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The President's pardon is a political tool the chief executive has in their arsenal which allows them to check the power of the judiciary. If an innocent defendant goes through the judicial system and is convicted anyway then the President may issue out a pardon to exonerate them. This is the ideal use of the pardon, but in reality it is used to benefit the lackeys of the President or the governors who can issue out pardons on the state level. Because the de facto use is not consistent with reason or civil governance, given its arbitraity, I believe there needs to be more restrictions on that particular power. In the theory of checks and balances, one branch can check the power of another, however, there is another theory which is separation of power meaning that one branch cannot obstruct the power of the others. This sounds contradictory but it is not. For a check to not be an obstruction the check needs to be a negative on a power and that negative can only be an active reaction. There are several checks which violate this rule, one being the power of the President's veto. The veto does not have to be an active check on the legislature since a bill from Congress needs to be signed by the President in order to be enacted. This means that the President can passively do nothing and still check the power of the legislature. There is a specific circumstance where if Congress is in session when the time frame to sign it ends then the bill will become law even without the President's signature, but that isn't all the time. To follow the two theories correctly, all bills will be able to become law without the President's signature but if the President objects to a bill then he can veto. This will force the President to be more active when checking the power of Congress. Likewise, a pardon is just the veto against the judiciary. The judicial branch exercises its power to convict a defendant and the President may intervene to nullify that conviction. The pardon is an active check, which is consistent with the theory, however the timing of the pardon is not so. Just as a bill needs to complete its course through the legislative branch before the President may veto it, so to must a conviction pass through the entire judiciary before the President may pardon it. This means that a defendant must make an appeal all the way up to the Supreme Court before a Pardon may be applicable. The pardon should have no affect with the decision of the court, only to exonerate the individual defendant. This way the theories of separation of power and system of checks & balances is better defined and implemented with reason and the power of the executive to be used inappropriately, that means arbitrarily, is restricted.

When the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention designed the Constitution they debated the structure of government and how to best implement a proper separation of power and system of checks and balances. When discussing Article II there were concerns about the office of the Presidency and its relationship with the executive council. By this point most states had an executive council also known as the privy council or the governor's council. There were various ways to structure the council. You can have the executive council be appointed entirely by the legislature without the chief executive's approval, the council could be made up of members of the legislature, the chief executive could appoint advisors by themselves, the chief executive could nominate advisors who would need approval from the legislature, etc. The delegates decided on the last option but the relationship was still not clearly enumerated and the first few presidential administrations consisted of debates between the two branches over the Cabinet. The Presidents and the Senate wanted as much control and oversight as possible. I do not believe that the current structure of the President's Cabinet is well designed and so here is my proposed amendment. Each department will be headed by two Consuls, one styled as a Secretary and the other a Chief. The Secretary is nominated by the Speaker of the House and approved by the Senate. They can only be removed by impeachment/conviction or by a joint resolution. The President cannot reject or remove a Secretary but could appeal to either house with a removal request. The Secretary will advise the President and must be in the same room whenever the President and the department's Chief are meeting. The Secretary can be called by the Congress to give a report on the activities of the department and Congress can request or pass a bill to change specific department's policies. The second Consul is the Chief of the department. They will run the operations and management of the department and subsidiary agencies in a more executive manner. They will enforce the policies determined by the President and Secretary while also gathering data about its department's operations to be relayed to the President and Secretary. The President will have full discretion in appointing the Chiefs and do not require Congress' approval. The President may remove, replace, or add Chiefs at will. Congress cannot. Congress can impeach a Chief via House and conviction via Senate for committing high crimes, treason, or indecent misdemeanors unbecoming of an advisor to the President.

November 3, 1764 The petition of the Council and House of Representatives of his Majesty's Province of Massachusetts Bay, Most humbly showeth: That the Act passed in the last session of Parliament, entitled " An act for granting certain duties in the British colonies and plantations in America," etc., must necessarily bring many burdens upon the inhabitants of these colonies and plantations, which your petitioners conceive would not have been imposed if a full representation of the state of the colonies had been made to your honourable House. That the duties laid upon foreign sugars and molasses by a former Act of Parliament entitled " an Act for the better securing and encouraging the trade of his Majesty's sugar colonies in America," if the Act had been executed with rigour, must have had the effect of an absolute prohibition. That the duties laid on those articles by the present Act still remain so great that, however otherwise intended, they must undoubtedly have the same effect. That the importation of foreign molasses into this province in particular is of the greatest importance, and a prohibition will be prejudicial to many branches of its trade and will lessen the consumption of the manufactures of Great Britain. That this importance does not arise merely, nor principally, from the necessity of foreign molasses in order to its being consumed or distilled within the province. That if the trade for many years carried on for foreign molasses can be no longer continued, a vent cannot be found for more than one half the fish of inferior quality which are caught and cured by the inhabitants of the province, the French not permitting fish to be carried by foreigners to any of their islands, unless it be bartered or exchanged for molasses. That if there be no sale of fish of inferior quality it will be impossible to continue the fishery, the fish usually sent to Europe will then cost so dear that the French will be able to undersell the English at all the European markets; and by this means one of the most valuable returns to Great Britain will be utterly lost, and that great nursery of seamen destroyed. That the restraints laid upon the exportation of timber, boards, staves, and other lumber from the colonies to Ireland and other parts of Europe, except Great Britain, must greatly affect the trade of this province and discourage the clearing and improving of the lands which are yet uncultivated. That the powers given by the late Act to the court of vice-admiralty, instituted over all America, are so expressed as to leave it doubtful, whether goods seized for illicit importation in any one of the colonies may not be removed, in order to trial, to any other colony where the judge may reside, although at many hundred miles distance from the place of seizure. That if this construction should be admitted, many persons, however legally they goods may have been imported, must lose their property, merely from an inability of following after it, and making that defence which they might do if the trial had been in the colony where the goods were seized. That this construction would be so much the more grievous, seeing that in America the officers by this Act are indemnified in case of seizure whenever the judge of admiralty shall certify y that there was probable camise; and the claimant can neither have costs nor maintain an action against the person seizing, how much soever he may have expended in defence of his property. That the extension of the powers of courts of vice-admiralty has, so far as the jurisdiction of the said courts hath been extended, deprived the colonies of one of the' most valuable of English liberties, trials by juries. That every Act of Parliament, which in this respect distinguishes his Majesty's subjects in the colonies from their fellow subjects in Great Britain, must create a very sensible concern and grief. That there have been communicated to your petitioners sundry resolutions of the House of Commons in their last session for imposing stamp duties or taxes upon the inhabitants of the colonies, the consideration whereof was referred to the next session. That your petitioners acknowledge with all gratitude the tenderness of the legislature of Great Britain of the liberties of the subjects in the colonies, who have always judged by their representatives both of the way and manner in which internal taxes should bc raised within their respective governments, and of the ability of the inhabitants to pay them. That they humbly hope the colonies in general have so demeaned themselves, more especially during the late war, as still to deserve the continuance of all those liberties which they have hitherto enjoyed. That although during the war the taxes upon the colonies were greater than they have been since the conclusion of it, yet the sources by which the inhabitants were enabled to pay their taxes having ceased, and their trade being decayed, they are not so able to pay the taxes they are subjected to in time of peace as they were the greater taxes in time of war. That one principal difficulty which has ever attended the trade of the colonies, proceeds from the scarcity of money, which scarcity is caused by the balance of trade with Great Britain, which has been continually against the colonies. That the drawing sums of money from the colonies from time to time must distress the trade to that degree that eventually Great Britain may lose more by the diminution of the consumption of her manufactures than all the sums which it is possible for the colonies thus to pay can countervail. That they humbly conceive if the taxes which the inhabitants of this province are obliged annually to pay towards the support of the internal government, the restraint they are under in their trade for the benefit of Great Britain, and the consumption thereby occasioned of British manufactures, be all considered and have their due weight it must appear that the subjects of this province are as fully burdened as their fellow subjects in Britain, and that they are, whilst in America, more beneficial to the nation than they would be if they should be removed to Britain and there held to a full proportion of the national taxes and duties of every kind. Your petitioners, therefore, most humbly pray that they may be relieved from the burdens which, they have humbly represented to have been brought upon them by the late Act of Parliament, as to the wisdom of the honourable House shall seem meet, that the privileges of the colonies relative to their internal taxes which they have so longed enjoyed, may still be referred, until your petitioners, in conjunction with the other governments, can have opportunity to make a more full representation of the state and the condition of the colonies and the interest of Great Britain with regard to them. In Council Octr. 31 1764. Read & sent down In the House of Represent [Oct] Nov 1764 Read and ^accepted with the Amendments^ Ordered that the foregoing Petition be sent to the Agent by both Houses to be presented to the Honble. House of Commons accordingly. Sent up for concurrence, S. White Spkr In Council 2 Nov. 1764— Read and Concurred with the Amendments of the House at A & B unanimously; their Amendment at C being unanimously nonconcurred. And the Secretary is directed to sign the same in the name of the Board. Sent down for Concurrence, A Oliver Secr [This petition was altered several times, after it was first read and adopted in the House of Representatives. The Council objected to two or three sentences, some of which were omitted. There was finally a committee of conference of the House of Representatives and of the Council ; and the result was "to retain the words "rights" and '• liberties" in several places,instead of" privileges," which had been substituted by the Council. The committee were J. Otis, jr. 0. Thacher, and Col. Clap, of the House; T. Hutchinson, J. Otis, and E. Trowbridge, of the Council.] Sources: 1. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/petition_mass_1764.asp 2. https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/2530

THE COLONEL DISMOUNTED: OR THE RECTOR VINDICATED. IN A LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIS REVERENCE: CONTAINING A DISSERTATION UPON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COLONY. BY COMMON SENSE. QUODCUNQUE OSTENDIS MIHI SIC, INCREDULUS ODI. Hor. WILLIAMSBURG: PRINTED BY JOSEPH ROYLE, MDCCLXIV. I think it necessary to advertise the readers that this letter was drawn up above eight months ago, purely for amusement. But from a motive which has prevailed with me, I now make it public. To distinguish His Reverence’s elegant and polite language, the quotations from his inimitable works are printed in italic characters. To the Reverend John Camm, Rector of York-Hampton It must be confessed, may it please Your Reverence, that you have erected two noble works, outlasting monumental brass, in honor of your victory over the patrons of ignorance and irreligion. The dignity of sentiment that shines with so peculiar a luster in your Single and Distinct View and in your Observations, the elegant language devoid of sophistry and diversified with the most agreeable tropes that give ornament and strength to those excellent performances, must excite the admiration of the present age and transmit your name, with distinguished éclat, to posterity. Wonderful genius! who with infinite wit and humor can transform the unripe crab, the mouth-distorting persimmon, the most arrant trash into delicious fruit, nay wring-jaw cider into palatable liquor. Presumptuous tithe-pig Colonel! Infatuated syllogistical Colonel! What humiliating disgrace have they brought upon themselves! But they deserve it. Why did they inflame your resentment? Did they not know Your Reverence has honesty to represent facts truly, learning to write accurately, and wit to make your lampoons, though loaded with rancor and abuse, agreeable and entertaining? Did they not know that besides these excellent accomplishments you possess in an eminent degree that cardinal virtue† with whose assistance very moderate abilities are capable of making a great figure? What arrogance was it then, even in the boreas of the Northern Neck, in the violentus auster,2 to enter the lists against such a gladiatorian penman? Could these pygmies expect to triumph over such a redoubted colossus? And in defense too of a cause that was not defensible? In defense of some particular Assemblies that had been impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors before the Lords of Trade and Plantations, when Your Reverence was agent for the WHOLE body of the Virginia clergy in England? These high crimes and misdemeanors, it is certain, are accumulated in the impeachment to a surprising degree; but what then? The impeachment may be true, notwithstanding; nay, it is true: Your Reverence has said it is true and that is enough. Indeed the colonels with their hurly-burly vociferous verbosity dispute your veracity and pretend that in your representation of the General Assembly’s conduct you indulge a language injurious to the truth, that you encourage party contentions, that you break in upon the respect owing to the legislature of the colony, that you construe the worthiest and best intentions into criminal designs against the royal authority, that you prefer the support of your own cause before the truth and the service of the public, and that by a low kind of wit and satire you expect to prevail against reason and argument. But they, you know, deal in false facts, ill-adapted maxims, confident assertions, imaginary impossible cases, inconsistent notions, sneaking chicanery, and voluminous nonsense, and therefore are not worthy of credit. May it please Your Reverence, I was pronouncing the other day a sublime miscellaneous oration before a numerous audience, and proving that Your Reverence does not deserve these reflections. But before I proceed I must explain what I mean by a miscellaneous oration, not that I intend this explanation for Your Reverence’s information; this would be presumption, since you have proved indisputably, by your own incomparable writings, that you are a perfect master of the miscellaneous manner. But as this letter may fall into the hands of readers less learned than Your Reverence, I think it necessary for their information. A miscellaneous oration then is exactly like that kind of miscellaneous writing in which, according to a noble author, the most confused head, if fraught with a little commonplace book learning, may exert itself to as much advantage as the most orderly and settled judgment. An orator in this way draws together shreds of learning and fragments of wit, and tacks them in any fantastic form he thinks proper; but connection, coherence, design, and meaning are against his purpose, and destroy the very spirit and genius of his oration. In short, may it please Your Reverence, it is just like the miscellaneous remarks in your Single and Distinct View. I say, may it please Your Reverence, I was holding forth to a numerous audience in support of your charge against the General Assembly, when the hot and violent demagogue, rushing through the crowd in an attitude that would have frightened the renowned knight of La Manca himself, advanced upon me with hasty strides and brawled out, Thou dealer in general topics, thou confounder of justice with injustice, I will prove this charge to be contrary to the truth in every instance. I had given half a crown, may it please Your Reverence, for your Single and Distinct View; and as a subscriber to the Virginia Gazette I became possessed of your Observations, and another witty paper remarkable for an elegant and polite description of a certain odoriferous knight who has the honor of being distinguished by one of the titles properly belonging to Your Reverence. But Ned the barber, a shrewd inquisitive fellow, while shaving me the other day, cast his eye upon that facetious paper, which I held in my hand, and asked me whether the progenitors of the sweet-scented knight received the honor of knighthood from the monarch who advanced the loin of beef to that dignity or not. I told him I believed this honor must have been conferred by the British Solomon, because as history tells us he was very intimate with His Reverence’s ancestors, making them the constant companions of his sports and divertisements; and it was probable he created them baronets when he instituted that order, but of this I could not be positive. Well then, said Ned, pray Sir ask the Rector of York-Hampton; he knows all things, all secrets, no prattling gossip, Who with an hundred pair of wings News from the furthest quarters brings, Sees, hears, and tells, untold before, All that she knows, and ten times more, knows so much as this Reverend Rector does; and as nothing can be hid from him, no person is so capable of resolving this question. To oblige Ned the barber, this digression has obtruded itself; and he waits with impatience for your determination. May it please Your Reverence, as you had declared the hectoring bullies were more considerable for fierce language than true spirit, I was under no difficulty about the manner of my defense; for, thought I, if Your Reverence obliged two bullies to part with their strongholds, surely the same weapons, though perhaps not managed when in my hands with the same dexterity as when under Your Reverence’s conduct, will dispel the fog which one Cromwellian preacher endeavors to diffuse over the face of truth. Then by a motion of my left hand, which I was obliged to use upon this occasion, similar to that of a soldier when he is commanded to handle his cartridge, I drew your Single and Distinct View from my right pocket, and opposing it to the enemy I found myself more invincible than if armed with Mambrino’s celebrated helmet, or the more celebrated shield, forged with Vulcanian art for the son of Thetis. It was, may it please Your Reverence, altogether impenetrable to the enemy’s great guns; and as for his small arms, they made not the least impression upon it. Having this advantage, I advanced, in my turn, upon my antagonist, drove him off the field, and took possession of several posts the strength of which he had magnified, until they fell into my hands. He then shifted his ground, and by a sudden maneuver which I really did not expect, entrenched himself in new entrenchments. These I instantly stormed; but as I could not carry them I was at a loss how to conduct my attack until reflecting on the astonishing virtues of your Single and Distinct View, I resolved to try if trumpeting it out would not have the effect upon these entrenchments as the sound of the ram’s horn had upon the walls of Jericho; and I assure you I had great expectations at first, for the entrenchments were shocked several times, especially upon the repetition of your fine criticisms, and I verily thought they would have been leveled with the ground by the sound of the words justice, learning, religion, liberty, property, public good, which compose part of your character, in the panegyric Your Reverence so justly bestows upon yourself. But as the severest shocks from this tremendous battery did not destroy the entrenchments, though they were frequently severe enough to shock my senses, I applied to your Observations, and thundering out with a vociferous contempt these words of your other encomium upon yourself, I write for liberty and property, for the rights of commerce, for an established church, for the validity of the King’s authority, pro aris et focis,3 immediately the enemy beat the chamade and demanded a conference, which I granted him. As this conference relates to Your Reverence, I think it proper to transmit you a particular detail of it, which I choose to do through Mr. Royle’s press, that I may be certain of its coming safe to hand. The Colonel opened the conference as followeth: I make no doubt, Sir, said he, but that you have entered into this controversy from an opinion that everything the Rector has advanced with respect to the General Assemblies, and those whom he distinguishes by the name of his adversaries, is true. I replied, My motive for espousing His Reverence proceeds from my opinion of his veracity. Then, Sir, said the Colonel, I will convince you that the Rector has neither truth or ingenuity. Neither truth or ingenuity in His Reverence’s works! replied I, hastily. What do you mean, Colonel? Have you not experienced the wonderful effects of his Single and Distinct View? And would you not have felt, perhaps, more fatal effects from his Observations had you not implored this conference? I acknowledge, said the Colonel, the Rector’s works, like those deep-throated engines Milton makes the apostate angels oppose to the celestial army, . . . belched out smoke, And with outrageous noise the air And all her entrails tore; disgorging foul Their devilish glut . . . but smoke and noise are not evidences of truth. Colonel, said I, interrupting him, I expect you will not treat His Reverence with scurrility. I will endeavor to avoid it, answered the Colonel, for I am by no means fond of copying the Rector’s style or saintlike phrases; it is by reason and argument, not by blows and insults, that I expect to convince you of the truth. The Colonel went on: I had determined not to give myself any further trouble about the Rector of York-Hampton. I know it was a Sisyphean labor to engage in a dispute with this man, for, as Pope says, Destroy his fib, or sophistry, in vain, The creature’s at his dirty work again. I thought too I should be very indifferently employed to reply in form, as Lord Shaftesbury calls it, to his Single and Distinct View, which in my opinion carries with it its own ridicule; neither could I be persuaded that so sorry a performance, which perverts the meaning of my most simple expressions, mutilates sentences, and makes me speak words I never uttered would be looked upon by men of sense as a refutation of my Letter to the Clergy. And as for his tinsel wit, if it can be worthy of such an epithet, I despised it. But that I may convince you of this writer’s sophistry, of his misrepresentation of the plainest facts, and of the constitutional proceedings of the General Assembly, I will examine his legerdemain performances; and I hope irksome as the talk is I shall have the strength to go through with it. In the apology this Rector makes for his impudence or rudeness (these are his own words) he says that in this war which his adversaries began, the manner of his defense has been directed by the conduct of the attack, for he found it too great a difficulty for him to let the merit of their example be entirely thrown away; so that lex talionis is the rule of retribution with this peacemaking Rector. However, let that be as it will, let us see whether this eminent divine is a man of truth and ingenuity. My adversaries began the war, says this faithful recorder of events. But is he sure of this? Or is it a false fact, a confident assertion invented to persuade men out of their senses, according to his own elegant expressions? I affirm it is a false fact, a confident assertion, which, if I prove, will, I presume, make the scourge he intended for others reverberate with double force upon himself. At the September session of Assembly in the year 1758, the people represented to the House of Burgesses that “by reason of the short crops of tobacco made that year it would be impossible for them to discharge their public dues and taxes that were payable in tobacco, which would expose them to the vexatious and oppressive exactions of the public collectors; and they prayed that an act might pass for paying all public, county, and parish levies, and officers’ fees in money at such price as by the House should be thought reasonable.” The short crops made that year, and the impossibility of paying their public tobacco dues as the laws then stood, were the reasons given by the people for desiring, and by the General Assembly, in consequence of this representation, for passing the Two-Penny Act. But though the relief of the people from the general distress of that year could be the only possible motive with the General Assembly for passing that act, yet this discerner of spirits, this man who knows everybody’s thoughts, discovered other reasons for their conduct. Suffer me to recite them in brief from the impeachment brought against the legislative body of the colony before the Lords of Trade and Plantations in the time of the Rector’s agency in England. In that impeachment they are accused with exercising acts of supremacy inconsistent with the dignity of the Church of England and manifestly tending to draw the people of the plantations from their allegiance, with assuming to themselves a power to bind the King’s hands, with having nothing more at heart than to lessen the influence of the crown and the maintenance of the clergy, with attacking the rights of the crown and of the clergy, with depriving the King of his royal authority over the clergy, putting them under the power of the vestries and making them subject to the humors of the people, with never intending any good to the clergy, with taking possession of the patronages and wanting to be absolute masters of the maintenance of the clergy, with passing acts of Assembly on pretense that only small quantities of tobacco were made in some years that they might render the condition of the clergy most distressful, various, and uncertain after a painful and laborious performance of their functions. In short, and to sum up the whole in one word, with being traitors in the legal sense of the word. This charge, so heavy and so injurious, occasioned my Letter to the Clergy; and I will submit it to your determination whether I had not a right, as a friend to truth, as a member of that body so grossly abused, to obviate the acrimonious invectives contained in this charge. If I had no right, then I am the aggressor; but if I had, then the Rector’s want of truth and ingenuity in a plain matter of fact is evident, as he must be the author of this controversy. To this I replied, You certainly have a right, Colonel, by all legal methods, to vindicate the conduct of the General Assembly not only as a member of it, but as an honest man, against every unjust accusation; and as this impeachment was brought in a public manner before the Lords of Trade in England, who have the direction and superintendency of the plantation affairs, I must own that your publishing your defense here does not make you the author of this war. The promoter of this impeachment is, without question, the person who BEGAN it. Well then, Sir, said the Colonel, the Rector BEGAN the war. I replied, Be not so hasty, Colonel; His Reverence is innocent. A man of his integrity, of his truth and uprightness of heart, could not invent such a malevolent groundless charge; and as you accuse a clergyman remarkable for his humility and meekness of temper as a promoter of dissension between the legislature and clergy of the colony, you deserve the censure His Reverence has thought proper to pass upon you. Why Sir, asked the Colonel, seemingly astonished, was not the Rector the author of this impeachment? If he was not the clerk that drew it, still he was the instrument; or, that I may express myself in less ambiguous terms, the informer upon whose evidence it was drawn up. Nay, does not the paper presented by him to the Lords of Trade as The Humble Representation of the Clergy of the Church of England in His Majesty’s Colony and Dominion of Virginia, which in fact composes part of this invidious libel, prove that he was the author of it? And is not this more than thinking, according to the pretty proverb so wittily applied in his Observations? Is it not good authority for charging him with being the author, the forger of the impeachment? Besides, does he not justify it in his Observations? Does he not, by a most unfair and disingenuous comment upon four acts passed by the General Assembly attempt to prove that they all agree in these peccant circumstances? Why really, Colonel, said I, how can you justify three of those acts? For by your present plan of defense, you only endeavor to prove that the General Assembly were not guilty of the crimes laid to their charge by passing one act; their passing three others, then, of the same pernicious tendency, is altogether unjustifiable. I was, may it please Your Reverence, a little graveled here, and under some apprehension of tripping if I had attempted a further justification of your truth and ingenuity. I was therefore desirous to divert the Colonel from pursuing his proofs against you as the author of the war by putting him upon his defense of the other three peccant acts. The Colonel replied, I perceive, Sir, by your attempting to divert me from the point I was upon, you are convinced the Rector BEGAN the war. The Colonel stopped. I was silent. For, may it please Your Reverence, what could I say in your vindication until I had it from yourself that you was not the informer upon whose evidence this impeachment was drawn up; but if you deny that you was the informer, and will let me know who was, I am resolved to have another bout with the Colonel. I must therefore beseech you to be very explicit in this particular when you favor the public with your next production. It would be disgustful, even to you, Sir, his friend, resumed the Colonel, was I to take notice of all the fustian contained in his panegyrics upon his own and his brethren’s loyalty. Don’t think, gentlemen of the clergy, said the Colonel, breaking out into a rhapsody upon repeating the word brethren, don’t think that you all have the honor of being brethren to this ever-to-be-reverenced Rector. No, gentlemen, the word brethren, like the word many,† is capable of being taken by two handles. Do not, therefore, flatter yourselves that the Rector of York-Hampton takes it by the same handle he takes the word all* (by which single word all has produced one of the finest pieces of true genuine original criticism that ever was invented by the wit of man). I say, gentlemen, the word brethren is not, like the word all, to be taken by the big handle, but like the word many is to be taken by the little handle; so that the Rector’s brethren are but few comparatively with the whole body of the Virginia clergy, perhaps only a quindecemvirate5 of them, of which he is the chief, who in a general convention of twenty-five carried the vote for appointing him their agent to impeach the General Assembly of their country of treason. But now I am addressing myself to the clergy, give me leave to propose a question or two to those fifty-five (for it seems there are at least eighty parochial clergymen in the colony)† who did not think proper to attend the regular summons of the bishop’s commissary. Did you, gentlemen, when you sent excuses for want of your appearance send also your concurrence in the measures that were proposed in the convention? Were you acquainted with these measures before they were proposed? If you were, who made you acquainted with them? Not your late commissary. He was one of the traitors; he was not under the influence of the clergy or in their true interest, and therefore cannot be supposed to have given you the information, though he was the only person who ought to have done it; perhaps he was not let into the secret designs of the Rector and his brethren. And if you were not informed, could you send your concurrence to measures you knew nothing of? I am persuaded you could not, but that you would have attended the regular summons of the bishop’s commissary on purpose to have opposed the measures that were carried by the quindecemvirate had you been acquainted with them before the meeting of the convention. The respect I bear you, the high sentiments I entertain of your truth and ingenuity (these, gentlemen, are favorite words with the Rector), the piety, candor, and integrity so conspicuous in the lives of most of you, make me sure you would have attended on purpose to oppose measures so contrary to your real interest, so repugnant to truth, and which could only serve to destroy the harmony and concord it is your inclination as well as duty to cultivate and maintain between the legislature and the reverend body of the clergy. The Colonel resumed his defense: Was I to trace out ALL the Rector’s boasts of his and his brethren’s adhering to and preserving the old constitution, which some particular Assemblies were endeavoring to destroy, of their sheltering themselves under the authority of the British oak, under the wings of the prerogative, under the protection of a most gracious and religious monarch, from whose allegiance the General Assemblies were attempting to draw the people of the plantations, it would carry me further than there is any need to go on this occasion. ALL his ostentatious flourishes are to be seen at large in his masterly works, which I suppose are by this time transmitted to Graham Franks, now in England, to be laid before the Board of Trade or perhaps a more honorable board, that his unparalleled loyalty may be manifested when his cause against the collector of his parish levy is carried before that high tribunal. But lest the word ALL, which I have taken occasion to use twice in this part of my defense, to wit, once when I spoke of the Rector’s boasts, and again when I spoke of his ostentatious flourishes, should fling him into labor with another criticism and make him bring forth, like the mountain in the fable, I must inform you which handle you are to take it by in these two places. Know then, Sir, that you are to take this word ALL by the big handle, and not by the little handle, which last mentioned handle I took it by when in my Letter to the Clergy I explained my sense of it as it stood in the impeachment by making it include the greater part of the members of the General Assembly; which I said must be the import of the word in that part of the impeachment I was then considering. But this explanation I suppose the Rector passed over, that he might demonstrate to the world his profundity in critical knowledge. I will now examine the three acts the Rector cites as further instances of the General Assembly’s disloyalty. In the year 1738 two new counties and parishes were erected upon the frontiers of the colony, far distant from navigation. That these counties might be settled and a good barrier be thereby made against the French,* several encouragements were granted to the inhabitants; one of these was that they might pay all levies and officers’ fees in money for tobacco, at the rate of three farthings per pound. Under this regulation the salary of the ministers in each of the new parishes was only £152, when the salary of the other parochial ministers was 16,640 pounds of tobacco, as settled by the act of 1727, which was then in force. The ministers of these new parishes continued to receive this salary of £152 until the year 1753, when one of them petitioned the Council for an augmentation of his salary; this petition was sent by the Council to the House of Burgesses, who immediately passed the act for the frontier parishes, as the Rector calls it, whereby the minister’s salary in each of these parishes was settled at £100 a year, according to the desire of the minister petitioning. This act, passed upon this consideration, and which was so advantageous to the ministers of these parishes, was one article in the impeachment of high crimes against the majesty of our sovereign and the dignity of the Church of England; and as the colony had no agent at that time in England to represent a true state of the case, was, from the misrepresentation of the agent appointed by fifteen of the Virginia clergy without the participation of the two ministers concerned, repealed by the royal proclamation. For this repeal the ministers of those two parishes returned the Rector their humble and hearty acknowledgments by their petition to the General Assembly for a renewal of the repealed act, without which they must starve; which petition had such an effect upon the humanity of this traitorous Assembly, who had nothing more at heart than to lessen the maintenance of the clergy and to render their condition most distressful, various, and uncertain, that regardless of the Rector’s resentment they complied with the ministers’ request. As to the Norfolk and Princess Anne Act, I presume I need not repeat what I have said upon it in my Letter to the Clergy, where I have given a candid and honest account of the reasons which prevailed with the General Assembly to pass it; to which I can add nothing, except that the petition from the people which gave rise to it was presented to the House of Burgesses at their October session, 1754, and being referred to the next session, did not come under the consideration of the House until the 7th day of May, 1755; so that full time was given for any person to represent against it if it had not been agreeable to him. From this account of the Frontier and Norfolk acts the Rector’s want of truth and ingenuity, of decency and good manners in his remarks upon the General Assembly for passing these acts, is sufficiently evident. For him to charge the legislature with attempting to lessen the influence of the crown and the maintenance of the clergy because they gave to the ministers of the frontier parishes an increase of salary, without which they must have lived in the greatest indigence, and because they gave relief to the people in one part of the colony from laws which under their particular circumstances were extremely oppressive to them, I say for him to charge the legislature with such attempts is an instance of want of truth and an indecency of behavior which no man could be guilty of but one who was resolved to trudge, with might and main, through dirt and mire to gain his ends. And now, Sir, may I not say with great justice of this Rector, in his own words, that he has shown more judgment in suppressing part of the Apostle’s account of charity than in giving us what he had quoted; for had he given the Apostle’s account unmutilated, the reader must have seen that charity doth not behave itself unseemly, that it rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth. But as the proverbial account of truth, that it is not to be spoken at all times, seemed to be more for the Rector’s purpose, he has preferred it in his articles of impeachment. The general act of 1755 was passed when, I confess, there was not such a pressing necessity for it as there was afterwards, in the year 1758; but their passing this act when perhaps there was no great necessity for it does not make the General Assembly guilty of the crimes contained in the Rector’s impeachment. The legislature of this as of all other countries are fallible men, and as such may enact laws which they may think necessary and for the public good but which from experience may be found unnecessary and even destructive of that good they were intended to promote. But is this fallibility to be imputed to them as a crime? Or is their enacting a law to enable the inhabitants of the colony to discharge their tobacco debts in money, in a year, as they thought, of general dearth and scarcity, an evidence of their attempting to restrain the power of their sovereign and to destroy the dignity of the established church? And yet in such a point of view does this Rector place their conduct. Is such a representation honest? Is it such a one as ought to have come from a man who so confidently charges others with a want of truth and ingenuity? And is it decent for a clergyman to treat members of the General Assembly for offering a just defense against so aggravated a charge with a language not to be found but amongst those who have prostituted themselves to the lowest dregs and sediments of scurrility? Here I stopped the Colonel and said with some warmth, You forget your promise, Colonel, not to treat His Reverence with hard names. His scurrility, indeed, is provoked defensive scurrility; which consideration will have its due effect with the readers of every degree, who are the judge and jury and everything with His Reverence. But you, Colonel, have, unprovoked, abused His Reverence in your first defense, and in your letter to him published in a public newspaper you have charged him with a neglect of duty in his parish, which is one of the most palpable, barefaced, and impudent falsehoods that ever was invented. I thought, Sir, replied the Colonel, I had convinced you that the Rector was the aggressor, and that his abusive and unjust charge against the General Assembly had occasioned the controversy between us. As to my abuse of him in my Letter to the Clergy, you must be convinced of the contrary if you will read that letter with attention; for though the manner in which he has detached my words which seem to have any severity of expression in them from their proper places, collected them into one view, and taken them to himself, may show how easy it is for a caviler to give a new sense, or a new nonsense, to anything, yet as they are applied by me in the several parts of my Letter to the Clergy in which they stand they will appear to be nothing more than proper and just expressions relative to the treatment the General Assemblies have received from the Rector and his accomplices. It is true, in one place of my letter I have disputed the Rector’s superiority in point of learning above other men, which I acknowledge is great sauciness in me, since he has demonstrated by his fine writings that he is as excellent a critic and as learned a divine as he is a good Christian; but as I did not know so much at that time, I hope I shall be forgiven. If I have accused him with a neglect of duty in his parish, and can be convinced that this accusation is unjust, in that case I have done him an injury, and will not only ask his forgiveness of my offense, but make an atonement for it by publicly acknowledging that I have aspersed the character of a diligent pastor, attentive to and perpetually careful of the spiritual concerns of all the flock committed to his charge. But then, as I may differ from him about the precise meaning of the word duty, I must, to prevent mistakes, have the meaning of it fixed and determined; for perhaps I may understand it in a more extensive sense than the Rector doth. It is, you know Sir, according to his own definition of it, a complex term, and consequently must include something more than an excursion out of the parish where he resides to his church in York-Hampton on a Sunday when he is not confined at home by pain and sickness. I suppose the Rector calls himself a minister, a laborer, a watchman, a pastor, a steward, an ambassador, in sacred things. These different characters, then, must have different heads of duty belonging to them. I cannot therefore agree that he discharges all these duties by only attending his parish church on a Sunday; and if he does nothing more, he may be likened to a servant who having six talents committed to his management wraps five of them up in a napkin and only trades with one, or rather a small part of one of them. Whether such a servant acts justly or not is not for me to determine. But Colonel, said I, I have studied to find out what connection there could be between His Reverence’s neglect of duty in his parish and the dispute between you and him about the Two-Penny Act. Exactly as much, Sir, replied the Colonel, as there is between my officiating as a clergyman in the churches of the parish where I live and a dispute relating to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws; which is all the reply I shall make to his windmill and giant and his other quixotisms. Why Colonel, said I, do you really officiate as a clergyman in the churches of the parish where you live? I do not, answered the Colonel; but I officiate sometimes as reader in the church which I frequent in the absence of the minister, being thereto appointed by the vestry. My motive for accepting this appointment, I presume, the Rector has no right to inquire into, since it was not from a pecuniary consideration. Well Colonel, said I, as to that matter, whether right or wrong, I have no business with it; but your resentment against His Reverence for making use of the happy privilege which every British subject enjoys, of approaching the throne in an humble petition, is not to be defended. Did I express any resentment against the Rector, replied the Colonel, for making use of this happy privilege, I should be blameable because I value it as much as the Rector can, notwithstanding his pompous encomiums upon his own loyalty. But I shall always consider it as an affront to the throne, which under our present illustrious race of kings has been eminently distinguished for truth and justice, to approach it with a petition loaded with calumny and abuse against the King’s substitute and every other part of the legislature of the colony. If the Rector thought himself injured by any act of the General Assembly, he had a right to approach the throne with an humble petition against it; but then he should have approached it with truth: he should have represented facts with candor and integrity, and not have imputed such act to causes which could not possibly exist; and if he had done so, I assure you, Sir, he and I should have had no dispute. But Colonel, said I, in your account of the famous petition you have reflected with great severity upon the clergy, when I own I can see no mighty harm in that petition, provided it might stand alone, without your comment. Besides, it was the petition of one clergyman only, who did not prefer it from any imagination that there was room to expect success in it, but to evince the contrary by experiment. Your reflections therefore were very disingenuous; and though the design of the petition is a piece of secret history, a stratagem, a machination, which it seems you, with all your sagacity and insight into everybody’s affairs, have not been able to penetrate, yet your inference drawn from it that if the provision for the clergy was made better by an act they would make no complaint concerning encroachments on the authority of the King is no less ungenerous, since to make this inference good it should have appeared in the petition that the clergy wanted a better provision by an act without a suspending clause. But there is no such thing in the petition; and I believe it would be a difficult matter to prove that the clergy, though willing enough to have a better provision, would accept of it by means of an act without a suspending clause. My account of the famous petition, as the Rector calls it, replied the Colonel, is taken from the Burgesses’ Journals, where it stands as the petition of the clergy, and not as the petition of one of them. However, let it be for the present that it was owned by one clergyman only. The Rector says this clergyman designed well; and that one other clergyman was privy to the petition, who, from what he says about the secret history of it, I conclude must be himself. Now this petition declares that many clergymen who are a disgrace to the ministry find opportunities to fill the parishes; and can any expression be found in my Letter to the Clergy, torture it how you will, that reflects with such severity upon them as this declaration doth, which was made in the most public manner by one of their own body abetted by one other, and he no less a person than the pious Rector of York-Hampton? And if our parishes are filled with so many clergymen who are a disgrace to the ministry, may it not be suspected that such men would accept of a better provision by an act without a suspending clause? And that they would not be very nice in examining whether such act was worded exactly conformable to a royal instruction to the governor for his own particular conduct, especially when they were not answerable for a transgression of it? The Rector, in zeal for the royal authority, might, for aught I know, be willing to refuse a better provision under such an act; but as he has not as yet attained to that degree of supremacy as to decree by his own authority that his brethren should refuse it, it would be necessary to determine this matter in a convention. And if the clergymen, distinguished with such excellent characters by the author of the petition, who are so many, should prevail against the self-denying Rector of York-Hampton upon a question in which their temporal interest might outweigh the royal authority as in all probability they would, the Rector, by an established rule of the convention, must submit, and perhaps rather than be the occasion of a schism, would subscribe to the vote of the majority. But as his conduct in such a case cannot be known, it must remain a matter of opinion whether he would accept of a better provision or not under such an act. But notwithstanding the changes the Rector is perpetually ringing upon an act with, and an act without a suspending clause, his loyalty will not shine forth with a meridian brightness unless he refuses to accept of a better provision under an act with a suspending clause; for the governor is not to give his assent to any act with a suspending clause that alters or repeals an act which has received the royal approbation, without first obtaining the King’s permission. So that before the Rector ought to accept of a better provision under any act of the General Assembly, the clergy should appoint him their agent a second time to approach the throne with an humble petition for the royal permission to the governor to give his assent to such act; which appointment, if I dare venture a conjecture, would be extremely pleasing to him, as he would thereby have an opportunity of soliciting a place for himself of the first ecclesiastical dignity in the colony, which I believe is at this time vacant. And let it not be thought that a convention cannot be held during the vacancy of the commissaryship for appointing him agent; for if an advertisement in the Virginia Gazette, signed by him and two or three others, was of sufficient authority, in the late commissary’s time, to convene the clergy, certainly now there is no commissary he may by his own power call a convention upon a matter of such importance to himself. But let all this happen as it may, it is extremely obvious that the Rector’s temper inclines him to inflame his own resentment into a fixed contempt of the General Assembly; otherwise he could not have approved of the conduct of the author of this petition, if what he says of him is true, that he did not prefer the petition from any imagination that there was room to expect success in it, but to evince the contrary by experiment: so that the General Assembly may be used by designing men as instruments to carry on their deep-laid stratagems and machinations on purpose to afford matter of pleasantry to the Rector. But it may be that the Rector has tripped in his history of this clergyman’s conduct, who, I have heard, gave the gentleman on whom he prevailed to present the petition to the House of Burgesses a quite different account of his design; and that gentleman was insulted by a great intimate of the Rector’s for presenting it; which insult, I suppose, would not have been given if the author of the petition had expected no other effects from it than what the Rector says he did. Colonel, said I, your remarks are of a sour and aggravating cast. His Reverence’s temper does not incline him to inflame his own resentment; he has suffered persecution; he has missed the president’s place at the college; he has been forbid, with others, the late governor’s house under the title of disturbers of his government; he has been recommended by the late governor in conjunction with others to the correction of the Grand Jury for being so audacious as to publish under their names an invitation to as many of their brethren as were willing to attend, for them to meet at a brother’s house before he left the country. He has been forbid the present governor’s palace, when he waited on him with the royal disallowance to several acts of Assembly. He has, I say, suffered all these persecutions, cum multis aliis quae nunc prescribere longum est; and certainly His Reverence, who has suffered so much for adhering to reason and justice, and the principles of true patriotism, is excusable for the freedoms he has used. The Rector, replied the Colonel, gives colorings to his imagery as best suit his purpose; but remove the false appearances and his representations will not exhibit so amiable a character. The brother at whose house this meeting was appointed was not a person of that distinction or moral accomplishments as to make it necessary for the clergy to pay their compliments to him in a body upon his leaving the country. The late governor knew, the late commissary knew, as did many other gentlemen, that he was one of the cabal; and they all believed, and, if it was proper to dwell any longer on this circumstance, a very good account might be given for their belief, that this meeting was on purpose to raise disturbances in the government, to form stratagems and machinations against the administration and the legislature of the colony, which this brother was to solicit in England. And as Mr. Dinwiddie, the late governor, thought it an affront to his authority as well as to the bishop’s commissary for three or four clergymen to assume to themselves a power to call a meeting of the clergy, he resented the insult in a manner becoming his character as the King’s substitute. As to the prohibition the Rector received from appearing at the present governor’s palace, his affrontive and disrespectful behavior was the occasion of it; for, as I have been informed that contrary to his duty and the respect due to the King’s representative, he did not wait on the governor with the royal disallowance to several acts of Assembly, with which he was charged by the Lords of Trade, until several weeks after his arrival in the country, though he was in the place of the governor’s residence; and when he did wait on him he delivered the dispatch opened after he had communicated it to such of his brethren as he thought proper. So that his own modesty, if he has any, and a consideration of his own character, should, methinks, have prevented his complaining of this prohibition. And as to his missing the president’s place at the college, his contumacious treatment of the Visitors’ authority, which is so publicly known, could not entitle him to their favors, even admitting that he was qualified in other respects. Colonel, said I, this is all prejudice. You suffer your passion to make a fool of you. His Reverence has given the strongest proofs of true patriotism; he has delivered the constitution from the basest attempts to destroy it; he faces every attack, encounters every danger, despises every obloquy; in short, he may say, with old Siffredi in the play, . . . I have preferred my duty, The good and safety of my fellow subjects, To all those views that fire the selfish race Of men . . . since he has with boldness, and, as he says, with truth justified his impeachment against the General Assemblies who were attempting to overturn the constitution and to restrain the royal prerogative by passing acts which interfered with acts confirmed by His Majesty, without a suspending clause. Now, Colonel, how can you exculpate the General Assemblies from this atrocious crime? The Rector’s patriotism, answered the Colonel, is as conspicuous as his modesty and politeness; but it is really matter of pleasantry, as this Thersites said of the famous petition, to hear him haranguing about the constitution, which if he knows anything of, he does not care to make it public. The constitution cannot be destroyed, nor the royal prerogative restrained by any act of the General Assembly. The King as sovereign possesses an inherent power in the legislature of the colony and can give his allowance or disallowance to any act passed by them; but as the Rector boasts that I am not able to answer his arguments upon this head of accusation, that I am graveled, that he hath caught my gentleman tripping lightly over marshy ground, you must give me leave to examine into the power of the General Assembly to enact laws, which I believe will put an end to the Rector’s exultations and convince you it was the contemptibleness and not the weight of his arguments that prevented my answering them in the letter I thought proper to address to him. I do not suppose, Sir, that you look upon the present inhabitants of Virginia as a people conquered by the British arms. If indeed we are to be considered only as the savage aborigines of this part of America, we cannot pretend to the rights of English subjects; but if we are the descendants of Englishmen, who by their own consent and at the expense of their own blood and treasure undertook to settle this new region for the benefit and aggrandizement of the parent kingdom, the native privileges our progenitors enjoyed must be derived to us from them, as they could not be forfeited by their migration to America. One of the greatest lawyers and the greatest philosopher of his age* tells us, “A country gained by conquest hath no right to be governed by the English laws.” And another no less eminent lawyer† says, “Where the country of a pagan or infidel is conquered, there, ipso facto, the laws of such country are abrogated.” And from hence I suppose it was that a learned and upright judge‡ gave it as his opinion, “That Virginia is to be governed by such laws as the King pleases.” But certainly this great judge was not acquainted with Virginia; if he was he never would have given an opinion which with respect either to the original or present inhabitants of this country must be erroneous. It must be erroneous with respect to the original inhabitants because they were never fully conquered, but submitted to the English government upon terms of peace and friendship fixed and settled by treaties; and they now possess their native laws and customs, savage as they are, in as full an extent as they did before the English settled upon this continent. It must be erroneous with respect to the present inhabitants because upon a supposition that their ancestors were conquerors of this country, they could not lose their native privileges by their conquests. They were as much freemen, and had as good a right to the liberties of Englishmen after their conquest as they had before; if they had not, few of them, I believe, would have been induced by so inadequate a reward to endeavor an extension of the English dominions, and by making conquests to become slaves. Under an English government all men are born free, are only subject to laws made with their own consent, and cannot be deprived of the benefit of these laws without a transgression of them. To assert this is sufficient; to demonstrate it to an Englishman is useless. He not only knows, but, if I may use the expression, feels it as a vital principle in the constitution, which places him in a situation without the reach of the highest executive power in the state, if he lives in an obedience to its laws. If then the people of this colony are freeborn and have a right to the liberties and privileges of English subjects, they must necessarily have a legal constitution, that is, a legislature composed in part of the representatives of the people who may enact laws for the internal government of the colony and suitable to its various circumstances and occasions; and without such a representative, I am bold enough to say, no law can be made. By the term internal government it may be easily perceived that I exclude from the legislature of the colony all power derogatory to their dependence upon the mother kingdom; for as we cannot lose the rights of Englishmen by our removal to this continent, so neither can we withdraw our dependence without destroying the constitution. In every instance, therefore, of our external government we are and must be subject to the authority of the British Parliament, but in no others; for if the Parliament should impose laws upon us merely relative to our internal government, it deprives us, as far as those laws extend, of the most valuable part of our birthright as Englishmen, of being governed by laws made with our own consent. As all power, therefore, is excluded from the colony of withdrawing its dependence from the mother kingdom, so is all power over the colony excluded from the mother kingdom but such as respects its external government. I do not deny but that the Parliament, as the stronger power, can force any laws it shall think fit upon us; but the inquiry is not what it can do, but what constitutional right it has to do so. And if it has not any constitutional right, then any tax respecting our internal polity which may hereafter be imposed on us by act of Parliament is arbitrary, as depriving us of our rights, and may be opposed. But we have nothing of this sort to fear from those guardians of the rights and liberties of mankind. But it may be objected that this general position excludes all the laws of England, so as that none of them are obligatory upon us in our internal government. The answer to this objection is obvious: the common law, being the common consent of the people from time immemorial, and the “birthright of every Englishman, does follow him wherever he goes,” and consequently must be the general law by which the colony is to be governed. So also the statutes of England in force at the time of our separation, having every essential in their institution to make them obligatory upon our ancestors, that is, their consent by their representatives, and having the same sanction with the common law, must have the same extensive force, and bind us in the same manner the common law does; if it was otherwise it would involve this contradiction, that of two laws made by the same power, one is coercive upon us when the other is not so, which is plainly absurd. From these principles, which I take to be incontrovertible, as they are deduced from the nature of the English constitution, it is evident that the legislature of the colony have a right to enact ANY law they shall think necessary for their internal government. But lest these principles, plain and evident as they are, should be controverted by the Rector or some other of Sir Robert Filmer’s disciples, who perhaps may assert that the King by his prerogative can establish any form of government he pleases in the colony, I will examine the power the General Assembly derives from grants from the crown, abstracted from the original rights of the people. King James I by his charter, under the great seal of England, granted the dominion of Virginia to the Treasurer and Company of Adventurers, and gave them full power and authority to constitute a form of government in the colony as near as might be agreeable to the government and policy of England. Pursuant to this power, the Treasurer and Company by their charter established the legislature in the governor, Council, and representatives of the people, to be called the General Assembly, with “free power to treat, consult, and conclude as well of all emergent occasions concerning the public weal of the colony and every part thereof, as also to make, ordain, and enact such general laws and orders for the behoof of the colony and the good government thereof as shall from time to time appear necessary or requisite.” The General Assemblies have continued to exercise this legislative power from that time. King James left them in full possession of this power upon his dissolving the company; and King Charles I in the year 1634 by order in his Privy Council declared that “interests which the colony enjoyed while they were a corporation should not be impeached, but that they should enjoy the same privileges they did before the recalling the company’s patent.” And in the year 1642 under his sign manual and royal signet he “confirmed the form of government, declared that they should ever remain under the King’s immediate protection, and that the form of government should not be changed.” After the Restoration, in the year 1675, the General Assembly sent three agents to England to solicit a new charter from King Charles II. Their petition upon this occasion was referred by the King’s order in his Privy Council the 23rd of June to his attorney and solicitor general, who reported their opinion to the Lords of the Committee for Foreign Plantations, “That it would be for His Majesty’s service and for the increase of the trade and growth of the plantation of Virginia if His Majesty shall be graciously pleased to grant and confirm, under his great seal, unto his subjects in Virginia the particulars following.” And then they recite the several heads of the General Assembly’s petition, one of which was “That the power and authority of the General Assembly, consisting of the governor, Council, and Burgesses, may be by His Majesty ratified and confirmed”; but with this proviso, “That His Majesty may, at his pleasure, revoke any law made by them; and that no law so revoked shall, AFTER such revocation and intimation thereof from hence (i.e., from England), be further used or observed.” The Lords of the Committee for Foreign Plantations presented this report to His Majesty in his Privy Council at Whitehall on the 19th of November 1675; which His Majesty approved and confirmed, and ordered a bill to be prepared by the attorney and solicitor general for his signature in order to the passing letters patent “for the settlement and confirmation of all things according to the said report.” A complete charter was accordingly prepared, and received the King’s signature; but before it came to the great seal stopped in the hanaper office upon receiving an account of Bacon’s insurrection. But though the charter did not pass the great seal, King Charles II from that time, and his successors ever since, have inserted the several clauses of it relative to the power of the General Assembly in their commissions to their governors, who have “full power and authority, by and with the advice of the Council to call General Assemblies, and by and with the advice and consent of the Council and Assembly or the major part of them respectively, to make, constitute, and ordain laws, statutes, and ordinances for the public peace, welfare, and good government of the colony, and the people and inhabitants thereof.” “Which laws, statutes, and ordinances, of what nature or duration soever, are to be within three months or sooner after the making of them transmitted unto the King under the public seal of the colony for the royal approbation or disallowance. And in case all or any of them shall at any time be disallowed and not approved and so signified by the King under his sign manual or by the Privy Council unto the governor or commander-in-chief of the colony for the time being, then such and so many as shall be disallowed and not approved shall from thenceforth cease and determine and be utterly void and of no effect.” From this short review of our constitution it may be observed that the people have an original right to a legal government, that this right has been confirmed to them by charter, which establishes the General Assembly with a general power “to make, ordain, and constitute laws, statutes, and ordinances for the public peace, welfare, and good government of the colony.” Which power, by a constant and uninterrupted usage and custom, they have continued to exercise for more than 140 years. And if what Lord Coke says in Calvin’s Case is true, that “where the King by charter or letters patent grants to a country the laws of England or a power to make laws for themselves, he nor his successors can alter or abrogate the same,” we cannot be deprived of this right, even upon the Rector’s principles of passive obedience. But it may be asked if the King’s assent is not necessary to give sanction to the acts of the General Assembly. I answer, it is necessary. As sovereign, no law can be made without his assent, but then it is not necessary that he should be present in his royal person to give his assent; this is plainly impossible. He therefore gives power by commission under his great seal to his governor to give his assent, which, to speak in the language of the law, is in this case a teste meipso and gives life and being to the laws in the same manner as if he was present in his royal person. The King frequently gives his assent to acts of Parliament by commission to persons appointed for that purpose; he does the same thing by his commission to the governor, who thereby becomes the King’s representative in his legislative character, so that the governor’s assent to laws here is in effect the King’s assent. But as the King cannot be informed of the nature of the laws passed by his commissioner while under the consideration of the General Assembly, he reserves to himself a power of abrogating them, notwithstanding his commissioner’s assent; and from the time of such abrogation, and not before, they are to cease and determine. But Colonel, said I, notwithstanding you have deduced your history of the constitution from the royal grants and the established principles of the English government, His Reverence is in the right. He relies upon the King’s instructions to the governor, which ought not to be infringed, but must have the force and obligation of laws upon us. I have, replied the Colonel, a high reverence for the majesty of the King’s authority, and shall upon every occasion yield a due obedience to all its just powers and prerogatives; but submission, even to the supreme magistrate, is not the whole duty of a citizen, especially such a submission as he himself does not require. Something is likewise due to the rights of our country and to the liberties of mankind. To say that a royal instruction to a governor, for his own particular conduct, is to have the force and validity of a law, and must be obeyed without reserve, is at once to strip us of all the rights and privileges of British subjects, and to put us under the despotic power of a French or Turkish government. For what is the real difference between a French edict and an English instruction if they are both equally absolute? The royal instructions are nothing more than rules and orders laid down as guides and directions for the conduct of governors. These may and certainly ought to be laws to them, but never can be thought, consistently with the principles of the British constitution, to have the force and power of laws upon the people. Which is evident from this plain reason: promulgation is essential to the nature of laws, so that no law can bind any people before it is declared and published to them; but the King’s instructions are to be kept secret and not published to us, no not even to the Council, unless the governor thinks it for the King’s service. “You are to communicate,” says one of these instructions to the governor, “unto our Council of Virginia from time to time, such and so many of our instructions as you shall find convenient for our service.” So that from the instructions themselves it is evident the King does not intend them as laws to his people. Besides, the royal instructions are drawn up in England by ministers who from their distant situation from us cannot have so full and perfect a view of affairs in the colony as is necessary for those who are to be legislators and supreme directors of them. Sudden emergencies will arise; present occasions will be lost; and such quick and unexpected turns are perpetually happening in all sublunary affairs as require the utmost vigilance and celerity, and can never stay for such a distant guidance and command. The ministers in England see nothing with their own eyes that is passing amongst us and know nothing upon their own knowledge, and therefore are very improper legislators to give laws to the colony. The King’s instructions, then, being only intended as guides and directions to governors, and not being obligatory upon the people, the governors are only answerable for a breach of them, and not the General Assembly; and if they are answerable only, they have the only right of determining whether their passing acts upon particular emergent occasions is contrary to the spirit and true meaning of their instructions or not. In short, Sir, the Council and House of Burgesses have a right to present any act relative to the internal government of the colony to the governor for his assent without violating any instruction; and the governor has a right, as the King’s commissioner representing the royal person, to give or refuse his assent to such act as he may think it agreeable or contrary to his instructions directing his conduct in this particular. This I say, Sir, the Council and House of Burgesses may do, from the general powers with which they are invested by the constitution, without being guilty of attempts to restrain the power of the royal prerogative; which being committed to the governor, he is to determine how he is to exercise it and no other person has anything to do with it in this case. From hence then it is evident that the General Assembly may pass an act which alters or repeals an act that has received the royal approbation without destroying the old constitution or attempting to bind the King’s hands; and if such act is passed, it must have the force and obligation of a law until the King declares his royal disallowance of it. But since the royal instructions are so much insisted on by the Rector, I will examine whether the same doctrine I have endeavored to establish may not be deduced from them. I have no copy of the instructions relating to this question, nor have I been able to procure one; but as I have formerly read them, I believe I can recite them tolerably exact. By these instructions the governor is “not to give his assent to any act that alters or repeals any other act without a suspending clause, although the act to be altered or repealed has not had the royal approbation, unless in cases of great emergency; nor is he to give his assent to any act that alters or repeals any other act which has had the royal approbation without first obtaining the King’s permission, under the penalty of being removed from his government and incurring the King’s highest displeasure.” Now I infer from these instructions that, admitting the governor should pass an act contrary to them, he subjects himself to the penalties inflicted on him for a breach of his instructions, but the act so passed by him has the obligation of a law until the King’s disallowance of it; for if such act is void, ab initio, the instructions would be absurd, because to restrain the governor from passing an act which when passed is as absolutely void as if it had never existed, is absurd and useless. Our sovereign, therefore, knowing that from the fundamental principles of the constitution such act must have the force of a law when passed by the governor, has restrained him from giving his assent in such a case under particular personal penalties, but has left the act to its course until he thinks proper to repeal it by his disapprobation. But this is not all; for as the governor may pass an act in a case of great emergency though contrary to the general tenor of the instructions, it would involve a greater absurdity, if possible, should an act be void ab initio which he passes by virtue of the general powers given him by his commission under the King’s great seal, and another act passed by him under the same authority have the force of a law because the governor is of opinion that the exigencies of the colony make such act necessary. Under such a construction the case is plainly this: the governor passes an act in a case of great exigency contrary to the strict letter of his instructions, which act shall have the force of a law because he thinks the circumstances of the colony require it; but if he passes such an act when he thinks the circumstances of the colony do not require it, such act shall be void ab initio. This is like the absolution in the Romish Church, which is of no effect, though proclaimed with a loud voice, unless the intention of the priest accompanies, and is too absurd to deserve any further consideration. And yet into such an absurdity must you fall, Sir, when you contend that such an act is void ab initio, from a construction of the royal instructions to the governor. Neither will the Rector’s hearsay account* of one of the revised laws make any alteration in the case, for the land law that was altered by this revised law never received the royal assent; but the reason why this revised law laid some time dormant and unobserved was that as it affected the King’s grants of his lands, a suspending clause was added to it so that it could have no operation until the royal approbation of it was obtained. And though this approbation was obtained, it was not known to us until several years after, when Mr. Montague, our present agent, by direction from the committee of correspondence, inquiring after it found it in the Council office in England and transmitted it to us, from which time it became in force here. But Colonel, said I, though all this may be true I am at a loss to know what good reason can be given for an order of the late Assembly to support the vestries against the appeals of the clergy, and not an order for supporting private contractors against the merchants. When, Sir, answered the Colonel, you can produce an instance of a merchant or any other person except the Rector and two or three of his brethren bringing suits to try the validity of an act of the legislature, I will give you a reason why the merchants were not included in the order of the late Assembly. I suppose from what you say you would insinuate as if the Assembly pointed the clergy out as the particular objects of their resentment; but in this you are mistaken. An action was brought in the General Court by the Rector against the collector of his parish levy on purpose to controvert the power of the General Assembly in making laws, or rather to render their power a mere cipher. It behoved them then to support their own authority and the validity of their own acts against every attempt to destroy it; and from hence it was that by an order of the late Assembly the collector of York-Hampton parish levy was to be defended in the Rector’s suit against him at the public expense. Thus, Sir, I have endeavored to obviate the Rector’s arguments and to convince you that the General Assemblies were not setting up the standard of rebellion against the King’s authority when they passed the acts which have given this patriot Rector such great offense. The insults offered by him to the legislative body of the colony and to private characters are certainly carried to a great height; but whether this is owing to the panic he is thrown into lest the old constitution should be destroyed or to satisfy a malevolent and turbulent temper, is not worth my time to inquire. I have avoided repeating what I said formerly in my letters upon this subject, so must desire you to consider those letters as part of my present defense, since I cannot think that the Rector has given any answer to them. I know that the plainest demonstration is lost upon men who are under the influence of prejudice or an obstinate disposition of mind. Such men will never want ground for wrangling, especially if they have any by-purposes to serve. But notwithstanding the artful endeavors and invidious representations of such men, I make no doubt that you will, from a sincere desire of promoting truth and the public good, give an impartial decision in this dispute, which I shall submit to you after observing that whoever throws out reflections on the acts of the legislature as plainly tend to weaken their authority, let his profession of patriotism be otherwise ever so specious, is so far an enemy to his country. Colonel, said I, I have not sufficiently considered this matter to form a just opinion of it; but as His Reverence is a great master of reason and acquainted with the nature and principles of government, I will communicate this conference to him, which, as soon as he has reconnoitered, I doubt not will receive a proper reply. And thus, may it please Your Reverence, the conference broke up of which I have given you this faithful account. I shall be extremely rejoiced if you can find leisure from the laborious and painful duties of your pastoral office to send forth a reply to the Colonel’s arguments; but Cum tot sustineas et tanta negotia solus, . . . moribus ornes, Legibus emendes; in publica commoda peccem, Si longo sermone morer tua tempora . . . I am, may it please Your Reverence, with the utmost deference and esteem, Your most obedient servant, COMMON SENSE. Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/exploring-the-bounds-of-liberty-political-writings-of-colonial-british-america-from-the-glorious-revolution-to-the-american-revolution-vol-3-1755-1774#lf1670-03_label_142

The Sentiments of a British American by Oxenbridge Thacher from “Pamphlets of the American Revolution,” ed. by Bernard Bailyn I — SENTIMENTS of a British American IT WELL becomes the wisdom of a great nation, having been highly successful in their foreign wars and added a large extent of country to their dominions, to consider with a critical attention their internal state lest their prosperity should destroy them. Great Britain at this day is arrived to an heighth of glory and wealth which no European nation hath ever reached since the decline of the Roman Empire. Everybody knows that it is not indebted to itself alone for this envied power: that its colonies, placed in a distant quarter of the earth, have had their share of efficiency in its late successes, as indeed they have also contributed to the advancing and increasing its grandeur from their very first beginnings. In the forming and settling, therefore, the internal polity of the kingdom, these have reason to expect that their interest should be considered and attended to, that their rights, if they have any, should be preserved to them, and that they should have no reason to complain that they have been lavish of their blood and treasure in the late war only to bind the shackles of slavery on themselves and their children. No people have been more wisely jealous of their liberties and privileges than the British nation. It is observed by Vattel that “their present happy condition hath cost them seas of blood; but they have not purchased it too dear.” The colonies, making a part of this great empire, having the same British rights inherent in them as the inhabitants of the island itself, they cannot be disfranchised or wounded in their privileges but the whole body politic must in the end feel with them. The writer of this, being a native of an English colony, will take it for granted that the colonies are not the mere property of the mother state; that they have the same rights as other British subjects. He will also suppose that no design is formed to enslave them, and that the justice of the British Parliament will finally do right to every part of their dominions. These things presupposed, he intends to consider the late act made in the fourth year of his present Majesty entitled An Act for Granting Certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in America, etc., to show the real subjects of grievance therein to the colonists, and that the interest of Great Britain itself may finally be greatly affected thereby. There is the more reason that this freedom should be indulged after the act is passed inasmuch as the colonies, though greatly interested therein, had no opportunity of being heard while it was pending. [1.] The first objection is that a tax is thereby laid on several commodities, to be raised and levied in the plantations, and to be remitted home to England. This is esteemed a grievance inasmuch as the same are laid without the consent of the representatives of the colonists. It is esteemed an essential British right that no person shall be subject to any tax but what in person or by his representative he hath a voice in laying. The British Parliament have many times vindicated this right against the attempts of Kings to invade it. And though perhaps it may be said that the House of Commons, in a large sense, are the representatives of the colonies as well as of the people of Great Britain, yet it is certain that these have no voice in their election. Nor can it be any alleviation of their unhappiness that if this right is taken from them, it is taken by that body who have been the great patrons and defenders of it in the people of Great Britain. Besides, the colonies have ever supported a subordinate government among themselves. Being placed at such a distance from the capital, it is absolutely impossible they should continue a part of the kingdom in the same sense as the corporations there are. For this reason, from their beginning there hath been a subordinate legislature among them subject to the control of the mother state; and from the necessity of the case there must have been such, their circumstances and situation being in many respects so different from that of the parent state they could not have subsisted without this. Now the colonies have always been taxed by their own representatives and in their respective legislatures, and have supported an entire domestic government among themselves. Is it just, then, they should be doubly taxed? That they should be obliged to bear the whole charges of their domestic government, and should be as subject to the taxes of the British Parliament as those who have no domestic government to support ? The reason given for this extraordinary taxation? namely, that this war was undertaken for the security of the colonies, and that they ought therefore to be taxed to pay the charge thereby incurred, it is humbly apprehended is without foundation. For (I) It was of no less consequence to Great Britain than it was to the colonies that these should not be overrun and conquered by the French. Suppose they had prevailed and gotten all the English colonies into their possession: how long would Great Britain have survived their fate! Put the case that the town of Portsmouth or any other seaport had been besieged and the like sums expended in its defense, could any have thought that town ought to be charged with the expense? (2) The colonies contributed their full proportion to those conquests which adorn and dignify the late and present reign. One of them in particular raised in one year seven thousand men to be commanded by His Majesty's general, besides maintaining many guards and garrisons on their own frontiers. All of them by their expenses and exertions in the late war have incurred heavy debts, which it will take them many years to pay. (3) The colonies are no particular gainers by these acquisitions. None of the conquered territory is annexed to them. All are acquisitions accruing to the crown. On account of their commerce, they are no gainers: the northern colonies are even sufferers by these cessions. [I desire this may not be misunderstood. In this view I suppose them sufferers, namely that as the West Indies were not large enough to take off the produce the northern colonies could export to them before the conquest of Canada, now [that] that country is added it makes the disproportional much greate]. It is true they have more security from having their throats cut by the French while the peace lasts; but so have also all His Majesty's subjects. (4) Great Britain gaineth immensely by these acquisitions. The command of the whole American fur trade and the increased demand for their woolen manufactures from their numerous new subjects in a country too cold to keep sheep: these are such immense gains as in a commercial light would refund the kingdom, if every farthing of the expense of reducing Canada were paid out of the exchequer. But to say the truth, it is not only by the taxation itself that the colonists deem themselves aggrieved by the act we are considering. For— II. The power therein given to courts of admiralty alarms them greatly. The common law is the birthright of every subject, and trial by jury a most de planted. Many struggles had they with courts of admiralty, which, like the element they take theirarling privilege. So deemed our ancestors in ancient times, long before the colonies were begun to be planted . Many struggles had they with their copurts of admiralty, which, like the element they take their name from, have divers times attempted to innundate the land. Hence the statutes of Richard II, of Henry IV, and divers other public acts. Hence the watchful eye the reverend sages of the common law have kept over these courts. —Now by the act we are considering, the colonists are deprived of these privileges: of the common law, for these judges are supposed to be connusant only of the civil law; of juries, for all here is put in the breast of one man. He judges both law and fact, and his decree is final; at least it cannot be reversed on this side the Atlantic. In this particular the colonists are put under a quite different law from all the rest of the King's subjects: jurisdiction is nowhere else given to courts of admiralty of matters so foreign from their connusance. In some things the colonists have been long subject to this cruel yoke, and have indeed fully experienced its galling nature. Loud complaints have been long made by them of the oppressions of these courts, their exhorbitant fees, and the little justice the subject may expect from them in cases of seizures. Let me mention one thing that is notorious: these courts have assumed (I know not by what law) a commission of five per cent to the judge on all seizures condemned. What chance does the subject stand for his right upon the best claim when the judge, condemning, is to have an hundred or perhaps five hundred pounds, and acquitting, less than twenty shillings? If the colonists should be thought partial witnesses in this case, let those of the inhabitants of Great Britain who have had the misfortune to be suitors or to have any business in these dreadful courts be inquired of. There have been times when the legislature of Great Britain appeared to be as sensible of the bad conduct of these courts as we are now. I Mean when the statute of 6 Anne c. 37 and some later ones to the same purpose were made, wherein the remedy they have given is as extraordinary as the power given those courts. For in those statutes the judge of admiralty is subjected to a penalty of five hundred pounds, to be recovered by the aggrieved suitor at common law. These only refer to cases of prizes, and give no remedy in cases of seizures, where their power is not only decisive but in many respects uncontrollable. Meantime, can the colonists help wondering and grieving that the British legislature should vest with such high powers over them courts in whom they appear to have so little confidence? But in the act we are considering, the power of these courts is even much enlarged and made still more grievous. For it is thereby enacted that the seizor may inform in any court of admiralty for the particular colony, or in any court of admiralty to be appointed over all America, at his pleasure. Thus a malicious seizor may take the goods of any man, ever so lawfully and duly imported, and carry the trial of the cause to a thousand miles distance, where for mere want of ability to follow, the claimer shall be incapable of defending his right. At the same time an hardship is laid upon the claimer; his claim is not to be admitted] or heard until he find sureties to prosecute, who are to be of known ability in the place where security is given. And he, being unknown in a place so distance from home, whatever be his estate, shall be incapable of producing such sureties. III. The empowering commanders of the King's ships to seize and implead, as is done in this act and a former act and by special commission from the commissioners of the customs, is another great hardship on the colonies. The knowledge of all the statutes relating to the customs, of all the prohibitions on exports and imports, and of various intricate cases arising on them, requires a good lawyer. How can this science ever be expected from men educated in a totally different way, brought up upon the boisterous element and knowing no law aboard their ships but their own will? Here perhaps it will be said, this is not peculiar to the colonies. The power to these commanders is given in all parts of the dominions as well as in the colonies: why should they complain of being under the same law as the other subject.? I answer, There is this great essential difference between the cases: in Great Britain no jurisdiction is given to any other than the common law courts; there too the subjects are near the throne, where, when they are oppressed, their complaints may soon be heard and redressed; but with respect to the colonies, far different is the case! Here it is their own courts that try the cause! Here the subject is far distant from the throne! His complaints cannot soon be heard and redressed. The boisterous commander may take for his motto, Procul a Jove, a fulmine procul. The present decree, however unjust, deprives him even of the means of seeking redress. The judge with his troop and the proud captain have divided his wealth; and he hath nothing to do but to hang himself or to go a-begging in a country of beggars. There is yet another very great objection the colonists make to this act, of no less weight than the other three. It is this: IV. Whereas it is good law that all officers seizing goods seize at their peril, and if the goods they seize are not liable to forfeiture they must pay the claimant his cost, and are liable to his action besides, which two things have been looked upon as proper checks of exorbitant wanton power in the officer: both these checks are taken off. They, the officers, may charge the revenue with the cost, with the consent of four of the commissioners of the customs. And if the judge of admiralty will certify that there was probable cause of seizure, no action shall be maintained by the claimant though his goods on trial appear to be ever so duly imported and liable to no sort of forfeiture, and he hath been forced to expend ever so much in the defense of them. This last regulation is in the act peculiarly confined to America. Much more might be said on these subjects, but I aim at brevity. Let it now be observed that the interest of Great Britain is finally greatly affected by these new regulations. We will not here insist on the parental tenderness due from Great Britain to us and suggest she must suffer from sympathy with her children, who have been guilty of no undutiful behavior towards her but on the contrary have greatly increased her wealth and grandeur and in the last war have impoverished themselves in fighting her battles. We will suppose her for this little moment to have forgot the bowels of a mother. Neither will we dwell long on the importance of the precedent. The consideration of a million and half of British subjects disfranchised or put under regulations alien from our happy constitution: what pretense it may afford to after ministers to treat the inhabitants of the island itself after the same manner. We will suppose for the present that at a thousand leagues distance, across the water, the inhabitants of the capital will not be endangered by a conflagration of all the colonies. Nor will we mention any possible danger from the alienation of the affections of the colonies from their mother country in case of a new war. We will suppose them to have that reverence for the English name they are allowed to retain that they will be as lavish of what blood and treasure remains to them now they are cut off from all these privileges as when they could please themselves with the surest hope of holding them inviolable. What we are now considering is how the mere present self-interest of Great Britain is affected by these new regulations. Now everybody knows that the greatest part of the trade of Great Britain is with her colonies. This she enjoyeth, exclusive of any other European country, and hath entirely at her own command. Further, it may be made out that the greatest part of the profits of the trade of the colonies, at least on the continent, centers in Great Britain. The colonists, settled in a wide and sparse manner, are perpetually demanding the linen, woolen and other manufactures of Great Britain. They are not yet settled in so contiguous a manner as to be able to manufacture sufficient for their own supplies. And while they can pay for those of Great Britain with any proper remittances, their demands will be perpetually increasing. Great Britain, besides, is the mart which supplieth the colonies with all the produce of the other countries in Europe which the colonies use. Considering the vast numbers supported by these manufactures vended in the colonies, and by the articles of foreign trade brought into the kingdom and thence exported and consumed in the plantations, doubtless even the luxury of the colonists is the gain of Great Britain. So thought wise ministers in the late reign: on which ground they repealed two or three sumptuary laws made in the colonies for restraining that luxury. Now as the colonies have no gold or silver mines in them, it is certain that all their remittances they make must be from their trade. And it is obvious that when the sources of their remittances are cut off, the demands for these goods, by which so many thousands are supported, must cease. And whoever considereth with any degree of attention the new regulations and is acquainted with the state of the colonies must see that the evident tendency of them is to cut off all these sources and to destroy altogether the trade of the colonists. One grand source of these remittances is the fishery, which by the duty of three pence a gallon on molasses must entirely be at an end. That branch can never bear the high duties imposed, nor subsist with- out the molasses which the trade to the foreign islands furnisheth. Not only by their connection with this but by the mere effect of the new regulations, all the other trade of the colonists must be at an end. These regulations must break and subdue the hearts of the traders here. TRADE is a nice and delicate lady; she must be courted and won by soft and fair addresses. She will not bear the rude hand of a ravisher. Penalties increased, heavy taxes laid on, the checks of oppression and violence removed; these things must drive her from her present abode. Hence, one or other of these consequences will follow: either (1) the colonies will universally go into such manufactures as they are capable of doing within themselves, or (2) they will do without them, and being reduced to mere necessaries, will be clothed like their predecessors the Indians with the skins of beasts, and sink into like barbarism. They must then adopt Jack Straw's verses. When Adam delved, and Eve span, Who was then the gentleman? [I imagine many sanguine readers on the British side the water will think this is all exaggeration. Such may be informed that even now these things begin to appear. For two or three years past, exchange from the Massachusetts to England has been above par, and bills earnestly bought up. Now the bills the government have to dispose of, though set at a less exchange than the last year and though certain advice is received that the money is in the bank, cannot vend.] Now, either of these events taking place, how will it affect the island of Great Britain? The answer is obvious. The exports to the colonies wholly stopped or greatly diminished, the demands for those manufactures in Great Britain must be in proportion lessened. The substance of those manufacturers, merchants, and traders whom this demand supports is then gone. They who live from supplying these manufacturers, etc., must decay and die with them. Lastly, as trade may be compared to a grand chain made up of innumerable links, it is doubtful whether the British trade, great as it is, can bear the striking out so many without greatly endangering the whole. What now is the equivalent for all this to the nation? A tenth part of one year's tax, at the extent two years' tax upon the colonies (for after that time all their money will be gone) to be lodged in the exchequer and thence issued as the Parliament shall direct. Doth not this resemble the conduct of the good wife in the fable who killed her hen that every day laid her a golden egg? THESE are the sentiments of a British American, which he ventures to expose to the public with an honest well meant freedom. Born in one of the colonies and descended from ancestors who were among the first planters of that colony, he is not ashamed to avow a love to the country that gave him birth; yet he hath ever exulted in the name of Briton. He hath ever thought all the inhabitants in the remotest dominions of Great Britain interested in the wealth, the prosperity, and the glory of the capital. And he desireth ever to retain these filial sentiments. If the objections he proposeth are of any weight, he trusts the meanness and distance of the proposer shall not diminish that weight that those great minds who can comprehend the whole vast machine in one view will not deem it below them to inspect a single small wheel that is out of order. He concludes all with his most ardent wishes that the happy island of Great Britain may grow in wealth, in power, and glory to yet greater degrees; that the conquests it makes over foreign enemies may serve the more to protect the internal liberties of its subjects; that her colonies now happily extended may grow in filial affection and dutiful submission to her their mother; and that she in return may never forget her parental affections. That the whole English empire, united by the strongest bands of love and interest, formidable to the tyrants and oppressors of the earth, may retain its own virtue, and happily possess immortality. Source: https://ota.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/repository/xmlui/handle/20.500.12024/3133

The three strikes policy is a form of double jeopardy which violates the fifth amendment. If you commit two crimes and serve the sentences for both and then commit a third crime, no matter how benign, you will receive a harsher sentence for that third crime than you would had that third crime been your first. This means that the two previous crimes, which you already served, are being used a second time to punish you. Remember that double jeopardy is being convicted twice for the same offense. Under the three strike policy, you are being convicted using two offenses which you were previously convicted of.

On June 19, 1775, George Washington, the Virginia delegate to the Second Continental Congress, is granted a commission to be the Command in Chief of the Continental Army. Source: https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/tr00.html#obj10

Novanglus I Novanglus II Novanglus III Novanglus IV Novanglus V Novanglus VI Novanglus VII Novanglus VIII Novanglus IX Novanglus X Novanglus XI Novanglus XII Novanglus XIII Source: https://www.masshist.org/publications/adams-papers/index.php/view/ADMS-06-02-02-0072-0002

XIII. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay My Friends, April 1775 Another Clause in the Charter, quoted by this Writer, contains the Power “to make Laws and ordinancies, for the good and Welfare of the said Company, and for the Government and ordering of the Said Lands and Plantations and the People inhabiting the Same; So as such Laws and Ordinances be not contrary or repugnant to the Laws and Statutes of this our Realm of England.” This is the usual Clause inserted in the Charters of all Corporations in England, and it is intended to restrain those Bodies politick within the limits of the Constitution and the Laws. It expressed no more however, than the Law would imply. For the King could not erect a Corporation within the Realm and give it Power to Superceed or overrule the general Laws of the Kingdom. A Similar Clause is inserted in the Laws of this Province which impower Towns to make By Laws “so as they be not repugnant to the Laws of the Province.” I suppose this Clause was inserted in that Charter to restrain the Corporation from Setting up any Form of Government different from the English Constitution in general, and perhaps was intended to subject them to the Common Law [and to Such Statutes as were then in force. But if We allow it the utmost Latitude of Construction, and Suppose that it meant to confine them to Obedience to Common Law,] and all statutes which were then in Force, and to all others which Should thereafter be made, this is no more than they would have been bound to, if no such Clause had been in the Charter, so long as they and their Charter remained in England, which both Grantor and Grantees then intended. But the Moment the Charter and the Company were removed to New England beyond the four Seas, out of the Realm, out of the Extent and local Limit of the Laws of England, that moment they were discharged from all obligation of obedience to the Laws of England. The Charter lost all Force, which it ever had by the Laws of England, as a legal Instrument, and became only Evidence of a Contract. The whole Plan and Design of all Parties was essentially changed. If a Charter granted in England, to be exercised there, can be forfeited by the Laws of England, the Translation of that Charter and Company to America, and setting up a Government here under it, was a forfeiture of it. What the Consequences of this forfeiture were, is another Question. The King might have commanded the Adventurers to return, and upon their Refusal might have Seized their Estates in England, if they had any: that is all. But he did not. But it did not bring our Ancestores, who were allowed to remain here, under the Authority of Parliament nor under the absolute Power of the King. Nay, what is more, this Charter was deemed forfeited and void for these very Reasons in the King's bench, Trinity. 11. Car. 1. Yet our Ancestors continued to enjoy their Priviledges and carry on Government, according to that Charter, from that Time, untill the Reign of James the second, nay untill the Revolution. In a Collection of original Papers relative to the History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, page 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, you will find the Evidence of all this. “A Quo Warranto brought against the Company of the Massachusetts Bay by Sir John Banks, Attorney General.” This Quo Warranto goes upon the Principle upon which I have all along proceeded, vizt, that the common Law had made no Provision for erecting Governments or Colonies out of the Realm and therefore, any Royal Charter, out of the Realm was void. The Quo Warranto begins “That Sir Henry Roswell and all the Massachusetts 382Company &c used &c in several Parts beyond the Seas out of this Kingdom of England, without any Warrant or royal Grant (meaning that quoad hoc the Royal Grant was void) the Liberties, Priviledges, and Franchises following &c. 1. To be a Body Politick &c. 8. To appoint councell Houses in England, and beyond seas and there, when they please, to hold a Court of such of the said Company as they please; and in such Courts to make such Laws and Statutes concerning the Lands, Goods, and Chattells of that Company and other Persons beyond seas against the Laws and Customs of England &c.” 9. To transport out of England beyond the seas his Majestys subjects and others and them, at their Wills, to governe on the seas and on Parts beyond the seas. 14. To examine on Oath any Person in any Cause [touching Life and Member and to proceed to tryal, Sentence, Judgment and Execution] touching Life and Member, Lands, Tenements, Goods and Chattels, against the Laws and Customs of England,” “All which Franchises Liberties &c the said Sir Henry Roswell and others of the said Company have for all that Time, and still do usurp &c.” This Quo Warranto, manifestly, is grounded on the Principle, that the Laws of England did not extend beyond Seas, and therefore that the Charter, when translated beyond Seas, was void. In Michaelmas. Term. 11. Car. 1. Eaton, and in Hillary. 11. Car. 1. Roswell, and in Pass Paschal 13. Car. 1. Young, and in Hill. 12. Car. 1. Saltonstall, and Mich. Car. 1. Venn, came in and pleaded, that they never usurped any the Said Liberties &c nor doth use or claim any of the Same, but wholly disclaim them. Where-upon the Court gave Judgment, That they shall not for the future intermeddle with any Liberties &c aforesaid but shall forever be excluded from all use and claim of the same &c. Cradock made default, and was convicted of the usurpation, but had Judgment against him. Harwood, Perry, Wright, Vassall, Goffe, Adams, Browne and Foxcroft, pleaded and had Judgment as Eaton. The rest of the Patentees being in New England stood outlawed and no Judgment was entered up against them. In Consequence of these Proceedings, an order of the Privy Council was Sent 4. April 1638 to Mr. Winthrop in his Majestys Name, “requiring and injoining the Said Winthrop or any other in whose Power the said Letters Patent were, that they fail not to transmit The Said Patent hither, by the Return of the Ship, it being resolved in Case of any further Neglect, &c their Lordships will move his Majesty to reassume into his Hands the 383whole Plantation.” The Intent of this order, was that the Patent should be sent over, that the Government of the Colony might be under a Corporation in England according to the original and true Intent of the Patent. But did Mr. Winthrop, or any other of the Adventurers return the Patent! No. Young as the Plantation was they had the Courage and the Wisdom to keep their Patent, in their own Power. But as this Translation of the Patent to New England, instead of using it within the Realm as was at first intended is of great Importance, in this controversy, We must be a little more particular. The Charter as I have said Shews upon the Face of it, that it was intended to erect a Corporation within the Realm. The first Governor, Deputy Governor and Assistants were chosen in England, 13. May 1628. Cradock was chosen Governor and Goffe Deputy Governor in England, and as soon as the Election was over they with the Assistants appointed Mr. Endicot their Governor in the Plantation. This shews that they had one Governor in England, who was the Head of the Corporation, and another in America, who was only principal Agent or Manager for the Company. And in this manner the Affairs of the Company were conducted untill July 1629, when the Company in England projected a much larger Embarkation of Adventurers and a Translation of the Patent itself to New England. A Committee was appointed to consider of it, and advise with Council. The Company had been at great Expence, without any Returns or rational Prospect of Profit. Johnson, Winthrop, Dudley, and others, not the rascally Rabble of Romulus but Gentlemen of Family, Fortune, Education, and Figure, offered to go over with their Families, upon Condition that the Patent and Charter Should go with them. The Objection against it, was a doubt whether the Transfer was legal. The Report of the Committee is not on Record, but a Mr. White a Counsellor at Law was of the Company and his opinion was taken, and the Company concurred with it “that the Government and Patent Should be Settled in New England.” It is much to be wished that this important opinion of Mr. White was preserved. It might discover “Arcana.” It was certainly a wise and judicious opinion, in Point of Prudence and Policy, and has been vastly Successfull, for the Plantation probably had dwindled away, but for that Advice. However Governor Winthrop himself, who knew very well the Laws of England were confined within Seas, must have [been Sensible that there could be no Provision in that Law, for the Translation of the Company beyond Seas—and indeed they Seem to have]5 been all Sensible of this and to have considered the Charter only as a Licence to their People to go abroad. On the 20. of October, at a General Court in England, Mr. Winthrop was chosen Governor, and the Deputy Governor and Assistants chosen were all such as proposed to go over with the Charter. They went over accordingly, and the Existence of the English Power in America is entirely owing to this manifest departure from the first Intent of the Charter, for at this critical Time Richlieu and De Monts were upon the Point of making Settlements here which would have excluded the English forever. Massachusettensis says that this clause in the Charter—“So as such laws be not contrary or repugnant to the laws and statutes of this our realm of England” is as evident a recognition of the authority of Parliament over this Province as if the words “Acts of Parliament” had been inserted But there is no such Clause in the first Charter or the second, and if there had been in the first Charter, it would have now been void. For by an express Clause in the first Charter, every Part of it was to be expounded most favourably for the Grantees, and therefore if there had been two contradictory Clauses in it, that must have done which was most in favour of the Grantees. Now they think that any Clause, obliging them to Obedience to Parliament, would have been directly repugnant to the Clause now under Consideration which gives them the Liberties and Immunities of natural born subjects. Soon after, We are Struck with a Smart Remark indeed “if We are not annexed to the Realm we are Aliens.” It is not a little Surprizing, that this Writer should let Such Blunders escape him. If he had ever read one Page in a Book concerning the Connection of Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernesy, Gascoin &c with England, he must have seen the Contrary. He might have forgot it, or this observation might escape him inadvertently. It is too uncandid to suppose, that he thought he should never be answered, and that it would pass well enough with the Ignorant, and serve to deceive them. But unfortunately, all History and Law are against it. Lord Coke observed what a Concurrence of Judgments, Resolutions, and Rules there be in our Books in all Ages concerning this Case, as if they had been prepared for the deciding this Point; and that which never fell out in any doubtfull Case, no one opinion in all our Books is against this Judgement, in Calvins Case, who was not of the Realm, but yet was no Alien because born within the Allegiance of the King. The opposition he says has been executed chiefly by persons of desperate fortunes. But this round Affirmation is a downright Contempt of Truth. The Denial and opposition has been planned and conducted by Men of the first Fortune in North America. Nay by the first Fortunes in this Province. I will undertake to Name three Gentlemen on the Whigg Side, in Boston any one of whom is able to purchase Bernard, Hutchinson, the four Judges of Admiralty, and the five Commissioners of the Customs, and still have an handsome Fortune left. Novanglus to be continued.

XII. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay My Friends, 17 April 1775 We now come to Jersey and Guernsey, which Massachusettensis says “are no part of the realm of England, nor are they represented in parliament, but are subject to its authority.” A little knowledge of this subject will do us no harm, and as soon as we shall acquire it, we shall be satisfied, how these islands came to be subject to the authority of parliament. It is either upon the principle that the king is absolute there, and has a right to make laws for them by his mere will, and therefore may express his will by an act of parliament or an edict at his pleasure, or it is an usurpation. If it is an usurpation, it ought not to be a precedent for the colonies, but it ought to be reformed, and they ought to be incorporated into the realm, by act of parliament, and their own act. Their situation is no objection to this. Ours is an insurmountable obstacle. Thus we see that in every instance which can be found, the observation proves to be true, that by the common law, the laws of England, and the authority of parliament and the limits of the realm, were confined within seas. That the kings of England had frequently foreign dominions, some by conquest, some by marriage, and some by descent. But in all those cases the kings were either absolute in those dominions, or bound to govern them according to their own respective laws, and by their own legislative and executive councils. That the laws of England did not extend there, and the English parliament pretended no jurisdiction there, nor claimed any right to controul the king in his government of those dominions. And from this extensive survey of all the foregoing cases, there results a confirmation of what has been so often said, that there is no provision in the common law, in English precedents, in the English government or constitution, made for the case of the colonies. It is not a conquered, but a discovered country. It came not to the king by descent, but was explored by the settlers. It came not by marriage to the king, but was purchased by the settlers, of the savages. It was not granted by the king of his grace, but was dearly, very dearly earned by the planters, in the labour, blood, and treasure which they expended to subdue it to cultivation. It stands upon no grounds then of law or policy, but what are found in the law of nature, and their express contracts in their charters, and their implied contracts in the commissions to governors and terms of settlement. The cases of Chester, and Durham, counties palatine within the realm, shall conclude this fatigueing ramble. Chester was an earldom and a county, and in 21 year of king R. 2. A. D. 1397, it was by an act of parliament, erected into a principality, and several castles and towns, were annexed to it, saving to the king the rights of his crown. This was a county palatine, and had jura regalia, before this erection of it, into a principality. But the statute which made it a principality, was again repealed, by 1. H. 4. c. 3. and in 1399, by the 1. H. 4. c. 18. Grievous complaints were made to the king in parliament, of murders, manslaughters, robberies, batteries, riots, &c. done by people of the county of Chester, in divers counties of England. For remedy of which it is enacted, that if any person of the county of Chester, commit any murder or felony in any place out of that county, process shall be made against him by the common law, 'till the exigent,1 in the county where such murder or felony was done: and if he flee into the county of Chester, and be outlawed, and put in exigent for such murder or felony, the same outlawry or exigent, shall be certified to the officers and ministers of the same county of Chester, and the felon shall be taken, his lands and goods within that county shall be seized as forfeit into the hands of the prince, or of him that shall be lord of the same county of Chester, and the king shall have the year and day and waste; and the other lands and goods of such felons, out of said county, shall remain wholly to the king, &c. as forfeit. And a similar provision in case of battery or trespass, &c. Considering the great seal of England, and the process of the kings contracts did not run into Chester, it was natural that malefactors should take refuge there and escape punishment, and therefore a statute like this, was of indispensible necessity, and afterwards in 1535, another statute was made, 27. H. c. 5. for the making of justices of peace within Chester, &c. Recites the king, considering the manifold robberies, murthers, thefts, trespasses, riots, routs, embraceries, maintenances, oppressions, ruptures of his peace &c. which have been daily done within his county palatine of Chester &c. by reason that common justice hath not been indifferently ministred there, like and in form as it is in other places of this his realm, by reason whereof the said criminals have remained unpunished; for redress whereof, and to the intent that one order of law should be had, the king is impowered to constitute justices of peace, quorum, and goal delivery, in Chester, &c. By the 32. H. 8. c. 43. another act was made concerning the county palatine of Chester, for shire days. These three acts soon excited discontent in Chester. They had enjoyed an exemption from the king's English courts, legislative and executive, and they had no representatives in the English parliament, and therefore they thought it a violation of their rights, to be subjected even to those three statutes, as reasonable and absolutely necessary as they appear to have been: and accordingly we find in 1542.–34. and 35. H. 8. c. 13. a zealous petition to be represented in parliament, and an act was made for making of knights and burgesses within the county and city of Chester. It recites a part of the petition to the king, from the inhabitants of Chester, shewing, “that the county palatine, had been excluded from parliament, to have any knights and burgesses there; by reason whereof, the said inhabitants have hitherto sustained manifold disherisons, losses and damages, in lands, goods and bodies, as well as in the good civil and politick governance and maintenance of the common wealth, of their said country: and forasmuch as the said inhabitants have always hitherto been bound by the acts and statutes, made by your highness and progenitors in said court, (meaning when expressly named, not otherwise,) as far forth as other counties, cities and boroughs, which have had knights and burgesses, and yet have had neither knight nor burgess there, for the said county palatine; the said inhabitants for lack thereof, have been oftentimes touched and grieved with acts and statutes, made within the said court, as well derogatory unto the most ancient jurisdictions, liberties, and privileges of your said county palatine, as prejudicial unto the common weal, quietness, rest and peace of your subjects, &c.” For remedy whereof, two knights of the shire and two burgesses for the city are established. I have before recited all the acts of parliament, which were ever made to meddle with Chester, except the 51. H. 3. st. 5. in 1266, which only provides that the justices of Chester, and other bailiffs, shall be answerable in the exchequer, for wards, estcheats, and other bailiwicks; yet Chester was never severed from the crown or realm of England, nor ever expressly exempted from the authority of parliament: yet as they had generally enjoyed an exemption from the exercise of the authority of parliament, we see how soon they complain of it as grievous, and claim a representation, as a right; and we see how readily it was granted.—America, on the contrary, is not in the realm, never was subject to the authority of parliament, by any principle of law, is so far from Great-Britain, that she never can be represented; yet she is to be bound in all cases whatsoever. The first statute, which appears in which Durham is named, is 27. H. 8. c. 24. §21. Cuthbert bishop of Durham, and his successors, and their temporal chancellor of the county palatine of Durham, are made justices of the peace. The next is 31 Eliz. c. 9. recites, that Durham is, and of long time hath been an ancient county palatine, in which the Queen's writ, hath not, and yet doth not run; enacts that a writ of proclamation upon an exigent, against any person dwelling in the bishoprick, shall run there for the future. And §5. confirms all the other liberties of the bishop and his officers. And after this, we find no other mention of that bishoprick in any statute until 25 Char. 2. c. 9. This statute recites, “whereas the inhabitants of the county palatine of Durham, have not hitherto had the liberty and priviledge of electing and sending any knights and burgesses to the high court of parliament, altho' the inhabitants of the said county palatine are liable to all payments, rates, and subsidies, granted by parliament, equally with the inhabitants of other counties, cities, and burroughs, in this kingdom, who have their knights and burgesses in the parliament, and are therefore concerned equally with others, the inhabitants of this kingdom, to have knights and burgesses in the said high court of parliament of their own election, to represent the condition of their county, as the inhabitants of other counties, cities, and burroughs of this kingdom have.” Enacts two knights for the county, and two burgesses for the city. Here it should be observed, that altho' they acknowledge that they had been liable to all rates, &c. granted by parliament, yet none had actually been laid upon them before this statute. Massachusettensis then comes to the first charter of this province, and he tells us, that in it “we shall find irresistable evidence, that our being a part of the empire subject to the supreme authority of the state, bound by its laws, and subject to its protection, was the very terms and conditions by which our ancestors held their lands and settled the province.” This is roundly and warmly said: but there is more zeal in it than knowledge. As to our being part of the empire, it could not be the British empire, as it is called, because that was not then in being, but was created seventy or eighty years afterwards. It must be the English empire then, but the nation was not then polite enough to have introduced into the language of the law, or common parlance any such phrase or idea. Rome never introduced the terms Roman empire until the tragedy of her freedom was compleated. Before that, it was only the republic, or the city. In the same manner the realm or the kingdom, or the dominions of the king, were the fashionable style in the age of the first charter. As to being subject to the supreme authority of the state, the prince who granted that charter thought it resided in himself, without any such troublesome tumults as lords and commons; and before the granting that charter, had dissolved his parliament, and determined never to call another, but to govern without. It is not very likely then, that he intended our ancestors should be governed by parliament, or bound by its laws. As to being subject to its protection, we may guess what ideas king and parliament had of that, by the protection they actually afforded to our ancestors. Not one farthing was ever voted or given by the king or his parliament, or any one resolution taken about them. As to holding their lands, surely they did not hold their lands of lords and commons. If they agreed to hold their lands of the king, this did not subject them to English lords and commons, any more than the inhabitants of Scotland holding their lands of the same king, subjected them. But there is not a word about the empire, the supreme authority of the state, being bound by its laws, or obliged for its protection in that whole charter. But “our charter is in the royal style.” What then? Is that the parliamentary style? The style is, this “Charles, by the grace of God, king of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, defender of the faith, &c.” Now in which capacity did he grant that charter? As king of France, or Ireland, or Scotland, or England? He govern'd England by one parliament, Scotland by another. Which parliament, were we to be governed by? And Ireland by a third, and it might as well be reasoned that America was to be governed by the Irish parliament as by the English. But it was granted “under the great seal of England”—true. But this seal runneth not out of the realm, except to mandatory writs, and when our charter was given, it was never intended to go out of the realm. The charter and the corporation were intended to abide and remain within the realm, and be like other corporations there. But this affair of the seal is a mere piece of imposition. In Moore's reports in the case of the union of the realm of Scotland with England, it is resolved by the judges that “the seal is alterable by the king at his pleasure, and he might make one seal for both kingdoms (of England and Scotland,) for seals, coin, and leagues are of absolute prerogative to the king, without parliament, nor restrained to any assent of the people”, and in determining how far the great seal doth command out of England, they made this distinction. “That the great seal was currant for remedials, which groweth on complaint of the subject, and thereupon writs are addressed under the great seal of England, which writs are limited, their precinct to be within the places of the jurisdiction of the court, that was to give the redress of the wrong. And therefore writs are not to go into Ireland, or the isles, nor Wales, nor the counties palatine, because the king's courts here have not power to hold pleas of lands or things there. But the great seal hath a power preceptory to the person, which power extendeth to any place where the person may be found, &c.” This authority plainly shews that the great seal of England, has no more authority out of the realm, except to mandatory or preceptory writs, (and surely the first charter was no preceptory writ) than the privy seal, or the great seal of Scotland, or no seal at all. In truth, the seal and charter were intended to remain within the realm, and be of force to a corporation there; but the moment it was transferred to New England, it lost all its legal force, by the common law of England; and as this translation of it was acquiesced in by all parties, it might well be considered as good evidence of a contract between the parties, and in no other light, but not a whit the better or stronger for being under the great seal of England. But “the grants are made by the king for his heirs and successors.” What then? So the Scots held their lands of him who was then king of England, his heirs and successors, and were bound to allegiance to him, his heirs and successors, but it did not follow from thence that the Scots were subject to the English parliament. So the inhabitants of Aquitain, for ten descents, held their lands, and were tied by allegiance to him who was king of England, his heirs and successors, but were under no subjection to English lords and commons. Heirs and successors of the king, are supposed to be the same persons, and are used as synonimous words in the English law. There is no positive, artifical provision made by our laws or the British constitution for revolutions. All our positive laws suppose that the royal office will descend to the eldest branch of the male line, or in default of that to the eldest female, &c. forever, and that the succession will not be broken. It is true that nature, necessity and the great principles of self-preservation, have often over-ruled the succession. But this was done without any positive instruction of law. Therefore the grants being by the king for his heirs and successors, and the tenures being of the king his heirs and successors, and the preservation being to the king his heirs and successors, are so far from proving that we were to be part of an empire as one state subject to the supreme authority of the English or British state, and subject to its protection, that they don't so much as prove that we are annexed to the English crown. And all the subtilty of the writers on the side of the ministry, has never yet proved that America is so much as annexed to the crown, much less to the realm. “It is apparent the king acted in his royal capacity as king of England.” This I deny. The laws of England gave him no authority to grant any territory out of the realm. Besides, there is no colour for his thinking that he acted in that capacity, but his using the great seal of England: but if the king is absolute in the affair of the seal, and may make or use any seal that he pleases, his using that seal which had been commonly used in England, is no certain proof that he acted as king of England; for it is plain, he might have used the English seal in the government of Scotland, and in that case it will not be pretended that he would have acted in his royal capacity as king of England. But his acting as king of England “necessarily supposes the territory granted to be a part of the English dominions, and holden of the crown of England.” Here is the word “dominions,” systematically introduced instead of the word “realm.” There was no English dominions but the realm. And I say that America was not any part of the English realm or dominions. And therefore, when the king granted it, he could not act as king of England by the laws of England. As to the “territory being holden of the crown,” there is no such thing in nature or art. Lands are holden according to the original notion of feuds of the natural person of the lord. Holding lands, in feudal language, means no more than the relation between lord and tenant. The reciprocal duties of these are all personal. Homage, fealty, &c. and all other services, are personal to the lord; protection, &c. is personal to the tenant. And therefore no homage, fealty, or other services, can ever be rendered to the body politick, the political capacity, which is not corporated, but only a frame in the mind, an idea. No lands here or in England are held of the crown, meaning by it, the political capacity—they are all held of the royal person, the natural person of the king. Holding lands, &c. of the crown, is an impropriety of expression, but it is often used, and when it is, it can have no other sensible meaning than this—that we hold lands of that person, whoever he is, who wears the crown—the law supposes he will be a right, natural heir of the present king forever. Massachusettensis then produces a quotation from the first charter, to prove several points. It is needless to repeat the whole, but the parts chiefly relied on, are italicised. It makes the company “a body politick in fact and name, &c. and enables it to sue and be sued.” Then the writer asks, “whether this looks like a distinct state or independent empire?” I answer no. And that it is plain and uncontroverted, that the first charter was intended only to erect a corporation within the realm, and the governor and company were to reside within the realm, and their general courts were to be held there. Their agents, deputies and servants only were to come to America. And if this had taken place, nobody ever doubted but they would have been subject to parliament. But this intention was not regarded on either side, and the company came over to America, and brought their charter with them. And as soon as they arrived here, they got out of the English realm, dominions, state, empire, call it by what name you will, and out of the legal jurisdiction of parliament. The king might by his writ or proclamation have commanded them to return, but he did not. NOVANGLUS

XI. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay My Friends, 10 April 1775 The cases of Wales and Ireland are not yet exhausted. They afford such irrefragable proofs, that there is a distinction between the crown and realm, and that a country may be annexed and subject to the former, and not the latter, that they ought to be thoroughly studied and understood. The more these cases, as well as those of Chester, Durham, Jersey, Guernsey, Calais, Gascoine, Guienne, &c. are examined, the more clearly it will appear, that there is no precedent in English records, no rule of common law, no provision in the English constitution, no policy in the English or British government, for the case of the colonies; and therefore that we derive our laws and government solely from our own compacts with Britain and her kings, and from the great legislature of the universe. We ought to be cautious of the inaccuracies of the greatest men, for these are apt to lead us astray. Lord Coke, in 7 rep. 21. 6. says “Wales was sometimes a kingdom, as it appeareth by 19 H. 6. fol. 6, and by the act of parliament of 2 H. 5. cap. 6, but while it was a kingdom, the same was holden, and within the see of the king of England: and this appeareth by our books, Fleta, lib. 1. E. 3, 14, 8. E. 3, 59, 13. E. 3. Tit. Jurisdict. 10. H. 4, 6. And in this respect, in diverse ancient charters, kings of old time stiled themselves in several manners, as king Edgar, Britanniae, Basileus, Etheldrus, Totius Albionis Dei providentia Imperator, Edredus magnae Britanniae Monarcha, which among many others of like nature I have seen. But by the statute of 12 of Ed. I. Wales was united and incorporated into England and made parcel of England in possession; and therefore it is ruled in 7. H. 4. fol. 14. that no protection doth lie, quia moratur in Wallia, because Wales is within the realm of England. And where it is recited in the act of 27 H. 8. that Wales was ever parcel of the realm of England, it is true in this sense, viz. that before 12 E. I. it was parcel in tenure, and since it is parcel of the body of the realm. And whosoever is born within the see of the king of England, though it be in another kingdom, is a natural-born subject, and capable and inheritable of lands in England, as it appeareth in Plow. com. 126. And therefore those that were born in Wales before 12 E. I. while it was only holden of England, were capable and inheritable of lands in England.” Where my lord Coke, or any other sage, shews us the ground on which his opinion stands, we can judge for ourselves, whether the ground is good, and his opinion just. And if we examine by this rule, we shall find in the foregoing words, several palpable inaccuracies of expression, 1. by the 12 E. I. (which is the Statutum Walliae quoted by me before) it is certain, that Wales was not united and incorporated into England, and made parcel of England. It was annexed and united to the crown of England only. It was done by the king's sole and absolute authority—not by an act of parliament, but by a mere constitutio imperatoria, and neither E. I, nor any of his successors, ever would relinquish the right of ruling it, by mere will and discretion, until the reign of James I. 2d. It is not recited in the 27 H. 8, that Wales was ever parcel of the realm of England. The words of that statute are, “incorporated, annexed, united and subject to and under the imperial crown of this realm,” which is a decisive proof that a country may be annexed to the one, without being united with the other. And this appears fully in lord Coke himself, 7 rep. 22, b. “Ireland originally came to the kings of England by conquest, but who was the first conqueror thereof hath been a question. I have seen a charter made by king Edgar, in these words, Ego Edgarus Anglorum Basileus, omnium quae insularum oceani, quae Britanniam circumjacent, imperatur et dominus, gratias ago ipsi Deo omnipotenti regi meo, qui meum imperium sic ampliavit et exaltavit super regnum patrum meorum, &c. Mihi concessit propitia divinitas, cum Anglorum imperis omnia regna insularum oceani, &c. Cum suis ferocissibus regibus usque Norvegiam, maximamque partem Hiberniae, cum sua nobilissima civitate de Dublina, Anglorum regno subjugare, quapropter et ego Christi gloriam et laudem in regno meo exaltare, et ejus servitium amplificare devotus disposui, &c. Yet for that it was wholly conquered in the reign of H. 2. The honour of the conquest of Ireland is attributed to him. That Ireland is a dominion separate and divided from England it is evident by our books, 20 H. 6, 8.; Sir John Pilkington's case, 32. H. 6, 26.; 20 Eliz. Dyer 360; Plow. com. 360; and 2 r. 3, 12. Hibernia habet parliamentum, et saciunt leges, et statuta nostra, non ligant eos, quia non mittunt milites ad parliamentum (which is to be understood unless they be specially named) sed personae eorum sunt subjecti regis, sicut inhabitantes in Calesia, Gasconia et Guigan. Wherein it is to be observed, that the Irishman (as to his subjection) is compared to men born in Calice, Gascoin and Guian. Concerning their laws, Ex rotulis patentium de anno 11. Regis H. 3, there is a charter which that king made beginning in these words: Rex Baronibus, Militibus et omnibus libere tenentibus L. salutem, satis, ut credimus vestra audivit discretio, quod quando bonae memoriae Johannes quondam rex Angliae, pater noster venit in Hiberniam, ipse duxit secum vires discretos et legis peritos, quorum communi consilio et ad juctantiam adjunctorum Hiberniansium statuit et praecepit leges Anglicanas in Hibernia, ita quod leges easdem in scripturas redactas reliquit sub sigillo suo ad scaccarium Dublin. So as now the laws of England became the proper laws of Ireland; and therefore because they have parliaments holden there, whereat they have made diverse particular laws, concerning that dominion, as it appeareth in 20 H. 6, 8, and 20 Eliz. Dyer 360, and for that they retain unto this day diverse of their ancient customs, the book in 20 H. 6, 8, holdeth, that Ireland is governed by laws and customs, separate and diverse from the laws of England. A voyage royal may be made into Ireland. Vid. 11. H. 4. 7. and 7. E. 4. 27. which proveth it a distinct dominion. And in anno 33. Eliz. it was resolved by all the judges of England in the case of ORURKE an Irishman, who had committed high treason in Ireland, that he by the statute of 33 H. 8. c. 23, might be indicted, arraigned, and tried for the same in England, according to the purview of that statute: the words of which statute be, that all treasons, &c. committed by any person out of the realm of England, shall be from henceforth inquired of, &c. And they all resolved (as afterwards they did also in sir John Perrot's case) that Ireland was out of the realm of England, and that treasons committed there were to be tried within England, by that statute. In the statute of 4 H. 7, c. 24 of fines, provision is made for them that be out of this land, and it is holden in Plow. com. in Stowell's case 375, that he that is in Ireland is out of this land, and consequently within that proviso. Might not then the like plea be devised as well against any person born in Ireland, as (this is against Calvin a Postnatus) in Scotland? For the Irishman is born extra ligeantia regis, regni sui Angliae, &c. which be verba operativa in the plea: But all men know, that they are natural born subjects, and capable of, and inheritable to lands in England.” I have been at the pains of transcribing this long passage for the sake of a variety of important observations that may be made upon it. 1. That exuberance of proof that is in it, both that Ireland is annexed to the crown, and that it is not annexed to the realm of England. 2. That the reasoning in the year book, that Ireland has a parliament, and makes laws, and our statutes don't bind them, because they don't send knights to parliament, is universal, and concludes against these statutes binding in which Ireland is specially named, as much as against these in which it is not, and therefore lord Coke's parenthesis, (which is to be understood unless they be specially named) is wholly arbitrary and groundless, unless it goes upon the supposition, that the king is absolute in Ireland, it being a conquered country, and so has power to bind it at his pleasure, by an act of parliament, or 367by an edict: or unless it goes upon the supposition of Blackstone, that there had been an express agreement and consent of the Irish nation to be bound by acts of the English parliament; and in either case it is not applicable even by analogy to America, because that is not a conquered country, and most certainly never consented to be bound by all acts of parliament, in which it should be named. 3. That the instance, request and consent of the Irish is stated, as a ground upon which king John and his discreet law-sages, first established the laws of England in Ireland. 4. The resolution of the judges in the cases of Orurke and Perrot, is express that Ireland was without the realm of England, and the late resolutions of both houses of parliament and the late opinion of the judges, that Americans may be sent to England upon the same statute to be tried for treason, is also express that America is out of the realm of England. So that we see what is to become of us, my friends. When they want to get our money by taxing us, our privileges by annihilating our charters, and to screen those from punishment who shall murder us at their command, then we are told that we are within the realm; but when they want to draw, hang and quarter us, for honestly defending those liberties which God and compact have given and secured to us, oh, then we are clearly out of the realm! 5. In Stowell's case it is resolved that Ireland is out of this land, that is, the land of England. The consequence is, that it was out of the reach and extent of the law of the land, that is the common law. America surely is still further removed from that land, and therefore is without the jurisdiction of that law which is called the law of the land in England. I think it must appear by this time, that America is not parcel of the realm, state, kingdom, government, empire or land of England or Great-Britain, in any sense which can make it subject universally to the supreme legislature of that island. But for the sake of curiosity, and for the purpose of shewing that the consent even of a conquered people has always been carefully conciliated. I beg leave to look over lord Coke's 4. Inst. p. 12. “After king Henry 2d,” says he “had conquered Ireland, he fitted and transcribed this modus (meaning the ancient treatise called modus tenendi parliamentum, which was rehearsed and declared before the conquerer at the time of the conquest, and by him approved for England) into Ireland, in a parchment roll, for the holding of parliaments there, which no doubt H. 2. did by advice of his judges, &c. This modus, &c. was anno 6. H. 4. in the custody of Sir Christopher Preston, which roll H. 4. in the same year, De assensu Johannis Talbot Chevalier, his lieutenant there, and of his council of Ireland, exemplified,” &c. Here we see the original of a parliament in Ireland, which is assigned as the cause or reason why Ireland is a distant kingdom from England: and in the same, 4. inst. 349. we find more evidence that all this was done at the instance and request of the people in Ireland. Lord Coke says, “H. 2. the father of K. John, did ordain and command, at the instance of the Irish, that such laws as he had in England, should be of force and observed in Ireland.” “Hereby Ireland being of itself a distant dominion, and no part of the kingdom of England, (as it directly appeareth by many authorities in Calvin's case) was to have parliaments holden there, as England, &c.” See the record as quoted by lord Coke in the same page, which shews that even this establishment of English laws, was made De communi omnium de Hiberniae consensu. This whole chapter is well worth attending to, because the records quoted in it shew how careful the ancients were to obtain the consent of the governed to all laws, tho' a conquered people and the king absolute. Very unlike the minister of our aera, who is for pulling down and building up the most sacred establishments of laws and government, without the least regard to the consent or good will of Americans. There is one observation more of lord Coke that deserves particular notice. “Sometimes the king of England called his nobles of Ireland to come to his parliament of England, &c. and by special words the parliament of England may bind the subjects of Ireland,” and cites the record 8. E. 2. and subjoins “an excellent precedent to be followed, whensoever any act of parliament shall be made in England, concerning the state of Ireland, &c.” By this lord Coke seems to intimate an opinion, that representatives had been and ought to be called from Ireland to the parliament of England, whenever it undertook to govern it by statutes, in which it should be specially named. After all I believe there is no evidence of any express contract of the Irish nation to be governed by the English parliament, and very little of an implied one; that the notion of binding it by acts in which it is expressly named is meerly arbitrary. And that this nation which has ever had many and great virtues, has been most grievously oppressed:—and it is to this day so greatly injured and oppressed, that I wonder American committees of correspondence and congresses, have not attended more to it than they have. Perhaps in some future time they may. But I am running beyond my line. We must now turn to Burrows's reports, vol. 2. 834. Rex vs. Cowle. Lord Mansfield has many observations upon the case of Wales, which ought not to be overlooked. Page 850. He says, “Edward 1st. conceived the great design of annexing all other parts of the island of Great Britain to the realm of England. The better to effectuate his idea, as time should offer occasion; he mentioned 'that all parts thereof, not in his own hands or possession, were holden of his crown.' The consequence of this doctrine was, that, by the feudal law, supreme jurisdiction resulted to him, in right of his crown, as sovereign lord, in many cases, which he might lay hold of; and when the said territories should come into his hands and possession, they would come back as parcel of the realm of England, from which (by fiction of law at least) they had been originally severed. This doctrine was literally true as to the counties palatine of Chester and Durham. But (no matter upon what foundation) he maintained that the principality of Wales was holden of the imperial crown of England: he treated the prince of Wales as a rebellious vassal; subdued him; and took possession of the principality. Whereupon, on the 4th of December, in the 9th year of his reign, he issued a commission to enquire 'per quas leges et per quas consuetudines, antecessores nostri reges regni consueverant principem Walliae et barones wallenses Wallieae et pares suos et alios in priores et eorum pares, &c.' If the principality was feudatory, the conclusion necessarily followed, 'that it was under the government of the king's laws, and the king's courts, in cases proper for them to interpose; though (like counties palatine) they had peculiar laws and customs, jura regalia, and complete jurisdiction at home.' There was a writ at the same time issued to all his officers in Wales, 'to give information to the commissioners:' and there were 14 interrogatories specifying the points to be enquired into. The statute of Rutland 12. E. I. refers to this inquiry. By that statute he does not annex Wales to England, but recites it as a consequence of its coming into his hands. 'Divina providentia terram Walliae, prius, nobis jure feodali sulojectam, jam in proprietatis nostrae dominium convertit, et coronae regni angliae, tanquam partem corporis ejusdem annexuit, et univit.' The 27. H, 8. c. 26. adheres to the same plan, and recites that 'Wales ever hath been incorporated, annexed, united and subject to, and under the imperial crown of this realm, as a very member, and joint of the same.' Edward I. having succeeded as to Wales, maintained likewise that Scotland was holden of the crown of England.” This opinion of the court was delivered by lord Mansfield in the year 1759. In conformity to the system contained in these words, my lord Mansfield, and my lord North, together with their little friends Bernard and Hutchinson, have “conceived the great design of annexing” all North-America “to the realm of England,” and “the better to effectuate this idea, they all maintain, that North-America is holden of the crown.” And (no matter upon what foundation) they all maintained that America is dependent on the imperial crown and parliament of Great Britain: and they are all very eagerly desirous of treating the Americans as rebellious vassals, to subdue them and take possession of their country. And when they do, no doubt America will come back as parcel of the realm of England, from which (by fiction of law at least) or by virtual representation, or by some other dream of a shadow of a shade, they had been originally severed. But these noblemen and ignoblemen ought to have considered, that Americans understand the laws and the politicks as well as themselves, and that there are 600,000 men in it, between 16 and 60 years of age, and therefore it will be very difficult to chicane them out of their liberties by “fictions of law,” and “no matter upon what foundation.” Methinks I hear his lordship upon this occasion, in a soliloquy somewhat like this. “We are now in the midst of a war, which has been conducted with unexampled success and glory. We have conquered a great part, and shall soon compleat the conquest of the French power in America. His majesty is near 70 years of age, and must soon yield to nature. The amiable, virtuous and promising successor, educated under the care of my nearest friends, will be influenced by our advice. We must bring the war to a conclusion, for we have not the martial spirit and abilities of the great commoner: but we shall be obliged to leave upon the nation an immense debt. How shall we manage that? Why, I have seen letters from America, proposing that parliament should bring America to a closer dependence upon it, and representing that if it does not, she will fall a prey to some foreign power, or set up for herself. These hints may be improved, and a vast revenue drawn from that country and the East-Indies, or at least the people here may be flattered and quieted with the hopes of it. It is the duty of a judge to declare law, but under this pretence, many we know have given law or made law, and none in all the records of Westminster hall more than of late. Enough has been already made, if it is wisely improved by others, to overturn this constitution. Upon this occasion I will accommodate my expressions, to such a design upon America and Asia, and will so accommodate both law and fact, that they may hereafter be improved to admirable effect in promoting our design.” This is all romance, no doubt, but it has as good a moral as most romances. For 1st. It is an utter mistake that Ed. 1st. conceived the great design of annexing all to England, as one state, under one legislature. He conceived the design of annexing Wales, &c. to his crown. He did not pretend that it was before subject to the crown but to him. “Note jure feodali” are his words. And when he annexes it to his crown, he does it by an edict of his own, not an act of parliament: and he never did in his whole life allow, that his parliament, that is his lords and commons, had any authority over it, or that he was obliged to take or ask their advice in any one instance concerning the management of it, nor did any of his successors for centuries. It was not Ed. I. but Henry 7. who first conceived the great design of annexing it to the realm, and by him and H. 8. it was done, in part, but never compleated until Jac. I. There is a sense indeed in which annexing a territory to the crown, is annexing it to the realm, as putting a crown upon a man's head, is putting it on the man, but it does not make it part of the man. 2d. His lordship mentions the statute of Rutland, but this was not an act of parliament, and therefore could not annex Wales to the realm if the king had intended it, for it never was in the power of the king alone to annex a country to the realm. This cannot be done, but by act of parliament. As to Edward's treating the prince of Wales as a “rebellious vassal,” this was arbitrary, and is spoken of by all historians as an infamous piece of tyranny. Ed. 1. and H. 8. both considered Wales, as the property and revenue of the crown, not as a part of the realm, and the expressions, “coronae, regni angliae, tanquam partem carports ejesdem,” signified “as part of the same body,” that is of the same “crown,” not “realm” or “kingdom”; and the expressions in 27. H. 8. “under the imperial crown of this realm, as a very member and joint of the same,” mean, as a member and joint of the “imperial crown,” not of the realm. For the whole history of the principality, the acts of kings, parliaments, and people shew, that Wales never was intituled by this annexation to the laws of England, nor bound to obey them. The case of Ireland is enough to prove that the crown and realm are not the same. For Ireland is certainly annexed to the crown of England, and it certainly is not annexed to the realm. There is one paragraph in the foregoing words of lord Mansfield, which was quoted by his admirer Governor Hutchinson in his dispute with the house, with a profound compliment. “He did not know a greater authority,” &c. But let the authority be as great as it will, the doctrine will not bear the test. “If the principality was feudatory, the conclusion necessarily follows, that it was under the government of the king's laws.” Ireland is feudatory to the crown of England, but would not be subject to the king's English laws, without its consent and compact. An estate may be feudatory to a lord, a country may be feudatory to a sovereign lord, upon all possible variety of conditions—it may be only to render homage—it may be to render a rent, it may be to pay a tribute—if his lordship by feudatory means, the original notion of feuds, it is true by that the king the general imperator, was absolute, and the tenant held his estate only at will, and the subject not only his estate but his person and life at his will. But this notion of feuds had been relaxed in an infinite variety of degrees, in some the estate is held at will, in others for life, in others for years, in others forever, to heirs, &c. in some to be govern'd by prince alone, in some by prince and nobles, and in some by prince, nobles and commons, &c. So that being feudatory, by no means proves that English lords and commons have any share in the government over us. As to counties palatine; these were not only holden of the king and crown, but were exerted by express acts of parliament, and therefore were never exempted from the authority of parliament. The same parliament, which erected the county Palatine, and gave it its jura regalia, and compleat jurisdiction, might unmake it, and take away those regalia and jurisdiction. But American governments and constitutions were never erected by parliament, their regalia and jurisdiction were not given by parliament, and therefore parliament have no authority to take them away. But if the colonies are feudatory to the kings of England, and subject to the government of the king's laws, it is only to such laws as are made in their general assemblies, their provincial legislatures. NOVANGLUS

X. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay My Friends, 3 April 1775 Give me leave now to descend from these general matters, to Massachusettensis. He says “Ireland who has perhaps the greatest possible subordinate legislature, and send no members to the British parliament, is bound by its acts, when expressly named.” But if we are to consider what ought to be, as well as what is, why should Ireland have the greatest possible subordinate legislature? Is Ireland more numerous and more important to what is called the British empire, than America? Subordinate as the Irish legislature is said to be, and a conquered country as undoubtedly it is, the parliament of Great-Britain, altho' they claim a power to bind Ireland by statutes, have never laid one farthing of a tax upon it. They knew it would occasion resistance if they should. But the authority of parliament to bind Ireland at all, if it has any, is founded upon a different principle entirely from any that takes place in the case of America. It is founded on the consent and compact of the Irish by Poyning's law to be so governed, if it has any foundation at all: and this consent was given and compact made in consequence of a conquest. In the reign of Henry 2d of England, there were five distinct sovereignties in Ireland, Munster, Leinster, Meath, Ulster and Connaught, besides several small tribes. As the prince of any one of these petty states took the lead in war, he seemed to act, for the time being, as monarch of the island. About the year 1172 Rodoric O'Connor, king of Connaught, was advanced to this preeminence. Henry, had long cast a wishful eye upon Ireland, and now partly to divert his subjects from the thoughts of Becket's murder, partly to appease the wrath of the Pope for the same event, and partly to gratify his own ambition, he lays hold of a pretence, that the Irish had taken some natives of England and sold them for slaves, applies to the Pope for license to invade that island. Adrian the 3d, an Englishman by birth, who was then pontiff, and very clearly convinced in his own mind of his right to dispose of kingdoms and empires, was easily perswaded, by the prospect of Peter's pence, to act as emperor of the world, and make an addition to his ghostly jurisdiction of an island which tho' converted to christianity had never acknowledged any subjection to the see of Rome. He issued a bull, premising that Henry had ever shewn an anxious care to enlarge the church, and increase the saints on earth and in Heaven, that his design upon Ireland proceeded from the same pious motives: that his application to the holy see, was a sure earnest of success: that it was a point incontestible, that all christian kingdoms belonged to the patrimony of St. Peter; that it was his duty to sow among them the seeds of the gospel, which might fructify to their eternal salvation; he exhorts Henry to invade Ireland, exterminate the vices of the natives, and oblige them to pay yearly from every house, a penny to the see of Rome: gives him full right and entire authority over the whole island, and commands all to obey him as their sovereign. Macmorrogh, a licentious scoundrel, who was king of Leinster, had been driven from his kingdom, for his tyranny, by his own subjects, in conjunction with Ororic, king of Meath, who made war upon him for committing a rape upon his queen; applied to Henry for assistance, to restore him, and promised to hold his kingdom in vassallage of the crown of England. Henry accepted the offer, and engaged in the enterprise. It is unnecessary to recapitulate all the intrigues of Henry, to divide the Irish kingdoms among themselves and set one against another, which are as curious as those of Edward the first, to divide the kingdom of Wales and play Lewellyn's brothers against him, or as those of the ministry, and our junto, to divide the American colonies, who have more sense than to be divided. It is sufficient to say that Henry's expeditions, terminated, altogether by means of those divisions among the Irish, in the total conquest of Ireland, and its annexation forever to the English crown. By the annexation of all Ireland to the English crown, I mean, that all the princes and petty sovereigns in Ireland agreed to become vassals of the English crown. But what was the consequence of this? The same consequence was drawn, by the kings of England in this case, as had been drawn in the case of Wales after the conquest of Lewellyn, viz. that Ireland was become a part of the property, possession or revenue of the English crown, and that its authority over it was absolute, and without controul. This matter must be traced from step to step. The first monument we find in English records, concerning Ireland, is a mere rescriptum principis, intituled statutum hiberniae de coheredibus 14, Hen. 3d, A. D. 1229. In the old abridgment Tit. Homage, this is said not to be a statute. Vid. Ruffheads statutes at large, V. 1. 15. Mr. Cay very properly observes, that it is not an act of parliament, vid. Barrington's observations on the statutes, p. 34. In this rescript, the king informs certain milites (adventurers probably, in the conquest of Ireland, or their descendents) who had doubts how lands holden by knights service, descending to copartners, within age, should be divided, what is the law and custom in England with regard to this. But the record itself shews it to be a royal rescript only. Rex dilecto et fideli suo gerardo sit' mauricii justii' suo Hiberniae salutem. Quia tales Milites de partibus Hiberniae nuper, ad nos accedentes nobis ostenderunt, quod, &c. Et a nobis petierunt inde certiorari, qualiter in regno nostro Angliae, in casu consimili hactenus usitatem sit, &c. He then goes on and certifies what the law in England was, and then concludes, Et Ideo vobis mandamus, quod predictas consuetudines in hoc casu, quas in regno nostro Angliae habemus ut predictum est, in terra nostra Hiberniae proclamari et firmiter teneri, fac, &c. Here again we find the king conducting, exactly as Ed. I, did in Wales, after the conquest of Wales. Ireland had now been annexed to the English crown many years, yet parliament was not allowed to have obtained any jurisdiction over it, and Henry ordained laws for it by his sole and absolute authority, as Ed. I did by the statute of Wales. Another incontestible proof, that annexing a country to the crown of England, does not annex it to the realm, or subject it to parliament. But we shall find innumerable proofs of this. Another incontestable proof of this, is the ordinatio pro statu Hiberniae made 17 Ed. I, 1288. This is an ordinance made by the king, by advice of his council, for the government of Ireland. “Edward, by the grace of God, king of England, lord of Ireland, &c. to all those who shall see or hear these letters, doth send salutation.” He then goes on and ordains many regulations, among which the seventh chapter is “that none of our officers shall receive an original writ pleadable at the common law, but such as be sealed by the great seal of Ireland;” &c. this ordinance concludes “In witness whereof we have caused these our letters patent to be made.” Dated at Nottingham 24 Nov. 17 year of our reign. This law if it was passed in parliament was never considered to have any more binding force, than if it had been made only by the king. By Poyning's law indeed in the reign of H. 7 all precedent English statutes are made to bind in Ireland, and this among the rest, but untill Poyning's law, it had no validity as an act of parliament, and was never executed, but in the English pale, for, notwithstanding all that is said of the total compact conquest, by H. 2, yet it did not extend much beyond the neighbourhood of Dublin, and the conqueror could not inforce his laws and regulations much further. There is a note on the roll of 21 Ed. I, in these words, “Et memorandum quod istud statutum de verbo ad verbum, missum suit in Hyberniam, teste rege apud Kenyngton 14, dic. Augueti anno regni sui vicessimo septimo: et mandatum suit Johanni Wogan, justiciario Hiberniae, quod praedictim statutum, per Hiberniam, in locis quibus expedire viderit legi, et publice proclamari ac firmiter teneri faciat.” “This note most fully proves, that the king by his sole authority, could introduce any English law; and will that authority be lessened by the concurrence of the two houses of parliament? There is also an order of Charles the first, in the third year of his reign, to the treasurers and chancellors of the exchequer both of England and Ireland, by which they are directed to increase the duties upon Irish exports; which shews that it was then imagined, that the king would tax Ireland by his prerogative, without the intervention of parliament.” vid. obs. on the statutes, p. 127. Another instance to shew, that the king by his sole authority, whenever he pleased, made regulations for the government of Ireland, notwithstanding it was annexed and subject to the crown of England, is the ordinatio facta pro statu terrae Hiberniae, in the 31. Ed. I. in the appendix to Ruffhead's statutes, p. 37. This is an extensive code of laws, made for the government of the Irish church and state, by the king alone, without lords or commons. The kings “volumus et firmiter precipimus,” governs and establishes all, and among other things, he introduces by the 18th chapter the English laws, for the regimen of persons of English extract, settled in Ireland. The next appearance of Ireland, in the statutes of England, is in the 34. Ed. 3. c. 17. This is no more than a concession of the king to his lords and commons of England, in these words “item it is accorded that all the merchants as well aliens as denizens, may come into Ireland, with their merchandizes, and from thence freely to return, with their merchandizes and victuals, without fine or ransom to be taken of them, saving always to the king, his ancient customs and other duties.” And by chapter 18. “Item, that the people of England, as well religious as other, which have their heritage and possessions in Ireland, may bring their corn, beasts and victuals to the said land of Ireland, and from thence to re-carry their goods and merchandizes into England freely, without impeachment, paying their customs and their devoirs to the king.” All this is no more than an argument between the king and his English subjects, lords and commons, that there should be a free trade between the two islands, and that one of them should be free for strangers. But is no colour of proof that the king could not govern Ireland without his English lords and commons. The 1. H. 5. c. 8. All Irishmen and Irish clerks, beggars, shall depart this realm before the first day of November, except graduates, serjeants &c. is explained by 1. H. 6. c. 3. which shews what sort of Irishmen only may come to dwell in England. It enacts that all persons born in Ireland shall depart out of the realm of England, except a few, and that Irishmen shall not be principals of any hall, and that Irishmen shall bring testimonials from the lieutenant, or justice of Ireland, that they are of the kings obeysance. By the 8. H. 6. c. 8. “Irishmen resorting into the realm of England, shall put in surety for their good abearing.” Thus I have cursorily mentioned every law made by the king of England, whether in parliament or out of it, for the government of Ireland, from the conquest of it by Henry the 2d, in 1172, down to the reign of Henry the 7th, when an express contract was made between the two kingdoms, that Ireland should for the future be bound by English acts of parliament, in which it should be specially named. This contract was made in 1495, so that upon the whole it appears, beyond dispute, that for more than 300 years, tho' a conquered country, and annexed to the crown of England; yet was so far from being annexed to or parcel of the realm, that the king's power was absolute there, and he might govern it without his English parliament, whose advice concerning it, he was under no obligation to ask or pursue. The contract I here allude to, is what is called Poyning's law, the history of which is briefly this. Ireland revolted from England, or rather adhered to the partizans of the house of York, and Sir Edward Poyning was sent over about the year 1495, by king Henry the 7th, with very extensive powers, over the civil as well as military administration. On his arrival he made severe inquisition about the disaffected, and in particular attacked the earls of Dismond and Kildare. The first stood upon the defensive and eluded the power of the deputy: but Kildare was sent prisoner to England: not to be executed it seems, nor to be tried upon the statute of H. 8.—but to be dismissed as he actually was, to his own country, with marks of the king's esteem and favour; Henry judging that, at such a juncture, he should gain more by clemency and indulgence, than by rigour and severity. In this opinion he sent a commissioner to Ireland, with a formal amnesty, in favour of Desmond and all his adherents, whom the tools of his ministers did not fail to call traitors and rebels with as good a grace and as much benevolence, as Massachusettensis discovers. Let me stop here and enquire, whether lord North has more wisdom than Henry the 7th, or whether he took the hint from the history of Poyning's, of sending General Gage, with his civil and military powers? If he did, he certainly did not imitate Henry, in his blustering menaces, against certain “ringleaders and forerunners.” While Poyning resided in Ireland, he called a parliament, which is famous in history for the acts which it passed in favour of England, and Englishmen settled in Ireland. By these, which are still called Poyning's laws, all the former laws of England, were made to be of force in Ireland, and no bill can be introduced into the Irish parliament, unless it previously receive the sanction of the English privy council; and by a construction if not by the express words of these laws, Ireland is still said to be bound by English statutes in which it is specially named. Here then let Massachusettensis pause and observe the original of the notion that countries might be bound by acts of parliament, if “specially named,” tho' without the realm. Let him observe too, that this notion is grounded entirely on the voluntary act, the free consent of the Irish nation, and an act of an Irish parliament, called Poyning's law. Let me ask him, has any colony in America ever made a Poyning's act? Have they ever consented to be bound by acts of parliament, if specially named? Have they ever acquiesced in, or implicitly consented to any acts of parliament, but such as are bona fide made for the regulation of trade? This idea of binding countries without the realm, by “specially naming” them, is not an idea taken from the common law. There was no such principle, rule, or maxim, in that law—it must be by statute law then, or none. In the case of Wales and Ireland, it was introduced by solemn compact, and established by statutes, to which the Welch and Irish were parties, and expressly consented. But in the case of America there is no such statute, and therefore Americans are bound by statutes in which they are “named,” no more than by those in which they are not. The principle upon which Ireland is bound by English statutes in which it is named, is this, that being a conquered country, and subject to the mere will of the king, it voluntarily consented to be so bound. This appears in part already, and more fully in 1. Blackstone, 99, 100, &c.—who tells us, “that Ireland is a distinct, tho' a dependent, subordinate kingdom.” But how came it dependant and subordinate? He tells us “that king John, in the twelfth year of his reign, after the conquest, went into Ireland, carried over with him many able sages of the law; and there by his letters patent, in right of the dominion of conquest, is said to have ordained and established, that Ireland should be governed by the laws of England: which letters patent Sir Edward Coke apprehends to have been there confirmed in parliament.” “By the same rule that no laws made in England, between king John's time and Poyning's law, were then binding in Ireland, it follows that no acts of the English parliament, made since the tenth of Henry 7th, do now bind the people of Ireland, unless specially named or included under general words. And on the other hand it is equally clear, that where Ireland is particularly named, or is included under general words, they are bound by such acts of parliament; for it follows from the very nature and constitution of a dependent state: dependence being very little else, but an obligation to conform to the will or law of that superior person or state, upon which the inferior depends. The original and true ground of this superiority in the present case, is what we usually call, tho' somewhat improperly, the right of conquest: a right allowed by the law of nations, if not by that of nature; but which in reason and civil policy can mean nothing more, than that, in order to put an end to hostilities, a compact is either expressly or tacitly made between the conqueror and conquered, that if they will acknowledge the victor for their master, he will treat them for the future as subjects, and not as enemies.” These are the principles upon which the dependence and subordination of Ireland are founded. Whether they are just or not, is not necessary for us to enquire. The Irish nation, have never been entirely convinced of their justice; have been ever discontented with them, and ripe and ready to dispute them. Their reasonings have ever been answered, by the ratio ultima et penultima of the tories, and it requires to this hour, no less than a standing army of 12000 men to confute them. As little as the British parliament exercises the right, which it claims of binding them by statutes, and altho' it never once attempted or presumed to tax them, and altho' they are so greatly inferior to Britain in power, and so near in situation. But thus much is certain, that none of these principles take place, in the case of America. She never was conquered by Britain. She never consented to be a state dependent upon, or subordinate to the British parliament, excepting only in the regulation of her commerce: and therefore the reasonings of British writers, upon the case of Ireland, are not applicable to the case of the colonies, any more than those upon the case of Wales. Thus have I rambled after Massachusettensis through Wales and Ireland: but have not reached my journey's end. I have yet to travel through Jersey, Guernsey, and I know not where. At present I shall conclude with one observation. In the history of Ireland and Wales, though undoubtedly conquered countries, and under the very eye and arm of England, the extreme difficulty, the utter impractability, of governing a people who have any sense, spirit, or love of liberty, without incorporating them into the state, or allowing them some other way, equal priviledges may be clearly seen. Wales was forever revolting for a thousand years, untill it obtained that mighty blessing. Ireland, has been frequently revolting, altho' the most essential power of a supreme legislature, that of imposing taxes has never been exercised over them, and it cannot now be kept under, but by force, and it would revolt forever, if parliament should tax them. What kind of an opinion then must the ministry entertain of America? When her distance is so great, her territory so extensive, her commerce so important, not a conquered country, but dearly purchased and defended? When her trade is so essential to the navy, the commerce, the revenue, the very existence of Great-Britain, as an independent state? They must think America inhabited by three million fools and cowards. NOVANGLUS