCISE; and that experience has shown the BENEFIT OF THEIR GRANTS and the FUTILITY OF PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION as a method of supply. These solid truths compose six fundamental propositions. There are three more Resolutions corollary to these. If you admit the first set, you can hardly reject the others. But if you admit the first, I shall be far from solicitous whether you accept or refuse the last. I think these six massive pillars will be of strength sufficient to support the temple of British concord. I have no more doubt than I entertain of my existence that, if you admitted these, you would command an immediate peace, and, with but tolerable future management, a lasting obedience in America. I am not arrogant in this confident assurance. The propositions are all mere matters of fact, and if they are such facts as draw irresistible conclusions even in the stating, this is the power of truth, and not any management of mine. Sir, I shall open the whole plan to you, together with such observations on the motions as may tend to illustrate them where they may want explanation. The first is a Resolution— "That the Colonies and Plantations of Great Britain in North America, consisting of fourteen separate Governments, and containing two millions and upwards of free inhabitants, have not had the liberty and privilege of electing and sending any Knights and Burgesses, or others, to represent them in the High Court of Parliament." This is a plain matter of fact, necessary to be laid down, and, excepting the description, it is laid down in the language of the Constitution; it is taken nearly verbatim from Acts of Parliament. The second is like unto the first— "That the said Colonies and Plantations have been liable to, and bounden by, several subsidies, payments, rates, and taxes given and granted by Parliament, though the said Colonies and Plantations have not their Knights and Burgesses in the said High Court of Parliament, of their own election, to represent the condition of their country; by lack whereof they have been oftentimes touched and grieved by subsidies given, granted, and assented to, in the said Court, in a manner prejudicial to the commonwealth, quietness, rest, and peace of the subjects inhabiting within the same." Is this description too hot, or too cold; too strong, or too weak? Does it arrogate too much to the supreme legislature? Does it lean too much to the claims of the people? If it runs into any of these errors, the fault is not mine. It is the language of your own ancient Acts of Parliament. "Non meus hic sermo, sed quae praecepit Ofellus, Rusticus, abnormis sapiens." It is the genuine produce of the ancient, rustic, manly, homebred sense of this country.—I did not dare to rub off a particle of the venerable rust that rather adorns and preserves, than destroys, the metal. It would be a profanation to touch with a tool the stones which construct the sacred altar of peace. I would not violate with modern polish the ingenuous and noble roughness of these truly Constitutional materials. Above all things, I was resolved not to be guilty of tampering, the odious vice of restless and unstable minds. I put my foot in the tracks of our forefathers, where I can neither wander nor stumble. Determining to fix articles of peace, I was resolved not to be wise beyond what was written; I was resolved to use nothing else than the form of sound words, to let others abound in their own sense, and carefully to abstain from all expressions of my own. What the law has said, I say. In all things else I am silent. I have no organ but for her words. This, if it be not ingenious, I am sure is safe. There are indeed words expressive of grievance in this second Resolution, which those who are resolved always to be in the right will deny to contain matter of fact, as applied to the present case, although Parliament thought them true with regard to the counties of Chester and Durham. They will deny that the Americans were ever "touched and grieved" with the taxes. If they consider nothing in taxes but their weight as pecuniary impositions, there might be some pretence for this denial; but men may be sorely touched and deeply grieved in their privileges, as well as in their purses. Men may lose little in property by the act which takes away all their freedom. When a man is robbed of a trifle on the highway, it is not the twopence lost that constitutes the capital outrage. This is not confined to privileges. Even ancient indulgences, withdrawn without offence on the part of those who enjoyed such favors, operate as grievances. But were the Americans then not touched and grieved by the taxes, in some measure, merely as taxes? If so, why were they almost all either wholly repealed, or exceedingly reduced? Were they not touched and grieved even by the regulating duties of the sixth of George the Second? Else, why were the duties first reduced to one third in 1764, and afterwards to a third of that third in the year 1766? Were they not touched and grieved by the Stamp Act? I shall say they were, until that tax is revived. Were they not touched and grieved by the duties of 1767, which were likewise repealed, and which Lord Hillsborough tells you, for the Ministry, were laid contrary to the true principle of commerce? Is not the assurance given by that noble person to the Colonies of a resolution to lay no more taxes on them an admission that taxes would touch and grieve them? Is not the Resolution of the noble lord in the blue ribbon, now standing on your Journals, the strongest of all proofs that Parliamentary subsidies really touched and grieved them? Else why all these changes, modifications, repeals, assurances, and resolutions? The next proposition is— "That, from the distance of the said Colonies, and from other circumstances, no method hath hitherto been devised for procuring a representation in Parliament for the said Colonies." This is an assertion of a fact, I go no further on the paper, though, in my private judgment, a useful representation is impossible—I am sure it is not desired by them, nor ought it perhaps by us—but I abstain from opinions. The fourth Resolution is— "That each of the said Colonies hath within itself a body, chosen in part, or in the whole, by the freemen, free-holders, or other free inhabitants thereof, commonly called the General Assembly, or General Court, with powers legally to raise, levy, and assess, according to the several usage of such Colonies duties and taxes towards defraying all sorts of public services." This competence in the Colony Assemblies is certain. It is proved by the whole tenor of their Acts of Supply in all the Assemblies, in which the constant style of granting is, "an aid to his Majesty", and Acts granting to the Crown have regularly for near a century passed the public offices without dispute. Those who have been pleased paradoxically to deny this right, holding that none but the British Parliament can grant to the Crown, are wished to look to what is done, not only in the Colonies, but in Ireland, in one uniform unbroken tenor every session. Sir, I am surprised that this doctrine should come from some of the law servants of the Crown. I say that if the Crown could be responsible, his Majesty—but certainly the Ministers,—and even these law officers themselves through whose hands the Acts passed, biennially in Ireland, or annually in the Colonies—are in an habitual course of committing impeachable offences. What habitual offenders have been all Presidents of the Council, all Secretaries of State, all First Lords of Trade, all Attorneys and all Solicitors General! However, they are safe, as no one impeaches them; and there is no ground of charge against them except in their own unfounded theories. The fifth Resolution is also a resolution of fact— "That the said General Assemblies, General Courts, or other bodies legally qualified as aforesaid, have at sundry times freely granted several large subsidies and public aids for his Majesty's service, according to their abilities, when required thereto by letter from one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State; and that their right to grant the same, and their cheerfulness and sufficiency in the said grants, have been at sundry times acknowledged by Parliament." To say nothing of their great expenses in the Indian wars, and not to take their exertion in foreign ones so high as the supplies in the year 1695—not to go back to their public contributions in the year 1710—I shall begin to travel only where the journals give me light, resolving to deal in nothing but fact, authenticated by Parliamentary record, and to build myself wholly on that solid basis. On the 4th of April, 1748, a Committee of this House came to the following resolution: "Resolved: That it is the opinion of this Committee that it is just and reasonable that the several Provinces and Colonies of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, be reimbursed the expenses they have been at in taking and securing to the Crown of Great Britain, the Island of Cape Breton and its dependencies." The expenses were immense for such Colonies. They were above L200,000 sterling; money first raised and advanced on their public credit. On the 28th of January, 1756, a message from the King came to us, to this effect: "His Majesty, being sensible of the zeal and vigor with which his faithful subjects of certain Colonies in North America have exerted themselves in defence of his Majesty's just rights and possessions, recommends it to this House to take the same into their consideration, and to enable his Majesty to give them such assistance as may be a proper reward and encouragement." On the 3d of February, 1756, the House came to a suitable Resolution, expressed in words nearly the same as those of the message, but with the further addition, that the money then voted was as an encouragement to the Colonies to exert themselves with vigor. It will not be necessary to go through all the testimonies which your own records have given to the truth of my Resolutions. I will only refer you to the places in the Journals: Vol. xxvii.—16th and 19th May, 1757. Vol. xxviii.—June 1st, 1758; April 26th and 30th, 1759; March 26th and 31st, and April 28th, 1760; Jan. 9th and 20th, 1761. Vol. xxix.—Jan. 22d and 26th, 1762; March 14th and 17th, 1763. Sir, here is the repeated acknowledgment of Parliament that the Colonies not only gave, but gave to satiety. This nation has formally acknowledged two things: first, that the Colonies had gone beyond their abilities, Parliament having thought it necessary to reimburse them; secondly, that they had acted legally and laudably in their grants of money, and their maintenance of troops, since the compensation is expressly given as reward and encouragement. Reward is not bestowed for acts that are unlawful; and encouragement is not held out to things that deserve reprehension. My Resolution therefore does nothing more than collect into one proposition what is scattered through your Journals. I give you nothing but your own; and you cannot refuse in the gross what you have so often acknowledged in detail. The admission of this, which will be so honorable to them and to you, will, indeed, be mortal to all the miserable stories by which the passions of the misguided people have been engaged in an unhappy system. The people heard, indeed, from the beginning of these disputes, one thing continually dinned in their ears, that reason and justice demanded that the Americans, who paid no taxes, should be compelled to contribute. How did that fact of their paying nothing stand when the taxing system began? When Mr. Grenville began to form his system of American revenue, he stated in this House that the Colonies were then in debt two millions six hundred thousand pounds sterling money, and was of opinion they would discharge that debt in four years. On this state, those untaxed people were actually subject to the payment of taxes to the amount of six hundred and fifty thousand a year. In fact, however, Mr. Grenville was mistaken. The funds given for sinking the debt did not prove quite so ample as both the Colonies and he expected. The calculation was too sanguine; the reduction was not completed till some years after, and at different times in different Colonies. However, the taxes after the war continued too great to bear any addition, with prudence or propriety; and when the burthens imposed in consequence of former requisitions were discharged, our tone became too high to resort again to requisition. No Colony, since that time, ever has had any requisition whatsoever made to it. We see the sense of the Crown, and the sense of Parliament, on the productive nature of a REVENUE BY GRANT. Now search the same Journals for the produce of the REVENUE BY IMPOSITION. Where is it? Let us know the volume and the page. What is the gross, what is the net produce? To what service is it applied? How have you appropriated its surplus? What! Can none of the many skilful index-makers that we are now employing find any trace of it?—Well, let them and that rest together. But are the Journals, which say nothing of the revenue, as silent on the discontent? Oh no! a child may find it. It is the melancholy burthen and blot of every page. I think, then, I am, from those Journals, justified in the sixth and last Resolution, which is—- "That it hath been found by experience that the manner of granting the said supplies and aids, by the said General Assemblies, hath been more agreeable to the said Colonies, and more beneficial and conducive to the public service, than the mode of giving and granting aids in Parliament, to be raised and paid in the said Colonies." This makes the whole of the fundamental part of the plan. The conclusion is irresistible. You cannot say that you were driven by any necessity to an exercise of the utmost rights of legislature. You cannot assert that you took on yourselves the task of imposing Colony taxes from the want of another legal body that is competent to the purpose of supplying the exigencies of the state without wounding the prejudices of the people. Neither is it true that the body so qualified, and having that competence, had neglected the duty. The question now, on all this accumulated matter, is: whether you will choose to abide by a profitable experience, or a mischievous theory; whether you choose to build on imagination, or fact; whether you prefer enjoyment, or hope; satisfaction in your subjects, or discontent? If these propositions are accepted, everything which has been made to enforce a contrary system must, I take it for granted, fall along with it. On that ground, I have drawn the following Resolution, which, when it comes to be moved, will naturally be divided in a proper manner: "That it may be proper to repeal an Act made in the seventh year of the reign of his present Majesty, entitled, An Act for granting certain duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in America; for allowing a drawback of the duties of customs upon the exportation from this Kingdom of coffee and cocoa-nuts of the produce of the said Colonies or Plantations; for discontinuing the drawbacks payable on china earthenware exported to America; and for more effectually preventing the clandestine running of goods in the said Colonies and Plantations. And that it may be proper to repeal an Act made in the fourteenth year of the reign of his present Majesty, entitled, An Act to discontinue, in such manner and for such time as are therein mentioned, the landing and discharging, lading or shipping of goods, wares, and merchandise at the town and within the harbor of Boston, in the Province of Massachusetts Bay, in North America. And that it may be proper to repeal an Act made in the fourteenth year of the reign of his present Majesty, entitled, An Act for the impartial administration of justice in the cases of persons questioned for any acts done by them in the execution of the law, or for the suppression of riots and tumults, in the Province of Massachusetts Bay, in New England. And that it may be proper to repeal an Act made in the fourteenth year of the reign of his present Majesty, entitled, An Act for the better regulating of the Government of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England. And also that it may be proper to explain and amend an Act made in the thirty-fifth year of the reign of King Henry the Eighth, entitled, An Act for the Trial of Treasons committed out of the King's Dominions." I wish, Sir, to repeal the Boston Port Bill, because—independently of the dangerous precedent of suspending the rights of the subject during the King's pleasure—it was passed, as I apprehend, with less regularity and on more partial principles than it ought. The corporation of Boston was not heard before it was condemned. Other towns, full as guilty as she was, have not had their ports blocked up. Even the Restraining Bill of the present session does not go to the length of the Boston Port Act. The same ideas of prudence which induced you not to extend equal punishment to equal guilt, even when you were punishing, induced me, who mean not to chastise, but to reconcile, to be satisfied with the punishment already partially inflicted. Ideas of prudence and accommodation to circumstances prevent you from taking away the charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island, as you have taken away that of Massachusetts Bay, though the Crown has far less power in the two former provinces than it enjoyed in the latter, and though the abuses have been full as great, and as flagrant, in the exempted as in the punished. The same reasons of prudence and accommodation have weight with me in restoring the charter of Massachusetts Bay. Besides, Sir, the Act which changes the charter of Massachusetts is in many particulars so exceptionable that if I did not wish absolutely to repeal, I would by all means desire to alter it, as several of its provisions tend to the subversion of all public and private justice. Such, among others, is the power in the Governor to change the sheriff at his pleasure, and to make a new returning officer for every special cause. It is shameful to behold such a regulation standing among English laws. The Act for bringing persons accused of committing murder, under the orders of Government to England for trial, is but temporary. That Act has calculated the probable duration of our quarrel with the Colonies, and is accommodated to that supposed duration. I would hasten the happy moment of reconciliation, and therefore must, on my principle, get rid of that most justly obnoxious Act. The Act of Henry the Eighth, for the Trial of Treasons, I do not mean to take away, but to confine it to its proper bounds and original intention; to make it expressly for trial of treasons—and the greatest treasons may be committed—in places where the jurisdiction of the Crown does not extend. Having guarded the privileges of local legislature, I would next secure to the Colonies a fair and unbiassed judicature, for which purpose, Sir, I propose the following Resolution: "That, from the time when the General Assembly or General Court of any Colony or Plantation in North America shall have appointed by Act of Assembly, duly confirmed, a settled salary to the offices of the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Superior Court, it may be proper that the said Chief Justice and other Judges of the Superior Courts of such Colony shall hold his and their office and offices during their good behavior, and shall not be removed therefrom but when the said removal shall be adjudged by his Majesty in Council, upon a hearing on complaint from the General Assembly, or on a complaint from the Governor, or Council, or the House of Representatives severally, or of the Colony in which the said Chief Justice and other Judges have exercised the said offices." The next Resolution relates to the Courts of Admiralty. It is this. "That it may be proper to regulate the Courts of Admiralty or Vice Admiralty authorized by the fifteenth Chapter of the Fourth of George the Third, in such a manner as to make the same more commodious to those who sue, or are sued, in the said Courts, and to provide for the more decent maintenance of the Judges in the same." These courts I do not wish to take away, they are in themselves proper establishments. This court is one of the capital securities of the Act of Navigation. The extent of its jurisdiction, indeed, has been increased, but this is altogether as proper, and is indeed on many accounts more eligible, where new powers were wanted, than a court absolutely new. But courts incommodiously situated, in effect, deny justice, and a court partaking in the fruits of its own condemnation is a robber. The Congress complain, and complain justly, of this grievance. These are the three consequential propositions I have thought of two or three more, but they come rather too near detail, and to the province of executive government, which I wish Parliament always to superintend, never to assume. If the first six are granted, congruity will carry the latter three. If not, the things that remain unrepealed will be, I hope, rather unseemly incumbrances on the building, than very materially detrimental to its strength and stability. Here, Sir, I should close, but I plainly perceive some objections remain which I ought, if possible, to remove. The first will be that, in resorting to the doctrine of our ancestors, as contained in the preamble to the Chester Act, I prove too much, that the grievance from a want of representation, stated in that preamble, goes to the whole of legislation as well as to taxation, and that the Colonies, grounding themselves upon that doctrine, will apply it to all parts of legislative authority. To this objection, with all possible deference and humility, and wishing as little as any man living to impair the smallest particle of our supreme authority, I answer, that the words are the words of Parliament, and not mine, and that all false and inconclusive inferences drawn from them are not mine, for I heartily disclaim any such inference. I have chosen the words of an Act of Parliament which Mr. Grenville, surely a tolerably zealous and very judicious advocate for the sovereignty of Parliament, formerly moved to have read at your table in confirmation of his tenets. It is true that Lord Chatham considered these preambles as declaring strongly in favor of his opinions. He was a no less powerful advocate for the privileges of the Americans. Ought I not from hence to presume that these preambles are as favorable as possible to both, when properly understood; favorable both to the rights of Parliament, and to the privilege of the dependencies of this Crown? But, Sir, the object of grievance in my Resolution I have not taken from the Chester, but from the Durham Act, which confines the hardship of want of representation to the case of subsidies, and which therefore falls in exactly with the case of the Colonies. But whether the unrepresented counties were de jure or de facto bound, the preambles do not accurately distinguish, nor indeed was it necessary; for, whether de jure or de facto, the Legislature thought the exercise of the power of taxing as of right, or as of fact without right, equally a grievance, and equally oppressive. I do not know that the Colonies have, in any general way, or in any cool hour, gone much beyond the demand of humanity in relation to taxes. It is not fair to judge of the temper or dispositions of any man, or any set of men, when they are composed and at rest, from their conduct or their expressions in a state of disturbance and irritation. It is besides a very great mistake to imagine that mankind follow up practically any speculative principle, either of government or of freedom, as far as it will go in argument and logical illation. We Englishmen stop very short of the principles upon which we support any given part of our Constitution, or even the whole of it together. I could easily, if I had not already tired you, give you very striking and convincing instances of it. This is nothing but what is natural and proper. All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights, that we may enjoy others; and we choose rather to be happy citizens than subtle disputants. As we must give away some natural liberty to enjoy civil advantages, so we must sacrifice some civil liberties for the advantages to be derived from the communion and fellowship of a great empire. But, in all fair dealings, the thing bought must bear some proportion to the purchase paid. None will barter away the immediate jewel of his soul. Though a great house is apt to make slaves haughty, yet it is purchasing a part of the artificial importance of a great empire too dear to pay for it all essential rights and all the intrinsic dignity of human nature. None of us who would not risk his life rather than fall under a government purely arbitrary. But although there are some amongst us who think our Constitution wants many improvements to make it a complete system of liberty, perhaps none who are of that opinion would think it right to aim at such improvement by disturbing his country, and risking everything that is dear to him. In every arduous enterprise we consider what we are to lose, as well as what we are to gain; and the more and better stake of liberty every people possess, the less they will hazard in a vain attempt to make it more. These are the cords of man. Man acts from adequate motives relative to his interest, and not on metaphysical speculations. Aristotle, the great master of reasoning, cautions us, and with great weight and propriety, against this species of delusive geometrical accuracy in moral arguments as the most fallacious of all sophistry. The Americans will have no interest contrary to the grandeur and glory of England, when they are not oppressed by the weight of it; and they will rather be inclined to respect the acts of a superintending legislature when they see them the acts of that power which is itself the security, not the rival, of their secondary importance. In this assurance my mind most perfectly acquiesces, and I confess I feel not the least alarm from the discontents which are to arise from putting people at their ease, nor do I apprehend the destruction of this Empire from giving, by an act of free grace and indulgence, to two millions of my fellow-citizens some share of those rights upon which. I have always been taught to value myself. It is said, indeed, that this power of granting, vested in American Assemblies, would dissolve the unity of the Empire, which was preserved entire, although Wales, and Chester, and Durham were added to it. Truly, Mr. Speaker, I do not know what this unity means, nor has it ever been heard of, that I know, in the constitutional policy of this country. The very idea of subordination of parts excludes this notion of simple and undivided unity. England is the head; but she is not the head and the members too. Ireland has ever had from the beginning a separate, but not an independent, legislature, which, far from distracting, promoted the union of the whole. Everything was sweetly and harmoniously disposed through both islands for the conservation of English dominion, and the communication of English liberties. I do not see that the same principles might not be carried into twenty islands and with the same good effect. This is my model with regard to America, as far as the internal circumstances of the two countries are the same. I know no other unity of this Empire than I can draw from its example during these periods, when it seemed to my poor understanding more united than it is now, or than it is likely to be by the present methods. But since I speak of these methods, I recollect, Mr. Speaker, almost too late, that I promised, before I finished, to say something of the proposition of the noble lord on the floor, which has been so lately received and stands on your Journals. I must be deeply concerned whenever it is my misfortune to continue a difference with the majority of this House; but as the reasons for that difference are my apology for thus troubling you, suffer me to state them in a very few words. I shall compress them into as small a body as I possibly can, having already debated that matter at large when the question was before the Committee. First, then, I cannot admit that proposition of a ransom by auction; because it is a mere project. It is a thing new, unheard of; supported by no experience; justified by no analogy; without example of our ancestors, or root in the Constitution. It is neither regular Parliamentary taxation, nor Colony grant. Experimentum in corpore vili is a good rule, which will ever make me adverse to any trial of experiments on what is certainly the most valuable of all subjects, the peace of this Empire. Secondly, it is an experiment which must be fatal in the end to our Constitution. For what is it but a scheme for taxing the Colonies in the ante-chamber of the noble lord and his successors? To settle the quotas and proportions in this House is clearly impossible. You, Sir, may flatter yourself you shall sit a state auctioneer, with your hammer in your hand, and knock down to each Colony as it bids. But to settle, on the plan laid down by the noble lord, the true proportional payment for four or five and twenty governments according to the absolute and the relative wealth of each, and according to the British proportion of wealth and burthen, is a wild and chimerical notion. This new taxation must therefore come in by the back door of the Constitution. Each quota must be brought to this House ready formed; you can neither add nor alter. You must register it. You can do nothing further, for on what grounds can you deliberate either before or after the proposition? You cannot hear the counsel for all these provinces, quarrelling each on its own quantity of payment, and its proportion to others If you should attempt it, the Committee of Provincial Ways and Means, or by whatever other name it will delight to be called, must swallow up all the time of Parliament. Thirdly, it does not give satisfaction to the complaint of the Colonies. They complain that they are taxed without their consent, you answer, that you will fix the sum at which they shall be taxed. That is, you give them the very grievance for the remedy. You tell them, indeed, that you will leave the mode to themselves. I really beg pardon—it gives me pain to mention it—but you must be sensible that you will not perform this part of the compact. For, suppose the Colonies were to lay the duties, which furnished their contingent, upon the importation of your manufactures, you know you would never suffer such a tax to be laid. You know, too, that you would not suffer many other modes of taxation, so that, when you come to explain yourself, it will be found that you will neither leave to themselves the quantum nor the mode, nor indeed anything. The whole is delusion from one end to the other. Fourthly, this method of ransom by auction, unless it be universally accepted, will plunge you into great and inextricable difficulties. In what year of our Lord are the proportions of payments to be settled? To say nothing of the impossibility that Colony agents should have general powers of taxing the Colonies at their discretion, consider, I implore you, that the communication by special messages and orders between these agents and their constituents, on each variation of the case, when the parties come to contend together and to dispute on their relative proportions, will be a matter of delay, perplexity, and confusion that never can have an end. If all the Colonies do not appear at the outcry, what is the condition of those assemblies who offer, by themselves or their agents, to tax themselves up to your ideas of their proportion? The refractory Colonies who refuse all composition will remain taxed only to your old impositions, which, however grievous in principle, are trifling as to production. The obedient Colonies in this scheme are heavily taxed, the refractory remain unburdened. What will you do? Will you lay new and heavier taxes by Parliament on the disobedient? Pray consider in what way you can do it. You are perfectly convinced that, in the way of taxing, you can do nothing but at the ports. Now suppose it is Virginia that refuses to appear at your auction, while Maryland and North Carolina bid handsomely for their ransom, and are taxed to your quota, how will you put these Colonies on a par? Will you tax the tobacco of Virginia? If you do, you give its death-wound to your English revenue at home, and to one of the very greatest articles of your own foreign trade. If you tax the import of that rebellious Colony, what do you tax but your own manufactures, or the goods of some other obedient and already well-taxed Colony? Who has said one word on this labyrinth of detail, which bewilders you more and more as you enter into it? Who has presented, who can present you with a clue to lead you out of it? I think, Sir, it is impossible that you should not recollect that the Colony bounds are so implicated in one another,—you know it by your other experiments in the bill for prohibiting the New England fishery,—that you can lay no possible restraints on almost any of them which may not be presently eluded, if you do not confound the innocent with the guilty, and burthen those whom, upon every principle, you ought to exonerate. He must be grossly ignorant of America who thinks that, without falling into this confusion of all rules of equity and policy, you can restrain any single Colony, especially Virginia and Maryland, the central and most important of them all. Let it also be considered that, either in the present confusion you settle a permanent contingent, which will and must be trifling, and then you have no effectual revenue; or you change the quota at every exigency, and then on every new repartition you will have a new quarrel. Reflect, besides, that when you have fixed a quota for every Colony, you have not provided for prompt and punctual payment. Suppose one, two, five, ten years' arrears. You cannot issue a Treasury Extent against the failing Colony. You must make new Boston Port Bills, new restraining laws, new acts for dragging men to England for trial. You must send out new fleets, new armies. All is to begin again. From this day forward the Empire is never to know an hour's tranquillity. An intestine fire will be kept alive in the bowels of the Colonies, which one time or other must consume this whole Empire. I allow indeed that the empire of Germany raises her revenue and her troops by quotas and contingents; but the revenue of the empire, and the army of the empire, is the worst revenue and the worst army in the world. Instead of a standing revenue, you will therefore have a perpetual quarrel. Indeed, the noble lord who proposed this project of a ransom by auction seems himself to be of that opinion. His project was rather designed for breaking the union of the Colonies than for establishing a revenue. He confessed he apprehended that his proposal would not be to their taste. I say this scheme of disunion seems to be at the bottom of the project; for I will not suspect that the noble lord meant nothing but merely to delude the nation by an airy phantom which he never intended to realize. But whatever his views may be, as I propose the peace and union of the Colonies as the very foundation of my plan, it cannot accord with one whose foundation is perpetual discord. Compare the two. This I offer to give you is plain and simple. The other full of perplexed and intricate mazes. This is mild; that harsh. This is found by experience effectual for its purposes; the other is a new project. This is universal; the other calculated for certain Colonies only. This is immediate in its conciliatory operation; the other remote, contingent, full of hazard. Mine is what becomes the dignity of a ruling people—gratuitous, unconditional, and not held out as a matter of bargain and sale. I have done my duty in proposing it to you. I have indeed tired you by a long discourse; but this is the misfortune of those to whose influence nothing will be conceded, and who must win every inch of their ground by argument. You have heard me with goodness. May you decide with wisdom! For my part, I feel my mind greatly disburthened by what I have done to-day. I have been the less fearful of trying your patience, because on this subject I mean to spare it altogether in future. I have this comfort, that in every stage of the American affairs I have steadily opposed the measures that have produced the confusion, and may bring on the destruction, of this Empire. I now go so far as to risk a proposal of my own. If I cannot give peace to my country, I give it to my conscience. But what, says the financier, is peace to us without money? Your plan gives us no revenue. No! But it does; for it secures to the subject the power or refusal, the first of all revenues. Experience is a cheat, and fact a liar, if this power in the subject of proportioning his grant, or of not granting at all, has not been found the richest mine of revenue ever discovered by the skill or by the fortune of man. It does not indeed vote you L152,750 11s. 23/4d, nor any other paltry limited sum; but it gives the strong box itself, the fund, the bank—from whence only revenues can arise amongst a people sensible of freedom. Posita luditur arca. Cannot you, in England—cannot you, at this time of day—cannot you, a House of Commons, trust to the principle which has raised so mighty a revenue, and accumulated a debt of near 140,000,000 in this country? Is this principle to be true in England, and false everywhere else? Is it not true in Ireland? Has it not hitherto been true in the Colonies? Why should you presume that, in any country, a body duly constituted for any function will neglect to perform its duty and abdicate its trust? Such a presumption would go against all governments in all modes. But, in truth, this dread of penury of supply from a free assembly has no foundation in nature; for first, observe that, besides the desire which all men have naturally of supporting the honor of their own government, that sense of dignity and that security to property which ever attends freedom has a tendency to increase the stock of the free community. Most may be taken where most is accumulated. And what is the soil or climate where experience has not uniformly proved that the voluntary flow of heaped-up plenty, bursting from the weight of its own rich luxuriance, has ever run with a more copious stream of revenue than could be squeezed from the dry husks of oppressed indigence by the straining of all the politic machinery in the world? Next, we know that parties must ever exist in a free country. We know, too, that the emulations of such parties—their contradictions, their reciprocal necessities, their hopes, and their fears—must send them all in their turns to him that holds the balance of the State. The parties are the gamesters; but Government keeps the table, and is sure to be the winner in the end. When this game is played, I really think it is more to be feared that the people will be exhausted, than that Government will not be supplied; whereas, whatever is got by acts of absolute power ill obeyed, because odious, or by contracts ill kept, because constrained, will be narrow, feeble, uncertain, and precarious. "Ease would retract Vows made in pain, as violent and void." I, for one, protest against compounding our demands. I declare against compounding, for a poor limited sum, the immense, ever-growing, eternal debt which is due to generous government from protected freedom. And so may I speed in the great object I propose to you, as I think it would not only be an act of injustice, but would be the worst economy in the world, to compel the Colonies to a sum certain, either in the way of ransom or in the way of compulsory compact. But to clear up my ideas on this subject: a revenue from America transmitted hither—do not delude yourselves—you never can receive it; no, not a shilling. We have experience that from remote countries it is not to be expected. If, when you attempted to extract revenue from Bengal, you were obliged to return in loan what you had taken in imposition, what can you expect from North America? For certainly, if ever there was a country qualified to produce wealth, it is India; or an institution fit for the transmission, it is the East India Company. America has none of these aptitudes. If America gives you taxable objects on which you lay your duties here, and gives you, at the same time, a surplus by a foreign sale of her commodities to pay the duties on these objects which you tax at home, she has performed her part to the British revenue. But with regard to her own internal establishments, she may, I doubt not she will, contribute in moderation. I say in moderation, for she ought not to be permitted to exhaust herself. She ought to be reserved to a war, the weight of which, with the enemies that we are most likely to have, must be considerable in her quarter of the globe. There she may serve you, and serve you essentially. For that service—for all service, whether of revenue, trade, or empire—my trust is in her interest in the British Constitution. My hold of the Colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the Colonists always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your government,—they will cling and grapple to you, and no force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. But let it be once understood that your government may be one thing, and their privileges another, that these two things may exist without any mutual relation, the cement is gone—the cohesion is loosened—and everything hastens to decay and dissolution. As long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces towards you. The more they multiply, the more friends you will have; the more ardently they love liberty, the more perfect will be their obedience. Slavery they can have anywhere—it is a weed that grows in every soil. They may have it from Spain; they may have it from Prussia. But, until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and your natural dignity, freedom they can have from none but you. This is the commodity of price of which you have the monopoly. This is the true Act of Navigation which binds to you the commerce of the Colonies, and through them secures to you the wealth of the world. Deny them this participation of freedom, and you break that sole bond which originally made, and must still preserve, the unity of the Empire. Do not entertain so weak an imagination as that your registers and your bonds, your affidavits and your sufferances, your cockets and your clearances, are what form the great securities of your commerce. Do not dream that your letters of office, and your instructions, and your suspending clauses, are the things that hold together the great contexture of the mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them. It is the spirit of the English Constitution which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the Empire, even down to the minutest member. Is it not the same virtue which does everything for us here in England? Do you imagine, then, that it is the Land Tax Act which raises your revenue? that it is the annual vote in the Committee of Supply which gives you your army? or that it is the Mutiny Bill which inspires it with bravery and discipline? No! surely no! It is the love of the people; it is their attachment to their government, from the sense of the deep stake they have in such a glorious institution, which gives you your army and your navy, and infuses into both that liberal obedience without which your army would be a base rabble, and your navy nothing but rotten timber. All this, I know well enough, will sound wild and chimerical to the profane herd of those vulgar and mechanical politicians who have no place among us; a sort of people who think that nothing exists but what is gross and material, and who, therefore, far from being qualified to be directors of the great movement of empire, are not fit to turn a wheel in the machine. But to men truly initiated and rightly taught, these ruling and master principles which, in the opinion of such men as I have mentioned, have no substantial existence, are in truth everything, and all in all. Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire and little minds go ill together. If we are conscious of our station, and glow with zeal to fill our places as becomes our situation and ourselves, we ought to auspicate all our public proceedings on America with the old warning of the church, Sursum corda! We ought to elevate our minds to the greatness of that trust to which the order of providence has called us. By adverting to the dignity of this high calling our ancestors have turned a savage wilderness into a glorious empire, and have made the most extensive and the only honorable conquests—not by destroying, but by promoting the wealth, the number, the happiness, of the human race. Let us get an American revenue as we have got an American empire. English privileges have made it all that it is; English privileges alone will make it all it can be. In full confidence of this unalterable truth, I now, quod felix faustumque sit, lay the first stone of the Temple of Peace; and I move you— "That the Colonies and Plantations of Great Britain in North America, consisting of fourteen separate governments, and containing two millions and upwards of free inhabitants, have not had the liberty and privilege of electing and sending any Knights and Burgesses, or others, to represent them in the High Court of Parliament." Source: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004895777.0001.000/1:3?rgn=div1;view=fulltext
- Virginia Establishment of Colonial Correspondence
Virginia Resolutions Establishing A Committee of Correspondence; March 12, 1773 Whereas, the minds of his Majesty's faithful subjects in this colony have been much disturbed by various rumours and reports of proceedings tending to deprive them of their ancient, legal, and constitutional rights. And whereas, the affairs of this colony are frequently connected with those of Great Britain, as well as of the neighbouring colonies, which renders a communication of sentiments necessary; in order, therefore, to remove the uneasinesses and to quiet the minds of the people, as well as for the other good purposes above mentioned Be it resolved, that a standing committee of correspondence and inquiry be appointed to consist of eleven persons, to wit: the Honourable Peyton Randolph, Esquire; Robert Carter Nicholas, Richard Bland, Richard Henry Lee, Benjamin Harrison, Edmund Pendleton, Patrick Henry, Dudley Digges, Dabney Carr, Archibald Cary, and Thomas Jefferson, Esquires, any six of whom to be a committee, whose business it shall be to obtain the most early and authentic intelligence of all such Acts and resolutions of the British Parliament, or proceedings of administration, as may relate to or affect the British colonies in America, and to keep up and maintain a correspondence and communication with our sister colonies, respecting these important considerations ; and the result of such their proceedings, from time to time, to lay before this House. Resolved, that it be an instruction to the said committee that they do, without delay, inform themselves particularly of the principles and authority on which was constituted a court of inquiry, said to have been lately held in Rhode Island, with powers to transmit persons accused of offences committed in America to places beyond the seas to be tried. The said resolutions being severally read a second time, were, upon the question severally put thereupon, agreed to by the House, nemine contradicente. Resolved, that the speaker of this House do transmit to the speakers of the different assemblies of the British colonies on the continent, copies of the said resolutions, and desire that they will lay them before their respective assemblies, and request them to appoint some person or persons of their respective bodies, to communicate from time to time with the said committee. Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/va_res_corres_1773.asp











