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Massachusettensis LETTER VII. To the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. IF we carry our researches further back than the emigration of our ancestors, we shall find many things that reflect light upon the object we are in quest of. It is immaterial when America was first discovered or taken possession of by the English. In 1602 one Gosnold landed upon one of the islands, called Elizabeth-islands, which were so named in honor of Queen Elizabeth, built a fort and projected a settlement; but his men were discouraged, and the project failed. In 1606 King James granted all the continent from 34 to 45 degrees, which he divided into two colonies, viz. the southern or Virginia, to certain merchants at London; the northern or New-England, to certain merchants at Plymouth in England. In 1607 some of the patentees of the northern colony began a settlement at Sagadahoc, but the emigrants were disheartened after the trial of one winter, and that attempt failed of success. Thus this territory had not only been granted by the crown for purposes of colonization, which are to enlarge the empire or dominion of the parent state, and to open new sources of national wealth; but actual possession had been taken by the grantees, previous to the emigration of our ancestors, or any grant to them. In 1620 a patent was granted to the adventurers for the northern colony, incorporating them by the name of the council for the affairs of New-Plymouth. From this company of merchants in England, our ancestors derived their title to this territory. The tract of land called Massachusetts was purchased of this company by Sir Henry Roswell and associates: their deed bears date, March 19th, 1627. In 1628 they obtained a charter of incorporation, which I have already remarked upon. The liberties, privileges and franchises, granted by this charter, do not, perhaps, exceed those granted to the city of London and other corporations within the realm. The legislative power was very confined; it did not even extend to levying taxes of any kind: that power was, however, assumed under this charter, which by law worked a forfeiture, and for this among other things, in the reign of Charles the Second, the charter was adjudged forfeited, and the franchises seized into the King’s hands. This judgment did not affect our ancestors’ title to their lands, which were not derived originally from the charter, though confirmed by it, but by purchase from the council at Plymouth, who held immediately under the crown. Besides, our ancestors had now reduced what before was a naked right to possession, and by persevering through unequalled toils, hardships and dangers, at the approach of which other emigrants had fainted, rendered New-England a very valuable acquisition both to the crown and nation. This was highly meritorious, and ought not to be overlooked in adjusting the present unhappy dispute; but our patriots would deprive us of all the merit, both to the crown and nation, by severing us from both. After the revolution, our ancestors petitioned the parliament to restore the charter. A bill for that purpose passed the house of commons, but went no further. In consequence of another petition, King William and Queen Mary granted our present charter for uniting and incorporating the Massachusetts, New-Plymouth, and several other territories into one province. More extensive powers of legislation, than those contained in the first charter, were become necessary, and were granted. And the form of the legislature was made to approach nearer to the form of the supreme legislature. The powers of legislation are confined to local or provincial purposes, and further restricted by these words, viz. So as the same be not repugnant or contrary to the laws of this our realm of England. Our patriots have made many nice distinctions and curious refinements to evade the force of these words; but, after all, it is impossible to reconcile them to the idea of an independent state, as it is to reconcile disability to omnipotence. The provincial power of taxation is also restricted to provincial purposes, and allowed to be exercised over such only, as are inhabitants or proprietors within the province. I would observe here, that the granting subordinate powers of legislation, does not abridge or diminish the powers of the higher legislatures: thus we see corporations in England and the several towns in this province vested with greater or lesser powers of legislation, without the parliament, in one case, or the general court in the other; being restrained from enacting those very laws, that fall within the jurisdiction of the several corporations. Had our present charter been conceived in such equivocal terms, as that it might be construed as restraining the authority of parliament; the uniform usage, ever since it passed the seal, would satisfy us that its intent was different. The parliament in the reign when it was granted, long before and in every reign since, has been making statutes to extend to the colonies; and those statutes have been as uniformly submitted to, as authoritative, by the colonies, till within ten or a dozen years. Sometimes acts of parliament have been made, and sometimes have been repealed, in consequence of petitions from the colonies. The provincial assemblies often refer to acts of parliament in their own, and have sometimes made acts to aid their execution. It is evident that it was the intention of their Majesties to grant subordinate powers of legislation, without impairing or diminishing the authority of the supreme legislature. Had there been any words in the charter, which precluded that construction, or did the whole taken together contradict it; lawyers would tell us, that the King was deceived in his grant, and the patentees took no estate by it, because the crown can neither alienate a part of the British dominions, nor impair the supreme power of the empire. I have dwelt longer on this subject than I at first intended, and not by any means done it justice; as, to avoid prolix narratives and tedious deduction, I have omitted perhaps more than I have adduced, in order to evince the truth of the position, that we are a part of the British dominions, and subject to the authority of parliament. The novelty of the contrary tenets will appear, by extracting a part of a pamphlet, published in 1764, by a Boston gentleman, who was then the oracle of the whigs, and whose profound knowledge in the law and constitution is equalled but by few. ‘I also lay it down (says he) as one of the first principles from whence I intend to deduce the civil rights of the British colonies, that all of them are subject to, and dependent on Great-Britain; and that therefore, as over subordinate governments, the parliament has an undoubted power and lawful authority to make acts for the general good, that, by naming them, shall and ought to be equally binding, as upon the subjects of Great-Britain within the realm. Is there the least difference, as to the consent of the colonists, whether taxes and impositions are laid on their trade, and other property by the crown alone, or by the parliament? As it is agreed on all hands, the crown alone cannot impose them, we should be justifiable in refusing to pay them; but we must and ought to yield obedience to an act of parliament, though erroneous, till repealed. ‘It is a maxim, that the King can do no wrong; and every good subject is bound to believe his King is not inclined to do any. We are blessed with a prince who has given abundant demonstrations, that, in all his actions, he studies the good of his people, and the true glory of his crown, which are inseparable. It would therefore be the highest degree of impudence and disloyalty, to imagine that the King, at the head of his parliament, could have any but the most pure and perfect intentions of justice, goodness and truth, that human nature is capable of. All this I say and believe of the King and parliament, in all their acts; even in that which so nearly affects the interests of the colonists; and that a most perfect and ready obedience is to be yielded to it while it remains in force. The power of parliament is uncontrolable but by themselves, and we must obey. They only can repeal their own acts. There would be an end of all government, if one or a number of subjects, or subordinate provinces, should take upon them so far to judge of the justice of an act of parliament, as to refuse obedience to it. If there was nothing else to restrain such a step, prudence ought to do it; for forcibly resisting the parliament and the King’s laws is high-treason. Therefore let the parliament lay what burdens they please on us, we must, it is our duty to submit and patiently bear them, till they will be pleased to relieve us.’ The Pennsylvania Farmer, who took the lead in explaining away the right of parliament to raise a revenue in America, speaking of regulating trade, tells us, that ‘He who considers these provinces as states distinct from the British empire has very slender notions of justice or of their interest; we are but parts of a whole, and therefore there must exist a power somewhere to preside and preserve the connection in due order. This power is lodged in parliament; and we are as much dependent on Great-Britain as a perfectly free people could be on another.’ He supposes that we are dependent in some considerable degree upon Great-Britain; and that such dependance is nevertheless consistent with perfect freedom. Having settled this point, let us reflect upon the resolves and proceedings of our patriots. We often read resolves denying the authority of parliament, which is the imperial authority, gilded over with professions of loyalty to the King, but the golden leaf is too thin to conceal the treason: It either argues profound ignorance or hypocritical cunning. We find many unsuspecting persons prevailed on openly to oppose the execution of acts of parliament with force and arms. My friends! some of the persons, that beguiled you, could have turned to the chapter, page and section, where such insurrections are pronounced rebellions, by the law of the land; and had not their hearts been dead to a sense of justice, and steeled against every feeling of humanity, they would have timely warned you of your danger. Our patriots have sent us in pursuit of a mere ignis fatuus, a fascinating glare devoid of substance; and now, when we find ourselves bewildered, with scarce one ray of hope to raise our sinking spirits, or stay our fainting souls, they conjure up phantoms more delusive and fleeting, if possible, than that which first led us astray. They tell us, we are a match for Great-Britain.—The twentieth part of the strength that Great-Britain could exert, were it necessary, is more than sufficient to crush this defenceless province to atoms, notwithstanding all the vapouring of the disaffected here and elsewhere. They tell us the army is disaffected to the service: What pains have our politicians not taken to attach them to the service? The officers conceive no very favourable opinion of the cause of the whigs, from the obloquy with which their General hath been treated, in return for his humanity; nor from the infamous attempts to seduce the soldiers from his Majesty’s service. The policy of some of our patriots has been as weak and contemptible, as their motives are sordid and malevolent; for when they found their success in corrupting the soldiery did not answer their expectations, they took pains to attach them the firmer to the cause they adhered to, by preventing the erecting of barracks for their winter quarters; by which means many contracted diseases, and some lives were lost, from the unwholesome buildings they were obliged to occupy. And, as though some stimulus was still wanting, some provocation to prevent human nature revolting in the hour of battle, they deprived the soldiers of a gratification never denied to the brute creation,—straw to lay on. I do not mention this conduct to raise the resentment of the troops; it has had its effect already, and it is proper you should know it; nor should I have blotted paper in relating facts so mortifying to the pride of man, had it not been basely suggested, that there would be a defection should the army take the field. Those are matters of small moment compared to another, which is the cause they are engaged in. It is no longer a struggle between whigs and tories, whether these or those shall occupy posts of honor, or enjoy the emoluments of office; nor is it now whether this or the other act of parliament shall be repealed. The army is sent here to decide a question, intimately connected with the honor and interest of the nation; no less than whether the colonies shall continue a part of, or be for ever dismembered from, the British empire. It is a cause in which no honest American can wish our politicians success, though it is devoutly to be wished, that their discomfiture may be effected without recourse being had to the ultima ratio,—the sword. This our wretched situation is but the natural consequence of denying the authority of parliament and forcibly opposing its acts. Sometimes we are amused with intimations, that Holland, France, or Spain, will make a diversion in our favour.—These, equally with the others, are suggestions of despair. These powers have colonies of their own, and might not choose to set a bad example, by encouraging the colonies of any other state to revolt. The Dutch have too much money in the English funds, and are too much attached to their money, to espouse our quarrel. The French and Spaniards have not yet forgot the drubbing they received from Great-Britain last war; and all three fear to offend that power, which our politicians would persuade us to despise. Lastly, they tell us, that he people in England will take our part, and prevent matters from coming to extremity. This is their fort, where, when driven from every other post, they fly for refuge. Alas! my friends, our congresses have stopped up every avenue that leads to that sanctuary. We hear, by every arrival from England, that it is no longer a ministerial (if it ever was) but a national cause. My dear countrymen, I deal plainly with you; I never should forgive myself if I did not. Are there not eleven regiments in Boston? A respectable fleet in the harbour? Men of war stationed at every considerable port along the continent? Are there not three ships of the line sent here, notwithstanding the danger of the winter coast, with more than the usual compliment of marines? Have not our congresses, county, provincial and continental, instead of making advances for an accommodation, bid defiance to Great-Britain?—He that runs may read. If our politicians will not be persuaded from running against the thick bosses of the buckler, it is time for us to leave them to their fate, and provide for the safety of ourselves, our wives, our children, our friends, and our country. I have many things to add, but must now take my leave, for this week, by submitting to your judgment, whether there be not an absolute necessity of immediately protesting against all traiterous resolves, leagues and associations, of bodies of men, that appear to have acted in a representative capacity. Had our congresses been accidental or spontaneous meetings, the whole might have rested upon the individuals that composed them; but as they appear in the character of the peoples delegates, is there not the utmost danger of the innocent being confounded with the guilty, unless they take timely care to distinguish themselves? MASSACHUSETTENSIS. January 23, 1775 Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/leonard-massachusettensis#lf0951_head_009

Massachusettensis LETTER VI. To the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay. HAD a person, some fifteen years ago, undertaken to prove that the colonies were a part of the British empire or dominion, and, as such, subject to the authority of the British parliament; he would have acted as ridiculous a part, as to have undertaken to prove a self-evident proposition: Had any person denied it, he would have been called a fool or madman. At this wise period, individuals and bodies of men deny it, notwithstanding in doing it they subvert the fundamentals of government, deprive us of British liberties, and build up absolute monarchy in the colonies; for our charters suppose regal authority in the grantor. If that authority be derived from the British crown, it præ-supposes this territory to have been a part of the British dominion, and as such subject to the imperial sovereign. If that authority was vested in the person of the King, in a different capacity; the British constitution and laws are out of the question, and the King must be as absolute to us, as tho’ his prerogatives had never been circumscribed. Such must have been the sovereign authority of the several Kings, who have granted American charters, previous to the several grants: there is nothing to detract from it, at this time in those colonies that are destitute of charters; and the charter governments must then severally revert to absolute monarchy as their charters may happen to be forfeited by the grantees not fulfilling the conditions of them, for every charter contains an express or implied condition. It is curious indeed to trace the denial and oppugnation to the supreme authority of the state. When the stampact was made, the authority of parliament to impose internal taxes was denied, but their right to impose external ones, or, in other words, to lay duties upon goods and merchandise, was admitted. When the act was made, imposing duties upon tea, &c. a new distinction was set up; that the parliament had a right to lay duties upon merchandise for the purpose of regulating trade, but not for the purpose of raising a revenue. That is, the parliament had good right and lawful authority to lay the former duty of a shilling on the pound, but had none to lay the present duty of three pence. Having got thus far safe, it was only taking one step more to extricate ourselves entirely from their fangs, and become independent states: That our patriots most heroically resolved upon, and flatly denied that parliament had a right to make any laws whatever, that should be binding upon the colonies. There is no possible medium between absolute independence and subjection to the authority of parliament. He must be blind indeed that cannot see our dearest interest in the latter, notwithstanding many pant after the former: misguided men! could they once overtake their wish, they would be convinced of the madness of the pursuit. My dear countrymen, it is of the last importance that we settle this point clearly in our minds; it will serve as a sure test, certain criterion, and invariable standard, to distinguish the friends from the enemies of our country, patriotism from sedition, loyalty from rebellion. To deny the supreme authority of the state is a high misdemeanor, to say no worse of it; to oppose it by force is an overt act of treason, punishable by confiscation of estate and a most ignominious death. The realm of England is an appropriate term for the ancient realm of England, in contradistinction to Wales and other territories that have been annexed to it. These, as they have been severally annexed to the crown, whether by conquest or otherwise, became a part of the empire, and subject to the authority of parliament, whether they send members to parliament or not, and whether they have legislative powers of their own or not. Thus Ireland, which has perhaps the greatest possible subordinate legislature, and sends no members to the British parliament, is bound by its acts, when expressly named. Guernsey and Jersey are no part of the realm of England, nor are they represented in parliament, but are subject to its authority: And, in the same predicament are the American colonies, and all the other dispersions of the empire. Permit me to request your attention to this subject a little longer: I assure you it is as interesting and important, as it is dry and unentertaining. Let us now recur to the first charter of this province, and we shall find irresistable evidence, that our being part of the empire, subject to the supreme authority of the state, bound by its laws and entitled to its protection, were the terms and conditions by which our ancestors held their lands and settled the province. Our charter, like all other American charters, is under the great seal of England; the grants are made by the King, for his heirs and successors, the several tenures to be of the King, his heirs and successors: in like manner are the reservations. It is apparent, the King acted in his royal capacity, as King of England, which necessarily supposes the territory granted, to be a part of the English dominions, holden of the crown of England. The charter, after reciting several grants of the territory to Sir Henry Roswell and others, proceeds to incorporation in these words: ‘And for as much as the good and prosperous success of the plantations of the said parts of New-England aforesaid intended by the said Sir Henry Roswell and others, to be speedily set upon, cannot but chiefly depend, next under the blessing of almighty God and the support of our royal authority, upon the good government of the same, to the end that the affairs of business, which from time to time shall happen and arise concerning the said lands and the plantations of the same may be the better managed and ordered, we have further hereby, of our special grace, certain knowledge and meer motion, given, granted and confirmed, and for us, our heirs and successors, do give, grant and confirm unto our said trusty and well beloved subjects, Sir Henry Roswell, &c. and all such others as shall hereafter be admitted and made free of the company and society hereafter mentioned, shall from time to time and at all times, forever hereafter, be, by virtue of these presents, one body corporate, politic in fact and name, by the name of the Governor and company of the Massachusetts-Bay, in New-England; and them by the name of the Governor and company of the Massachusetts-Bay, in New-England, one body politic and corporate in deed, fact and name. We do for us, our heirs and successors make, ordain, constitute and confirm by these presents, and that by that name they shall have perpetual succession, and that by that name they and their successors shall be capable and enabled as well to implead and to be impleaded, and to prosecute, demand and answer and be answered unto all and singular suits, causes, quarrels and actions of what kind or nature soever; and also to have, take, possess, acquire and purchase, any lands, tenements and hereditaments, or any goods or chattles, the same to lease, grant, demise, aliene, bargain, sell and dispose of, as our liege people of this our realm of England, or any other corporation or body politic of the same, may do.’ I would beg leave to ask one simple question, whether this looks like a distinct state or independent empire. Provision is then made for electing a governor, deputy governor and eighteen assistants. After which is this clause: ‘We do for us, our heirs and successors, give and grant to the said governor and company and their successors, that the governor, or in his absence the deputy-governor, of the said company for the time being, and such of the assistants or freemen of the said company as shall be present, or the greater number of them so assembled, whereof the governor or deputy-governor and six of the assistants, at the least to be seven, shall have full power and authority to choose, nominate and appoint such and so many others, as they shall think fit, and shall be willing to accept the same to be free of the said company and body, and them into the same to admit and to elect and constitute such officers as they shall think fit and requisite for the ordering, managing and dispatching of the affairs of the said governor and company and their successors, and to make laws and ordinances for the good and welfare of the said company, and for the government and ordering of the said lands and plantations and the people inhabiting and to inhabit the same, as to them from time to time shall be thought meet: So as such laws and ordinances be not contrary or repugnant to the laws and statutes of this our realm of England.’ Another clause is this; ‘And for their further encouragement, of our especial grace and favour, we do by these presents, for us, our heirs, and successors, yield and grant to the said governor and company and their successors, and every one of them, their factors and assigns, that they and every of them shall be free and quit from all taxes, subsidies and customs in New-England for the space of seven years, and from all taxes and impositions for the space of twenty-one years, upon all goods and merchandize, at any time or times hereafter, either upon importation thither, or exportation from thence into our realm of England, or into other of our dominions, by the said governor and company and their successors, their deputies, factors and assigns, &c.’ The exemption from taxes for seven years in one case, and twenty one years in the other, plainly indicates that, after their expiration, this province would be liable to taxation. Now I would ask, by what authority those taxes were to be imposed? It could not be by the governor and company, for no such power was delegated or granted to them; and besides it would have been absurd and nugatory to exempt them from their own taxation, supposing them to have had the power, for they might have exempted themselves.—It must therefore be by the King or parliament: it could not be by the King alone, for as King of England, the political capacity in which he granted the charter, he had no such power, exclusive of the lords and commons, consequently it must have been by the parliament. This clause in the charter is as evident a recognition of the authority of the parliament over this province, as if the words, “acts of parliament,” had been inserted, as they were in the Pennsylvania charter. There was no session of parliament after the grant of our charter until the year 1640.—In 1642 the house of commons passed a resolve, ‘that, for the better advancement of the plantations in New-England, and the encouragement of the planters to proceed in their undertaking, their exports and imports should be freed and discharged from all customs, subsidies, taxations and duties, until the further order of the house.’ Which was gratefully received and recorded in the archives of our predecessors.—This transaction shews very clearly in what sense our connection with England was then understood. It is true that, in some arbitrary reigns, attempts were made by the servants of the crown to exclude the two houses of parliament, from any share of the authority over the colonies; they also attempted to render the King absolute in England: but the parliament always rescued the colonies, as well as England, from such attempts. I shall recite but one more clause of this charter, which is this, ‘And further our will and pleasure is, and we do hereby for us, our heirs and successors, ordain, declare and grant to the said govenor and company, and their successors, that all and every of the subjects of us, our heirs and successors, which shall go to and inhabit within the said land and premises hereby mentioned to be granted, and every of their children, which shall happen to be born there, or on the seas in going thither, or returning from thence, shall have and enjoy all liberties and immunities of free and natural subjects, within any of the dominions of us, our heirs or successors, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever, as if they and every of them were born within the realm of England.’ It is upon this or a similar clause in the charter of William and Mary, that our patriots have built up the stupendous fabric of American independence. They argue from it a total exemption from parliamentary authority, because we are not represented in parliament. I have already shewn, that the supposition of our being exempt from the authority of parliament, is pregnant with the grossest absurdities. Let us now consider this clause in connection with the other parts of the charter. It is a rule of law, founded in reason and common sense, to construe each part of an instrument, so as the whole may hang together, and be consistent with itself. If we suppose this clause to exempt us from the authority of parliament, we must throw away all the rest of the charter; for every other part indicates the contrary, as plainly as words can do it, and, what is still worse, this clause becomes felo de se, and destroys itself; for if we are not annexed to the crown, we are aliens, and no charter, grant or other act of the crown, can naturalize us or entitle us to the liberties and immunities of Englishmen. It can be done only by act of parliament. An alien is one born in a strange country, out of the allegiance of the King, and is under many disabilities though residing in the realm. As Wales, Jersey, Guernsey, Ireland, the foreign plantations, &c. were severally annexed to the crown, they became parts of one and the same empire, the natives of which are equally free as though they had been born in that territory, which was the antient realm. As our patriots depend upon this clause, detached from the charter, let us view it in that light. If a person, born in England, remove to Ireland, and settle there, he is then no longer represented in the British parliament; but he and his posterity are and will ever be subject to the authority of the British parliament: If he remove to Jersey, Guernsey, or any other parts of the British dominions that send no members to parliament, he will still be in the same predicament. So that the inhabitants of the American colonies do in fact enjoy all the liberties and immunities of natural-born subjects. We are entitled to no greater privileges than those, that are born within the realm; and they can enjoy no other than we do, when they reside out of it. Thus, it is evident, that this clause amounts to no more than the royal assurance, that we are a part of the British empire, are not aliens, but natural-born subjects, and, as such, bound to obey the supreme power of the state, and entitled to protection from it. To avoid prolixity, I shall not remark particularly upon other parts of this charter, but observe in general, that whoever reads it with attention will meet with irresistable evidence in every part of it, that our being a part of the English dominions, subject to the English crown, and within the jurisdiction of parliament, were the terms upon which our ancestors settled this colony, and the very tenures by which they held their estates. No lands within the British dominions are perfectly allodial; they are held mediately or immediately of the King, and, upon forfeiture, revert to the crown. My dear countrymen, you have many of you been most falsly and wickedly told, by our patriots, that Great-Britain was meditating a land tax, and seeking to deprive us of our inheritance; but had all the malice and subtilty of men and devils been united, a readier method to effect it could not have been devised, than the late denials of the authority of parliament, and forcible oppositions to its acts: Yet, this has been planned and executed chiefly by persons of desperate fortunes. MASSACHUSETTENSIS. January 16, 1775 Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/leonard-massachusettensis#lf0951_head_008

Massachusettensis LETTER V. To the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay. My dear Countrymen. SOME of you may perhaps suspect that I have been wantonly scattering firebrands, arrows and death, to gratify a malicious and revengeful disposition: The truth is this; I had seen many excellent detached pieces, but could see no pen at work to trace our calamity to its source, and point out the many adventitious aids, that conspired to raise it to its present height; though I impatiently expected it, being fully convinced that you wait only to know the true state of facts, to rectify whatever is amiss in the province, without any foreign assistance. Others may be induced to think, that I grudge the industrious poor of Boston their scantlings of charity. I will issue a brief in their favour. The opulent, be their political sentiments what they may, ought to relieve them from their sufferings, and those who, by former donations, have been the innocent cause of protracting their sufferings, are under a tenfold obligation to assist them now; and at the same time to make the most explicit declarations, that they did not intend to promote nor ever will join in rebellion. Great allowances are to be made for the crossings, windings and tergiversations of a politician: he is a cunning animal, and as government is said to be founded in opinion, his tricks may be a part of the arcana imperii. Had our politicians confined themselves within any reasonable bounds, I never should have molested them; but when I became satisfied, that many innocent, unsuspecting persons were in danger of being drenched with blood and carnage, I could restrain my emotions no longer; and, having once broke the bands of natural reserve, was determined to probe the sore to the bottom, though I was sure to touch the quick. It is very foreign from my intentions to draw down the vengeance of Great-Britain upon the whigs; they are too valuable a part of the community to lose, if they will permit themselves to be saved: I wish nothing worse to the highest of them, than that they may be deprived of their influence, till such time as they shall have changed their sentiments, principles and measures. Sedition has already been marked through its zigzag path to the present times. When the statute for regulaing the government arrived, a match was put to the train, and the mine, that had been long forming, sprung, and threw the whole province into confusion and anarchy. The occurrences of the summer and autumn past are so recent and notorious, that a particular detail of them is unnecessary. Suffice it to say, that every barrier that civil government had erected for the security of property, liberty and life, was broken down; and law, constitution and government trampled under by the rudest invaders. I shall not dwell upon these harsh notes much longer. I shall yet become an advocate for the leading whigs; much must be allowed to men in their situation, forcibly actuated by the chagrin of disappointment, the fear of punishment, and the fascination of hope at the same time. Perhaps the whole story of empire does not furnish another instance of a forcible opposition to government with so much specious and so little real cause, with such apparent probability without any possibility of success. The stampact gave the alarm. The instability of the public counsels, from the Grenvillian administration to the appointment of the earl of Hillsborough to the American department, afforded as great a prospect of success, as the heavy duties, imposed by the stamp-act, did a colour for the opposition. It was necessary to give the history of this matter in its course, offend who it would, because those acts of government, that are called the greatest grievances, became proper and necessary, through the misconduct of our politicians; and the justice of Great-Britain towards us, could not be made apparent without first pointing out that. I intend to consider the acts of the British government, which are held up as the principal grievances, and enquire whether Great-Britain is chargeable with injustice in any one of them; but must first ask your attention to the authority of parliament. I suspect many of our politicians are wrong in their first principle, in denying that the constitutional authority of parliament extends to the colonies; if so, it must not be wondered at, that their whole fabric is so ruinous: I shall not travel through all the arguments that have been adduced, for and against this question, but attempt to reduce the substance of them to a narrow compass, after having taken a cursory view of the British constitution. The security of the people from internal rapacity and violence, and from foreign invasion, is the end and design of government. The simple forms of government are monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, that is, where the authority of the state is vested in one, a few, or the many. Each of these species of government has advantages peculiar to itself, and would answer the ends of government, were the persons, intrusted with the authority of the state, always guided themselves by unerring wisdom and public virtue; but rulers are not always exempt from the weakness and depravity, which make government necessary to society. Thus monarchy is apt to rush headlong into tyranny, aristocracy to beget faction and multiplied usurpation, and democracy to degenerate into tumult, violence and anarchy. A government, formed upon these three principles in due proportion, is the best calculated to answer the ends of government, and to endure. Such a government is the British constitution, consisting of King, Lords and Commons, which at once includes the principal excellencies, and excludes the principal defects of the other kinds of government. It is allowed, both by Englishmen and foreigners, to be the most perfect system that the wisdom of ages has produced. The distributions of power are so just, and the proportions so exact, as at once to support and controul each other. An Englishman glories in being subject to and protected by such a government. The colonies are a part of the British empire. The best writers upon the laws of nations tell us, that when a nation takes possession of a distant country, and settles there, that country, though separated from the principal establishment or mother-country, naturally becomes a part of the state, equal with its ancient possessions. Two supreme or independent authorities cannot exist in the same state. It would be what is called imperium in imperio, and the height of political absurdity. The analogy between the political and human body is great. Two independent authorities in a state would be like two distinct principles of volition and action in the human body, dissenting, opposing, and destroying each other. If then we are a part of the British empire, we must be subject to the supreme power of the state, which is vested in the estates of parliament, notwithstanding each of the colonies have legislative and executive powers of their own, delegated or granted to them for the purposes of regulating their own internal police, which are subordinate, and must necessarily be subject, to the checks, controul and regulation of the supreme authority. This doctrine is not new; but the denial of it is. It is beyond a doubt that it was the sense both of the parent country and our ancestors, that they were to remain subject to parliament; it is evident from the charter itself, and this authority has been exercised by parliament, from time to time, almost ever since the first settlement of the country, and has been expressly acknowledged by our provincial legislatures It is not less our interest than our duty to continue subject to the authority of parliament, which will be more fully considered hereafter. The principal argument against the authority is this; the Americans are entitled to all the privileges of an englishman; it is the privilege of an englishman to be exempt from all laws that he does not consent to in person, or by representative; the Americans are not represented in parliament, and therefore are exempt from acts of parliament, or, in other words, not subject to its authority. This appears specious; but leads to such absurdities as demonstrate its fallacy. If the colonies are not subject to the authority of parliament, Great-Britain and the colonies must be distinct states, as completely so as England and Scotland were before the union, or as Great-Britain and Hanover are now. The colonies in that case will owe no allegiance to the imperial crown, and perhaps not to the person of the King; as the title to the crown is derived from an act of parliament, made since the settlement of this province, which act respects the imperial crown only. Let us wave this difficulty, and suppose allegiance due from the colonies to the person of the king of Great Britain; he then appears in a new capacity, as king of America, or rather, in several new capacities, as king of Massachusetts, king of Rhode-Island, king of Connecticut, &c. &c. For, if our connection with Great Britain, by the parliament, be dissolved, we shall have none among ourselves; but each colony will become as distinct from the others, as England was from Scotland before the union. Some have supposed, that each state having one and the same person for its king, it is a sufficient connection: Were he an absolute monarch, it might be; but, in a mixed government, it is no union at all. For, as the king must govern each state by its parliament, those several parliaments would pursue the particular interest of its own state; and however well disposed the king might be to pursue a line of interest that was common to all, the checks and controul, that he would meet with, would render it impossible. If the king of Great-Britain has really these new capacities, they ought to be added to his titles; and then another difficulty will arise, the prerogatives of these new crowns have never been defined or limited. Is the monarchical part of the several provincial constitutions to be nearer, or more remote from absolute monarchy, in an inverted ratio to each one’s approaching to, or receding from a republic? But let us suppose the same prerogatives inherent in the several American crowns, as are in the imperial crown of Great-Britain; where shall we find the British constitution, that we all agree we are entitled to? We shall seek for it in vain in our provincial assemblies. They are but faint sketches of the estates of parliament. The houses of representatives or burgesses have not all the powers of the house of commons: in the charter governments they have no more than what is expressly granted by their several charters. The first charters, granted to this province, did not impower the assembly to tax the people at all. Our council-boards are as destitute of the constitutional authority of the house of lords, as their several members are of the noble independence and splendid appendages of peerage. The house of peers is the bulwark of the British constitution, and, thro’ successive ages, has withstood the shocks of monarchy, and the sappings of democracy, whilst the constitution gained strength by the conflict. Thus, the supposition of our being independent states, or exempt from the authority of parliament, destroys the very idea of our having a British constitution. The provincial constitutions, considered as subordinate, are generally well adapted to those purposes of government, for which they were intended, that is, to regulate the internal police of the several colonies; but, having no principle of stability within themselves, tho’ they may support themselves in moderate times, they would be merged by the violence of turbulent ones. The several colonies would become wholly monarchical or wholly republican, were it not for the checks, controuls, regulations and supports, of the supreme authority of the empire. Thus, the argument that is drawn from their first principle of our being entitled to English liberties, destroys the principle itself; it deprives us of the bill of rights, and all the benefits resulting from the revolution, of English laws, and of the British constitution. Our patriots have been so intent upon building up American rights, that they have overlooked the rights of Great Britain, and our own interest. Instead of proving, that we were entitled to privileges which our fathers knew our situation would not admit us to enjoy, they have been arguing away our most essential rights. If there be any grievance, it does not consist in our being subject to the authority of parliament, but in our not having an actual representation in it. Were it possible for the colonies to have an equal representation in parliament, and were refused it upon proper application, I confess, I should think it a grievance: But, at present it seems to be allowed, by all parties, to be impracticable, considering that the colonies are distant from Great-Britain a thousand transmarine leagues. If that be the case, the right or privilege that we complain of being deprived of, is not withheld by Britain; but the first principles of government, and the immutable laws of nature, render it impossible for us to enjoy it. This is apparently the meaning of that celebrated passage in Governor Hutchinson’s letter, that rang through the continent, viz. There must be an abridgement of what is called English liberties. He subjoins, that he had never yet seen the projection, whereby a colony, three thousand miles from the parent-state, might enjoy all the privileges of that parent-state and be subject to it, or in words to that effect. The obnoxious sentence, taken detached from the letter, appears very unfriendly to the colonies; but, considered in connection with the other parts of the letter, is but a necessary result from our situation. Allegiance and protection are reciprocal. It is our highest interest to continue a part of the British empire, and equally our duty to remain subject to the authority of parliament. Our own internal police may generally be regulated by our provincial legislatures; but, in national concerns, or where our own assemblies do not answer the ends of government, with respect to ourselves, the ordinances or interposition of the great council of the nation is necessary. In this case, the major must rule the minor. After many more centuries shall have rolled away, long after we, who are now bustling upon the stage of life, shall have been received to the bosom of mother earth, and our names are forgotten; the colonies may be so far encreased as to have the balance of wealth, numbers, and power in their favour. The good of the empire may then make it necessary to fix the seat of government here; and some future George, equally the friend of mankind with him who now sways the British sceptre, may cross the Atlantic, and rule Great Britain by an American parliament. MASSACHUSETTENSIS. January 9, 1775 Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/leonard-massachusettensis#lf0951_head_007

Massachusettensis LETTER IIII. To the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay. PERHAPS, by this time, some of you may enquire who it is, that suffers his pen to run so freely? I will tell you; it is a native of this province, that knew it before many, that are now basking in the rays of political sunshine, had a being. He was favored, not by whigs or tories, but the people, with such a stand in the community, as that he could distinctly see all the political manœuvres of the province. He saw some with pleasure, others with pain. If he condemns the conduct of the whigs, he does not always approve of the conduct of the tories. He dwells upon the misconduct of the former, because we are indebted to that for bringing us into this wretched state; unless the supineness of the latter, at some periods, and some impolitic efforts to check the whigs in their career, at others, that served like adding fuel to the fire, ought to be added to the account. He is now repaying your favours, if he knows his own heart, from the purest gratitude and the most undissembled patriotism, which will one day be acknowledged. I saw the small seed of sedition, when it was implanted: it was, as a grain of mustard. I have watched the plant until it has become a great tree; the vilest reptiles that crawl upon the earth, are concealed at the root; the foulest birds of the air rest upon its branches. I now would induce you to go to work immediately with axes and hatchets, and cut it down, for a two-fold reason; because it is a pest to society, and lest it be felled suddenly by a stronger arm, and crush its thousands in the fall. An apprehension of injustice in the conduct of Great-Britain towards us, I have already told you was one source of our misery. Last week I endeavoured to convince you of the necessity of her regulating, or rather establishing, some government amongst us. I am now to point out the principles and motives, upon which the blockade act was made. The violent attack upon the property of the East-India company, in the destruction of their tea, was the cause of it. In order to form a right judgment of that transaction, it is necessary to go back and view the cause of its being sent here. As the government of England is mixt, so the spirit or genius of the nation is at once monarchical, aristocratical, democratical, martial, and commercial. It is difficult to determine, which is the most predominant principle; but it is worthy of remark, that to injure the British nation upon either of these points, is like injuring a Frenchman in the point of honor. Commerce is the great source of national wealth; for this reason it is cherished by all orders of men from the palace to the cottage. In some countries, a merchant is held in contempt by the nobles; in England they respect him. He rises to high honors in the state, often contracts alliances with the first families in the kingdom, and noble blood flows in the veins of his posterity. Trade is founded upon persons or countries mutually supplying each other with their redundances. Thus none are impoverished, all enriched, the asperities of human life worn away, and mankind made happier by it. Husbandry, manufacture, and merchandize are its triple support: deprived of either of these, it would cease. Agriculture is the natural livelihood of a country but thinly inhabited, as arts and manufactures are of a populous one. The high price of labour prevents manufactures being carried on to advantage in the first; scarcity of soil obliges the inhabitants to pursue them in the latter. Upon these, and the considerations arising from the fertility and produce of different climates, and such like principles, the grand system of the British trade is founded. The collected wisdom of the nation has always been attentive to this great point of policy, that the national trade might be so balanced and poised, as that each part of her extended dominions might be benefited, and the whole concentre to the good of the empire. This evinces the necessity of acts for regulating trade. To prevent one part of the empire being enriched at the expence and to the impoverishing of another, checks, restrictions, and sometimes absolute prohibitions, are necessary. These are imposed or taken off as circumstances vary. To carry the acts of trade into execution, many officers are necessary. Thus we see a number of custom-house officers so constituted, as to be checks and controuls upon each other, and prevent their swerving from their duty, should they be tempted; and a board of commissioners appointed to superintend the whole, like the commissioners of the customs in England. Hence also arises the necessity of courts of admiralty. The laws and regulations of trade are esteemed in England as sacred. An estate made by smuggling, or pursuing an illicit trade, is there looked upon as filthy lucre, as monies amassed by gaming; and upon the same principle, because it is obtained at the expence and often ruin of others. The smuggler not only injures the public, but often ruins the fair trader. The great extent of sea-coast, many harbours, the variety of islands, the numerous creeks and navigable rivers, afford the greatest opportunity to drive an illicit trade in these colonies without detection. This advantage has not been overlooked by the avaricious, and many persons seem to have set the laws of trade at a defiance. This accounts for so many new regulations being made, new officers appointed, and ships of war from time to time stationed along the continent. The way to Holland and back again is well known; and by much the greatest part of the tea that has been drank in America for several years, has been imported from thence and other places, in direct violation of law. By this the smugglers have amassed great estates, to the prejudice of the fair trader. It was sensibly felt by the East-India company; they were prohibited from exporting their teas to America, and were obliged to sell it at auction in London; the London merchant purchased it, and put a profit upon it when he shipt it for America; the American merchant, in his turn, put a profit upon it, and after him the shopkeeper; so that it came to the consumers hands, at a very advanced price. Such quantities of tea were annually smuggled, that it was scarcely worth while for the American merchant to import tea from England at all. Some of the principal trading towns in America were wholly supplied with this commodity by smuggling: Boston however continued to import it, until advice was received that the parliament had it in contemplation to permit the East-India company to send their teas directly to America. The Boston merchants then sent their orders conditionally to their correspondents in England, to have tea shipt for them, in case the East-India company’s tea did not come out. One merchant, a great whig, had such an order lying in England for sixty chests, on his own account, when the company’s tea was sent. An act of parliament was made to enable the East-India company to send their tea directly to America, and sell it at auction there; not with a view of raising a revenue from the three-penny duty, but to put it out of the power of the smugglers to injure them by their infamous trade. We have it from good authority, that the revenue was not the consideration before parliament; and it is reasonable to suppose it: for had that been the point in view, it was only to restore the former regulation, which was then allowed to be constitutional, and the revenue would have been respectable. Had this new regulation taken effect, the people in America would have been great gainers. The wholesale merchant might have been deprived of some of his gains; but the retailer would have supplied himself with this article, directly from the auction, and the consumer reap the benefit; as tea would have been sold, under the price that had been usual, by near one half. Thus the country in general would have been great gainers, the East-India company secured in supplying the American markets with this article, which they are entitled to by the laws of trade, and smuggling suppressed, at least as to tea. A smuggler and a whig are cousin-germans, the offspring of two sisters, avarice and ambition. They had been playing into each others hands a long time. The smuggler received protection from the whig; and he, in his turn, received support from the smuggler. The illicit trader now demanded protection from his kinsman, and it would have been unnatural in him to have refused it; and beside, an opportunity presented of strengthening his own interest. The consignees were connected with the tories, and that was a further stimulus.—Accordingly, the press was again set to work, and the old story repeated with additions about monopolies; and many infatuated persons once more wrought up to a proper pitch to carry into execution any violent measures, that their leaders should propose. A bold stroke was resolved upon. The whigs, though they had got the art of managing the people, had too much sense to be ignorant that it was all a meer finesse, not only without, but directly repugnant to law, constitution and government, and could not last always. They determined to put all at hazard, and to be aut Cæsar aut nihil. The approaching storm was foreseen; and the first ship that arrived with the tea was detained below Castle-William. A body meeting was assembled at the old-south meeting-house, which has great advantage over a town-meeting, as no law has yet ascertained the qualification of the voters; each person present, of whatever age, estate, or country, may take the liberty to speak or vote at such an assembly; and that may serve as a skreen to the town where it originated, in case of any disastrous consequence. The body-meeting consisting of several thousands, being thus assembled, with the leading whigs at its head, in the first place sent for the owner of the tea-ship, and required him to bring her to the wharf, upon pain of their displeasure; the ship was accordingly brought up, and the master was obliged to enter at the custom-house: He reported the tea, after which twenty days are allowed for landing it and paying the duty. The next step was to resolve.—They resolved that the tea should not be landed, nor the duty paid, that it should go home in the same bottom that it came in, &c. &c. This was the same as resolving to destroy it, for as the ship had been compelled to come to the wharf, and was entered at the custom-house, it could not, by law, be cleared out, without the duties being first paid, nor could the Governor grant a permit for the vessel to pass Castle-William, without a certificate from the custom-house of such clearance, consistent with his duty. The body accordingly ordered a military guard to watch the ship every night until further orders. The consignees had been applied to, by the selectmen, to send the tea to England: they answered, they could not, for if they did, it would be forfeited by the acts of trade, and they should be liable to make good the loss to the East-India company. Some of the consignees were mobbed, and all were obliged to fly to the castle, and there immure themselves. They petitioned the Governor and Council to take the property of the East-India company under their protection. The council declined being concerned in it. The consignees then offered the body to store the tea under the care of the selectmen or a committee of the town of Boston, and to have no further concern in the matter until they could send to England, and receive further instructions from their principals. This was refused with disdain. The military guard was regularly kept in rotation till the eve of the twentieth day, when the duties must have been paid, the tea landed, or be liable to seizure; then the military guard was withdrawn, or rather omitted being posted; and a number of persons in disguise forceably entered the ships (three being by this time arrived) split open the chefts, and emptied all the tea, being of ten thousand pounds sterling value, into the dock, and perfumed the town with its fragrance. Another circumstance ought not to be omitted: the afternoon before the destruction of the tea, the body sent the owner of one of the ships to the Governor, to demand a pass; he answered, that he would as soon give a pass for that as any other vessel, if he had the proper certificate from the custom-house, without which he could not give a pass for any, consistent with his duty. It was known that this would be the answer, when the message was sent; and it was with the utmost difficulty that the body were kept together till the messenger returned. When the report was made, a shout was set up in the galleries and at the door, and the meeting immediately dispersed. The Governor had, previous to this, sent a proclamation by the sheriff, commanding the body to disperse; they permitted it to be read, and answered it with a general hiss. These are the facts as truly and fairly stated, as I am able to state them. The oftensible reason for this conduct, was the tea’s being subject to the three-penny duty. Let us take the advocates for this transaction upon their own principle, and admit the duty to be unconstitutional, and see how the argument stands. Here is a cargo of tea, subject, upon its being entered and landed, to a duty of three-pence per pound, which is paid by the East-India company, or by their factors, which amounts to the same thing. Unless we purchase the tea, we shall never pay the duty; if we purchase it, we pay the three-pence included in the price; therefore, lest we should purchase it, we have a right to destroy it A flimsy pretext! and it either supposes the people destitute of virtue, or that their purchasing of the tea was a matter of no importance to the community; but even this gauze covering is stripped off, when we consider, that the Boston merchants, and some who were active at the body-meeting, were every day importing from England large quantities of tea, subject to the same duty, and vending it unmolested; and at this time had orders lying in their correspondents hands, to send them considerable quantities of tea, in case the East-India company should not send it themselves. When the news of this transaction arrived in England, and it was considered in what manner almost every other regulation of trade had been evaded by artifice, and when artifice could no longer serve, recourse was had to violence; the British lion was roused. The crown-lawyers were called upon for the law; they answered, high-treason. Had a Cromwell, whom some amongst us deify and imitate, in all his imitable perfections, had the guidance of the national ire; unless compensation had been made to the sufferers immediately upon its being demanded, your proud capital had been levelled with the dust; not content with that, rivers of blood would have been shed to make atonement for the injured honour of the nation. It was debated whether to attaint the principals of treason. We have a gracious king upon the throne, he felt the resentment of a man, softened by the relentings of a parent. The bowels of our mother country yearned towards her refractory, obstinate child. It was determined to consider the offence in a milder light, and to compel an indemnification for the sufferers, and prevent the like for the future, by such means as would be mild, compared with the insult to the nation, or severe, as our future conduct should be: That was to depend upon us. Accordingly, the blockade act was passed; and had an act of justice been done in indemnifying the sufferers, and an act of loyalty in putting a stop to seditious practices, our port had long since been opened. This act has been called unjust, because it involves the innocent in the same predicament with the guilty: But it ought to be considered, that our news-papers had announced to the world, that several thousands attended those body-meetings; and it did not appear, that there was one dissentient, or any protest entered. I do not know, how a person could expect distinction in such a case, if he neglected to distinguish himself. When the noble lord proposed it in the house of commons, he called upon all the members present to mention a better method of obtaining justice in this case: scarce one denied the necessity of doing something; but none could mention a more eligible way. Even ministerial opposition was abashed. If any parts of the act strike us, like the severity of a master; let us coolly advert to the aggravated insult, and, perhaps, we shall wonder at the lenity of a parent. After this transaction, all parties seem to have laid upon their oars, waiting to see what parliament would do. When the blockade act arrived, many and many were desirous of paying for the tea immediately; and some, who were guiltless of the crime, offered to contribute to the compensation: but our leading whigs must still rule the roast, and that inauspicious influence, that had led us hitherto, plunged us still deeper in misery. The whigs saw their ruin connected with a compliance with the terms of opening the port; as it would afford a convincing proof of the wretchedness of their policy in the destruction of the tea, and as they might justly have been expected to pay the money demanded themselves; and so set themselves industriously to work to prevent it, and engage the other colonies to espouse their cause. This was a crisis too important and alarming to the province to be neglected by its friends. A number of as respectable persons as any in this province, belonging to Boston, Cambridge, Salem, and Marblehead, now came forward, publicly to disavow the proceedings of the whigs, to do justice to the much injured character of Mr. Hutchinson, and to strengthen his influence at the court of Great-Britain, where he was going to receive the well-deserved plaudit of his sovereign, that he might be able to obtain a repeal or some mitigation of that act, the terms of which, they foresaw, the perverseness of the whigs would prevent a compliance with. This was done by several addresses, which were subscribed by upwards of two hundred persons, and would have been by many more, had not the sudden embarkation of Mr. Hutchinson prevented it. The justices of the court of common pleas and general sessions of the peace, for the county of Plymouth, sent their address to him in England. There were some of almost all orders of men, among these addressers; but they consisted principally of men of property, and of large family connections; and several were independent in their circumstances, and lived wholly upon the income of their estates. Some indeed might be called partizans; but a very considerable proportion were persons that had, of choice, kept themselves at a distance from the political vortex, had beheld the competition of the whigs and tories, without any emotion; while the community remained safe, had looked down on the political dance, in its various mazes and intricacies, and saw one falling, another rising, rather as a matter of amusement: but, when they saw the capital of the province upon the point of being sacrificed by political cunning, it called up all their feelings. Their motives were truly patriotic. Let us now attend to the ways and means by which the whigs prevented these exertions producing a good effect. Previous to this, a new and, till lately unheard of, mode of opposition had been devised, said to be the invention of the fertile brain of one of our party agents, called a committee of correspondence. This is the foulest, subtlest and most venomous serpent, that ever issued from the eggs of sedition. These committees generally consist of the highest whigs, or at least there is some high whig among them, that is the ruling spirit of the whole. They are commonly appointed at thin town-meetings, or if the meetings happen to be full, the moderate men seldom speak or act at all when this sort of business comes on. They have been by much too modest. Thus the meeting is often prefaced with “At a full town-meeting,” and the several resolves headed with nem. con. with strict truth; when, in fact, but a small proportion of the town have had a hand in the matter. It is said that the committee for the town of Boston was appointed for a special purpose, and that their commission long since expired. However that may be, these committees, when once established, think themselves amenable to none; they assume a dictatorial stile, and have an opportunity, under the apparent sanction of their several towns, of clandestinely wreaking private revenge on individuals, by traducing their characters, and holding them up as enemies to their country wherever they go, as also of misrepresenting facts and propagating sedition through the country. Thus, a man of principle and property, in travelling through the country, would be insulted by persons whose faces he had never before seen, he would often feel the smart without suspecting the hand that administred the blow. These committees, as they are not known in law, and can derive no authority from thence, lest they should not get their share of power, sometimes engross it all; they frequently erect themselves into a tribunal, where the same persons are at once legislator, accusers, witnesses, judges and jurors, and the mob the executioners. The accused has no day in court, and the execution of the sentence is the first notice he receives. This is the channel through which liberty matters have been chiefly conducted the summer and fall past. This accounts for the same distempers breaking out in different parts of the province at one and the same time, which might be attributed to something supernatural by those that were unacquainted with the secret conductors of the infection. It is chiefly owing to these committees, that so many respectable persons have been abused, and forced to sign recantations and resignations; that so many persons, to avoid such reiterated insults, as are more to be deprecated by a man of sentiment than death itself, have been obliged to quit their houses, families and business, and fly to the army for protection; that husband has been separated from wife, father from son, brother from brother, the sweet intercourse of conjugal and natural affection interrupted, and the unfortunate refugee forced to abandon all the comforts of domestic life. My countrymen, I beg you to pause and reflect on this conduct: have not these people, that are thus insulted, as good a right to think and act for themselves in matters of the last importance as the whigs? Are they not as closely connected with the interest of their country as the whigs? Do not their former lives and conversations appear to have been regulated by principle, as much as those of the whigs? You must answer, yes. Why then do you suffer them to be cruelly treated for differing in sentiment from you? Is it consistent with that liberty you profess? Let us wave the consideration of right and liberty, and see if this conduct can be reconciled to good policy. Do you expect to make converts by it? Persecution has the same effect in politics, that it has in religion; it confirms the sectary. Do you wish to silence them, that the inhabitants of the province may appear unanimous? The mal-treatment they received for differing from you, is an undeniable evidence that we are not unanimous. It may not be amiss to consider, that this is a changeable world, and time’s rolling wheel may, ere long, bring them uppermost; in that case, I am sure you would not wish to have them fraught with resentment. It is astonishing, my friends, that those, who are in pursuit of liberty, should ever suffer arbitrary power, in such an hideous form and squalid hue, to get a footing among them. I appeal to your good sense; I know you have it, and hope to penetrate to it, before I have finished my publications, notwithstanding the thick atmosphere that now invelopes it. But, to return from my digression. The committee of correspondence represented the destruction of the tea in their own way. They represented those that addressed Governor Hutchinson, as persons of no note or property; as mean, base wretches and seekers, who had been sacrificing their country in adulation of him. Whole nations have worshipped the rising, but, if this be an instance, it is the only instance of people’s worshipping the setting, sun. By this means, the humane and benevolent in various parts of the continent, were induced to advise us not to comply with the terms for opening our port, and engaged to relieve us with their charities, from the distress that must otherwise fall upon the poor. Their charitable intentions may ascend to heaven, like incense from the altar, in sweet memorial before the throne of God; but their donations came near proving fatal to the province: It encouraged the whigs to persevere in injustice, and has been the means of seducing many an honest man into the commission of a crime, that he did not suspect himself capable of being guilty of. What I have told you, are not the suggestions of a speculatist; there are some mistakes as to numbers, and there may be some as to time and place, partly owing to miscopying, and partly to my not always having the books and papers necessary to greater accuracy, at hand; but the relation of facts is in substance true, I had almost said, as holy writ.—I do not ask you to take the truths of them from an anonymous writer: The evidence of most of them is within your reach, examine for yourselves:—I promise, that the benefit you will reap therefrom will abundantly pay you for the trouble of the research; you will find, I have faithfully unriddled the whole mystery of our political iniquity. I do not address myself to whigs or tories, but to the whole people. I know you well. You are loyal at heart, friends to good order, and do violence to yourselves in harbouring, one moment, disrespectful sentiments towards Great-Britain, the land of our forefathers’ nativity, and sacred repository of their bones: but you have been most insidiously induced to believe, that Great-Britain is rapacious, cruel, and vindictive, and envies us the inheritance purchased by the sweat and blood of our ancestors. Could that thick mist that hovers over the land, and involves it in more than Egyptian darkness, be but once dispelled, that you might see our sovereign the provident father of all his people, and Great-Britain a nursing mother to these colonies, as they really are; long live our gracious king, and happiness to Britain, would resound from one end of the province to the other. MASSACHUSETTENSIS. January 2, 1775 Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/leonard-massachusettensis#lf0951_head_006

Massachusettensis LETTER III. To the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay. To undertake to convince a person of his error is the indispensable duty, the certain, though dangerous, test of friendship. He that could see his friend persevering in a fatal error, without reminding him of it, and striving to reclaim him, through fear that he might thereby incur his displeasure, would little deserve the sacred name himself. Such delicacy is not only false, but criminal. Were I not fully convinced, upon the most mature deliberation that I am capable of, that the temporal salvation of this province depends upon an entire and speedy change of measures, which must depend upon a change of sentiment, respecting our own conduct, and the justice of the British nation; I never should have obtruded myself on the public.—I repeat my promise, to avoid personal reflection as much as the nature of the task will admit of; but I will continue faithfully to expose the wretched policy of the whigs, tho’ I may be obliged to penetrate the arcana, and discover such things as, were there not a necessity for it, I should be infinitely happier in drawing a veil over, or covering with a mantle. Should I be so unfortunate as to incur your displeasure, I shall nevertheless think myself happy if I can but snatch one of my fellow-subjects as a brand out of the burning. Perhaps some may imagine, that I have represented too many of my countrymen, as well as the leading whigs, in an unjust point of light, by supposing these so wicked as to mislead, or those so little circumspect as to be misled, in matters of the last importance. Whoever has been conversant with the history of man, must know that it abounds with such instances. The same game, and with the same success, has been played in all ages and in all countries. The bulk of the people are generally but little versed in matters of state. Want of inclination or opportunity to figure in public life, makes them content to rest the affairs of government in the hands, where accident or merit has placed them. Their views and employments are confined to the humbler walks of business or retirement. There is a latent spark however in their breasts, capable of being kindled into a flame; to do this has always been the employment of the disaffected. They begin by reminding the people of the elevated rank they hold in the universe, as men; that all men by nature are equal; that Kings are but the ministers of the people; that their authority is delegated to them by the people for their good; and that they have a right to resume it, and place it in other hands, or keep it themselves, whenever it is made use of to oppress them. Doubtless there have been instances, where these principles have been inculcated to obtain a redress of real grievances, but they have been much oftener perverted to the worst of purposes.—No government, however perfect in theory, is administered in perfection; the frailty of man does not admit of it. A small mistake, in point of policy, often furnishes a pretence to libel government, and persuade the people, that their rulers are tyrants, and the whole government a system of oppression. Thus the seeds of sedition are usually sown; and the people are led to sacrifice real liberty to licentiousness, which gradually ripens into rebellion and civil war. And what is still more to be lamented, the generality of the people, who are thus made the dupes of artifice, and the mere stilts of ambition, are sure to be losers in the end. The best they can expect, is to be thrown neglected by, when they are no longer wanted; but they are seldom so happy: if they are subdued, confiscation of estate and ignominious death are their portion; if they conquer, their own army is often turned upon them, to subjugate them to a more tyrannical government than that they rebelled against. History is replete with instances of this kind: we can trace them in remote antiquity; we find them in modern times, and have a remarkable one in the very country from which we are derived. It is an universal truth, that he that would excite a rebellion, whatever professions of philanthropy he may make, when he is insinuating and worming himself into the good graces of the people, is at heart as great a tyrant as ever weilded the iron rod of oppression. I shall have occasion hereafter to consider this matter more fully, when I shall endeavour to convince you, how little we can gain, and how much we may lose, by this unequal, unnatural, and desperate contest. My present business is, to trace the spirit of opposition to Great-Britain through the general court, and the courts of common law. In moderate times, a representative that votes for an unpopular measure, or opposes a popular one, is in danger of losing his election the next year; when party runs high, he is sure to do it. It was the policy of the whigs to have their questions, upon high matters, determined by yea and nay votes, which were published with the representatives names in the next gazette. This was commonly followed by severe strictures and the most illiberal invectives upon the dissentients: sometimes they were held up as objects of resentment, of contempt at others; the abuse was in proportion to the extravagance of the measure they opposed. This may seem not worth notice, but its consequences were important. The scurrility made its way into the dissentient’s town, it furnished his competitor with means to supplant him, and he took care to shun the rock his predecessor had split upon. In this temper of the times, it was enough to know who voted with Cassius and who with Lucius, to determine who was a friend and who an enemy to the country, without once adverting to the question before the house. The loss of a seat in the house was not of so much consequence; but, when once he became stigmatized as an enemy to his country, he was exposed to insult; and if his profession or business was such, that his livelihood depended much on the good graces of his fellow citizens, he was in danger of losing his bread and involving his whole family in ruin. One particular set of members, in committee, always prepared the resolves and other spirited measures. At first they were canvassed freely, at length would slide through the house without meeting an obstacle: The lips of the dissentients were sealed up; they sat in silence, and beheld with infinite regret the measures they durst not oppose. Many were borne down against their wills by the violence of the current: upon no other principle can we reconcile their ostensible conduct in the house to their declarations in private circles. The apparent unanimity in the house encouraged the opposition out of doors, and tbat in its turn strengthened the party in the house. Thus they went on, mutually supporting and up-lifting each other. Assemblies and towns resolved alternately: some of them only omitted resolving to snatch the sceptre out of the hands of our Sovereign, and to strike the imperial crown from his sacred head. A master-stroke in politics, respecting the agent, ought not to be neglected. Each colony has usually an agent residing at the court of Great-Britain: These agents are appointed by the three branches of their several assemblies, and indeed there cannot be a provincial agent without such appointment. The whigs soon found, that they could not have such services rendered them from a provincial agent, as would answer their purposes. The house therefore refused to join with the other two branches of the general court in the appointment. The house chose an agent for themselves; and the council appointed another. Thus we had two agents for private purposes, and the expence of agency doubled; and with equal reason a third might have been added, as agent for the Governor, and the charges been trebled. The additional expence was of little consideration, compared with another inconvenience that attended this new mode of agency. The person, appointed by the house, was the ostensible agent of the province, though in fact he was only the agent of a few individuals that had got the art of managing the house at their pleasure. He knew his continuing in office depended upon them. An office that yielded several hundred pounds sterling annually, the business of which consisted in little more than attending the levees of the Great, and writing letters to America, was worth preserving. Thus he was under a strong temptation to sacrifice the province to a party; and echoed back the sentiments of his patrons. The advices, continually received from one of the persons that was thus appointed agent, had great influence upon the members of the house of more moderate principles. He had pushed his researches deep into nature, and made important discoveries: they thought he had done the same in politics, and did not admire him less as a politician than as a philosopher. His intelligence, as to the disposition of his Majesty, the ministry, the parliament, and the nation in general, was deemed the most authentic. He advised us to keep up our opposition, to resolve and re-resolve, to cherish a military spirit; uniformly holding up this idea, that if we continued firm, we had nothing to fear from the government in England. He even proposed some modes of opposition himself. The spirited measures were always ushered into the house with a letter from him. I have been sometimes almost ready to suspect him of being the primum mobile, and that, like the man behind the curtain at a puppet-shew, he was playing off the figures here with his own secret wires. If he advised to these measures contrary to his better knowledge, from sinister views, and to serve a private purpose, he has wilfully done the province irreparable injury. However, I will do him justice: he enjoined it upon us to refrain from violence, as that would unite the nation against us; and I am rather inclined to think that he was deceived himself with respect to the measures he recommended, as he had already felt the resentment of that very government which he told us there was nothing to fear from. This disposition of the house could not have produced such fatal effects, had the other two branches of the legislature retained their constitutional freedom and influence. They might have been a sufficient check. The councillors depended upon the general assembly for their political existence: the whigs reminded the council of their mortality. If a councillor opposed the violent measures of the whigs with any spirit, he lost his election the next May. The council consisted of twenty-eight. From this principle, near half that number, mostly men of the first families, note and abilities, with every possible attachment to their native country, and as far from temptation as wealth and independence could remove them, were tumbled from their seats in disgrace. Thus the board, which was intended to moderate between the two extremes of prerogative and privilege, lost its weight in the scale, and the political balance of the province was destroyed. Had the chair been able to retain its own constitutional influence, the loss of the board would have been less felt; but, no longer supported by the board, that fell likewise. The Governor, by the charter, could do little or nothing without the council. If he called upon a military officer to raise the militia, he was answered, they were there already. If he called upon his council for their assistance, they must first enquire into the cause. If he wrote to government at home to strengthen his hands, some officious persons procured and sent back his letters. It was not the person of a Bernard or Hutchinson that made them obnoxious: any other governors would have met with the same fate, had they discharged their duty with equal fidelity; that is, had they strenuously opposed the principles and practices of the whigs; and when they found that the government here could not support itself, wrote home for aid sufficient to do it. And let me tell you, had the intimations in those letters, which you are taught to execrate, been timely attended to, we had been as happy a people as good government could make us. Governor Bernard came here recommended by the affections of the province, over which he had presided. His abilities are acknowledged. True British honesty and punctuality are traits in his character too strongly marked to escape the eye of prejudice itself. We know Governor Hutchinson to be amiable and exemplary in private life: his great abilities, integrity and humanity, were conspicuous in the several important departments that he filled, before his appointment to the chair, and reflect honour on his native country. But his abilities and integrity, added to his thorough knowledge of the province, in all its interests and connections, were insufficient in this case. The constitution itself was gone, though the ancient form remained: the spirit was truly republican. He endeavoured to reclaim us by gentle means. He strove to convince us by arguments, drawn from the first principles of government, our several charters, and the express acknowledgments of our ancestors, that our claims were inconsistent with the subordination due to Great-Britain; and, if persisted in, might work the destruction of those that we were entitled to. For this, he was called an enemy to his country, and set up as a mark for the envenomed arrows of malice and party rage. Had I entertained a doubt about its being the governor, and not the man, that was aimed at; the admirable facility with which the news-paper abuse was transferred from Governor Hutchinson to his humane and benevolent successor, General Gage, almost as soon as he set foot on our shore, would have removed it. Thus, disaffection to Great-Britain being infused into the body of the people, the subtle poison stole through all the veins and arteries, contaminated the blood, and destroyed the very stamina of the constitution. Had not the courts of justice been tainted in the early stages, our government might have expelled the virus, purged off the peccant humors, and recovered its former vigour by its own strength. The judges of the superior courts were dependent upon the annual grants of the general court for their support. Their salaries were small in proportion to the salaries of other officers in the government of less importance. They had often petitioned the assembly to enlarge them, without success. They were at this time reminded of their dependence. However, it is but justice to say, that the judges remained unshaken, amid the raging tempests, which is to be attributed rather to their firmness than situation. But the spirit of the times was very apparent in the juries. The grand jurors were elective; and in such places where libels, riots, and insurrections were the most frequent, the high whigs took care to get themselves chosen. The judges pointed out to them the seditious libels on governors, magistrates, and the whole government; but to no effect. They were enjoined to present riots and insurrections, of which there was ample evidence, with as little success. It is difficult to account for so many of the first rate whigs being returned to serve on the petit-jury at the term next after extraordinary insurrections, without supposing some legerdemain in drawing their names out of the box. It is certain, that, notwithstanding swarms of the most virulent libels infested the province, and there were so many riots and insurrections, scarce one offender was indicted, and I think not one convicted and punished. Causes of meum et tuum were not always exempt from party influence. The mere circumstance of the whigs gaining the ascendency over the tories is trifling. Had the whigs divided the province between them, as they once flattered themselves they should be able to do, it would have been of little consequence to the community, had they not cut asunder the very sinews of government, and broke in pieces the ligaments of social life in the attempt. I will mention two instances, which I have selected out of many, of the weakness of our government, as they are recent and unconnected with acts of parliament. One Malcolm, a loyal subject, and, as such, entitled to protection, the evening before the last winter sessions of the general-court, was dragged out of his house, stripped, tarred and feathered, and carted several hours in the severest frost of that winter, to the utmost hazard of his life. He was carried to the gallows with an halter about his neck, and, in his passage to and from the gallows, was beaten with as cruel stripes as ever were administered by the hands of a savage. The whipping, however, kept up the circulation of his blood, and saved the poor man’s life. When they had satiated their malice, they dispersed in good order. This was transacted in the presence of thousands of spectators, some of whom were members of the general-court. Malcolm’s life was despaired of several days, but he survived and presented a memorial to the general-assembly, praying their interposition. The petition was read, and all he obtained was, leave to withdraw it. So that he was destitute of protection every hour until he left the country; as were thousands beside, until the arrival of the King’s troops. This originated in a small fracas in the street, wherein Malcolm struck, or threatened to strike, a person that insulted him, with a cutlass, and had no connection with the quarrel of the times, unless his sustaining a small post in the customs made it. The other instance is much stronger than this, as it was totally detached from politics. It had been suspected, that infection had been communicated from an hospital, lately erected at Marblehead, for the purpose of innoculating the small-pox, to the town’s people. This caused a great insurrection: the insurgents burnt the hospital; not content with that, threatened the proprietors and many others, some of the first fortunes and characters in the town, with burning their houses over their heads, and continued parading the streets, to the utmost terror of the inhabitants several days. A massacre and general devastation was apprehended. The persons threatened, armed themselves, and petitioned the general-assembly, which was then sitting, for assistance, as there was little or no civil authority in the place. A committee was ordered to repair to Marblehead, report the facts, and inquire into the cause. The committee reported the facts nearly as stated in the petition; the report was accepted, and nothing farther done by the assembly. Such demonstrations of the weakness of government, induced many persons to join the whigs, to seek from them that protection, which the constitutional authority of the province was unable to afford. Government, at home, early in the day, made an effort to check us in our career, and to enable us to recover from anarchy without her being driven to the necessity of altering our provincial constitution, knowing the predilection that people always have for an antient form of government. The judges of the superior court had not been staggered, though their feet stood in slippery places; they depended upon the leading whigs for their support. To keep them steady, they were made independent of the grants of the general-assembly. But it was not a remedy any way adequate to the disease. The whigs now turned their artillery against them; and it played briskly.—The chief justice, for accepting the crown grant, was accused of receiving a royal bribe. Thus, my friends, those very persons, who had made you believe, that every attempt to strengthen government, and save our charter, was an infringement of your privileges; by little and little, destroyed your real liberty, subverted your charter constitution, abridged the freedom of the house, annihilated the freedom of the board, and rendered the governor a mere doge of Venice. They engrossed all the power of the province into their own hands: A democracy or republic it has been called, but it does not deserve the name of either—It was, however, a despotism, cruelly carried into execution by mobs and riots, and more incomparible with the rights of mankind, than the enormous monarchies of the East. The absolute necessity of the interposition of parliament is apparent. The good policy of the act, for regulating the government in this province, will be the subject of some future paper. A particular Inquiry into the despotism of the whigs will be deferred for a chapter on congresses. I shall next ask your attention to a transaction, as important in its consequences, and perhaps more so, than any I have yet mentioned, I mean the destruction of the tea, belonging to the East-India company. I am sensible of the difficulty of the task, in combating generally received opinions. It is hard work to eradicate deep-rooted prejudice. But I will persevere. There are hundreds, if not thousands, in the province, that will feel the truth of what I have written, line by line, as they read it; and as to those who obstinately shut their eyes against it now, haply the sever of the times may intermit; there may be some lucid interval when their minds shall be open to truth before it is too late to serve them, otherwise it will be revealed to them in bitter moments, attended with keen remorse and unutterable anguish. Magna est veritas et prævalebit. MASSACHUSETTENSIS. December 26, 1774 Sources: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/leonard-massachusettensis#lf0951_head_005

Massachusettensis LETTER II. To the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay. My dear Countrymen, I ENDEAVOURED last week to convince you of our real danger, not to render you desperate, but to induce you to seek immediately some effectual remedy. Our case is not remediless, as we have to deal with a nation not less generous and humane than powerful and brave; just indeed, but not vindictive. I shall, in this and successive papers, trace this yet growing distemper through its several stages, from its first rise to the present hour, point out the causes, mark the effects, shew the madness of persevering in our present line of conduct, and recommend what, I have been long convinced, is our only remedy. I confess my self to be one of those that think our present calamity is in a great measure to be attributed to the bad policy of a popular party in this province; and that their measures for several years past, whatever may have been their intention, have been diametrically opposite to their profession,—the public good; and cannot, at present, but compare their leaders to a false guide, who, having led a benighted traveller through many mazes and windings in a thick wood, finds himself at length on the brink of a horrid precipice, and, to save himself, seizes fast hold of his follower, to the utmost hazard of plunging both headlong down the steep, and being dashed in pieces together against the rocks below. In ordinary cases, we may talk in the measured language of a courtier; but when such a weight of vengeance is suspended over our heads, by a single thread, as threatens every moment to crush us to atoms, delicacy itself would be ill-timed: I will declare the plain truth whenever I find it, and claim it as a right to canvass popular measures and expose their errors and pernicious tendency, as freely as governmental measures are canvassed, so long as I confine myself within the limits of the law. At the conclusion of the late war, Great-Britain found, that, though she had humbled her enemies, and greatly enlarged her own empire, that the national debt amounted to almost one hundred and fifty millions, and that the annual expence of keeping her extended dominions in a state of defence, which good policy dictates no less in a time of peace than war, was increased in proportion to the new acquisitions. Heavy taxes and duties were already laid, not only upon the luxuries and conveniences, but even the necessaries of life in Great-Britain and Ireland. She knew, that the colonies were as much benefited by the conquests in the late war, as any part of the empire, and indeed more so, as their continental foes were subdued, and they might now extend their settlements not only to Canada, but even to the western ocean—The greatest opening was given to agriculture, the natural livelihood of the country, that ever was known in the history of the world, and their trade was protected by the British navy. The revenue to the crown, from America, amounted to but little more than the charges of collecting it.—She thought it as reasonable, that the colonies should bear a part of the national burden, as that they should share in the national benefit. For this purpose, the stamp-act was passed. The colonies soon found, that the duties imposed by the stamp-act would be grievous, as they were laid upon custom-house papers, law-proceedings, conveyancing, and indeed extended to almost all their internal trade and dealings. It was generally believed through the colonies, that this was a tax not only exceeding our proportion, but beyond our utmost ability to pay. This idea united the colonies generally in opposing it. At first we did not dream of denying the authority of parliament to tax us, much less to legislate for us. We had always considered ourselves, as a part of the British empire, and the parliament, as the supreme legislature of the whole. Acts of parliament for regulating our internal polity were familiar. We had paid postage, agreeable to act of parliament for establishing a post-office, duties imposed for regulating trade, and even for raising a revenue to the crown, without questioning the right, though we closely adverted to the rate or quantum. We knew that, in all those acts of government, the good of the whole had been consulted, and, whenever through want of information any thing grievous had been ordained, we were sure of obtaining redress by a proper representation of it. We were happy in our subordination; but in an evil hour, under the influence of some malignant planet, the design was formed of opposing the stamp-act by a denial of the right of parliament to make it. The love of empire is so predominant in the human breast, that we rarely find an individual content with relinquishing a power that he is able to retain; never, a body of men. Some few months after it was known that the stamp-act was passed, some resolves of the house of burgesses in Virginia, denying the right of parliament to tax the colonies, made their appearance. We read them with wonder—they savoured of independence—they flattered the human passions—the reasoning was specious—we wished it conclusive. The transition, to believing it so, was easy—and we, and almost all America, followed their example, in resolving that the parliament had no such right. It now became unpopular to suggest the contrary; his life would be in danger that asserted it. The news-papers were open to but one side of the question; and the inslammatory pieces that issued weekly from the press, worked up the populace to a fit temper to commit the outrages that insued. A non-importation was agreed upon, which alarmed the merchants and manufacturers in England. It was novel, and the people in England then supposed, that the love of liberty was so powerful in an American merchant, as to stifle his love of gain, and that the agreement would be religiously adhered to. It has been said, that several thousands were expended in England, to foment the disturbances there. However that may be, opposition to the ministry was then gaining ground, from circumstances, foreign to this.—The ministry was changed, and the stamp-act repealed.—The repealing statute passed, with difficulty however, through the house of peers: near forty noble lords protested against giving way to such an opposition, and foretold what has since literally come to pass in consequence of it. When the statute was made, imposing duties upon glass, paper, India teas, &c. imported into the colonies, it was said, that this was another instance of taxation; for some of the dutied commodities were necessaries, we had them not within ourselves, were prohibited from importing them from any place except Great-Britain, were therefore obliged to import them from Great-Britain, and, consequently, were obliged to pay the duties. Accordingly, news-paper publications, pamphlets, resolves, non-importation agreements, and the whole system of American opposition, were again put in motion. We obtained a partial repeal of this statute, which took off the duties from all the articles, except teas. This was the lucky moment when to have closed the dispute. We might have made a safe and honorable retreat. We had gained much, perhaps more than we expected. If the parliament had passed an act, declaratory of their right to tax us; our assemblies had resolved, ten times, that they had no such right. We could not complain of the three-penny duty on tea as burdensome, for a shilling which had been laid upon it, for the purpose of regulating trade and therefore was allowed to be constitutional, was taken off; so that we were in fact gainers nine-pence in a pound by the new regulation. If the appropriation of the revenue, arising from this statute was disrelished, it was only our striking off one article of luxury from our manner of living, an article too, which if we may believe the resolves of most of the towns in this province, or rely on its collected wisdom in a resolve of the house of representatives, was to the last degree ruinous to health. It was futile to urge its being a precedent, as a reason for keeping up the ball of contention; for, allowing the supreme legislature ever to want a precedent, they had many for laying duties on commodities imported into the colonies. And besides, we had great reason to believe that the remaining part of the statute would be repealed, as soon as the parliament should suppose it could be done with honour to themselves; as the incidental revenue, arising from the former regulation, was four fold to the revenue arising from the latter. A claim of the right, could work no injury, so long as there was no grievous exercise of it; especially as we had protested against it, through the whole, and could not be said to have departed from our claims in the least. We might now upon good terms have dropped the dispute, and been happy in the affections of our mother-country; but that is yet to come. Party is inseparable from a free state. The several distributions of power, as they are limited by, so they create perpetual dissentions between, each other, about their respective boundaries; but the greatest source is the competition of individuals for preferment in the state. Popularity is the ladder by which the partizans usually climb.—Accordingly the struggle is, who shall have the greatest share of it. Each party prosesses disinterested patriotism, though some cynical writers have ventured to assert, that self-love is the ruling passion of the whole. There were two parties in this province of pretty long standing, known by the name of whig and tory, which at this time were not a little imbittered against each other.—Men of abilities and acknowledged probity were on both sides. If the tories were suspected of pursuing their private interest through the medium of court favour, there was equal reason to suspect the whigs of pursuing their private interest by the means of popularity. Indeed some of them owed all their importance to it, and must in a little time have sunk into obscurity, had these turbulent commotions then subsided. The tories and whigs took different routs, as usual. The tories were for closing the controversy with Great-Britain, the whigs for continuing it: the tories were for restoring government in the province, which had become greatly relaxed by these convulsions, to its former tone; the whigs were averse to it: they even refused to revive a temporary riot act, which expired about this time. Perhaps they thought, that mobs were a necessary ingredient in their system of opposition: However, the whigs had great advantages in the unequal combat, their scheme flattered the people with the idea of independence; the tories’ plan supposed a degree of subordination, which is rather an humiliating idea; besides there is a propensity in men to believe themselves injured and oppressed whenever they are told so. The ferment, raised in their minds in the time of the stamp-act, was not yet allayed, and the leaders of the whigs had gained the confidence of the people by their successes in their former struggle; so that they had nothing to do but to keep up the spirit among the people, and they were sure of commanding in this province. It required some pains to prevent their minds settling into that calm, which is ordinarily the effect of a mild government; the whigs were sensible that there was no oppression that could be either seen or felt; if any thing was in reality amiss in government, it was its being too lax: So far was it from the innocent being in danger of suffering, that the most atrocious offenders escaped with impunity. They accordingly applied themselves to work upon the imagination, and to inflame the passion; for this work they possessed great talents. I will do justice to their ingenuity: they were intimately acquainted with the feelings of man, and knew all the avenues to the human heart:—Effigies, paintings, and other imagery, were exhibited; the fourteenth of August was celebrated annually as a festival in commemoration of a mob’s destroying a building, owned by the late Lieutenant Governor, which was supposed to have been erected for a stamp-office, and compelling him to resign his office of stamp-master under liberty-tree; annual orations were delivered in the old-south meeting house, on the fifth of March, the day when some persons were unfortunately killed by a party of the twenty-ninth regiment; lists of imaginary grievances were continually published; the people were told weekly, that the ministry had formed a plan to enslave them; that the duty upon tea was only a prelude to a window-tax, hearth-tax, land-tax, and poll-tax, and these were only paving the way for reducing the country to lordships: this last bait was the more easily swallowed, as there seems to be an apprehension of that kind hereditary to the people of New-England; and they were conjured by the duty they owed themselves, their country, and their God, by the reverence due to the sacred memory of their ancestors, and all their toils and sufferings in this once inhospitable wilderness, and by their affections for unborn millions, to rouse and exert themselves in the common cause. This perpetual incantation kept the people in continual alarm. We were farther stimulated by being told, that the people of England were depraved, the parliament venal, and the ministry corrupt; nor were attempts wanting to traduce Majesty itself. The kingdom of Great-Britain was depicted as an ancient structure, once the admiration of the world, now sliding from its base, and rushing to its fall. At the same time, we were called upon to mark our own rapid growth, and to behold the certain evidence that America was upon the eve of independent empire. When we consider what effect a well wrote tragedy or novel has on the human passions, though we know it to be all fictitious; what effect must all this be supposed to have had upon those, that believed these high wrought images to be realities? The tories have been censured for remissness in not having exerted themselves sufficiently at this period: The truth of the case is this; they saw and shuddered at the gathering storm, but durst not attempt to dispel it, lest it should burst on their own heads. Printers were threatned with the loss of their bread, for publishing freely on the tory side. One Mr. Mien was forced to fly the country for persisting in it. All our dissenting ministers were not inactive on this occasion. When the clergy engage in a political warfare, religion becomes a most powerful engine, either to support or overthrow the state. What effect must it have had upon the audience to hear the same sentiments and principles which they had before read in a news-paper, delivered on Sundays from the pulpits, with a religious awe, and the most solemn appeals to heaven, from lips which they had been taught, from their cradles, to believe could utter nothing but eternal truths? What was it natural to expect from a people, bred under a free constitution, jealous of their liberty, credulous even to a proverb, when told their privileges were in danger, thus wrought upon in the extreme? I answer:—Outrages, disgraceful to humanity itself. What mischief was not an artful man, who had obtained the confidence and guidance of such an enraged multitude, capable of doing? He had only to point out this or the other man as an enemy to his country, and no character, station, age or merit, could protect the proscribed from their fury. Happy was it for him, if he could secrete his person, and subject his property only to their lawless ravages. By such means, many people naturally brave and humane, have been wrought upon to commit such acts of private mischief and public violence, as will blacken many a page in the history of our country. I shall next trace the effects of this spirit, which the whigs had thus infused into the body of the people, through the courts of common law, and the general-assembly; and mark the ways and means whereby they availed themselves of it to the subversion of our charter constitution, antecedent to the late act of parliament. MASSACHUSETTENSIS December 19, 1774 Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/leonard-massachusettensis#lf0951_head_004

Massachusettensis LETTER I. To the Inhabitants of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay. WHEN a people, by what means soever, are reduced to such a situation, that every thing they hold dear, as men and citizens, is at stake, it is not only excusable, but even praiseworthy, for an individual to offer to the public any thing, that he may think has a tendency to ward off the impending danger; nor should he be restrained from an apprehension that what he may offer will be unpopular, any more than a physician should be restrained from prescribing a salutary medicine, through fear it might be unpalatable to his patient. The press, when open to all parties and influenced by none, is a salutary engine in a free state, perhaps a necessary one to preserve the freedom of that state; but, when a party has gained the ascendency so far as to become the licensers of the press, either by an act of government, or by playing off the resentment of the populace against printers and authors; the press itself becomes an engine of oppression or licentiousness, and is as pernicious to society as otherwise it would be beneficial. It is too true to be denied, that, ever since the origin of our controversy with Great Britain, the press, in this town, has been much devoted to the partizans of liberty: they have been indulged in publishing what they pleased, fas vel nefas, while little has been published on the part of government. The effect this must have had upon the minds of the people in general is obvious; they must have formed their opinion upon a partial view of the subject, and of course it must have been in some degree erroneous: In short, the changes have been rung so often upon oppression, tyranny and slavery, that, whether sleeping or waking, they are continually vibrating in our ears; and it is now high time to ask ourselves, whether we have not been deluded by found only. My dear countrymen, let us divest ourselves of prejudice, take a view of our present wretched situation, contrast it with our former happy one, carefully investigate the cause, and industriously seek some means to escape the evils we now feel, and prevent those that we have reason to expect. We have been so long advancing to our present state, and by such gradations, that perhaps many of us are insensible of our true state and real danger. Should you be told, that acts of high treason are flagrant through the country, that a great part of the province is in actual rebellion; would you believe it true? Should you not deem the person asserting it an enemy to the province? Nay, should you not spurn him from you with indignation? Be calm, my friends, it is necessary to know the worst of a disease, to enable us to provide an effectual remedy. Are not the bands of society cut asunder, and the sanctions, that hold man to man, trampled upon? Can any of us recover a debt, or obtain compensation for an injury, by law? Are not many persons, whom once we respected and revered, driven from their homes and families, and forced to sly to the army for protection, for no other reason but their having accepted commissions under our king? Is not civil government dissolved? Some have been made to believe, that nothing short of attempting the life of the king, or fighting his troops, can amount to high treason or rebellion. If, reader, you are one of those, apply to an honest lawyer (if such an one can be found), and enquire what kind of offence it is, for a number of men to assemble armed, and forceably to obstruct the course of justice, even to prevent the king’s courts from being held at their stated terms; for a body of people to seize upon the king’s provincial revenue, I mean the monies collected by virtue of grants made to his Majesty for the support of his government within this province; for a body of men to assemble without being called by authority, and to pass governmental acts; or for a number of people to take the militia out of the hands of the king’s representative; or to form a new militia, or to raise men and appoint officers for a public purpose, without the order or permission of the king or his representative; or for a number of men to take to their arms, and march with a professed design of opposing the king’s troops: ask, reader, of such a lawyer, what is the crime, and what the punishment; and if per chance thou art one that hast been active in these things, and art not insensibility itself, his answer will harrow up thy soul. I assure you, my friends, I would not that this conduct should be told beyond the borders of this province; I wish it were consigned to perpetual oblivion; but, alas, it is too notorious to be concealed: our news-papers have already published it to the world, and we can neither prevent nor conceal it. The shaft is already sped, and the utmost exertion is necessary to prevent the blow. We already feel the effects of anarchy: mutual confidence, affection and tranquillity, those sweeteners of human life, are succeeded by distrust, hatred and wild uproar; the useful arts of agriculture and commerce are neglected for cabaling, mobbing this or the other man, because he acts, speaks, or is suspected of thinking different from the prevailing sentiment of the times, in purchasing arms and forming a militia, O height of madness! with a professed design of opposing Great-Britain. I suspect many of us have been induced to join in these measures, or but faintly to oppose them, from an apprehension that Great-Britain would not or could not exert herself sufficiently to subdue America. Let us consider this matter: However closely we may hug ourselves in the opinion that the parliament has no right to tax or legislate for us, the people of England hold the contrary opinion as firmly: they tell us we are a part of the British empire; that every state from the nature of government must have a supreme uncontroulable power coëxtensive with the empire itself; and that, that power is vested in parliament. It is as absurd to deny this doctrine in Great-Britain, as it is to assert it in the colonies; so there is but little probability of serving ourselves at this day by our ingenious distinctions between a right of legislature for one purpose and not for another. We have bid them defiance, and the longest sword must carry it, unless we change our measures. Mankind are the same in all parts of the world; the same fondness for dominion that presides in the breast of an American, actuates the breast of an European. If the colonies are not a part of the British empire already, and subject to the supreme authority of the state, Great-Britain will make them so. Had we been prudent enough to confine our opposition within certain limits, we might have stood some chance of succeeding once more; but alas we have passed the Rubicon. It is now universally said and believed, in England, that if this opportunity of reclaiming the colonies, and reducing them to a sense of their duty is lost, they in truth will be dismembered from the empire, and become as distinct a state from Great-Britain as Hanover; that is, although they may continue their allegiance to the person of the King, they will own none to the imperial crown of Great-Britain, nor yield obedience to any of her laws but such as they shall think proper to adopt. Can you indulge the thought one moment, that Great-Britain will consent to this? For what has she protected and defended the colonies against the maritime powers of Europe, from their first British settlement to this day? For what did she purchase New-York of the Dutch? For what was she so lavish of her best blood and treasure in the conquest of Canada, and other territories in America? Was it to raise up a rival state, or to enlarge her own empire? Or, if the consideration of empire was out of the question, what security can she have of our trade, when once she has lost our obedience? I mention these things, my friends, that you may know how people reason upon the subject in England; and to convince you that you are much deceived, if you imagine that Great-Britain will accede to the claims of the colonies: she will as soon conquer New-England as Ireland or Canada, if either of them revolted; and by arms, if the milder influences of government prove ineffectual. Perhaps you are as fatally mistaken in another respect, I mean as to the power of Great-Britain to conquer; but can any of you, that think soberly upon the matter, be so deluded as to believe that Great-Britain, who so lately carried her arms with success to every part of the globe, triumphed over the united powers of France and Spain, and whose fleets give law to the ocean, is unable to conquer us? Should the colonies unite in a war with Great-Britain (which by the way is not a supposable case) the colonies south of Pennsylvania would be unable to furnish any men; they have not more than is necessary to govern their numerous slaves, and to defend themselves against the Indians. I will suppose that the northern colonies can furnish as many, and indeed more men than can be used to advantage; but have you arms fit for a campaign? If you have arms, have you military stores, or can you procure them? When this war is proclaimed, all supplies from foreign parts will be cut off. Have you money to maintain the war? Or had you all those things, some others are still wanting, which are absolutely necessary to encounter regular troops, that is discipline, and that subordination whereby each can command all below him from a general officer to the lowest subaltern: these you neither have nor can have in such a war. It is well known that the provincials in the late war were never brought to a proper discipline, though they had the example of the regular troops to encourage, and the martial law to enforce it. We all know, notwithstanding the province law for regulating the militia, it was under but little more command than what the officers could obtain from treating and humouring the common soldiers: what then can be expected from such an army as you will bring into the field, if you bring any, each one a politician, puffed up with his own opinion, and feeling himself second to none? Can any of you command ten thousand such men? Can you punish the disobedient? Can all your wisdom direct their strength, courage and activity to any given point? Would not the least disappointment or unfavourable aspect cause a general dereliction of the service? Your new-fangled militia have already given us a specimen of their future conduct. In some of their companies, they have already chosen two, in others three sets of officers, and are as dissatisfied with the last choice as the first. I do not doubt the natural bravery of my countrymen: all men would act the same part in the same situation. Such is the army, with which you are to oppose the most powerful nation upon the globe. An experienced officer would rather take his chance with five thousand British troops, than with fifty thousand such militia. I have hitherto confined my observations to the war within the interior parts of the colonies; let us now turn our eyes to our extensive sea coast, and that we find wholly at the mercy of Great-Britain; our trade, fishery, navigation and maritime towns taken from us, the very day that war is proclaimed. Inconceivably shocking the scene, if we turn our views to the wilderness; our back settlements a prey to our ancient enemy, the Canadians, whose wounds received from us in the late war will bleed afresh at the prospect of revenge, and to the numerous tribes of savages, whose tender mercies are cruelties: thus with the British navy in the front, Canadians and savages in the rear, a regular army in the midst, we must be certain that, when ever the sword of civil war is unsheathed, devastation will pass through our land like a whirlwind, our houses be burnt to ashes, our fair possessions laid waste, and he that falls by the sword will be happy in escaping a more ignominious death. I have hitherto gone upon a supposition that all the colonies from Nova-Scotia to Georgia would unite in the war against Great-Britain; but I believe if we consider coolly upon the matter, we shall find no reason to expect any assistance out of New-England: if so, there will be no arm stretched out to save us, New-England, or perhaps this self-devoted province will fall alone the unpitied victim of its own folly, and furnish the world with one more instance of the fatal consequences of rebellion. I have as yet said nothing of the difference in sentiment among ourselves: upon a superficial view we might imagine, that this province was nearly unanimous, but the case is far different. A very considerable part of the men of property in this province are at this day firmly attached to the cause of government; bodies of men compelling persons to disavow their sentiments, to resign commissions, or to subscribe leagues and covenants, have wrought no change in their sentiments: it has only attached them more closely to government, and caused them to wish more fervently, and to pray more devoutly for its restoration: these and thousands beside, if they fight at all, will fight under the banners of loyalty. I can assure you that associations are now forming in several parts of this province for the support of his Majesty’s government and mutual defence; and let me tell you, when ever the royal standard shall be set up, there will be such a flocking to it, as will astonish the most obdurate. And now, in God’s name, what is it that has brought us to this brink of destruction? Has not the government of Great-Britain been as mild and equitable in the colonies as in any part of her extensive dominions? Has not she been a nursing mother to us from the days of our infancy to this time? Has she not been indulgent almost to a fault? Might not each one of us at this day have sat quietly under his own vine and fig-tree, and there have been none to make us afraid, were it not for our own folly? Will nor posterity be amazed, when they are told that the present distraction took its rise from a three-penny duty on tea, and call it a more unaccountable frenzy, and more disgraceful to the annals of America than that of the witchcraft. I will attempt in the next paper to retrace the steps and mark the progressions that led us to this state. I promise to do it with fidelity, and, if any thing should look like reflecting on individuals or bodies of men, it must be set down to my impartiality, and not to a fondness for censuring. MASSACHUSETTENSIS. December 12, 1774 Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/leonard-massachusettensis#lf0951_head_003

The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and proved. By James Otis, Esq Haec omnis regio et celsi plaga pinea montis Cedat amiciliae Teucrorum: et foederis aequas Dicamus leges, sociósque in regna vocemus. Considant, si tantus amor, et moenia condant. VIRG. BOSTON: Printed and Sold by EDES and GILL, in Queen-Street. M,DCC,LXIV. July 30, 1764 Introduction. Of the Origin of Government. THE origin of government has in all ages no less perplexed the heads of lawyers and politicians, than the origin of evil has embarrassed divines and philosophers: And 'tis probable the world may receive a satisfactory solution on both those points of enquiry at the same time. The various opinions on the origin of government have been reduced to four. 1. That dominion is founded in Grace. 2. On force or meer power. 3. On compact. 4. On property. The first of these opinions is so absurd, and the world has paid so very dear for embracing it, especially under the administration of the roman pontiffs, that mankind seem at this day to be in a great measure cured of their madness in this particular; and the notion is pretty generally exploded, and hiss'd off the stage. To those who lay the foundation of government in force and meer brutal power, it is objected; that, their system destroys all distinction between right and wrong; that it overturns all morality, and leaves it to every man to do what is right in his own eyes; that it leads directly to scepticism, and ends in atheism. When a man's will and pleasure is his only rule and guide, what safety can there be either for him or against him, but in the point of a sword? On the other hand the gentlemen in favor of the original compact have been often told that their system is chimerical and unsupported by reason or experience. Questions like the following have been frequently asked them, and may be again. "When and where was the original compact for introducing government into any society, or for creating a society, made? Who were present and parties to such compact? Who acted for infants and women, or who appointed guardians for them? Had these guardians power to bind both infants and women during life, and their posterity after them? Is it in nature or reason that a guardian should by his own act perpetuate his power over his ward, and bind him, and his posterity in chains? Is not every man born as free by nature as his father? Has he not the same natural right to think and act and contract for himself? Is it possible for a man to have a natural right to make a slave of himself or of his posterity? Can a father supersede the laws of nature? What man is or ever was born free, if every man is not? What will there be to distinguish the next generation of men from their forefathers, that they should not have the same right to make original compacts as their ancestors had? If every man has such right, may there not be as many original compacts as there are men and women born or to be born? Are not women born as free as men? Would it not be infamous to assert that the ladies are all slaves by nature? If every man and woman born or to be born has, and will have, a right to be consulted, and must accede to the original compact before they can with any kind of justice be said to be bound by it, will not the compact be ever forming and never finished, ever making, but never done? Can it with propriety be called a compact original or derivative, that is ever in treaty but never concluded?" When it has been said that each man is bound as soon as he accedes, and that the consent may be either express or tacit, it has been asked, "What is a tacit consent or compact? Does it not appear plain that those who refuse their assent can not be bound? If one is at liberty to accede or not, is he not also at liberty to recede on the discovery of some intolerable fraud and abuse that has been palm'd upon him by the rest of the high contracting parties? Will not natural equity in several special cases rescind the original compacts of great men as effectualy as those of little men are rendered null and void in the ordinary course of a court of chancery?" There are other questions which have been started, and a resolution of them demanded, which may perhaps be deemed indecent by those who hold the prerogatives of an earthly monarch, and even the power of a plantation government, so sacred as to think it little less than blasphemy to enquire into their origin and foundation: while the government of the supreme ruler of the universe is every day discussed with less ceremony and decency than the administration of a petty German prince. I hope the reader will consider that I am at present only mentioning such questions as have been put by high-flyers & others in church and state, who would exclude all compact between a Sovereign and his people, without offering my own sentiments upon them; this however I presume I may be allowed hereafter to do without offence. Those who want a full answer to them may consult Mr. Locke's discourses on government, M. De Vattel's law of nature and nations, and their own consciences. "What state were Great-Britain, Ireland and the Plantations left in by the abdication of James II? Was it a state of nature or of civil government? If a state of civil government, where were the supreme legislative and executive powers from the abdication to the election of William and Mary? Could the Lords and Commons be called a complete parliament or supreme power without a King to head them? Did any law of the land or any original compact previous to the abdication provide, that on such an event, the supreme power should devolve on the two houses? Were not both houses so manifestly with the novelty and strangeness of the event, and so far from finding any act of parliament, book-case, or precedent to help them, that they disputed in solemn conferrence by what name to call the action, and at last give it one, as new in our language and in that of parliament as the thing itself was in fact?" If on this memorable and very happy event the three kingdoms and the dominions fell back into a state of nature, it will be asked, "Whether every man and woman were not then equal? If so, has not every one of them a natural and equitable right to be consulted in the choice of a new king, or in the formation of a new original compact or government, if any new form had been made? Might not the nation at that time have rightfully changed the monarchy into a republic or any form, that might seem best? Could any change from a state of nature take place without universal consent, or at least without the consent of the majority of the individuals? Upon the principles of the original compact as commonly explained and understood, could a few hundred men who before the dissolution of the government had been called, and in fact were, lords, knights and gentlemen, have lawfully made that glorious deliverer and defender W. 3. rightful king"? Such an one he certainly was, and such have been all his illustrious successors to the present happy times; when we have the joy to see the sceptre sway'd in justice, wisdom and mercy, by our lawful Sovereign George the Third; a prince who glories in being a Briton born, and whom may God long preserve and prosper. "If upon the abdication all were reduced to a state of nature, had not apple women and orange girls as good a right to give their respectable suffrages for a new king as the philosopher, courtier, petit maitre and politician? Were these and ten millions of others such ever more consulted on that occasion, than the multitude now are in the adjustment of that real modern farce, an election of a king of the Romans; which serves as a contrast to the grandeur of the antient republics, and shows the littleness of the modern German and some other gothic constitutions in their present degenerate state? " "In the election of W. 3. were the votes of Ireland and the plantations ever called for or once tho't of till the affair was settled? Did the lords and commons who happened to be then in and about Westminster represent, and act, for the individuals, not only of the three kingdoms, but for all the freeborn and as yet unconquered possessors and proprietors of their own money-purchased, blood-purchased plantations, which, till lately, have been defended with little or no assistance from Great-Britain? Were not those who did not vote in or for the new model at liberty upon the principles of the compact to remain in what some call the delectable state of nature, to which by the hypothesis they were reduced, or to join themselves to any other state, whose solemn league and covenant they could subscribe? Is it not a first principle of the original compact, that all who are bound should bind themselves? Will not common sense without much learning or study dictate obvious answers to all the above questions?—and, say the opposers of the original compact and of the natural equality and liberty of mankind, will not those answers infallibly show that the doctrine is a piece of metaphysical jargon and systematical nonsense"? Perhaps not. With regard to the fourth opinion, that dominion is founded in property, what is it but playing with words? Dominion in one sense of the term is synonimous with property, so one cannot be called the foundation of the other, but as one name may appear to be the foundation or cause of another. Property cannot be the foundation of dominion as synonimous with government; for on the supposition that property has a precarious existence antecedent to government, and tho' it is also admitted that the security of property is one end of government, but that of little estimation even in the view of a miser when life and liberty of locomotion and further accumulation are placed in competition, it must be a very absurd way of speaking to assert that one end of government is the foundation of government. If the ends of government are to be considered as its foundation, it cannot with truth or propriety be said that government is founded on any one of those ends; and therefore government is not founded on property or its security alone, but at least on something else in conjunction. It is however true in fact and experience, as the great, the incomparable Harrington has most abundantly demonstrated in his Oceana, and other divine writings, that Empire follows the balance of property: 'Tis also certain that property in fact generally confers power, tho' the possessor of it may not have much more wit than a mole or a musquash: And this is too often the cause, that riches are sought after, without the least concern about the right application of them. But is the fault in the riches, or the general law of nature, or the unworthy possessor? It will never follow from all this, that government is rightfully founded on property, alone. What shall we say then? Is not government founded on grace? No. Nor on force? No. Nor on compact? Nor property? Not altogether on either. Has it any solid foundation? any chief corner stone, but what accident, chance or confusion may lay one moment and destroy the next? I think it has an everlasting foundation in the unchangeable will of GOD, the author of nature, whose laws never vary. The same omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely good and gracious Creator of the universe, who has been pleased to make it necessary that what we call matter should gravitate, for the celestial bodies to roll round their axes, dance their orbits and perform their various revolutions in that beautiful order and concert, which we all admire, has made it equally necessary that from Adam and Eve to these degenerate, days, the different sexes should sweetly attract each other, form societies of single families, of which larger bodies and communities are as naturally, mechanically, and necessarily combined, as the dew of Heaven and the soft distilling rain is collected by the all enliv'ning heat of the sun. Government is therefore most evidently founded on the necessities of our nature. It is by no means an arbitrary thing, depending merely on compact or human will for its existence. We come into the world forlorn and helpless; and if left alone and to ourselves at any one period of our lives, we should soon die in want despair or destraction. So kind is that hand, tho' little known or regarded, which feeds the rich and the poor, the blind and the naked; and provides for the safety of infants by the principle of parental love, and for that of men by Government! We have a King, who neither slumbers nor sleeps, but eternally watches for our good; whose rain falls on the just and on the unjust: yet while they live, move, and have their being in him, and cannot account for either, or for any thing else, so stupid and wicked are some men, as to deny his existence, blaspheme his most evident government, and disgrace their nature. Let no Man think I am about to commence advocate for despotism, because I affirm that government is founded on the necessity of our natures; and that an original supreme Sovereign, absolute, and uncontroulable, earthly power must exist in and preside over every society; from whose final decisions there can be no appeal but directly to Heaven. It is therefore originally and ultimately in the people. I say this supreme absolute power is originally and ultimately in the people; and they never did in fact freely, nor can they rightfully make an absolute, unlimited renunciation of this divine right. It is ever in the nature of the thing given in trust, and on a condition, the performance of which no mortal can dispence with; namely, that the person or persons on whom the sovereignty is confer'd by the people, shall incessantly consult their good. Tyranny of all kinds is to be abhor'd, whether it be in the hands of one, or of the few, or of the many.—And tho' "in the last age a generation of men sprung up that would flatter Princes with an opinion that they have a divine right to absolute power"; yet "slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that 'tis hard to be conceived that an englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it: Especially at a time when the finest writers of the most polite nations on the continent of Europe, are enraptured with the beauties of the civil constitution of Great-Britain; and envy her, no less for the freedom of her sons, than for her immense wealth and military glory. But let the origin of government be placed where it may, the end of it is manifestly the good of the whole. Salus populi suprema lex esto, is of the law of nature, and part of that grand charter given the human race, (tho' too many of them are afraid to assert it,) by the only monarch in the universe, who has a clear and indisputable right to absolute power; because he is the only ONE who is omniscient as well as omnipotent. It is evidently contrary to the first principles of reason, that supreme unlimited power should be in the hands of one man. It is the greatest "idolatry, begotten by flattery, on the body of pride," that could induce one to think that a single mortal should be able to hold so great a power, if ever so well inclined. Hence the origin of deifying princes: It was from the trick of gulling the vulgar into a belief that their tyrants were omniscient; and that it was therefore right, that they should be considered as omnipotent. Hence the Dii majorum et minorum gentium; the great, the monarchical, the little, Provincial subordinate and subaltern gods, demi-gods, and semidemi-gods, ancient and modern. Thus deities of all kinds were multiplied and increased in abundance; for every devil incarnate, who could enslave a people, acquired a title to divinity; and thus the "rabble of the skies" was made up of locusts and catterpillars; lions, tygers and harpies; and other devourers translated from plaguing the earth! The end of government being the good of mankind, points out its great duties: It is above all things to provide for the security, the quiet, and happy enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. There is no one act which a government can have a right to make, that does not tend to the advancement of the security, tranquility and prosperity of the people. If life, liberty and property could be enjoyed in as great perfection in solitude, as in society, there would be no need of government. But the experience of ages has proved that such is the nature of man, a weak, imperfect being; that the valuable ends of life cannot be obtained, without the union and assistance of many. Hence 'tis clear that men cannot live apart or independent of each other: In solitude men would perish; and yet they cannot live together without contests. These contests require some arbitrator to determine them. The necessity of a common, indifferent and impartial judge, makes all men seek one; tho' few find him in the sovereign power, of their respective states or any where else in subordination to it. Government is founded immediately on the necessities of human nature, and ultimately on the will of God, the author of nature; who has not left it to men in general to choose, whether they will be members of society or not, but at the hazard of their senses if not of their lives. Yet it is left to every man as he comes of age to chuse what society he will continue to belong to. Nay if one has a mind to turn Hermit, and after he has been born, nursed, and brought up in the arms of society, and acquired the habits and passions of social life, is willing to run the risque of starving alone, which is generally most unavoidable in a state of hermitage, who shall hinder him? I know of no human law, founded on the law of nature, to restrain him from separating himself from all the species, if he can find it in his heart to leave them; unless it should be said, it is against the great law of self-preservation: But of this every man will think himself his own judge. The few Hermits and Misanthropes that have ever existed, show that those states are unnatural. If we were to take out from them, those who have made great worldly gain of their godly hermitage, and those who have been under the madness of enthusiam, or disappointed hopes in their ambitious projects, for the detriment of mankind: perhaps there might not be left ten from Adam to this day. The form of government is by nature and by right so far left to the individuals of each society, that they may alter it from a simple democracy, or government of all over all, to any other form they please. Such alteration may and ought to be made by express compact: But how seldom this right has been asserted, history will abundantly show. For once that it has been fairly settled by compact; fraud, force or accident have determined it an hundred times. As the people have gained upon tyrants, these have been obliged to relax, only till a fairer opportunity has put it in their power to encroach again. But if every prince since Nimrod had been a tyrant, it would not prove a right to tyranize. There can be no prescription old enough to supersede the law of nature, and the grant of GOD almighty; who has given to all men a natural right to be free, and they have it ordinarily in their power to make themselves so, if they please. Government having been proved to be necessary by the law of nature, it makes no difference in the thing to call it from a certain period, civil. This term can only relate to form, to additions to, or deviations from, the substance of government: This being founded in nature, the superstructures and the whole administration should be conformed to the law of universal reason. A supreme legislative and a supreme executive power, must be placed somewhere in every common-wealth: Where there is no other positive provision or compact to the contrary, those powers remain in the whole body of the people. It is also evident there can be but one best way of depositing those powers; but what that way is, mankind have been disputing in peace and in war more than five thousand years. If we could suppose the individuals of a community met to deliberate, whether it were best to keep those powers in their own hands, or dispose of them in trust, the following questions would occur—Whether those two great powers of Legislation and Execution should remain united? If so, whether in the hands of the many, or jointly or severally in the hands of a few, or jointly in some one individual? If both those powers are retained in the hands of the many, where nature seems to have placed them originally, the government is a simple democracy, or a government of all over all. This can be administred, only by establishing it as a first principle, that the votes of the majority shall be taken as the voice of the whole. If those powers are lodged in the hands of a few, the government is an Aristocracy or Oligarchy. Here too the first principles of a practicable administration is that the majority rules the whole. If those great powers are both lodged in the hands of one man, the government is a simple Monarchy, commonly, though falsly called absolute, if by that term is meant a right to do as one pleases.—Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas, belongs not of right to any mortal man. The same law of nature and of reason is equally obligatory on a democracy, an aristrocracy, and a monarchy: Whenever the administrators, in any of those forms, deviate from truth, justice and equity, they verge towards tyranny, and are to be opposed; and if they prove incorrigible, they will be deposed by the people, if the people are not rendered too abject. Deposing the administrators of a simple democracy may found oddly, but it is done every day, and in almost every vote. A. B. & C. for example, make a democracy. To day A & B are for so vile a measure as a standing army. To morrow B & C vote it out. This is as really deposing the former administrators, as setting up and making a new king is deposing the old one. Democracy in the one case, and monarchy in the other, still remain; all that is done is to change the administration. The first principle and great end of government being to provide for the best good of all the people, this can be done only by a supreme legislative and executive ultimately in the people, or whole community, where GOD has placed it; but the inconveniencies, not to say impossibility, attending the consultations and operations of a large body of people, have made it necessary to transfer the power of the whole to a few: This necessity gave rise to deputation, proxy or a right of representation. A Power of legislation, without a power of execution in the same or other hands, would be futile and vain: On the other hand, a power of execution, supreme or subordinate, without an independent legislature, would be perfect despotism. The difficulties attending an universal congress, especially when society became large, have bro't men to consent to a delegation of the power of all: The weak and the wicked have too often been found in the same interest, and in most nations have not only bro't these powers jointly, into the hands of one, or some few, of their number; but made them hereditary, in the families of despotic nobles & princes. The wiser and more virtuous states, have always provided that the representation of the people should be numerous. Nothing but life and liberty are naturally hereditable: this has never been considered by those, who have tamely given up both into the hands of a tyrannical Oligarchy or despotic Monarchy. The analogy between the natural, or material, as it is called, and the moral world is very obvious; GOD himself appears to us at some times to cause the intervention or combination of a number of simple principles, tho' never when one will answer the end; gravitation and attraction have place in the revolution of the planets, because the one would fix them to a centre, and the other would carry them off indefinitely; so in the moral world, the first simple principle is equality and the power of the whole. This will answer in small numbers; so will a tolerably virtuous Oligarchy or a Monarchy. But when the society grows in bulk, none of them will answer well singly, and none worse than absolute monarchy. It becomes necessary therefore as numbers increase, to have those several powers properly combined; so as from the whole to produce that harmony of government so often talked of and wished for, but too seldom found in ancient or modern states. The grand political problem in all ages has been to invent the best combination or distribution of the supreme powers of legislation and execution. Those states have ever made the greatest figure, and have been most durable, in which those powers have not only been separated from each other, but placed each in more hands than one, or a few. The Romans are the most shining example; but they never had a balance between the senate and the people, and the want of this, is generally agreed by the few who know any thing of the matter, to have been the cause of their fall. The British constitution in theory and in the present administration of it, in general comes nearest the idea of perfection, of any that has been reduced to practice; and if the principles of it are adhered to, it will according to the infallible prediction of Harrington, always keep the Britons uppermost in Europe, 'till their only rival nation shall either embrace that perfect model of a common wealth given us by that author, or come as near it as Great Britain is. Then indeed and not till then, will that rival & our nation either be eternal confederates, or contend in greater earnest than they have ever yet done, till one of them shall sink under the power of the other, and rise no more. Great Britain has at present, most evidently the advantage, and such opportunities of honest wealth and grandeur, as perhaps no state ever had before, at least not unce the days of Julius Caesar, the destroyer of the roman glory and grandeur; at a time when but for him and his adherents both might have been rendered immortal. We have said that the form and mode of government is to be settled by compact, as it was rightfully done by the convention after the abdication of James II, and assented to by the first representative of the nation chosen afterwards, and by every parliament, and by almost every man ever since, but the bigots, to the indefeasible power of tyrants civil and ecclesiastic. There was neither time for, nor occasion to call the whole people together: If they had not liked the proceedings it was in their power to controul them; as it would be should the supreme legislative or executive powers ever again attempt to enslave them. The people will bear a great deal, before they will even murmur against their rulers: But when once they are thoroughly roused, and in earnest, against those who would be glad to enslave them, their power is irrestible. At the abdication of King James, every step was taken that natural justice and equity could require; and all was done that was possible, at least in the wretched state in which he left the nation. Those very noble and worthy patriots, the lords spiritual and temporal of that day, and the principal persons of the commons, advised the prince, who in consequence thereof caused letters to be "written to the lords spiritual and temporal, being protestants, and other letters to the several counties, cities, universities, boroughs and cinque ports, for the choosing such persons to represent them as were of right to be sent to parliament, to meet at Westminster upon the 22d of January 1688, in order to such an establishment, as that their religion, laws and liberties might not again be in danger of being subversed." See W & M. sess, 1. C. 1. Upon this elections were made, and thereupon the said lords spiritual and temporal and commons met, and proceeded to assert their rights and liberties, and to the election of the Prince and Princess of Orange to be King and Queen of England, France and Ireland, and the dominions thereto belonging. The kingdom of Scotland agreed in the same choice: These proceedings were drawn into the form of acts of parliament, and are the basis of the acts of union and succession since made, and which all together are the sure foundation of that indisputable right which his present Majesty has to the Crown of Great-Britain and the dominions thereto belonging; which right 'tis the greatest folly to doubt of, as well as the blackest treason to deny. The present establishment founded on the law of GOD, and of nature, was began by the convention, with a professed and real view, in all parts of the British empire, to put the liberties of the people out of the reach of arbitrary power in all times to come. But the grandeur, as well as justice, equity and goodness of the proceedings of the nation on that memorable occasion, never have been nor can be so well represented as in the words of those great men who composed the convention; for which reason partly, but principally because they shew the rights of all British subjects, both at home and abroad, and should therefore be in as many hands as possible, I have transcribed the following clauses. 1 Wm. & M. Sess. 1. Chap. I preamble & sec 1—entituled— "An act for removing and preventing all questions and disputes concerning the assembling and sitting of this present parliament. For preventing all doubts and scruples which may in any wise arise concerning the meeting, sitting and proceeding of this present parliament; be it declared and enacted by the King's and Queen's most excellent Majesty's, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, now assembled, and by authority of the same: IIdly. That the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, convened at Westminster, the two and twentieth day of January A.D. 1688, and there sitting the 13th of February following, are the two houses of parliament, and so shall be and are hereby declared, enacted and adjudged to be, to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever, notwithstanding any want of writ or writs of summons, or any other defect of form or default whatsoever, as if they had been summoned according to the usual form. 1 of W. & M. Sess. 2. Chap. 2. Sec. 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12. An act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the Crown. Whereas the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, assembled at Westminster, lawfully, fully and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm, did upon the 13th of February A.D. 1688, present unto their Majesties, then called and known by the names and stile of William and Mary, Prince and Princess of Orange, being present in their proper persons, a certain declaration in writing, made by the said lords and commons in the words following; viz. Whereas the late King James the second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges, and ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of this kingdom. 1. By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws, and the execution of laws, without consent of parliament. 2. By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates, for humbly petitioning to be excused from concuring to the said assumed power. 3. By issuing and causing to be executed a commission under the great seal for erecting a court called, The court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes. 4. By levying money for and to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, for other time, and in other manner, than the same was granted by parliament. 5. By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace, without consent of parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law. 6. By causing several good subjects, being protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when papists were both armed and employed, contrary to law. 7. By violating the freedom of election of members to serve in parliament. 8. By prosecutions in the court of king's bench, for matters and causes cognizable only in parliament; and by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses. 9. And whereas of late years, partial, corrupt and unqualified persons, have been returned and served on juries in trials, and particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason, which were not freeholders. 10. And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects. 11. And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments inflicted. 12. And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures, before any conviction or judgment against the persons, upon whom the same were to be levied. All which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes, and freedom of this realm— And whereas the said late King James the second having abdicated the Government, and the throne being thereby vacant, his highness the prince of Orange (whom it hath pleased Almighty GOD to make the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and arbitrary power) did (by the advice of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and divers principal persons of the commons) cause letters to be written to the lords spiritual and temporal, being protestants, and other letters to the several counties, cities, universities, boroughs, and cinque-ports, for the choosing of such persons to represent them, as were of right to be sent to parliament, to meet and sit at Westminster upon the two and twentieth of January in this year 1688, in order to such an establishment, as that their religion, laws and liberties might not again be in danger of being subverted. Upon which letters, elections having been accordingly made: And thereupon the said lords spiritual and temporal and commons, pursuant to their respective letters and elections, being now assembled in a full and free representative of this nation, taking into their most serious consideration the best means for attaining the ends aforesaid; do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties, declare, 1. That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal. 2. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal. 3. That the commission for creating the late court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes, and all other commissions and courts of like nature, are illegal and pernicious. 4. That levying money for or to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament, for longer time, or in other manner, than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal. 5. That it is the right of the subjects to petition the King; and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal. 6. That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law. 7. That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defence, suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law. 8. That election of members of parliament ought to be free. 9. That the freedom of speech, and debates, or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament. 10. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 11. That jurors ought to be duly impannelled and returned; and jurors which pass upon mens trials for high treason, ought to be freeholders. 12. That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction, are illegal and void. 13. And that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving of the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently. And they do claim, demand, and insist upon all and singular the premises, as their undoubted rights and liberties; and that no, declarations, judgments, doings, or proceedings, to the prejudice of the people in any of the said premises, ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter into consequence or example: To which demand of their rights they are particularly encouraged by the declaration of his Highness the Prince of Orange, as being the only means for obtaining a full redress and remedy therein— Having therefore an entire confidence, that his said Highness the Prince of Orange, will perfect the deliverance so far advanced by him, and will still preserve them from the violation of their rights, which they have here asserted, and from all other attempts upon their religion, rights and liberties. II. The said Lords spiritual and temporal, and commons assembled at Westminster, do resolve that William & Mary Prince and Princess of Orange be, and be declared, King and Queen of England, France and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, to hold the crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions to them the said Prince and Princess, during their lives, and the life of the survivor of them; and that the sole and full exercise of the regal power be only in, and executed by the said Prince of Orange, in the names of the said prince and princess, during their joint lives; and after their deceases, the said crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions to be to the heirs of the body of the said princess; and for default of such issue, to the princess Anne of Denmark, and the heirs of her body; and for default of such issue, to the heirs of the body of the said prince of Orange. And the Lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, do pray the said prince and princess to accept the same accordingly. IV. Upon which their said Majesties did accept the crown and royal dignity of the kingdom of England, France and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, according to the resolutions and desire of the said lords and commons, contained in the said declaration. V. And thereupon their Majesties were pleased, that the said Lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, being the two houses of parliament, should continue to sit, and with their Majesties royal concurrence, make effectual provision for the settlement of the religion, laws and liberties of this kingdom; so that the same for the future might not be in danger again of being subverted; to which the said lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, did agree and proceed to act accordingly. VI. Now in pursuance of the premises, the said lords spiritual and temporal and commons, in parliament assembled, for the ratifying, confirming and establishing the said declaration, and the articles, clauses, matters and things therein contained, by the force of a law made in due form by authority of parliament, do pray that it may be declared and enacted. That all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in the said declaration, are the true, ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom, and so shall be esteemed, allowed, adjudged, deemed, and taken to be; and that all and every the particulars aforesaid, shall be firmly and strictly holden and observed, as they are expressed in the said declaration; and all officers and ministers whatsoever shall serve their Majesties and their successors according to the same in all times to come. XI. All which their Majesties are contented and pleased shall be declared, enacted, and established by authority of this present parliament, and shall stand remain and be the law of this realm for ever; and the same are by their said Majesties, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, declared, enacted, and established accordingly. XII. And be it further declared and enacted by the authority aforesaid, that from and after this present session of parliament, no dispensation by non obstant of or to any statute or any part thereof, shall be allowed; but that the same shall be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed in such statutes, and except in such cases as shall be specially provided for by one or more bill or bills to be passed during this present session of parliament. 12 & 13 of William 3d, Chap. 2. sec. 3 & 4. "Whereas it is necessary that further provision be made for securing our religion, laws and liberties, after the death of his Majesty and the Princess Anne of Denmark, and in default of issue of the body of the said Princess, and of his Majesty respectively; it is enacted, That after the said limitation shall take effect, judges commissions be made quamdiu se bene gefferint, and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of both houses parliament, it may be lawful to remove them; That no pardon under the great seal of England be pleaded to an impeachment by the commons in parliament. Whereas the laws of England are the birth-right of the people thereof, and all the Kings and Queens, who shall ascend the throne of this realm, ought to administer the government of the same according to the said laws, and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them according to the same; all the laws and statutes of this realm for securing the established religion, and the rights and liberties of the people, and all other laws and statutes now in force, are by his Majesty with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, ratified and confirmed." I shall close this introduction with a passage from Mr. Locke. "Tho', says he, "in a constituted common wealth, standing upon its own basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation of the community, there can be but one supreme power which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate; yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power, to act for certain ends, there remains still, "in the people, a supreme power to remove, or alter, the legislative when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them." For all power given, with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those who gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best, for their safety and security. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs, against the liberties and properties of the subject. For no man or society of men having a power to deliver up their preservation or consequently the means of it to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; whenever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental, sacred and unalterable law of self preservation, for which they entered into society. And thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but not as considered under any form of government, because this power of the people can never take place, till the government be dissolved." Locke on Government, B. 11. C. 13. This he says may be done, "from without by conquest; from within, 1st. When the legislative is altered. Which is often by the prince, but sometimes by the whole legislative. As by invading the property of the subject, and making themselves arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties and fortunes of the people; reducing them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience, and are left to the common refuge which GOD hath provided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to gain themselves, or put into the hands of any other an absolute power over the lives, liberties and estates of the people, by this breach of trust, they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society." Idem Chap.9. Of Colonies in general. THIS subject has never been very clearly and fully handled by any modern writer, that I have had the good fortune to meet with; and to do it justice, would require much greater abilities than I pretend to, and more leisure than I ever expect will fall to my share. Even the English writers and lawyers, have either intirely wav'd any consideration of the nature of Colonies, or very lightly touched upon it, for the people of England never discovered much concern for the prosperity of the Colonies, 'till the revolution; and even now some of their great men and writers, by their discourses of, and conduct towards them, consider them all rather as a parcel of little insignificant conquered islands, than as a very extensive settlement on the continent. Even their law-books and very dictionaries of law, in editions so late as 1750, speak of the British plantations abroad as consisting chiefly of islands; and they are reckoned up in some of them in this order—Jamaica, Barbados, Virginia, Maryland, New-England, New-York, Carolina, Bermudas. At the head of all these Islands (for there is no distinction made) stands Jamaica, in truth a conquered island; and as such, this and all the other little West-India islands deserve to be treated, for the conduct of their inhabitants and proprietors with regard to the Northern Colonies: Divers of these colonies are larger than all those islands together; and are well settled, not as the common people of England foolishly imagine, with a compound mongrel mixture of English, Indian and Negro, but with freeborn British white subjects, whose loyalty has never yet been suspected. There is a man now living, or but lately dead, who once was a secretary of state; during whose wonderful conduct of national affairs, without knowing whether Jamaica lay in the Mediterranean, the Baltic, or in the Moon, letters were often received, directed to the Governor of the island of New-England. Which island of New-England is a part of the continent of North-America, comprehending two provinces and two colonies; and according to the undoubted bounds of their charters, containing more land than there is in the three kingdoms. But I must confine myself to matters of more importance than detecting the geographical blunders, or refuting the errors of dead, superannuated or any otherwise stupified secretaries of state, who are now all out of place. If I were to define the modern Colonists, I should say, they are the noble discoverers and settlers of a new world; from whence as from an endless source, wealth, and plenty, the means of power, grandeur and glory, in a degree unknown to the hungry chiefs of former ages, have been pouring into Europe for 300 years past; In return for which those Colonists have received from the several states of Europe, except from Great-Britain, only since the revolution, nothing but ill-usage, slavery and chains, as fast as the riches of their own earning, could furnish the means of forging them. A plantation or colony, is a settlement of subjects in a territory disjoined or remove from the mother country, and may be made by private adventurers or the public; but in both cases the Colonists are entitled to as ample rights, liberties and priviledges as the subjects of the mother country are, and in some respects to more. Of the natural Rights of Colonists. THOSE who expect to find any thing very satisfactory on this subject in particular, or with regard to the law of nature in general, in the writings of such authors as Grotius and Pufendorf, will find themselves much mistaken. It is their constant practice to establish the matter of right on the matter of fact: This the celebrated Rousseau expresly says of Grotius, and with the same reason be might have added an hundred others. "The learned researches into the laws of nature and nations are often nothing more than the history of ancient abuses, so that it is a ridiculous infatuation to be too fond of studying them." "This was exactly the case with Grotius" The sentiments on this subject have therefore been chiefly drawn from the purer fountains of one or two of our English writers, particularly from Mr. Locke, to whom might be added a few of other nations; for I have seen but a few of any country, and of all I have seen, there are not ten worth reading. Grotius B. 3. C. 1. sec. 21. discoursing of confederates on unequal terms according to his manner says, "to the inequality in question may be referred some of those rights which are now called right of protection, right of patronage, and a right termed mundiburgium; as also that which mother cities had over their colonies among the Grecians. For as Thucydides says, those colonies enjoyed the same rights of liberty with the other cities, but they owed a reverence to the city whence they derived their origin, and were obliged to render her respect and certain expressions of honor, so long as the colony was well treated" Grotius de jure belli, &c. B. 1. C. 3. 21. "Hitherto also (says he) may be referred that separation which is made when people by one consent, go to form colonies. For this is the original of a new and independent state. They are not content to be slaves, but to enjoy equal priviledges and freedom says Thucydides. And King Tullius in Dion, Hali, says, we look upon it to be neither truth nor justice, that mother cities ought of necessity and by the law of nature to rule over their colonies." B. 2. C. 9. sec. 10. "Colonies, says Pufendorf, are settled in different methods. For either the colony continues a part of the common-wealth it was sent out from, or else is obliged to pay a dutiful respect to the mother common-wealth, and to be in readiness to defend and vindicate its honor, and so is united to it by a sort of unequal confederacy, or lastly is erected into a separate commonwealth, and assumes the same rights with the state it is descended from." Pufend. B. 8. C. 11.6. "Different common wealths may be formed out of one by common consent, by sending out colonies in the manner usual in old Greece. For the Romans afterwards when they sent a colony abroad, continued it under the jurisdiction of the mother commonwealth, or greater country. But the colonies planted by the Greeks, and after their method, constituted particular commonwealths, which were obliged only to pay a kind of deference and dutiful submission to the mother commonwealth." Pufend, B. 8. C. 12. sec. 5. From which passages tis manifest that these two great men only state facts, and the opinions of others, without giving their own upon the subject: And all that can be collected from those facts or opinions, is, that Greece was more generous, and a better mother to her colonies than Rome. The conduct of Rome towards her colonies and the corruptions and oppressions tolerated in her provincial officers of all denominations, was one great cause of the downfall of that proud republic. Dr. Strahan says, "there is a great affinity between the British colonies and those of the Spaniards and other nations, who have made settlements among the Indians in those parts: For the grants made by our Kings of tracts of lands in that country, for the planting of colonies, and making settlements therein, appear to have been made in imitation of grants made by the Kings of Spain to the proprietors of lands in the Spanish colonies, upon the very same conditions, and in consideration of the same services to be performed by the grantees. So that the government of the Spanish colonies and the rights of the proprietors of lands therein, depending, chiefly on the rules of civil and feudal law, as may be seen by the learned treatise of Solorzanus. de indi jure, the knowledge of the said laws must be of service likewise for determining any controversy that may arise touching the duties or forfeitures of the proprietors of lands in our English colonies. Pref. to translat. of Domat. With submission to so great an authority as Dr. Strahan, tis humbly hoped that the British colonists do not hold their lands as well as liberties by so slippery a tenure as do the Spaniards and French. The will of the Prince is the only tenure by which they hold; and the government of the Spanish and French settlements is in every respect despotic. 'Tis well known that the first American grants were by the Bulls of the Popes. The Roman Pontiffs had for ages usurped the most abominable power over princes: They granted away the kingdoms of the earth with as little ceremony as a man would lease a sheep-cot. Now according to Dr. Strahans's logic, it may be inferred, that the canon law, and the Popes Bulls, must be of Service likewise, for determining any controversy that may arise, touching the duties or forfeitures of the proprietors of lands in the British colonies. And indeed it must be owned, if we were to judge of some late proceedings by this rule, we must allow that they savor more of modern Rome and the Inquisition, than of the common law of England and the constitution of Great-Britain. In order to form an idea of the natural rights of the Colonists, I presume it will be granted that they are men, the common children of the same Creator with their brethren of Great-Britain. Nature has placed all such in a state of equality and perfect freedom, to act within the bounds of the laws of nature and reason, without consulting the will or regarding the humor, the passions or whims of any other man, unless they are formed into a society or body politic. This it must be confessed is rather an abstract way of considering men than agreeable to the real and general course of nature. The truth is, as has been shown, men come into the world and into society at the same instant. But this hinders not but that the natural and original rights of each individual may be illustrated and explained in this way better than in any other. We see here by the way a probability, that this abstract consideration of men, which has its use in reasoning on the principles of government, has insensibly led some of the greatest men to imagine, some real general state of nature, agreeable to this abstract conception, antecedent to and independent of society. This is certainly not the case in general, for most men become members of society from their birth, tho' seperate independent states are really in the condition of perfect freedom and equality with regard to each other; and so are any number of individuals who separate themselves from a society of which they have formerly been members, for ill treatment, or other good cause, with express design to found another. If in such case, there is a real interval, between the separation and the new conjunction, during such interval, the individuals are as much detached, and under the law of nature only, as would be two men who should chance to meet on a desolate island. The Colonists are by the law of nature free born, as indeed all men are, white or black. No better reasons can be given, for enslaving those of any color than such as baron Montesquieu has humorously given; as the foundation of that cruel slavery exercised over the poor Ethiopians; which threatens one day to reduce both Europe and America to the ignorance and barbarity of the darkest ages. Does it follow that tis right to enslave a man because he is black? Will short curl'd hair like wool, instead of christian hair, as tis called by those, whose hearts, are as hard as the nether millstone, help the argument? Can any logical inference in favour of slavery, be drawn from a flat nose, a long or a short face. Nothing better can be said in favor of a trade, that is the most shocking violation of the law of nature, has a direct tendency to diminish the idea of the inestimable value of liberty, and makes every dealer in it a tyrant, from the director of an African company to the petty chapman in needles and pins on the unhappy coast. It is a clear truth, that those who every day barter away other mens liberty, will soon care little for their own. To this cause must be imputed that ferosity▪ cruelty and brutal barbarity that has long marked the general character of the sugar-islanders. They can in general form no idea of government but that which in person, or by an overseer, the joint and several proper representative of a Creole and of the D—I, is exercised over ten thousands of their fellow men, born with the same right to freedom, and the sweet enjoyments of liberty and life, as their unrelenting task-masters, the overseers and planters. Is it to be wondered at, if, when people of the stamp of a Creolian planter get into power, they will not stick for a little present gain, at making their own posterity, white as well as black, worse slaves if possible than those already mentioned. There is nothing more evident says Mr. Locke, than "that creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one among another, without subordination and subjection, unless the master of them all should by any manifest declaration of his will set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty." "The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but only to have the law of nature for his rule". This is the liberty of independant states; this is the liberty of every man out of society, and who has a mind to live so; which liberty is only abridged in certain instances, not lost to those who are born in or voluntarily enter into society; this gift of God cannot be annihilated. The Colonists being men, have a right to be considered as equally entitled to all the rights of nature with the Europeans, and they are not to be restrained, in the exercise of any of these rights, but for the evident good of the whole community. By being or becoming members of society, they have not renounced their natural liberty in any greater degree than other good citizens, and if tis taken from them without their consent, they are so far enslaved. They have an undoubted right to expect, that their best good will ever be consulted by their rulers, supreme and subordinate, without any partial views confined to the particular interest of one island or another. Neither the riches of Jamaica, nor the luxury of a metropolis, should ever have weight enough to break the balance of truth and justice. Truth and faith belong to men as men, from men, and if they are disappointed in their just expectations of them in one society, they will at least with for them in another. If the love of truth and justice, the only spring of sound policy in any state, is not strong enough to prevent certain causes from taking place, the arts of fraud and force will not prevent the most fatal effects. In the long run, those who fall on arbitrary measures, will meet with their deserved fate. The law of nature, was not of man's making, nor is it in his power to mend it, or alter its course. He can only perform and keep, or disobey and break it. The last is never done with impunity, even in this life, if it is any punishment for a man to feel himself depraved; to find himself degraded by his own folly and wickedness from the rank of a virtuous and good man, to that of a brute; or to be transformed from the friend, perhaps father of his country, to a devouring Lion or Tyger. The unhappy revolutions which for ages have distressed the human race, have been all owing to the want of a little wisdom, common sense and integrity, in the administration of those, whom by their stations, God had in kindness to the world, rendered able to do a great deal, for the benefit of mankind, with the exertion of a small portion of private and public vertue. Of the Political and Civil Rights of the British Colonists. HERE indeed opens to view a large field; but I must study brevity—Few people have extended their enquiries after the foundation of any of their rights, beyond a charter from the crown. There are others who think when they have got back to old Magna Charta, that they are at the beginning of all things. They imagine themselves on the borders of Chaos (and so indeed in some respects they are) and see creation rising out of the unformed mass, or from nothing. Hence, say they, spring all the rights of men and of citizens.—But liberty was better understood, and more fully enjoyed by our ancestors, before the coming in of the first Norman Tyrants than ever after, 'till it was found necessary, for the salvation of the kingdom, to combat the arbitrary and wicked proceedings of the Stuarts. The present happy and most righteous establishment is justly built on the ruins, which those Princes bro't on their Family; and two of them on their own heads—The last of the name sacrificed three of the finest kingdoms in Europe, rope, to the councils of bigotted old women, priests, and more weak and wicked ministers of state: He afterward went a grazing in the fields of St. Germains, and there died in disgrace and poverty, a terrible example of God's vengeance on arbitrary princes! The deliverance under God wrought by the prince of Orange, afterwards deservedly made King Wm. 3d. was as joyful an event to the colonies as to Great-Britain: In some of them, steps were taken in his favour as soon as in England. They all immediately acknowledged King William and Queen Mary as their lawful Sovereign. And such has been the zeal and loyalty of the colonies ever since for that establishment, and for the protestant succession in his present Majesty's illustrious family, that I believe there is not one man in an hundred (except in Canada) who does not think himself under the best national civil constitution in the world. Their loyalty has been abundantly proved, especially in the late war. Their affection and reverence for their mother country is unqestionable. They yield the most chearful and ready obedience to her laws, particularly to the power of that august body the parliament of Great-Britain, the supreme legislative of the kingdom and its dominions. These I declare are my own sentiments of duty and loyalty. I also hold it clear that the act of Queen Anne, which makes it high treason to deny "that the King with and by the authority of parliament, is able to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to limit and bind the crown, and the descent, limitation, inheritance and government thereof" is founded on the principles of liberty and the British constitution: And he that would palm the doctrine of unlimited passive obedience and non-resistance upon mankind, and thereby or by any other means serve the cause of the Pretender, is not only a fool and a knave, but a rebel against common sense, as well as the laws of God, of Nature, and his Country. I also lay it down as one of the first principles from whence I intend to deduce the civil rights of the British colonies, that all of them are subject to, and dependent on Great-Britain; and that therefore as over subordinate governments, the parliament of Great-Britain has an undoubted power and lawful authority to make acts for the general good, that by naming them, shall and ought to be equally binding, as upon the subjects of Great-Britain within the realm. This principle, I presume will be readily granted on the other side the atlantic. It has been practiced upon for twenty years to my knowledge, in the province of the Massachusetts-Bay; and I have ever received it, that it has been so from the beginning, in this and the sister provinces, thro' the continent. I am aware, some will think it is time for me to retreat, after having expressed the power of the British parliament in quite so strong terms. But 'tis from and under this very power and its acts, and from the common law, that the political and civil rights of the Colonists are derived: And upon those grand pillars of liberty shall my defence be rested. At present therefore, the reader may suppose, that there is not one provincial charter on the continent; he may, if he pleases, imagine all taken away, without fault, without forfeiture, without tryal or notice. All this really happened to some of them in the last century. I would have the reader carry his imagination still further, and suppose a time may come, when instead of a process at common law, the parliament shall give a decisive blow to every charter in America, and declare them all void. Nay it shall also be granted, that 'tis barely possible, the time may come, when the real interest of the whole may require an act of parliament to annihilate all those charters. What could follow from all this, that would shake one of the essential, natural, civil or religious rights of the Colonists? Nothing. They would be men, citizens and british subjects after all. No act of parliament can deprive them of the liberties of such, unless any will contend that an act of parliament can make slaves not only of one, but of two millions of the commonwealth. And if so, why not of the whole? I freely own, that I can find nothing in the laws of my country, that would justify the parliament in making one slave, nor did they ever professedly undertake to make one. Two or three innocent colony charters have been threatned with destruction an hundred and forty years past. I wish the present enemies of those harmless charters would reflect a moment, and be convinced that an act of parliament that should demolish those bugbears to the foes of liberty, would not reduce the Colonists to a state of absolute slavery. The worst enemies of the charter governments are by no means to be found in England. 'Tis a piece of justice due to Great-Britain to own, they are and have ever been natives of or residents in the colonies. A set of men in America, without honour or love to their country, have been long grasping at powers, which they think unattainable while these charters stand in the way. Put they will meet with insurmountable obstacles to their project for enslaving the British colonies, should those, arising from provincial charters be removed. It would indeed seem very hard and severe, for those of the colonists, who have charters, with peculiar priviledges, to loose them. They were given to their ancestors, in consideration of their sufferings and merit, in discovering and settling America. Our fore-fathers were soon worn away in the of hard labour on their little plantations, and in war with the Savages. They thought they were earning a sure inheritance for their posterity. Could they imagine it would ever be tho't just to deprive them or theirs of their charter priviledges! Should this ever be the case, there are, thank God, natural, inherent and inseperable rights as men, and as citizens, that would remain after the so much wished for catastrophe, and which, whatever became of charters, can never be abolished de jure, if de facto, till the general conflagation. Our rights as men and free born British subjects, give all the Colonists enough to make them very happy in comparison with the subjects of any other prince in the world. Every British subject born on the continent of America, or in any other of the British dominions, is by the law of God, and nature, by the common law, and by act of parliament, (exclusive of all charters from the Crown) entitled to all the natural, essential, inherent and inseparable rights of our fellow subjects in Great-Britain. Among those rights are the following, which it is humbly conceived no man or body of men, not excepting the parliament, justly, equitably and consistently with their own rights and the constitution, can take away. 1st. That the supreme and subordinate powers of legislation should be free and sacred in the hands where the community have once rightfully placed them. 2dly. The supreme national legislative cannot be altered justly 'till the commonwealth is dissolved, nor a subordinate legislative taken away without forfeiture or other good cause. Nor then can the subjects in the subordinate government be reduced to a state of slavery, and subject to the despotic rule of others. A state has no right to make slaves of the conquered. Even when the subordinate right of legislature is forfeited, and so declared, this cannot affect the natural persons either of those who were invested with it, or the inhabitants, so far as to deprive them of the rights of subjects and of men—The colonists will have an equitable right notwithstanding any such forfeiture of charter, to be represented in Parliament, or to have some new subordinate legislature among themselves. It would be best if they had both. Deprived however of their common rights as subjects, they cannot lawfully be, while they remain such. A representation in Parliament from the several Colonies, since they are become so large and numerous, as to be called on not to maintain provincial government, civil and military among themselves, for this they have chearfully done, but to contribute towards the support of a national standing army, by reason of the heavy national debt, when they themselves owe a large one, contracted in the common cause, can't be tho't an unreasonable thing, nor if asked, could it be called an immodest request. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus, has been tho't a maxim of equity. But that a man should bear a burthen for other people, as well as himself, without a return, never long found a place in any law-book or decrees, but those of the most despotic princes. Besides the equity of an American representation in parliament, a thousand advantages would result from it. It would be the most effectual means of giving those of both countries a thorough knowledge of each others interests; as well as that of the whole, which are inseparable. Were this representation allowed; instead of the scandalous memorials and depositions that have been sometimes, in days of old, privately cooked up in an inquisitorial manner, by persons of bad minds and wicked views, and sent from America to the several boards, persons of the first reputation among their countrymen, might be on the spot, from the several colonies, truly to represent them. Future ministers need not, like some of their predecessors, have recourse for information in American affairs, to every vagabond stroller, that has run or rid post thro' America, from his creditors, or to people of no kind of reputation from the colonies; some of whom, at the time of administring their sage advice, have been as ignorant of the state of this country, as of the regions in Jupiter and Saturn. No representation of the Colonies in parliament alone, would however be equivalent to a subordinate legislative among themselves; nor so well answer the ends of increasing their prosperity and the commerce of Great-Britain. It would be impossible for the parliament to judge so well, of their abilities to bear taxes, impositions on trade, and other duties and burthens, or of the local laws that might be really needful, as a legislative here. 3dly. No legislative, supreme or subordinate, has a right to make itself arbitrary. It would be a most manifest contradiction, for a free legislative, like that of Great-Britain, to make itself arbitrary. 4thly. The supreme legislative cannot justly assume a power of ruling by extempore arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice by known settled, rules, and by duly authorized independant judges. 5thly. The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property, without his consent in person, or by representation. 6thly. The legislature cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands. These are their bounds, which by God and nature are fixed, hitherto have they a right to come, and no further. 1. To govern by stated laws. 2. Those laws should have no other end ultimately, but the good of the people. 3. Taxes are not to be laid on the people, but by their consent in person, or by deputation. 4. Their whole power is not transferable. These are the first principles of law and justice, and the great barriers of a free state, and of the British constitution in particular. I ask, I want to more—Now let it be shows how 'tis reconcileable with these principles, or to many other fundamental maxims of the British constitution, as well as the natural and civil rights, which by the laws of their country, all British subjects are intitled to, as their best inheritance and birth-right, that all the northern colonies, who are without one representative in the house of Commons, should be taxed by the British parliament. That the colonists, black and white, born here, are free born British subjects, and entitled to all the essential civil rights of such, is a truth not only manifest from the provincial charters, from the principles of the common law, and acts of parliament; but from the British constitution, which was re-established at the revolution, with a professed design to secure the liberties of all the subjects to all generations. In the 12 and 13 of Wm. cited above, the liberties of the subject are spoken of as their best birth-rights—No one ever dreamt, surely, that these liberties were confined to the realm. At that rate, no British subjects in the dominions could, without a manifest contradiction, be declared entitled to all the privileges of subjects born within the realm, to all intents and purposes, which are rightly given foreigners, by parliament, after residing seven years. These expressions of parliament, as well as of the charters, must be vain and empty sounds, unless we are allowed the essential rights of our fellow-subjects in Great-Britain. Now can there be any liberty, where property is taken away without consent? Can it with any colour of truth, justice or equity, be affirmed, that the northern colonies are represented in parliament? Has this whole continent of near three thousand miles in length, and in which and his other American dominions, his Majesty has, or very soon will have, some millions of as good, loyal and useful subjects, white and black, as any in the three kingdoms, the election of one member of the house of commons? Is there the least difference, as to the consent of the Colonists, whether taxes and impositions are laid on their trade, and other property, by the crown alone, or by the parliament. As it is agreed on all hands, the Crown alone cannot impose them, we should be justifiable in refusing to pay them, but must and ought to yield obedience to an act of parliament, tho' erroneous, 'till repealed. I can see no reason to doubt, but that the imposition, of taxes, whether on trade, or on land, or houses, or ships, on real or personal, fixed or floating property, in the colonies, is absolutely irreconcileable with the rights of the Colonists, as British subjects, and as men. I say men, for in a state of nature, no man can take my property from me, without my consent: If he does, he deprives me of my liberty, and makes me a slave. If such a proceeding is a breach of the law of nature, no law of society can make it just—The very act of taxing, exercised over those who are not represented, appears to me to be depriving them of one of their most essential rights, as freemen; and if continued, seems to be in effect an entire distranchisement of every civil right. For what one civil right is worth a rush, after a man's property is subject to be taken from him at pleasure, without his consent. If a man is not his own assessor in person, or by deputy, his liberty is gone, or lays intirely at the mercy of others. I think I have heard it said, that when the Dutch are asked why they enslave their colonies, their answer is, that the liberty of Dutchmen is confined to Holland; and that it was never intended for Provincials in America, of any where else. A sentiment this, very worthy of modern Dutchmen; but if their brave and worthy ancestors had entertained such narrow ideas of liberty, seven poor and distressed provinces would never have asserted their rights against the whole Spanish monarchy, of which the present is but a shadow. It is to be hoped, none of our fellow subjects of Britain, great or small, have borrowed this Dutch maxim of plantation politics; if they have, they had better return it from whence it came; indeed they had. Modern Dutch or French maxims of state, never will suit with a British constitution. It is a maxim, that the King can do no wrong; and every good subject is bound to believe his King is not inclined to do any. We are blessed with a prince who has given abundant demonstrations, that in all his actions, he studies the good of his people, and the true glory of his crown, which are inseparable. It would therefore, be the highest degree of impudence and disloyalty to imagine that the King, at the head of his parliament, could have any, but the most pure and perfect intentions of justice, goodness and truth, that human nature is capable of. All this I say and believe of the King and parliament, in all their acts; even in that which so nearly affects the interest of the colonists; and that a most perfect and ready obedience is to be yielded to it, while it remains in force. I will go further, and readily admit, that the intention of the, ministry was not only to promote the public good, by this act; but that Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer had therein a particular view to the "ease, the quiet, and the good will of the Colonies," he having made this declaration more than once. Yet I hold that 'tis possible he may have erred in his kind intentions towards the Colonies, and taken away our fish, and given us a stone. With regard to the parliament, as infallability belongs not to mortals, 'tis possible they may have been misinformed and deceived. The power of parliament is uncontroulable, but by themselves, and we must obey. They only can repeal their own acts. There would be an end of all government, if one or a number of subjects or subordinate provinces should take upon them so far to judge of the justice of an act of parliament, as to refuse obedience to it. If there was nothing else to restrain such a step, prudence ought to do it, for forceably resisting the parliament and the King's laws, is high treason. Therefore let the parliament lay what burthens they please on us, we must, it is our duty to submit and patiently bear them, till they will be pleased to relieve us. And tis to be presumed, the wisdom and justice of that august assembly, always will afford us relief by repealing such acts, as through mistake, or other human infirmities, have been suffered to pass, if they can be convinced that their proceedings are not constitutional, or not for the common good. The parliament may be deceived, they may have been misinformed of facts, and the colonies may in many respects be misrepresented to the King, his parliament, and his ministry. In some instances, I am well assured the colonies have been very strangely misrepresented in England. I have now before me a pamphlet, called the "administration of the colonies," said to be written by a gentleman who formerly commanded in chief in one of them. I suppose this book was designed for public information and use. There are in it many good regulations proposed, which no power can enforce but the parliament. From all which I infer, that if our hands are tied by the passing of an act of parliament, our mouths are not stoped, provided we speak of that transcendent body with decency, as I have endeavoured always to do; and should any thing have escaped me, or hereafter fall from my pen, that bears the least aspect but that of obedience, duty and loyalty to the King—parliament, and the highest respect for the ministry, the candid will impute it to the agony of my heart, rather than to the pravity of my will. If I have one ambitious wish, 'tis to see Great-Britain at the head of the world, and to see my King, under God, the father of mankind. I pretend neither to the spirit of prophecy, nor any uncommon skill in predicting a Crisis, much less to tell when it begins to be "nascent" or is fairly midwiv'd into the world. But if I were to fix a meaning to the two first paragraphs of the administration of the colonies, tho' I do not collect it from them, I should say the world was at the eve of the highest scene of earthly power and grandeur that has been ever yet displayed to the view of mankind. The cards are shuffling fast thro' all Europe. Who will win the prize is with God. This however I know, detur digniori. The next universal monarchy will be favourable to the human race, for it must be founded on the principles of equity, moderation and justice. No country has been more distinguished for these principles than Great-Britain, since the revolution. I take it, every subject has a right to give his sentiments to the public, of the utility or inutility of any act whatsoever, even after it is passed, as well as while it is pending.—The equity and justice of a bill may be questioned, with perfect submission to the legislature. Reasons may be given, why an act ought to be repeal'd, & yet obedience must be yielded to it till that repeal takes place. If the reasons that can be given against an act, are such as plainly demonstrate that it is against natural equity, the executive courts will adjudge such act void. It may be questioned by some, tho' I make no doubt of it, whether they are not obliged by their oaths to adjudge such act void. If there is not a right of private judgment to be exercised, so far at least as to petition for a repeal, or to determine the expediency of risking a trial at law, the parliament might make itself arbitrary, which it is conceived it can not by the constitution.—I think every man has a right to examine as freely into the origin, spring and foundation of every power and measure in a commonwealth, as into a piece of curious machinery, or a remarkable phenomenon in nature; and that it ought to give no more offence to say, the parliament have erred, or are mistaken, in a matter of fact or of right, than to say it of a private man, if it is true of both. If the assertion can be proved with regard to either, it is a kindness done them to show them the truth. With regard to the public, it is the duty of every good citizen to point out what he thinks erroneous in the common-wealth. I have waited years in hopes to see some one friend of the colonies pleading in publick for them. I have waited in vain. One priviledge is taken away after another, and where we shall be landed, God knows, and I trust will protect and provide for us even should we be driven and persecuted into a more western wilderness, on the score of liberty, civil and religions, as many of our ancestors were, to these once inhospitable shores of America. I had formed great expectations from a gentleman, who published his first volume in quarto on the rights of the colonies two years since; but, as he foresaw, the state of his health and affairs have prevented his further progress. The misfortune is, gentlemen in America, the best qualified in every respect to state the rights of the colonists, have reasons that prevent them from engaging: Some of them have good ones. There are many infinitely better able to serve this cause than I pretend to be; but from indolence, from timidity, or by necessary engagements, they are prevented. There has been a most profound, and I think shameful silence, till it seems almost too late to assert our indisputable rights as men and as citizens. What must posterity think of us. The trade of the whole continent taxed by parliament, stamps and other internal duties and taxes as they are called, talked of, and not one petition to the King and Parliament for relief. I cannot but observe here, that if the parliament have an equitable right to tax our trade, 'tis indisputable that they have as good an one to tax the lands, and every thing else. The taxing trade furnishes one reason why the other should be taxed, or else the burdens of the province will be unequally born, upon a supposition that a tax on trade is not a tax on the whole. But take it either way, there is no foundation for the distinction some make in England, between an internal and an external tax on the colonies. By the first is meant a tax on trade, by the latter a tax on land, and the things on it. A tax on trade is either a tax of every man in the province, or 'tis not. If 'tis not a tax on the whole, 'tis unequal and unjust, that a heavy burden should be laid on the trade of the colonies, to maintain an army of soldiers, custom-house officers, and fleets of guard-ships; all which, the incomes of both trade and land would not furnish means to support so lately as the last war, when all was at stake, and the colonies were reimbursed in part by parliament. How can it be supposed that all of a sudden the trade of the colonies alone can bear all this terrible burden. The late acquisitions in America, as glorious as they have been, and as beneficial as they are to Great-Britain, are only a security to these colonies against the ravages of the French and Indians. Our trade upon the whole is not, I beliave, benefited by them one groat. All the time the French Islands were in our hands, the fine sugars, &c, were all shipped home. None as I have been informed were allowed to be bro't to the colonies. They were too delicious a morsel for a North American palate. If it be said that a tax on the trade, of the colonies is an equal and just tax on the whole of the inhabitants: What then becomes of the notable distinction between external and internal taxes? Why may not the parliament lay stamps, land taxes, establish tythes to the church of England, and so indefinitely. I know of no bounds. I do not mention the tythes out of any disrespect to the church of England, which I esteem by far the best national church, and to have had as ornaments of it many of the greatest and best men in the world. But to those colonies who in general dissent from a principle of conscience, it would seem a little hard to pay towards the support of a worship, whose modes they cannot conform to. If an army must be kept up in America, at the expence of the colonies, it would not seem quite so hard if after the parliament had determined the sum to be raised, and apportioned it, to have allowed each colony to assess its quota, and raise it as easily to themselves as might be. But to have the whole levied and collected without our consent is extraordinary. 'Tis allowed even to tributaries, and those laid under military contribution, to assess and collect the sums demanded. The case of the provinces is certainly likely to be the hardest that can be instanced in story. Will it not equal any thing but down right military execution? Was there ever a tribute imposed even on the conquered? A fleet, an army of soldiers, and another of tax-gatherers kept up, and not a single office either for securing or collecting the duty in the gift of the tributary state. I am aware it will be objected, that the parliament of England, and of Great Britain, since the union, have from early days to this time, made acts to bind if not to tax Ireland: I answer, Ireland is a conquered country. I do not, however, lay so much stress on this; for it is my opinion, that a conquered country has, upon submission and good behaviour, the same right to be free, under a conqueror, as the rest of his subjects. But the old notion of the right of conquest, has been, in most nations, the cause of many severities and heinous breaches of the law of nature: If any such have taken place with regard to Ireland, they should form no precedent for the colonies. The subordination and dependency of Ireland to Great Britain, is expresly declared by act of parliament, in the reign of G. 1st. The subordination of the Colonies to Great Britain, never was doubted, by a Lawyer, if at all; unless perhaps by the author of the administration of the colonies: He indeed seems to make a moot point of it, whether the colony legislative power is as independent "as the legislative Great Britain holds by its constitution, and under the great charter."—The people hold under the great charter, as 'tis vulgarly expressed from our law-books: But that the King and parliament should be said to hold under Magna Charta, is as new to me, as it is to question whether the colonies are subordinate to Great Britain. The provincial legislative is unquestionably subordinate to that of Great Britain. I shall endeavour more fully to explain the nature of that subordination, which has puzzled so many in their enquiries. It is often very difficult for great lovers of power and great lovers of liberty, neither of whom may have been used to the study of law, in any of its branches, to see the difference between subordination, absolute slavery and subjection, on one side; and liberty, independence and licenciousness, on the other. We should endeavour to find the middle road, and confine ourselves to it. The laws, the proceedings of parliament, and the decisions of the judges, relating to Ireland, will reflect light on this subject, rendered intricate only by art. "Ireland being of itself a distinct dominion, and no part of the kingdom of England (as it directly appeareth by many authorities in Calvin's case) was to have PARLIAMENTS holden there as in England." 4 Inst. 349. Why should not the colonies have, why are they not entitled to their assemblies, or parliaments, at least, as well as a conquered dominion? "Wales, after the conquest of it, by Edward the first, was annexed to England, jure proprietatis, 12 Ed. 1. by the statute of Rutland only, and after, more really by 27 H. 8. and 34, but at first received laws from England, as Ireland did; but writs proceeded not out of the English chancery, but they had a Chancery of their own, as Ireland hath; was not bound by the laws of England, unnamed until 27 H. 8. no more than Ireland is. Ireland in nothing differs from it, but having a parliament gratia Regis (i.e. upon the old notion, of conquest) subject (truly however) to the parliament of England. None doubts Ireland as much conquered as it; and as much subject to the parliament of England, if it please." Vaughan, 300. A very strong argument arises from this authority, in favour of the unconquered plantations. If since Wales was annexed to England, they have had a representation in parliament, as they have to this day; and if the parliament of England does not tax Ireland, can it be right they should tax us, who have never been conquered, but came from England to colonize, and have always remained good subjects to this day? I cannot find any instance of a tax laid by the English parliament on Ireland. "Sometimes the King of England called his Nobles of Ireland, to come to his parliament of England, &c, and by special words, the parliament of England may bind the subjects of Ireland"—3 Inst.350.— The following makes it clear to me, the parliament of Great Britain do not tax Ireland. "The parliament of Ireland having been prorogued to the month of August next, before they had provided for the maintenance of the government in that kingdom, a project was set on foot here to supply that defect, by retrenching the drawbacks upon goods exported thither from England. According to this scheme, the 22d, the house in a grand committee, considered the present laws with respect to drawbacks upon tobaccoes, muslins, and East India silks, carried to Ireland; and came to two resolutions, which were reported the next day, and with an amendment to one of them agreed to by the house, as follows, Viz. 1. That three pence pr pound, part of the drawback on tobacco to be exported from Great Britain for Ireland, be taken off. 2. That the said diminution of the drawback do take effect upon all tobacco exported for Ireland, after the 24 of March 1713, and continue until the additional duty of three pence half penny per pound upon tobacco in Ireland, expiring on the said 24th of March, be regranted: And ordered a bill to be brought in, upon the said resolutions." Proceedings of House of Commons, Vol. 5. 72. This was constitutional; there is an infinite difference between taking off British drawbacks, and imposing Irish or other Provincial duties. "Ireland is considered as a provincial government, subordinate to, but no part of the Realm of England," Mich. 11. G. 2. in case of Otway and Ramsay—"Acts of parliament made here, (i.e. in England) extend not to Ireland, unless particularly named; much less judgments obtained in the courts here; nor is it possible they should, because we have no officers to carry them into execution there." ib. The first part seems to be applicable to the plantations in general, the latter is not; for by reason of charter reservations and particular acts of parliament, some judgments in England may be executed here, as final judgments, before his Majesty in council on a plantation appeal, and so from the admiralty. It seems to have been disputed in Ireland, so lately as the 6 Geo. 1. Whether any act of the British parliament bound Ireland; or at least it was apprehended, that the undoubted right of the British parliament to bind Ireland, was in danger of being shaken: This, I presume, occasioned the act of that year, which declares, that "the kingdom of Ireland ought to be subordinate unto and dependent upon the Imperial Crown of Great Britain, as being inseparably united thereto. And the King's Majesty, with the consent of the lords and commons of Great Britain in parliament, hath power to make laws to bind the people of Ireland."—This parliamentary power must have some bounds, even as to Ireland, as well as the colonies, who are admitted to be subordinate ab initio to Great Britain; not as conquered, but as emigrant subjects. If this act should be said to be a declaration not only of the general, but of the universal power of parliament, and that they may tax Ireland, I ask, Why it has never been done? If it had been done a thousand times, it would be a contradiction to the principles of a free government; and what is worse, destroy all subordination consistent with freedom, and reduce the people to slavery. To say the parliament is absolute and arbitrary, is a contradiction. The parliament cannot make 2 and 2,5: Omnipotency cannot do it. The supreme power in a state, is jus dicere only:—jus dare, strictly speaking, belongs alone to GOD. Parliaments are in all cases to declare what is for the good of the whole; but it is not the declaration of parliament that makes it so: There must be in every instance, a higher authority, viz. GOD. Should an act of parliament be against any of his natural laws, which are immutably true, their declaration would be contrary to eternal truth, equity and justice, and consequently void: and so it would be adjudged by the parliament itself, when convinced of their mistake. Upon this great principle, parliaments repeal such acts, as soon as they find they have been mistaken, in having declared them to be for the public good, when in fact they were not so. When such mistake is evident and palpable, as in the instances in the appendix, the judges of the executive courts have declared the act "of a whole parliament void." See here the grandeur of the British constitution! See the wisdom of our ancestors! The supreme legislative, and the supreme executive, are a perpetual check and balance to each other. If the supreme executive errs, it is informed by the supreme legislative in parliament: If the supreme legislative errs, it is informed by the supreme executive in the King's courts of law.—Here, the King appears, as represented by his judges, in the highest lustre and majesty, as supreme executor of the commonwealth; and he never shines brighter, but on his Throne, at the head of the supreme legislative. This is government! This, is a constitution! to preserve which, either from foreign or domestic foes, has cost oceans of blood and treasure in every age; and the blood and the treasure have upon the whole been well spent. British America, hath been bleeding in this cause from its settlement: We have spent all we could raise, and more; for notwithstanding the parliamentary reimbursements of part, we still remain much in debt. The province of the Massachusetts, I believe, has expended more men and money in war since the year 1620, when a few families first landed at Plymouth, in proportion to their ability, than the three Kingdoms together. The same, I believe, may be truly affirmed, of many of the other colonies; tho' the Massachusetts has undoubtedly had the heaviest burthen. This may be thought incredible: but materials are collecting; and tho' some are lost, enough may remain, to demonstrate it to the world. I have reason to hope at least, that the public will soon see such proofs exhibited, as will show, that I do not speak quite at random. Why then is it thought so heinous by the author of the administration of the colonies, and others, that the colonists should aspire after "a one whole legislative power" not independent of, but subordinate to the laws and parliament of Great-Britain?—It is a mistake in this author, to bring so heavy a charge as high treason against some of the colonists, which he does in effect in this place, by representing them as "claiming in fact or indeed, the same full free independent unrestrained power and legislative will, in their several corporations, and under the King's commission, and their respective charters, as the government and legislature of Great-Britain holds by its constitution and under the great charter." No such claim was ever tho't of by any of the colonists. They are all better men and better subjects; and many of them too well versed in the laws of nature and nations, and the law and constitution of Great-Britain, to think they have a right to more than a provincial subordinate legislative. All power is of GOD. Next and only subordinate to him, in the present state of the well-formed, beautifully constructed British monarchy, standing where I hope it ever will stand, for the pillars are fixed in judgment, righteousness and truth, is the King and Parliament. Under these, it seems easy to conceive subordinate powers in gradation, till we descend to the legislative of a town council, or even a private social club. These have each "a one whole legislative" subordinate, which, when it don't counteract the laws of any of its superiors, is to be indulged. Even when the laws of subordination are transgressed, the superior does not destroy the subordinate, but will negative its acts, as it may in all cases when disapproved. This right of negative is essential, and may be inforced: But in no case are the essential rights of the subjects, inhabiting the subordinate dominions, to be destroyed. This would put it in the power of the superior to reduce the inferior to a state of slavery; which cannot be rightfully done, even with conquered enemies and rebels. After satisfaction and security is obtained of the former, and examples are made of so many of the latter, as the ends of government require, the rest are to be restored to all the essential rights of men and of citizens. This is the great law of nature: and agreeable to this law, is the constant practice of all good and mild governments. This lenity and humanity has no where been carried further than in Great Britain. The Colonies have been so remarkable for loyalty, that there never has been any instance of rebellion or treason in them. This loyalty is in very handsome terms acknowledged by the author of the administration of the colonies. "It has been often suggested that care should be taken in the administration of the plantations, left, in some future time, these colonies should become independent of the mother country. But perhaps it may be proper on this occasion, nay, it is justice to say it, that if, by becoming independent, is meant a revolt, nothing is further from their nature, their interest, their thoughts. If a defection from the alliance of the mother country be suggested, it ought to be, and can be truly said, that their spirit abhors the sense of such; their attachment to the protestant succession in the house of Hanover, will ever stand unshaken; and nothing can eradicate from their hearts their natural and almost mechanical, affection to Great Britain, which they conceive under no other sense, nor call by any other name than that of home. Any such suggestion, therefore, is a false and unjust aspersion on their principles and affections; and can arise from nothing but an intire ignorance of their circumstances." After all this loyalty, it is a little hard to be charged with claiming, and represented as aspiring after, independency. The inconsistency of this I leave. We have said that the loyalty of the colonies has never been suspected; this must be restricted to a just suspicion. For it seems there have long been groundless suspicions of us in the minds of individuals. And there have always been those who have endeavoured to magnify these chimerical fears. I find Mr. Dummer complaining of this many years since. "There is, says he, one thing more I have heard often urged against the charter colonies and indeed tis what one meets with from people of all conditions and qualities, tho' with due respect to their better judgments, I can see neither reason nor colour for it. 'Tis said that their increasing numbers and wealth, joined to their great distance from Britain, will give them an opportunity, in the course of some years, to throw off their dependence on the nation, and declare themselves a free state, if not curb'd in time, by being made enirely subject to the crown." This jealousy has been so long talked of, that many seem to believe it really well grounded. Not that there is danger of a "revolt", even in the opinion of the author of the administration, but that the colonists will by fraud or force, avail themselves, in "fact or in deed", of an independent legislature. This, I think, would be a revolting with a vengeance. What higher revolt can there be, than for a province to assume the right of an independent legislative, or state? I must therefore think this a greater aspersion on the Colonists, than to charge them with a design to revolt, in the sense in which the Gentleman allows they have been abused: It is a more artful and dangerous way of attacking our liberties, than to charge us with being in open rebellion. That could be confuted instantly: but this seeming indirect way of charging the colonies, with a desire of throwing off their dependency, requires more pains to confute it than the other, therefore it has been recurred to. The truth is, Gentlemen have had departments in America, the functions of which they have not been fortunate in executing. The people have by these means been rendered uneasy, at bad Provincial measures. They have been represented as factious, seditious, and inclined to democracy, whenever they have refused passive obedience to provincial mandates, as arbitrary as those of a Turkish Bashaw: I say, Provincial mandates; for to the King and Parliament they have been ever submissive and obedient. These representations of us, many of the good people of England swallow with as much ease, as they would a bottle-bubble, or any other story of a cock and a bull; and the worst of it is, among some of the most credulous, have been found Stars and Garters. However, they may all rest assured, the Colonists, who do not pretend to understand themselves so well as the people of England; tho' the author of the Administration makes them the fine compliment, to say, they "know their business much better," yet, will never think of independency. Were they inclined to it, they know the blood and the treasure it would cost, if ever effected; and when done, it would be a thousand to one if their liberties did not fall a sacrifice to the victor. We all think ourselves happy under Great-Britain. We love, esteem and reverence our mother country, and adore our King. And could the choice of independency be offered the colonies, or subjection to Great-Britain upon any terms above absolute slavery. I am convinced they would accept the latter. The ministry, in all future generations may rely on it, that British America will never prove undutiful, till driven to it, as the last fatal resort against ministerial oppression, which will make the wisest mad, and the weakest strong. These colonies are and always have been, "entirely subject to the crown," in the legal sense of the terms. But if any politician of " tampering activity, of wrongheaded inexperience, misled to be meddling," means, by "curbing the colonies in time," and by "being made entirely subject to the crown;" that this subjection should be absolute, and confined to the crown, he had better have suppressed his wishes. This never will nor can be done, without making the colonists vassals of the crown. Subjects they are; their lands they hold of the crown, by common soccage, the freest feudal tennure, by which any hold their lands in England, or any where else. Would these gentlemen carry us back to the state of the Goths and Vandals, and revive all the military tenures and bondage which our fore-fathers could not bear? It may be worth noting here, that few if any instances can be given, where colonies have been disposed to forsake or disobey a tender mother: But history is full of examples, that armies stationed as guards over provinces, have seized the prey for their general, and given him a crown at the expence of his master. Are all ambitious generals dead? Will no more rise up hereafter? The danger of a standing army in remote provinces is much greater to the metropolis, than at home. Rome found the truth of this assertion; in her Sylla's, her Pompey's and Caesars; but she found it too late: Eighteen hundred years have roll'd away since her ruin. A continuation of the same liberties that have been enjoyed by the colonists since the revolution, and the same moderation of government exercised towards them, will bind them in perpetual lawful and willing subjection, obedience and love to Great-Britain: She and her colonies will both prosper and flourish: The monarchy will remain in sound health and full vigor at that blessed period, when the proud arbitrary tyrants of the continent shall either unite in the deliverance of the human race, or resign their crowns. Rescued, human nature must and will be, from the general slavery that has so long triumphed over the species. Great-Britain has done much towards it: What a Glory will it be for her to complete the work throughout the world! The author of the Administration (page 54) "describes" the defects of the "provincial courts," by a "very description," the first trait of which is, "The ignorance of the judges." Whether the description, or the description of the description, are verily true, either as applied by Lord Hale, or the Administrator, is left to the reader. I only ask, who makes the judges in the provinces? I know of but two colonies, viz. Connecticut and Rhode-Island, where they are chosen by the people. In all other colonies, they are either immediately appointed by the crown, or by his Majesty's governor, with the advice of what the Administrator calls, the "governor's council of state." And if they are in general such ignorant creatures, as the Administrator describes them, 'tis the misfortune, not the fault, of the people, in the colonies. However, I believe, justice in general, is as well administred in the colonies, as it will be when every thing is devolved upon a court of admiralty, general or provincial. The following is very remarkable. "In those popular governments, and where every executive officer is under a dependence for a temporary, wretched, and I had almost said arbitrary support, on the deputies of the people." Why is the temporary support found fault with? Would it be wise to give a governor a salary for a longer time than his political life? As this is quite as uncertain, as his natural life, it has been granted annually. So every governor has the chance of one year's salary after he is dead. All the King's officers, are not even in the charter provinces "dependent on the people" for support. The judges of the admiralty, those mirrors of justice, to be trusted, when none of the common law courts are, have all their commissions from home. These, besides other fees, have so much per cent on all they condemn, be it right or wrong, and this by act of parliament. Yet so great is their integrity, that it never was suspected that 50 per cent, if allowed, would have any influence on their decrees. Custom-house officers universally, and Naval-officers, in all but two or three of the colonies, are, I believe, appointed directly from home, or by instruction to the Governor: and take just what they please, for any restraint they are under by the provincial acts. But on whom should a Governor depend for his honorable support, but the people? Is not the King fed from the field, and from the labor of his people? Does not his Majesty himself receive his aids from the free grant of his parliament? Do not all these originate in the house of commons? Did the house of Lords ever originate a grant? Do not our law books inform us that the Lords only assent or dissent, but never so much as propose an amendment, on a money bill? The King can take no more than the Parliament will give him, and yet some of his Governors have tho't it an insufferable hardship, that they could not take what they pleased. To take leave of the administrator, there are in his book some good hints, but a multiplicity of mistakes in fact, and errors in matters of right, which I have not time to mention particularly. Ireland is a conquered kingdom; and yet have tho't they received very hard measure in some of the prohibitions and restrictions of their trade. But were the colonies ever conquered? Have they not been subject and obedient, and loyal from their settlement? Were not the settlements made under the British laws and constitution? But if the colonies were all to be considered as conquered, they are entitled to the essential rights of men and citizens. And therefore admitting the right of prohibition, in its utmost extent and latitude; a right of taxation can never be infer'd from that. It may be for the good of the whole, that a certain commodity should be prohibited: But this power should be exercised, with great moderation and impartiality, over dominions, which are not represented, in the national parliament. I had however rather see this carried with a high hand, to the utmost rigor, than have a tax of one shilling taken from me without my consent. A people may be very happy, free and easy among themselves, without a particular branch of foreign trade: I am sure these colonies, have the natural means of every manufacture in Europe, and some that are out of their power to make or produce. It will scarcely be believed a hundred years hence, that the American manufactures could have been brought to such perfection, as they will then probably be in, if the present measures are pushed. One single act of parliament, we find has set people a thinking, in six months, more than they had done in their whole lives before. It should be remembred, that the most famous and flourishing manufactures, of wool, in France, were begun by Lewis, 14, not an hundred years ago; and they now bid fair to rival the English, in every port abroad. All the manufactures that Great-Britain could make, would be consumed in America, and in her own plantations, if put on a right footing; for which a greater profit in return would be made, than she will ever see again for woollen sent to any part of Europe. But tho' it be allow'd, that liberty may be enjoy'd in a comfortable measure, where prohibitions are laid on the trade of a kingdom or province; yet if taxes are laid on either, without consent, they cannot be said to be free. This barrier of liberty being once broken down, all is lost. If a shilling in the pound may be taken from me against my will, why may not twenty shillings; and if so, why not my liberty or my life? Merchants were always particularly favor'd by the common law—"All merchants, except enemies, may safely come into England, with their goods and merchandize"—2 Inst. 28.—And why not as well to the plantations? Are they not entitled to all the British privileges? No, they must be confined in their imports and exports, to the good of the metropolis. Very well we have submitted to this. The act of navigation is a good act, so are all that exclude foreign manufactures from the plantations, and every honest man will readily subscribe to them. Moreover, "Merchant strangers, are also to come into the realm and depart at pleasure; and they are to be friendly entertained." 2 Ri. C. 1. But to promote the manufactures of England, 'tis tho't best to shut up the colonies in a manner from all the world. Right as to Europe: But for GOD's sake, must we have no trade with other colonies? In some cases the trade between British colony and colony is prohibited, as in wool, &c. Granting all this to be right, is it not enough? No, duties and taxes must be paid without any consent or representation in parliament. The common law, that inestimable privilege of a jury, is also taken away in all trials in the colonies, relating to the revenue, if the informers have a mind to go the admiralty; as they ever have done, and ever will do, for very obvious reasons. "It has ever been boasted, says Mr. Dummer in his defence of the charters, as the peculiar privilege of an Englishman, and the security of his property, to be tryed by his country, and the laws of the land: Whereas this admiralty method deprives him of both, as it puts his estate in the disposal of a single person, and makes, the civil law the rule of judgment; which tho' it may not properly be called foreign, being the law of nations, yet 'tis what he has not consented to himself, nor his representative for him. A jurisdiction therefore so founded, ought not to extend beyond what necessity requires"—"If some bounds are not set to the jurisdiction of the admiralty, beyond which it shall not pass, it may in time, like the element to which it ought to be confin'd, grow outrageous, and overflow the banks of all the other courts of justice." I believe it has never been doubted by one sound, common lawyer of England, whether a court of admiralty ever answer'd many good ends; "the court of King's bench has a power to restrain the court of admiralty in England; and the reasons for such restraining power are as strong in New England as in Great-Britain," and in some respects more so: Yet Mr. Dummer mentions, a clamour that was raised at home by a judge of the admiralty for New England, who complain'd "that the common law courts by granting prohibitions, weaken, and in a manner suppress the authority of this court, and all the good ends for which it was constituted." Thus we see, that the court of admiralty long ago discover'd, no very friendly disposition towards the common law courts here; and the records of the house of Representatives afford us a notable instance of one, who was expelled the house, of which he, had been an unworthy member, for the abusive misrepresentations of the province, by him secretly made. Trade and traffick, says, lord Coke, "is the livelihood of a merchant, the life of the commonwealth, wherein the King and every subject hath interest; for the merchant is the good Bailiff of the realm, to export and vent the native commodities of the realm, and to import and bring in, the necessary commodities for the defence and benefit of the Realm—2 Inst. 28. reading on Magna Charta. C. 15—And are not the merchants of British America entitled to a livelihood also? Are they not British subjects? Are not an infinity of commodities carried from hence for the benefit of the realm, for which in return come an infinity of trifles, which we could do without? Manufactures we must go into if our trade is cut off; our country is too cold to go naked in, and we shall soon be unable to make returns to England even for necessaries. "When any law or custom of parliament is broken, and the crown possessed of a precedent, how difficulty a thing is it to restore the subject again to his former freedom and safety?" 2 Inst, on the confirmation of the great charter—which provides in these words: "And for so much as divers people of our realm, are in fear, that the aids and tasks which they have given to us before time, towards our wars, and other business of their own grant and good will (howsoever they were made) might turn to a bondage to them and their heirs, because they might be at another time found in the rolls, and likewise for the prices taken throughout the realm by our ministers; We have granted for us and our heirs, that we shall not draw such aids, tasks nor prices into a custom, for any thing that hath been done heretofore, be it by roll, or any other precedent that may be founden." By the first chapter of this act, the great charter is declared to be the common law. I would ask, whether we have not reason to fear, that the great aids, freely given by these provinces in the late war, will in like manner turn to our bondage, if they are to be kept on and increased during a peace, for the maintenance of a standing army here?—If tis said those aids were given for our own immediate defence, and that England spent millions in the same cause; I answer; The names of his present Majesty, and his royal Grand-father, will be ever dear to every loyal British American, for the protection they afforded us, and the salvation, under God, effected by their arms; but with regard to our fellow-subjects of Britain, we never were a whit behind hand with them. The New England Colonies in particular, were not only settled without the least expence to the mother country, but they have all along defended themselves against the frequent incursions of the most inhuman Salvages, perhaps on the face of the whole earth, at their own cost: Those more than brutal men, spirited and dircted by the most inveterate, as well as most powerful enemy of Great Britain, have been constantly annoying our infant settlements for more than a century; spreading terror and desolation, and sometimes depopulating whole villages in a night: yet amidst the fatigues of labor, and the horrors of war and bloodshed, Heaven vouchsaf'd its smiles. Behold, an extensive territory, settled, defended, and secured to his Majesty, I repeat it, without the least expence to the mother country, till within twenty years past!—When Louisbourg was reduced to his late Majesty, by the valor of his New-England subjects, the 'parliament, it must be own'd, saw meet to refund part of the charges: And every one knows the importance of Louisbourg, in the consultations of Aix la Chapple; but for the loss of our young men, the riches and strength of a country, not indeed slain by the enemy, but overborn by the uncommon hardships of the siege, and their confinement in garrison afterwards, there could be no recompence made.—In the late war, the northern colonies not only rais'd their full quota of men, but they went even beyond their ability they are still deeply in debt, notwithstanding the parliamentary grants, annually made them, in part of their expences, in the common, national, cause; Had it not been for those grants, they had all been bankrupt long ago; while the sugar colonies, have born little or no share in it: They indeed sent a company or two of Negroes and Molattoes, if this be worth mentioning, to the sieges of Gaudaloupe, Martineco and the Havanna: I do not recollect any thing else that they have done; while the flower of our youth were annually pressed by ten thousands into the service, and there treated but little better, as we have been told, than hewers of wood and drawers of water. Provincial acts for impressing were obtained, only by letters of requisition from a secretary of state to Governor; requiring him to use his influence to raise men; and sometimes, more than were asked for a wanted, were pressed, to give a figure to Governor, and shew his influence; a remarkable instance of which might be mentioned. I would further observe, that Great-Britain was as immediately interested in the late war in America, as the colonies, were. Was she not threatned with an invasion at the same time we were? Has she not an immense trade to the colonies? The British writers say, more than half her profitable trade is to America; All the profits of our trade center there, and is little enough to pay for the goods we import. A prodigious revenue arises to the Crown on American exports to Great-Britain, which in general is not murmured at: No manufacture of Europe besides British, can be lawfully, bro't here; and no honest man desires they ever should, if the laws were put in execution upon all. With regard to a few Dutch imports that have made such a noise, the truth is, very little has been or could be run, before the apparatus of guardships; for the officers of some ports did their duty, while others may have made a monopoly of smuggling, for a few of their friends, who probably paid them large contributions; for it has been observed, that a very small office in the customs in America has raised a man a fortune sooner than a Government. The truth is the acts of trade have been too often evaded; but by whom? Not by the American merchants in general, but by some former custom-house officers, their friends, and partizans. I name no man, not being about to turn informer: But it has been a notorious grievance, that when the King himself cannot dispense with an act of parliament, there have been custom-house officers who have practised it for years together, in favor of those towards whom they were graciously disposed. But to return to the subject of taxation: I find that "the lords and commons cannot be charged with any thing for the defence of the realm, for the safe-guard of the sea, &c. unless by their will in parliament." Ld. Coke, on Magna Charta, Cap. 30. "Impositions neither in time of war, or other the greatest necessity or occasion, that may be, much less in the time of peace, neither upon foreign or inland commodities, of what nature soever, be they never so superfluous or unnecessary, neither upon merchants, strangers, nor denizens, may be laid by the King's absolute power, without assent of parliament, be it never for so short a time." Viner Prerogative of the King, Ea. 1. cites 2 Molloy. 320. Cap. 12. sec. 1. "In the reign of Edward 3. the black Prince of Wales having Aquitain granted to him, did lay an imposition of fuage or focage a oco, upon his subjects of that dukedom, viz. a shilling for every fire, called hearth silver, which was of so great discontentment and odious to them, that it made them revolt. And nothing since this time has been imposed by pretext of any prerogative, upon merchandizes, imported into or exported out of this realm, until Queen Mary's time." 2 Inst. 61. Nor has any thing of that kind taken place since the revolution. King Charles 1. his ship-money every one has heard of. It may be said that these authorities will not serve the colonists, because the duties laid on them are by parliament. I acknowledge the difference of fact; but cannot see the great difference in equity, while the colonists are not represented in the house of commons: And therefore with all humble deference I apprehend, that 'till the colonists are so represented, the spirit of all these authorities will argue strongly in their favour. When the parliament shall think fit to allow the colonists a representation in the house of commons, the equity of their taxing the colonies, will be as clear as their power is at present of doing it without, if they please, When Mr. Dummer wrote his defence of the charters, there was a talk of taking them away, by act of parliament. This defence is dedicated to the right honourable the Ld. Carteret, then one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, since Earl of Granville. His third proposition is, that "it is not for the interest of the crown to resume the charters, if forfeited." This he proves; as also that it would be more for the interest of Great Britain to enlarge, rather than diminish, the privilege of all the colonists. His last proposition is, that it "seems inconsistent with justice to disfranchise the charter colonies by an act of parliament." "It seems therefore, says he, a severity without a precedent, that a people, who have the misfortune of being a thousand leagues distant from their sovereign, a misfortune great enough in itself, should, unsummoned, unheard, in one day, be deprived of their valuable privileges, which they and their fathers have enjoyed for near a hundred years." 'Tis true, as he observes, "the legislative power is absolute and unaccountable, and King, lords and commons, may do what they please; but the question here is not about power, but right" (or rather equity) "and shall not the supreme judicature of all the nation do right"? "One may say, that what the parliament cannot do justly, they cannot do at all. In maximis minima est licentia. The higher the power is, the greater caution is to be used in the execution of it; because the sufferer is helpless and without resort." I never heard that this reasoning gave any offence. Why should it? Is it not exactly agreeable to the decisions of parliament and the determinations of the highest executive courts? (See the Appendix.) But if it was thought hard that charter privileges should be taken away by act of parliament, Is it not much harder to be in part, or in whole, disfranchised of rights, that have been always tho't inherent to a British subject, namely, to be free from all taxes, but what he consents to in person, or by his representative? This right, if it could be traced no higher than Magna Charta, is part of the common law, part of a British subjects birthright, and as inherent and perpetual, as the duty of allegiance; both which have been bro't to these colonies, and have been hitherto held sacred and inviolable, and I hope and trust ever will. 'Tis humbly conceived, that the British colonists (except only the conquered, if any) are, by Magna Charta, as well entitled to have a voice in their taxes, as the subjects within the realm. Are we not as really deprived of that right, by the parliament assessing us before we are represented in the house of commons, as if the King should do it by his prorogative? Can it be said with any colour of truth or justice, that we are represented in parliament? As to the colonists being represented by the provincial agents, I know of no power ever given them, but to appear before his Majesty, and his ministry. Sometimes they have been directed to petition the parliament: But they none of them have, and I hope never will have, a power given them, by the colonists, to act as representatives, and to consent to taxes; and if they should make any concessions to the ministry, especially without order, the provinces could not by that be considered as represented in parliament. Hibernia habet Parliamenta & faciunt leges et nostra statuta non ligant eos, quia non mittant milites ad Parliamentum, sed personae eorum sunt subjecti Regis, sicut inhabitantes Caline Gasconiae & Guienae. 12 Rep. 111. cites R. 3. 12.— "Ireland hath parliaments, and make laws, and our statutes do not bind them, because they send no Knights to parliament; but their persons are subjects of the King, as the inhabitants of Guiene, Gascony, &c." Yet, if specially named, or by general words included as within any of the King's dominions, Ireland, says Ld. Coke, might be bound. 4 Inst. 351. From all which, it seems plain, that the reason why Ireland and the plantations are not bound, unless named by an Act of Parliament, is, because they are not represented in the British parliament. Yet, in special cases, the British parliament has an undoubted right, as well as power, to bind both by their acts. But whether this can be extended to an indefinite taxation of both, is the great question. I conceive the spirit of the British constitution must make an exception of all taxes, until it is tho't fit to unite a dominion to the realm. Such taxation must be considered either as uniting the dominions to the realm, or disfranchising them. If they are united, they will be intitled to a representation, as well as Wales; if they are so taxed without a union, or representation, they are so far disfranchised. I don't find any thing that looks like a duty on the colonies before the 25th of C. 2. c. 7. imposing a duty on enumerated commodities. The liberty of the subject was little attended to in that reign. If the nation could not fully assert their rights till the revolution, the colonies could not expect to be heard. I look on this act rather as a precedent of power, than of right and equity; if 'tis such, it will not affect my argument. The act appointing a tax on all mariners, of a certain sum per month, to be deducted out of their wages, is not to be compared with this. Mariners are not inhabitants of any part of the dominions: The sea is their element, till they are decrepit, and then the hospital is open for all mariners who are British subjects without exception. The general post-office established thro' the dominions, is for the convenience of trade and commerce: It is not laying any burthen upon it; for besides that it is upon the whole cheaper to correspond in this way than any other, every one is at liberty to send his own letters by a friend. The act of the 6th of his late Majesty, tho' it imposes a duty in terms, has been said to be designed for a prohibition; which is probable from the sums imposed; and 'tis pity it had not been so expressed, as there is not the least doubt of the just and equitable right of the parliament to lay prohibitions thro' the dominions, when they think the good of the whole requires it. But as has been said, there is an infinite difference between that and the exercise of unlimited power of 'taxation, over the dominions, without allowing them a representation:—It is said that the duties imposed by the new act will amount to a prohibition: Time only can ascertain this. The utility of this act is so fully examined in the appendix, that I shall add nothing on that head here. It may be said that the colonies ought to bear their proportion of the national burdens: 'Tis just they should, and I think I have proved they have always done it freely and chearfully, and I know no reason to doubt but that they ever will. Sometimes we have been considered only as the corporations in England: And it may be urged that it is no harder upon us to be taxed by parliament for the general cause than for them, who besides are at the expence of their corporate subordinate government. I answer, 1. Those corporations are represented in parliament. 2. The colonies are and have been at great expence in raising men, building forts, and supporting the King's civil government here. Now I read of no governors and other officers of his Majesty's nomination, that the city of London taxes its inhabitants to support: I know of no forts and garrisons that the city of London has lately built at its own expence, or of any annual levies that they have raised for the King's service and the common cause. These are things very fitting and proper to be done by a subordinate dominion, and tis their duty to do all they are able; but it seems but equal they should be allowed to assess the charges of it themselves. The rules of equity and the principles of the constitution seem to require this. Those who judge of the reciprocal rights that subsist between a supreme and subordinate state or dominion, by no higher rules than are applied to a corporation of button-makers, will never have a very comprehensive view of them. Yet sorry am I to say it, many elaborate writers on the administration of the colonies, seem to me never to rise higher in their notions, than what might be expected from a secretary to one of the quorum. If I should be ranked among this number, I shall have this consolation, that I have fallen into what is called very good company, and among some who have seen very high life below stairs. I agree with the Administrator, that of whatever revenues raised in the colonies, if they must be raised without our consent, "the first and special appropriation of them ought to be to the paying the Governors, and all the other Crown officers;" for it would be hard for the Colonists to be obliged to pay them after this. It was on this principle that at the last assembly of this province, I moved to stop every grant to the officers of the Crown; more especially as I know some who have built very much upon the fine salaries they shall receive from the plantation branch of the revenue. Nor can I think it "injustice to the frame of human nature," to suppose, if I did not know it, that with similar views several officers of the Crown in some of the colonies have been pushing for such an act for many years. They have obtained their wish, and much good it will do them: But I would not give much for all that will center neat in the exchequer, after deducting the costs attending the execution of it, and the appropriations to the several officers proposed by the Administrator. What will be the unavoidable consequence of all this, suppose another war should happen, and it should be necessary to employ as many provincials in America as in the last? Would it be possible for the colonies, after being burthened in their trade, perhaps after it is ruined, to raise men? Is it probable that they would have spirit enough to exert themselves? If 'tis said the French will never try for America, or if they should, regular troops are only to be employed. I grant our regular troops are the best in the world, and that the experience of the present officers shews that they are capable of every species of American service; yet we should guard against the worst. If another tryal for Canada should take place, which from the known temper of France, we may judge she will bring on the first fair opportunity, it might require 30 or 40,000 regulars to secure his Majesty's just rights. If it should be said that other American duties must then be levied, besides the impossibilty of our being able to pay them, the danger recurs of a large standing army so remote from home. Whereas a good provincial militia, with such occasional succours from the mother country, as exigencies may require, never was, and never will be attended with hazard. The experience of part times will show, that an army of 20 or 30,000 veterans, half 3000 miles from Rome, were very apt to proclaim Cesars. The first of the name, the assassin of his country owed his false glory, to stealing the affections of an army from the commonwealth. I hope these hints will not be taken amiss; they seem to occur from the nature of the subject I am upon: They are delivered in pure affection to my King and country, and amount to no reflection on any man. The best army, and the best men, we may hereafter have, may be led into temptation; all I think, is, that a prevention of evil is much easier than a deliverance from it. The sum of my argument is, That civil government is of God: That the administrators of it were originally the whole people: That they might have devolved it on whom they pleased: That this devolution is fiduciary, for the good of the whole; That by the British constitution, this devolution is on the King, lords and commons, the supreme sacred and uncontroulable legislative power, not only in the realm, but thro' the dominions: That by the abdication, the original compact was broken to pieces: That by the revolution, it was renewed, and more firmly established, and the rights and liberties of the subject in all parts of the dominions, more fully explained and confirmed: That in consequence of this establishment, and the acts of succession and union, his Majesty GEORGE III. is rightful king and sovereign, and with his parliament, the supreme legislative of Great Britain; France and Ireland, and the dominions thereto belonging: That this constitution is the most free one, and by far the best, now existing on earth: That by this constitution, every man in the dominions is a free man: That no parts of his Majesty's dominions can be taxed without their consent: That every part has a right to be represented in the supreme or some subordinate legislature: That the refusal of this, would seem to be a contradiction in practice to the theory of the constitution: That the colonies are subordinate dominions, and are now in such a state, as to make it best for the good of the whole, that they should not only be continued in the enjoyment of subordinate legislation, but be also represented in some proportion to their number and estates, in the grand legislature of the nation: That this would firmly unite all parts of the British empire, in the greatest peace and prosperity; and render it invulnerable and perpetual. Source: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N07655.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

The Continentalist No. I The Continentalist No. II The Continentalist No. III The Continentalist No. IIII The Continentalist No. V The Continentalist No. VI The Continentalist No. I [Fishkill, New York, July 12, 1781] It would be the extreme of vanity in us not to be sensible, that we began this revolution with very vague and confined notions of the practical business of government. To the greater part of us it was a novelty: Of those, who under the former constitution had had opportunities of acquiring experience, a large proportion adhered to the opposite side, and the remainder can only be supposed to have possessed ideas adapted to the narrow colonial sphere, in which they had been accustomed to move, not of that enlarged kind suited to the government of an INDEPENDENT NATION. There were no doubt exceptions to these observations—men in all respects qualified for conducting the public affairs, with skill and advantage; but their number was small; they were not always brought forward in our councils; and when they were, their influence was too commonly borne down by the prevailing torrent of ignorance and prejudice. On a retrospect however, of our transactions, under the disadvantages with which we commenced, it is perhaps more to be wondered at, that we have done so well, than that we have not done better. There are indeed some traits in our conduct, as conspicuous for sound policy, as others for magnanimity. But, on the other hand, it must also be confessed, there have been many false steps, many chimerical projects and utopian speculations, in the management of our civil as well as of our military affairs. A part of these were the natural effects of the spirit of the times dictated by our situation. An extreme jealousy of power is the attendant on all popular revolutions, and has seldom been without its evils. It is to this source we are to trace many of the fatal mistakes, which have so deeply endangered the common cause; particularly that defect, which will be the object of these remarks, A WANT OF POWER IN CONGRESS. The present Congress, respectable for abilities and integrity, by experience convinced of the necessity of a change, are preparing several important articles to be submitted to the respective states, for augmenting the powers of the Confederation. But though there is hardly at this time a man of information in America, who will not acknowledge, as a general proposition, that in its present form, it is unequal, either to a vigorous prosecution of the war, or to the preservation of the union in peace; yet when the principle comes to be applied to practice, there seems not to be the same agreement in the modes of remedying the defect; and it is to be feared, from a disposition which appeared in some of the states on a late occasion, that the salutary intentions of Congress may meet with more delay and opposition, than the critical posture of the states will justify. It will be attempted to shew in a course of papers what ought to be done, and the mischiefs of a contrary policy. In the first stages of the controversy it was excuseable to err. Good intentions, rather than great skill, were to have been expected from us. But we have now had sufficent time for reflection and experience, as ample as unfortunate, to rectify our errors. To persist in them, becomes disgraceful and even criminal, and belies that character of good sense and a quick discernment of our interests, which, in spite of our mistakes, we have been hitherto allowed. It will prove, that our sagacity is limited to interests of inferior moment; and that we are incapable of those enlightened and liberal views, necessary to make us a great and a flourishing people. History is full of examples, where in contests for liberty, a jealousy of power has either defeated the attempts to recover or preserve it in the first instance, or has afterwards subverted it by clogging government with too great precautions for its security, or by leaving too wide a door for sedition and popular licenciousness. In a government framed for durable liberty, not less regard must be paid to giving the magistrate a proper degree of authority, to make and execute the laws with vigour, than to guarding against encroachments upon the rights of the community. As too much power leads to despotism, too little leads to anarchy, and both eventually to the ruin of the people. These are maxims well known, but never sufficiently attended to, in adjusting the frames of governments. Some momentary interest or passion is sure to give a wrong biass, and pervert the most favourable opportunities. No friend to order or to rational liberty, can read without pain and disgust the history of the commonwealth of Greece. Generally speaking, they were a constant scene of the alternate tyranny of one part of the people over the other, or of a few usurping demagogues over the whole. Most of them had been originally governed by kings, whose despotism (the natural disease of monarchy) had obliged their subjects to murder, expel, depose, or reduce them to a nominal existence, and institute popular governments. In these governments, that of Sparta excepted, the jealousy of power hindered the people from trusting out of their own hands a competent authority, to maintain the repose and stability of the commonwealths; whence originated the frequent revolutions and civil broils with which they were distracted. This, and the want of a solid fœderal union to restrain the ambition and rivalship of the different cities, after a rapid succession of bloody wars, ended in their total loss of liberty and subjugation to foreign powers. In a comparison of our governments with those of the ancient republics, we must, without hesitation, give the preference to our own; because, every power with us is exercised by representation, not in tumultuary assemblies of the collective body of the people, where the art or impudence of the ORATOR or TRIBUNE, rather than the utility or justice of the measure could seldom fail to govern. Yet whatever may be the advantage on our side, in such a comparison, men who estimate the value of institutions, not from prejudices of the moment, but from experience and reason, must be persuaded, that the same JEALOUSY of POWER has prevented our reaping all the advantages, from the examples of other nations, which we ought to have done, and has rendered our particular constitutions in many respects feeble and imperfect. Perhaps the evil is not very great in respect to our constitutions; for notwithstanding their imperfections, they may, for some time, be made to operate in such a manner, as to answer the purposes of the common defence and the maintenance of order; and they seem to have, in themselves, and in the progress of society among us, the seeds of improvement. But this is not the case with respect to the FOEDERAL GOVERNMENT; if it is too weak at first, it will continually grow weaker. The ambition and local interests of the respective members, will be constantly undermining and usurping upon its prerogatives, till it comes to a dissolution; if a partial combination of some of the more powerful ones does not bring it to a more SPEEDY and VIOLENT END. The Continentalist No. II [Fishkill, New York, July 19, 1781] In a single state, where the sovereign power is exercised by delegation, whether it be a limitted monarchy or a republic, the danger most commonly is, that the sovereign will become too powerful for his constituents; in fœderal governments, where different states are represented in a general council, the danger is on the other side—that the members will be an overmatch for the common head, or in other words, that it will not have sufficient influence and authority to secure the obedience of the several parts of the confederacy. In a single state, the sovereign has the whole legislative power as well as the command of the national forces, of course, an immediate controul over the persons and property of the subjects. Every other power is subordinate and dependent. If he undertakes to subvert the constitution, it can only be preserved by a general insurrection of the people. The magistrates of the provinces, counties, or towns, into which the state is divided, having only an executive and police jurisdiction, can take no decisive measures for counteracting the first indications of tyranny; but must content themselves with the ineffectual weapon of petition and remonstrance. They cannot raise money, levy troops, nor form alliances. The leaders of the people must wait till their discontents have ripened into a general revolt, to put them in a situation to confer the powers necessary for their defence. It will always be difficult for this to take place; because the sovereign possessing the appearance and forms of legal authority, having the forces and revenues of the state at his command, and a large party among the people besides, which with those advantages he can hardly fail to acquire, he will too often be able to baffle the first motions of the discontented, and prevent that union and concert essential to the success of their opposition. The security therefore of the public liberty, must consist in such a distribution of the sovereign power, as will make it morally impossible for one part to gain an ascendency over the others, or for the whole to unite in a scheme of usurpation. In fœderal governments, each member has a distinct sovereignty, makes and executes laws, imposes taxes, distributes justice, and exercises every other function of government. It has always within itself the means of revenue, and on an emergency can levy forces. If the common sovereign should meditate, or attempt any thing unfavourable to the general liberty, each member, having all the proper organs of power, can prepare for defence with celerity and vigour. Each can immediately sound the alarm to the others, and enter into leagues for mutual protection. If the combination is general, as is to be expected, the usurpers will soon find themselves without the means of recruiting their treasury, or their armies; and for want of continued supplies of men and money, must, in the end fall a sacrifice to the attempt. If the combination is not general, it will imply, that some of the members are interested in that which is the cause of dissatisfaction to others, and this cannot be an attack upon the common liberty, but upon the interests of one part in favour of another part; and it will be a war between the members of the fœderal union with each other, not between them and the fœderal government. From the plainest principles of human nature, two inferences are to be drawn, one, that each member of a political confederacy, will be more disposed to advance its own authority upon the ruins of that of the confederacy, than to make any improper concessions in its favour, or support it in unreasonable pretensions; the other, that the subjects of each member, will be more devoted in their attachments and obedience to their own particular governments, than to that of the union. It is the temper of societies as well as of individuals to be impatient of constraint, and to prefer partial to general interest. Many cases may occur, where members of a confederacy have, or seem to have an advantage in things contrary to the good of the whole, or a disadvantage in others conducive to that end. The selfishness of every part will dispose each to believe, that the public burthens are unequally apportioned, and that itself is the victim. These, and other circumstances, will promote a disposition for abridging the authority of the fœderal government; and the ambition of men in office in each state, will make them glad to encourage it. They think their own consequence connected with the power of the government of which they are a part; and will endeavour to encrease the one as the mean of encreasing the other. The particular governments will have more empire over the minds of their subjects, than the general one, because their agency will be more direct, more uniform, and more apparent. The people will be habituated to look up to them as the arbiters and guardians of their personal concerns, by which the passions of the vulgar, if not of all men are most strongly affected; and in every difference with the confederated body will side with them against the common sovereign. Experience confirms the truth of these principles. The chief cities of Greece had once their council of Amphyctions, or States-General, with authority to decide and compose the differences of the several cities; and to transact many other important matters relative to the common interest and safety. At their first institution, they had great weight and credit; but never enough to preserve effectually the ballance and harmony of the confederacy; and in time their decrees only served as an additional pretext to that side, whose pretensions they favoured. When the cities were not engaged in foreign wars, they were at perpetual varience among themselves. Sparta and Athens contended twenty-seven years for the precedence, or rather dominion of Greece, till the former made herself mistress of the whole; and till in subsequent struggles, having had recourse to the pernicious expedient of calling in the aid of foreign enemies; the Macedonians first, and afterwards the Romans became their masters. The German diet had formerly more authority than it now has, though like that of Greece never enough to hinder the great potentates from disturbing the repose of the empire, and mutually wasting their own territories and people. The Helvetie league is another example. It is true it has subsisted near five hundred years; but in that period the cantons have had repeated and furious wars with each other, which would have made them an easy prey to their more powerful neighbours, had not the reciprocal jealousy of these prevented either from taking advantage of their dissentions. This and their poverty have hitherto saved them from total destruction, and kept them from feeling the miseries of foreign conquest, added to those of civil war. The fœderal government is too weak to hinder their renewal, whenever the ambition or fanaticism of the principal cantons shall be disposed to rekindle the flame. For some time past indeed, it has been in a great measure nominal; the Protestants and Catholics have had separate diets, to manage almost all matters of importance; so that in fact, the general diet is only kept up to regulate the affairs of the common bailliages, and preserve a semblance of union; and even this it is probable would cease, did not the extreme weakness of the cantons oblige them to a kind of coalition. If the divisions of the United Provinces have not proceeded to equal extremities, there are peculiar causes to be assigned. The authority of the Stadtholder pervades the whole frame of the republic, and is a kind of common link by which the provinces are bound together. The jealousy of his progressive influence, in which more or less they all agree, operates as a check upon their ill-humours against one another. The inconsiderableness of each province separately, and the imminent danger to which the whole would be exposed of being overrun by their neighbours, in case of disunion, is a further preservative against the phrenzy of hostility; and their importance and even existence depending intirely upon frugality, industry and commerce; peace, both at home and abroad, is of necessity the predominant object of their policy. The Continentalist No. III [Fishkill, New York, August 9, 1781] The situation of these states is very unlike that of the United Provinces. Remote as we are from Europe, in a little time, we should fancy ourselves out of the reach of attempts from abroad, and in full liberty, at our leisure and convenience, to try our strength at home. This might not happen at once; but if the FOEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD LOSE ITS AUTHORITY, it would CERTAINLY FOLLOW. Political societies, in close neighbourhood, must either be strongly united under one government, or there will infallibly exist emulations and quarrels. This is in human nature; and we have no reason to think ourselves wiser, or better, than other men. Some of the larger states, a small number of years hence, will be in themselves populous, rich and powerful, in all those circumstances calculated to inspire ambition and nourish ideas of separation and independence. Though it will ever be their true interest to preserve the union, their vanity and self importance, will be very likely to overpower that motive, and make them seek to place themselves at the head of particular confederacies independent of the general one. A schism once introduced, competitions of boundary and rivalships of commerce will easily afford pretexts for war. European powers may have inducements for fomenting these divisions and playing us off against each other. But without such a disposition in them, if separations once take place, we shall, of course, embrace different interests and connections. The particular confederacies, leaguing themselves with rival nations, will naturally be involved in their disputes; into which they will be the more readily tempted by the hope of making acquisitions upon each other, and upon the colonies of the powers with whom they are respectively at enmity. WE ALREADY SEE SYMPTOMS OF THE EVILS TO BE APPREHENDED. In the midst of a war for our existence as a nation; in the midst of dangers too serious to be trifled with, some of the states have evaded, or refused, compliance with the demands of Congress in points of the greatest moment to the common safety. If they act such a part at this perilous juncture, what are we to expect in a time of peace and security? Is it not to be feared, that the resolutions of Congress would soon become like the decisions of the Greek amphyctions, or like the edicts of a German diet? But as these evils are at a little distance, we may perhaps be insensible and short sighted enough to disregard them. There are others that threaten our immediate safety. Our whole system is in disorder; our currency depreciated, till in many places it will hardly obtain a circulation at all, public credit at its lowest ebb, our army deficient in numbers, and unprovided with every thing, the government, in its present condition, unable to command the means to pay, clothe, or feed their troops, the enemy making an alarming progress in the southern states, lately in complete possession of two of them, though now in part rescued by the genius and exertions of a General without an army, a force under Cornwallis still formidable to Virginia. We ought to blush to acknowledge, that this is a true picture of our situation, when we reflect, that the enemy’s whole force in the United States, including their American levies and the late reinforcement, is little more than fourteen thousand effective men; that our population, by recent examination, has been found to be greater, than at the commencement of the war; that the quantity of our specie has also increased, that the country abounds with all the necessaries of life, and has a sufficiency of foreign commodities, with a considerable and progressive commerce; that we have beyond comparison a better stock of warlike materials, than when we began the contest, and an ally as willing as able to supply our further wants: And that we have, on the spot, five thousand auxiliary troops, paid and subsisted by that ally, to assist in our defence. Nothing but a GENERAL DISAFFECTION of the PEOPLE, or MISMANAGEMENT in their RULERS, can account for the figure we make, and for the distresses and perplexities we experience, contending against so small a force. Our enemies themselves must now be persuaded, that the first is not the cause; and WE KNOW it is not. The most decided attachment of the people could alone have made them endure, without a convulsion, the successive shocks in our currency, added to the unavoidable inconveniences of war. There is perhaps not another nation in the world, that would have shown equal patience and perseverance in similar circumstances. The enemy have now tried the temper of almost every part of America; and they can hardly produce in their ranks a thousand men, who without their arts and seductions have voluntarily joined their standard. The miseries of a rigorous captivity, may perhaps have added half as many more to the number of the American levies, at this time in their armies. This small accession of force is the more extraordinary, as they have at some periods, been apparently in the full tide of success, while every thing wore an aspect tending to infuse despondency into the people of this country. This has been remarkably the case in the southern states. They for a time had almost undisturbed possession of two of them; and Cornwallis, after overruning a great part of a third; after two victorious battles, only brought with him into Virginia, about two hundred tories. In the state where he thought himself so well established, that he presumptuously ventured to assure the minister, there was not a rebel left, a small body of Continental troops, have been so effectually seconded by the militia of that vanquished country, as to have been able to capture a number of his troops more than equal to their own, and to repossess the principal part of the state. As in the explanation of our embarrassments nothing can be alledged to the disaffection of the people, we must have recourse to the other cause of IMPOLICY and MISMANAGEMENT in their RULERS. Where the blame of this may lie is not so much the question as what are the proper remedies; yet it may not be amiss to remark, that too large a share has fallen upon Congress. That body is no doubt chargeable with mistakes; but perhaps its greatest has been too much readiness to make concessions of the powers implied in its original trust. This is partly to be attributed to an excessive complaisance to the spirit, which has evidently actuated a majority of the states, a desire of monopolizing all power in themselves. Congress have been responsible for the administration of affairs, without the means of fulfilling that responsibility. It would be too severe a reflection upon us to suppose, that a disposition to make the most of the friendship of others, and to exempt ourselves from a full share of the burthens of the war has had any part in the backwardness, which has appeared in many of the states, to confer powers and adopt measures adequate to the exigency. Such a sentiment would neither be wise, just, generous, nor honorable; nor do I believe the accusation would be well founded, yet our conduct makes us liable to a suspicion of this sort. It is certain, however, that too sanguine expectations from Europe have unintentionally relaxed our efforts, by diverting a sense of danger, and begetting an opinion, that the inequality of the contest would make every campaign the last. We did not consider how difficult it must be to exhaust the resources of a nation circumstanced like that of Great Britain; whose government has always been distinguished for energy, and its people for enthusiasm. Nor did we, in estimating the superiority of our friends make sufficient allowance for that want of concert, which will ever characterise the operations of allies, or for the immense advantage to the enemy, of having their forces, though inferior, under a single direction. Finding the rest of Europe either friendly, or pacific, we never calculated the contingencies, which might alter that disposition; nor reflected that the death* of a single prince, the change or caprice of a single minister, was capable of giving a new face to the whole system. We are at this time more sanguine than ever. The war with the Dutch, we believe, will give such an addition of force to our side, as will make the superiority irresistible. No person can dispute this, if things remain in their present state; but the extreme disparity of the contest is the very reason, why this cannot be the case. The neutral powers will either effect a particular, or a general accommodation, or they will take their sides. There are three suppositions to be made: one, that there will be a compromise between the united provinces and England; for which we are certain the mediation of Austria and Russia have been offered; another, a pacification between all the belligerent powers, for which we have reason to believe the same mediation has been offered; the third, a rejection of the terms of mediation and a more general war. Either of these suppositions is a motive for exertion. The first will place things in the same, probably in a worse situation, than before the declaration of the war against Holland. The composing of present differences may be accompanied with a revival of ancient connections; and at least would be productive of greater caution and restraint in a future intercourse with us. The second, it is much to be dreaded, would hazard a dismemberment of a part of these states; and we are bound in honor, in duty and in interest, to employ every effort to dispossess the enemy of what they hold. A natural basis of the negociation, with respect to this continent, will be, that each party shall retain what it possesses at the conclusion of the treaty, qualified perhaps by a cession of particular points for an equivalent elsewhere. It is too delicate to dwell on the motives to this apprehension; but if such a compromise sometimes terminates the disputes of nations originally independent, it will be less extraordinary where one party was originally under the dominion of the other. If we are determined, as we ought to be with the concurrence of our allies, not to accept such a condition, then we ought to prepare for the third event, a more general and more obstinate war. Should this take place, a variety of new interests will be involved, and the affairs of America MAY CEASE TO BE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE. In proportion as the objects and operations of the war become complicated and extensive, the final success must become uncertain; and in proportion as the interests of others in our concerns may be weakened, or supplanted by more immediate interests of their own, ought our attention to ourselves, and exertions in our own behalf to be awakened and augmented. We ought therefore, not only to strain every nerve for complying with the requisitions, to render the present campaign as decisive as possible; but we ought without delay, to ENLARGE THE POWERS OF CONGRESS. Every plan of which, this is not the foundation, will be illusory. The separate exertions of the states will never suffice. Nothing but a well-proportioned exertion of the resources of the whole, under the direction of a Common Council, with power sufficient to give efficacy to their resolutions, can preserve us from being a CONQUERED PEOPLE now, or can make us a HAPPY PEOPLE hereafter. The Continentalist No. IIII [Fishkill, New York, August 30, 1781] The preceding numbers are chiefly intended to confirm an opinion, already pretty generally received, that it is necessary to augment the powers of the confederation. The principal difficulty yet remains, to fix the public judgment, definitively, on the points, which ought to compose that augmentation. It may be pronounced with confidence, that nothing short of the following articles can suffice. 1st, THE POWER OF REGULATING TRADE, comprehending a right of granting bounties and premiums by way of encouragement, of imposing duties of every kind, as well for revenue as regulation, of appointing all officers of the customs, and of laying embargoes, in extraordinary emergencies. 2d, A moderate land-tax throughout the United States, at a specific rate per pound, or per acre, granted to the FOEDERAL GOVERNMENT in perpetuity, and, if Congress think proper, to be levied by their own collectors. 3d, A moderate capitation tax on every male inhabitant above fifteen years of age; exclusive of common soldiers, common seamen, day-labourers, cottagers and paupers; to be also vested in perpetuity, and with the same condition of collection. 4th, The disposal of all unlocated land, for the benefit of the United States (so far as respects the profits of the first sale and the quit-rents) the jurisdiction remaining to the respective States in whose limits they are contained. 5th, A certain proportion of the product of all mines, discovered, or to be discovered, for the same duration and with the same right of collection, as in the second and third articles. 6th, The appointment of all land (as well as naval) officers of every rank. The three first articles are of IMMEDIATE NECESSITY; the three last would be of great present but of much greater future utility; the whole combined would give solidity and permanency to the union. The great defect of the confederation is, that it gives the United States no property, or in other words, no revenue, nor the means of acquiring it, inherent in themselves, and independent on the temporary pleasure of the different members; and power without revenue in political society is a name. While Congress continue altogether dependent on the occasional grants of the several States, for the means of defraying the expences of the FOEDERAL GOVERNMENT, it can neither have dignity vigour nor credit. CREDIT supposes specific and permanent funds for the punctual payment of interest, with a moral certainty of a final redemption of the principal. In our situation it will probably require more, on account of the general diffidence, which has been excited by the past disorder in our finances. It will perhaps be necessary, in the first instance, to appropriate funds for the redemption of the principal† in a determinate period, as well as for the payment of interest. It is essential, that the property in such funds should be in the contractor himself, and the appropriation dependent on his own will; if instead of this the possession, or disposal of them, is to float on the voluntary and occasional concurrence of a number of different wills, not under his absolute controul, both the one and the other will be too precarious to be trusted. The most wealthy and best established nations are obliged to pledge their funds to obtain credit; and it would be the height of absurdity in us, in the midst of a revolution, to expect to have it on better terms. This credit being to be procured through Congress, the funds ought to be provided, declared, and vested in them. It is a fact, that besides the want of specific funds, a circumstance which operates powerfully against our obtaining credit abroad, is, not a distrust of our becoming independent, but of our continuing united; and with our present confederation the distrust is natural. Both foreigners and the thinking men among ourselves, would have much more confidence in the duration of the union, if they were to see it supported on the foundation here proposed. There are some among us ignorant enough to imagine, that the war may be carried on without credit; defraying the expences of the year with what may be raised within the year. But this is for want of a knowledge of our real resources and expenses. It may be demonstrated, that the whole amount of the revenue, which these States are capable of affording, will be deficient annually five or six millions of dollars, for the support of civil government and of the war. This is not a conjecture hazarded at random, but the result of experiment and calculation; nor can it appear surprising, when it is considered, that the revenues of the United Provinces equal to these States in population, beyond comparison superior in industry, commerce and riches, do not exceed twenty five millions of guilders, or about nine millions and an half of dollars. In times of war, they have raised a more considerable sum; but has been chiefly by gratuitous contributions of rich individuals; a resource we cannot employ, because there are few men of large fortunes in this country, and these for the most part in land. Taxes in the United Provinces are carried to an extreme, which would be impracticable here; not only the living are made to pay for every necessary of life; but even the dead are tributary to the public for the liberty of interment at particular hours. These considerations make it evident, that we could not raise an equal amount of revenue in these States; yet in seventy-six, when the currency was not depreciated, Congress emitted for the expences of the year fourteen millions of dollars. It cannot be denied, that there was a want of order and œconomy, in the expenditure of public money, nor that we had a greater military force to maintain at that time, than we now have; but, on the other hand, allowing for the necessary increase in our different civil lists, and for the advanced prices of many articles, it can hardly be supposed possible to reduce our annual expence very much below that sum. This simple idea of the subject, without entering into details, may satisfy us, that the deficiency which has been stated is not to be suspected of exaggeration. Indeed nations the most powerful and opulent are obliged to have recourse to loans, in time of war; and hence it is, that most of the States of Europe are deeply immersed in debt. France is among the number, notwithstanding her immense population, wealth and resources. England owes the enormous sum of two hundred millions sterling. The United Provinces, with all their prudence and parsimony, owe a debt of the generality of fifty millions sterling, besides the particular debts of each province. Almost all the other powers are more or less in the same circumstances. While this teaches us how contracted and uninformed are the views of those who expect to carry on the war, without running in debt; it ought to console us, with respect to the amount of that which we now owe, or may have occasion to incur, in the remainder of the war. The whole, without burthening the people, may be paid off in twenty years after the conclusion of peace. The principal part of the deficient five or six millions must be procured by loans from private persons, at home and abroad. Every thing may be hoped, from the generosity of France, which her means will permit; but she has full employment for her revenues and credit, in the prosecution of the war on her own part. If we judge of the future by the past, the pecuniary succours from her must continue to be far short of our wants: And the contingency of a war on the continent of Europe makes it possible, they may diminish rather than increase. We have in a less degree experienced the friendship of Spain in this article. The government of the United Provinces, if disposed to do it, can give us no assistance. The revenues of the Republic are chiefly mortgaged for former debts. Happily it has extensive credit, but it will have occasion for the whole to supply its own exigencies. Private men, either foreigners, or natives, will not lend to a large amount, but on the usual security of funds properly established. This security Congress cannot give, till the several States vest them with revenue, or the means of revenue for that purpose. Congress have wisely appointed a Superintendant of their Finances; a man of acknowledged abilities and integrity, as well as of great personal credit and pecuniary influence. It was impossible, that the business of finance could be ably conducted by a body of men, however well composed or well intentioned. Order in the future management of our monied concerns, a strict regard to the performance of public engagements, and of course, the restoration of public credit may be reasonably and confidently expected from Mr. Morris’s administration, if he is furnished with materials upon which to operate—that is, if the fœderal government can acquire funds as the basis of his arrangements. He has very judiciously proposed a national bank, which, by uniting the influence and interest of the monied men with the resources of government, can alone give it that durable and extensive credit of which it stands in need. This is the best expedient he could have devised for relieving the public embarrassments, but to give success to the plan, it is essential, that Congress should have it in their power to support him with unexceptionable funds. Had we begun the practice of funding four years ago, we should have avoided that depreciation of the currency, which has been as pernicious to the morals as to the credit of the nation: And there is no other method than this to prevent a continuance and multiplication of the evils flowing from that prolific source. The Continentalist No. V [Fishkill, New York, April 18, 1782] The vesting Congress with the power of regulating trade ought to have been a principal object of the confederation for a variety of reasons. It is as necessary for the purposes of commerce as of revenue. There are some, who maintain, that trade will regulate itself, and is not to be benefitted by the encouragements, or restraints of government. Such persons will imagine, that there is no need of a common directing power. This is one of those wild speculative paradoxes, which have grown into credit among us, contrary to the uniform practice and sense of the most enlightened nations. Contradicted by the numerous institutions and laws, that exist every where for the benefit of trade, by the pains taken to cultivate particular branches and to discourage others, by the known advantages derived from those measures, and by the palpable evils that would attend their discontinuance—it must be rejected by every man acquainted with commercial history. Commerce, like other things, has its fixed principles, according to which it must be regulated; if these are understood and observed, it will be promoted by the attention of government, if unknown, or violated, it will be injured—but it is the same with every other part of administration. To preserve the ballance of trade in favour of a nation ought to be a leading aim of its policy. The avarice of individuals may frequently find its account in pursuing channels of traffic prejudicial to that ballance, to which the government may be able to oppose effectual impediments. There may, on the other hand, be a possibility of opening new sources, which, though accompanied with great difficulties in the commencement, would in the event amply reward the trouble and expence of bringing them to perfection. The undertaking may often exceed the influence and capitals of individuals; and may require no small assistance, as well from the revenue, as from the authority of the state. The contrary opinion, which has grown into a degree of vogue among us, has originated in the injudicious attempts made at different times to effect a REGULATION of PRICES. It became a cant phrase among the opposers of these attempts, that TRADE MUST REGULATE ITSELF; by which at first was only meant that it had its fundamental laws, agreeable to which its general operations must be directed; and that any violent attempts in opposition to these would commonly miscarry. In this sense the maxim was reasonable; but it has since been extended to militate against all interference by the sovereign; an extreme as little reconcileable with experience, or common sense, as the practice it was first framed to discredit. The reasonings of a very ingenious and sensible writer, by being misapprehended, have contributed to this mistake. The scope of his argument is not, as by some supposed, that trade will hold a certain invariable course independent on the aid, protection, care or concern of government; but that it will, in the main, depend upon the comparative industry moral and physical advantages of nations; and that though, for a while, from extraordinary causes, there may be a wrong ballance against one of them, this will work its own cure, and things will ultimately return to their proper level. His object was to combat that excessive jealousy on this head, which has been productive of so many unnecessary wars, and with which the British nation is particularly interested; but it was no part of his design to insinuate that the regulating hand of government was either useless, or hurtful. The nature of a government, its spirit, maxims and laws, with respect to trade, are among those constant moral causes, which influence its general results, and when it has by accident taken a wrong direction, assist in bringing it back to its natural course. This is every where admitted by all writers upon the subject; nor is there one who has asserted a contrary doctrine. Trade may be said to have taken its rise in England under the auspices of Elizabeth; and its rapid progress there is in a great measure to be ascribed to the fostering care of government in that and succeeding reigns. From a different spirit in the government, with superior advantages, France was much later in commercial improvements, nor would her trade have been at this time in so prosperous a condition had it not been for the abilities and indefatigable endeavours of the great COLBERT. He laid the foundation of the French commerce, and taught the way to his successors to enlarge and improve it. The establishment of the woolen manufacture, in a kingdom, where nature seemed to have denied the means, is one among many proofs, how much may be effected in favour of commerce by the attention and patronage of a wise administration. The number of useful edicts passed by Louis the 14th, and since his time, in spite of frequent interruptions from the jealous enmity of Great Britain, has advanced that of France to a degree which has excited the envy and astonishment of its neighbours. The Dutch, who may justly be allowed a pre-eminence in the knowledge of trade, have ever made it an essential object of state. Their commercial regulations are more rigid and numerous, than those of any other country; and it is by a judicious and unremitted vigilance of government, that they have been able to extend their traffic to a degree so much beyond their natural and comparitive advantages. Perhaps it may be thought, that the power of regulation will be left placed in the governments of the several states, and that a general superintendence is unnecessary. If the states had distinct interests, were unconnected with each other, their own governments would then be the proper and could be the only depositaries of such a power; but as they are parts of a whole with a common interest in trade, as in other things, there ought to be a common direction in that as in all other matters. It is easy to conceive, that many cases may occur, in which it would be beneficial to all the states to encourage, or suppress a particular branch of trade, while it would be detrimental to either to attempt it without the concurrence of the rest, and where the experiment would probably be left untried for fear of a want of that concurrence. No mode can be so convenient as a source of revenue to the United States. It is agreed that imposts on trade, when not immoderate, or improperly laid, is one of the most eligible species of taxation. They fall in a great measure upon articles not of absolute necessity, and being partly transferred to the price of the commodity, are so far imperceptibly paid by the consumer. It is therefore that mode which may be exercised by the fœderal government with least exception or disgust. Congress can easily possess all the information necessary to impose the duties with judgment, and the collection can without difficulty be made by their own officers. They can have no temptation to abuse this power, because the motive of revenue will check its own extremes. Experience has shown that moderate duties are more productive than high ones. When they are low, a nation can trade abroad on better terms— its imports and exports will be larger—the duties will be regularly paid, and arising on a greater quantity of commodities, will yield more in the aggregate, than when they are so high as to operate either as a prohibition, or as an inducement to evade them by illicit practices. It is difficult to assign any good reason why Congress should be more liable to abuse the powers with which they are intrusted than the state-assemblies. [The frequency of the election of the members is a full security against a dangerous ambition, and the rotation established by the confederation makes it impossible for any state, by continuing the same men, who may put themselves at the head of a prevailing faction, to maintain for any length of time an undue influence in the national councils. It is to be presumed, that Congress will be in general better composed for abilities, and as well for integrity as any assembly on the continent. But to take away any temptation from a cabal to load particular articles, which are the principal objects of commerce to particular states, with a too great proportion of duties, to ease the others in the general distributions of expence; let all the duties whether for regulation or revenue, raised in each state, be creditted to that state, and let it in like manner be charged for all the bounties paid within itself for the encouragement of agriculture, manufactures, or trade. This expedient will remove the temptation; for as the quotas of the respective states are to be determined by a standard of land, agreeable to the article of the confederation, each will have so much the less to contribute otherwise as it pays more on its commerce. An objection has been made in a late instance to this principle. It has been urged, that as the consumer pays the duty, those states which are not equally well situated for foreign commerce, and which consume a great part of the imports of their neighbours, will become contributors to a part of their taxes. This objection is rather specious, than solid. The maxim, that the consumer pays the duty has been admitted in theory with too little reserve; frequently contradicted in practice. It is true, the merchant will be unwilling to let the duty be a deduction from his profits, if the state of the market will permit him to incorporate it with the price of his commodity. But this is often not practicable. It turns upon the quantity of goods at market in proportion to the demand. When the latter exceeds the former, and the competition is among the buyers, the merchant can easily increase his price and make his customers pay the duty. When the reverse is the case, and the competition is among the sellers, he must then content himself with smaller profits, and lose the value of the duty or at least of a part of it. Where a nation has a flourishing and well settled trade this more commonly happens than may be imagined, and it will, many times, be found that the duty is divided between the merchant and the consumer. Besides this consideration, which greatly diminishes the force of the objection, there is another which intirely destroys it. There is strong reciprocal influence between the prices of all commodities in a state, by which they, sooner or later, attain a pretty exact ballance and proportion to each other. If the immediate productions of the soil rise, the manufacturer will have more for his manufacture, the merchant for his goods; and the same will happen with whatever class the increase of price begins. If duties are laid upon the imports in one state, by which the prices of foreign articles are raised, the products of land and labour within that state will take a proportionable rise; and if a part of those articles are consumed in a neighbouring state, it will have the same influence there as at home. The importing state must allow an advanced price upon the commodities, which it receives in exchange from its neighbor in a ratio to the increased price of the article it sells. To know then which is the gainer or loser, we must examine how the general ballance of trade stands between them. If the importing state takes more of the commodities of its neighbour, than it gives in exchange, that will be the loser by the reciprocal augmentation of prices—it will be the gainer, if it takes less—and neither will gain, or lose, if the barter is carried on upon equal terms. The ballance of trade, and consequently the gain, or loss, in this respect will be governed more by the relative industry and frugality of the parties, than by their relative advantages for foreign commerce. Between separate nations, this reasoning will not apply with full force, because a multitude of local and extraneous circumstances may counteract the principal; but from the intimate connections of these states, the similitude of governments, situations, customs, manners—political and commercial causes will have nearly the same operation in the intercourse between the states, as in that between the different parts of the same state. If this should be controverted, the objection drawn from] the hypothesis of the consumer paying the duty must fall at the same time: For as far as this is true it is as much confined in its application to a state within itself, as the doctrine of a reciprocal proportion of prices. General principles in subjects of this nature ought always to be advanced with caution; in an experimental analysis there are found such a number of exceptions as tend to render them very doubtful; and in questions which affect the existence and collective happiness of these states, all nice and abstract distinctions should give way to plainer interests and to more obvious and simple rules of conduct. But the objection which has been urged ought to have no weight on another account. Which are the states, that have not sufficient advantages for foreign commerce, and that will not in time be their own carriers? Connecticut and Jersey are the least maritime of the whole; yet the sound which washes the coast of Connecticut has an easy outlet to the ocean, affords a number of harbours and bays, very commodious for trading vessels. New-London may be a receptacle for merchantmen of almost any burthen; and the fine rivers with which the state is intersected, by facilitating the transportation of commodities to and from every part, are extremely favorable both to its domestic and foreign trade. Jersey, by way of Amboy has a shorter communication with the ocean, than the city of NewYork. Princes bay, which may serve as an out port to it, will admit and shelter in winter and summer vessels of any size. Egg-harbour on its southern coast is not to be despised. The Delaware may be made as subservient to its commerce as to that of Pennsylvania, Gloucester, Burlington, and Trenton, being all conveniently situated on that river. The United Provinces with inferior advantages of position to either of these states, have for centuries held the first rank among commercial nations. The want of large trading cities has been sometimes objected as an obstacle to the commerce of these states; but this is a temporary deficiency that will repair itself with the encrease of population and riches. The reason that the states in question have hitherto carried on little foreign trade, is that they have found it equally beneficial to purchase the commodities imported by their neighbours. If the imposts on trade should work an inconvenience to them, it will soon cease by making it their interest to trade abroad. It is too much characteristic of our national temper to be ingenious in finding out and magnifying the minutest disadvantages, and to reject measures of evident utility even of necessity to avoid trivial and sometimes imaginary evils. We seem not to reflect, that in human society, there is scarcely any plan, however salutary to the whole and to every part, by the share, each has in the common prosperity, but in one way, or another, and under particular circumstances, will operate more to the benefit of some parts, than of others. Unless we can overcome this narrow disposition and learn to estimate measures, by their general tendency, we shall never be a great or a happy people, if we remain a people at all. The Continentalist No. VI [Fishkill, New York, July 4, 1782] Let us see what will be the consequences of not authorising the Fœderal Government to regulate the trade of these states. Besides the want of revenue and of power, besides the immediate risk to our independence, the danger of all the future evils of a precarious union, besides the deficiency of a wholesome concert and provident superintendence to advance the general prosperity of trade, the direct consequence will be, that the landed interest and the labouring poor will in the first place fall a sacrifice to the trading interest, and the whole eventually to a bad system of policy, made necessary by the want of such regulating power. Each state will be afraid to impose duties on its commerce, lest the other states, not doing the same, should enjoy greater advantages than itself; by being able to afford native commodities cheaper abroad, and foreign commodities cheaper at home. A part of the evils resulting from this would be: A loss to the revenue of those moderate duties, which, without being injurious to commerce, are allowed to be the most agreeable species of taxes to the people. Articles of foreign luxury while they would contribute nothing to the income of the state, being less dear by an exemption from duties, would have a more extensive consumption. Many branches of trade hurtful to the common interest would be continued for want of proper checks and discouragements. As revenues must be found to satisfy the public exigencies in peace and in war, too great a proportion of taxes will fall directly upon land and upon the necessaries of life, the produce of that land. The influence of these evils will be, to render landed property fluctuating and less valuable, to oppress the poor by raising the prices of necessaries, to injure commerce by encouraging the consumption of foreign luxuries, by encreasing the value of labor, by lessening the quantity of home productions, enhancing their prices at foreign markets, of course, obstructing their sale and enabling other nations to supplant us. Particular caution ought at present to be observed in this country, not to burthen the soil itself and its productions, with heavy impositions; because the quantity of unimproved land will invite the husbandmen to abandon old settlements for new, and the disproportion of our population for some time to come, will necessarily make labor dear, to reduce which, and not to increase it, ought to be a capital object of our policy. Easy duties therefore on commerce, especially on imports, ought to lighten the burthens, which will unavoidably fall upon land. Though it may be said, that on the principle of a reciprocal influence of prices, whereon the taxes are laid in the first instance, they will in the end be borne by all classes; yet it is of the greatest importance that no one should sink under the immediate pressure. The great art is to distribute the public burthens well and not suffer them, either first, or last, to fall too heavily upon parts of the community; else distress and disorder must ensue. A shock given to any part of the political machine vibrates through the whole. As a sufficient revenue could not be raised from trade to answer the public purposes, other articles have been proposed. A moderate land and poll tax, being of easy and unexpensive collection, and leaving nothing to discretion, are the simplest and best, that could be devised. It is to be feared, the avarice of many of the landholders will be opposed to a perpetual tax upon land, however moderate. They will ignorantly hope to shift the burthens of the national expence from themselves to others; a disposition as iniquitous as it is fruitless. The public necessities must be satisfied; this can only be done by the contributions of the whole society. Particular classes are neither able nor will be willing to pay for the protection and security of the others; and where so selfish a spirit discovers itself in any member, the rest of the community will unite to compel it to do its duty. Indeed many theorists in political œconomy have held, that all taxes, wherever they originate fall ultimately upon land; and have therefore been of opinion, that it would be best to draw the whole revenue of the state immediately from that source, to avoid the expence of a more diversified collection, and the accumulations which will be heaped in their several stages upon the primitive sums advanced in those taxes, which are imposed on our trade. But though it has been demonstrated, that this theory has been carried to an extreme, impracticable in fact, yet it is evident, in tracing the matter, that a large part of all taxes, however remotely laid, will by an insensible circulation, come at last to settle upon land; the source of most of the materials employed of commerce. It appears from calculation made by the ablest masters of political arithmetic, about sixty years ago, that the yearly product of all the lands in England amounted to £42,000,000 sterling, and the whole annual consumption, at that period, of foreign as well as domestic commodities, did not exceed £49,000,000, and the surplus of the exportation above the importation £2,000,000; on which sums, must arise all the revenues in whatever shape which go into the treasury. It is easy to infer from this, how large a part of them must directly, or indirectly be derived from land. Nothing can be more mistaken, than the collision and rivalship, which almost always subsist between the landed and trading interests, for the truth is they are so inseparably interwoven, that one cannot be injured, without injury, nor benefitted, without benefit to the other. Oppress trade, lands sink in value, make it flourish, their value rises, incumber husbandry, trade declines, encourage agriculture, commerce revives. The progress of this mutual reaction might easily be delineated, but it is too obvious to every man, who turns his thoughts, however superficially, upon the subject, to require it. It is only to be regretted that it is too often lost sight of, when the seductions of some immediate advantage or exemption tempt us to sacrifice the future to the present. But perhaps the class is more numerous than those, who not unwilling to bear their share of public burthens, are yet averse to the idea of perpetuity, as if there ever would arrive a period, when the state would cease to want revenues and taxes become unnecessary. It is of importance to unmask this delusion and open the eyes of the people to the truth. It is paying too great a tribute to the idol of popularity to flatter so injurious and so visionary an expectation. The error is too gross to be tolerated any where, but in the cottage of the peasant; should we meet with it in the senate house, we must lament the ignorance or despise the hypocrisy, on which it is ingrafted. Expence is in the present state of things entailed upon all governments. Though if we continue united, we shall be hereafter less exposed to wars by land, than most other countries; yet while we have powerful neighbours on either extremity, and our frontier is embraced by savages, whose alliance they may without difficulty command, we cannot, in prudence, dispense with the usual precautions for our interior security. As a commercial people, maritime power must be a primary object of our attention, and a navy cannot be created or maintained without ample revenues. The nature of our popular constitutions requires a numerous magistracy, for whom competent provision must be made; or we may be certain our affairs will always be committed to improper hands; and experience will teach us, that no government costs so much as a bad one. We may preach till we are tired of the theme, the necessity of disinterestedness in republics, without making a single proselyte. The virtuous declaimer will neither persuade himself nor any other person to be content with a double mess of porridge,* instead of a reasonable stipend for his services. We might as soon reconcile ourselves to the Spartan community of goods and wives, to their iron coin, their long beards, or their black broth. There is a total dissimulation in the circumstances, as well as the manners, of society among us; and it is as ridiculous to seek for models in the simple ages of Greece and Rome, as it would be to go in quest of them among the Hottentots and Laplanders. The public, for the different purposes, that have been mentioned, must always have large demands upon its constituents, and the only question is whether these shall be satisfied by annual grants perpetually renewed—by a perpetual grant once for all or by a compound of permanent and occasional supplies. The last is the wisest course. The Fœderal Government should neither be independent nor too much dependent. It should neither be raised above responsibility or controul, nor should it want the means of maintaining its own weight, authority, dignity and credit. To this end permanent funds are indispensable, but they ought to be of such a nature and so moderate in their amount, as never to be inconvenient. Extraordinary supplies can be the objects of extraordinary grants; and in this salutary medium will consist our true wisdom. It would seem as if no mode of taxation could be relished but that worst of all modes which now prevails, by assessment. Every proposal for a specific tax is sure to meet with opposition. It has been objected to a poll tax, at a fixed rate, that it will be unequal, as the rich will pay no more than the poor. In the form under which it has been offered in these papers, the poor properly speaking are not comprehended, though it is true that beyond the exclusion of the indigent the tax has no reference to the proportion of property; but it should be remembered that it is impossible to devise any specific tax, that will operate equally on the whole community. It must be the province of the legislature to hold the scales with a judicious hand and ballance one by another. The rich must be made to pay for their luxuries; which is the only proper way of taxing their superior wealth. Do we imagine that our assessments opperate equally? Nothing can be more contrary to the fact. Wherever a discretionary power is lodged in any set of men over the property of their neighbours, they will abuse it. Their passions, prejudices, partialities, dislikes, will have the principal lead in measuring the abilities of those over whom their power extends; and assessors will ever be a set of petty tyrants, too unskilful, if honest, to be possessed of so delicate a trust, and too seldom honest to give them the excuse of want of skill. The genius of liberty reprobates every thing arbitrary or discretionary in taxation. It exacts that every man by a definite and general rule should know what proportion of his property the state demands. Whatever liberty we may boast in theory, it cannot exist in fact, while assessments continue. The admission of them among us is a new proof, how often human conduct reconciles the most glaring opposites; in the present case the most vicious practice of despotic governments, with the freest constitutions and the greatest love of liberty. The establishment of permanent funds would not only answer the public purposes infinitely better than temporary supplies; but it would be the most effectual way of easing the people. With this basis for procuring credit, the amount of present taxes might be greatly diminished. Large sums of money might be borrowed abroad at a low interest, and introduced into the country to, defray the current expences and pay the public debts; which would not only lessen the demand for immediate supplies, but would throw more money into circulation, and furnish the people with greater means of paying the taxes. Though it be a just rule, that we ought not to run in debt to avoid present expence, so far as our faculties extend; yet the propriety of doing it cannot be disputed when it is apparent, that these are incompetent to the public necessities. Efforts beyond our abilities can only tend to individual distress and national disappointment. The product of the three forgoing articles will be as little as can be required to enable Congress to pay their debts, and restore order into their finances. In addition to these— The disposal of the unlocated lands will hereafter be a valuable source of revenue, and an immediate one of credit. As it may be liable to the same condition with the duties on trade, that is the product of the sales within each state, to be creditted to that state, and as the rights of jurisdiction are not infringed, it seems to be susceptible of no reasonable objection. Mines in every country constitute a branch of the revenue. In this where nature has so richly impregnated the bowels of the earth, they may in time become a valuable one; and as they require the care and attention of government to bring them to perfection, this care and a share in the profits of it, will very properly devolve upon Congress. All the precious metals should absolutely be the property of the Fœderal Government, and with respect to the others, it should have a discretionary power of reserving in the nature of a tax, such part as it may judge not inconsistent with the encouragement due to so important an object. This is rather a future than a present resource. The reason of allowing Congress to appoint its own officers of the customs, collectors of taxes, and military officers of every rank, is to create in the interior of each state a mass of influence in favour of the Fœderal Government. The great danger has been shown to be, that it will not have power enough to defend itself and preserve the union, not that it will ever become formidable to the general liberty. A mere regard to the interests of the confederacy will never be a principle sufficiently active to curb the ambition and intrigues of different members. Force cannot effect it: A contest of arms will seldom be between the common sovereign and a single refractory member; but between distinct combinations of the several parts against each other. A sympathy of situations will be apt to produce associates to the disobedient. The application of force is always disagreeable, the issue uncertain. It will be wise to obviate the necessity of it, by interesting such a number of individuals in each state in support of the Fœderal Government, as will be counterpoised to the ambition of others; and will make it difficult for them to unite the people in opposition to the just and necessary measures of the union. There is something noble and magnificent in the perspective of a great Fœderal Republic, closely linked in the pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and prosperous at home, respectable abroad; but there is something proportionably diminutive and contemptible in the prospect of a number of petty states, with the appearance only of union, jarring, jealous and perverse, without any determined direction, fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and insignificant by their dissentions, in the eyes of other nations. Happy America! if those, to whom thou hast intrusted the guardianship of thy infancy, know how to provide for thy future repose; but miserable and undone, if their negligence or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her banners on the ruins of thy tranquillity! Sources: No. I: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-02-02-1179#ARHN-01-02-02-1179-fn-0001 No. II: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-02-02-1181 No. III: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-02-02-1186 No. IIII: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-02-02-1191 No. V: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-03-02-0015 No. VI: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-03-02-0031

CALM AND RESPECTFUL THOUGHTS on the NEGATIVE of the CROWN on a SPEAKER chosen and presented by the REPRESENTATIVES of the PEOPLE: Occasioned by some PUBLICATIONS in the GEORGIA GAZETTE, of May and June 1772, wherein the late ASSEMBLY of that PROVINCE is charged with encroaching on the RIGHTS of the CROWN. BY A FREEMAN. Pro Rege & Patria semper. Buckingham’s Epitaph. It is a remark of a very considerable writer of our own, that it cannot be improper to canvass any constitutional question when decency is observed, and nothing advanced but on the credit of the best authorities, because in a British country every man ought to be acquainted with the laws by which his liberty and property are insured. Under the shelter of this observation some remarks have been ventured abroad, which I humbly apprehend have been rather condemned with severity, and replied to with personal reflections, than canvassed or answered with calmness or strength of argument. As the subject however has been formally dropt by one of the writers, I should not now take pen in hand could the other have been satisfied to enjoy his victory, without continuing to load the late Assembly with reflections, which I will not say are designed, but appear to have a tendency to set this province in the worst light at home, and to render the late Representatives as odious as possible in this province. My design is to take off the odium which is cast upon this province as though it meant to invade the Prerogative of the Crown. If the late Representatives have acted contrary to the sense of their Constituents they will doubtless be marked for it at a next election; if the majority of inhabitants should think the Crown has not a right of rejection, let their arguments be first considered before they are accused of a design of encroaching on the Prerogative. I will own my obligations; the most light I received in this controversy has been from that very writer, and, upon the most mature consideration, I must own the right he contends for appears to me more problematical than ever. I will however still leave this right as I found it (I always wished it should remain unagitated) undetermined and undecided, but I hope I am not too sanguine to flatter myself that those that read what may make against it will be convinced they that hold the negative may still be honest men, and good and loyal subjects, whether in a private character, or as the Representatives of a free and loyal people. I design to mention some arguments which persuade me this negative is not clearly established, and I shall take so much notice of the arguments brought in support of it to examine whether they really prove what is intended. It may not be improper first to lay down a few general principles which are universally allowed. It is agreed on all sides that the existence of a House of Commons is now as necessary and essential to our Constitution as the existence of a King and House of Lords. It is agreed that the Commons being the Representatives of the people the people ought to chuse them, the King and Lords must not interfere in the choice, and any one duly chosen, and not by law incapacitated, the election cannot be set aside. It is agreed that the Crown must call the House, issue writs of election, and may adjourn, prorogue, or dissolve the House, but to reign without Parliament is contrary to the Constitution; to dissolve wantonly, and without cause, is not against the Constitution, but it seems an improper use of a very legal power. The design of a House of Commons is to be a check on the Prerogative, and to watch over the rights of the people. Prerogative is placed in the Crown that the people may not encroach on the rights of the Crown. By the wisdom of the Constitution every branch of the Legislature forms a mutual check upon the other, the people are a check upon the Nobility, and the Nobility upon the people, while the King is a check upon both, and his executive power is again checked and kept within due bounds by the two Houses, through the privilege they have of enquiring into, impeaching, and punishing the conduct of the King’s evil Counsellors. The House of Commons is to consult for the good of the nation, and all monies give to the King are given only by the Commons; whatever is necessary for this purpose is their undeniable privilege, for, unless they may freely consult, and do that for which they are called together and constituted a House, the very purposes of their meeting must be defeated. I suppose therefore it will not be denied, as the Crown calls the Commons together for national purposes, the Commons so met must have a right or privilege to every thing that appears necessary to answer the purposes for which they are called and met together. This I take the true idea of the privileges of the House, and as the House cannot subsist nor act properly without them, to deny or curtail these privileges is attempting the abolition of the House itself, and of course destroying the Constitution. The fairest way therefore to judge of any claim of either branch of the Legislature is to consider the effect it may have on the other branches, and whatever clasheth with any known right or privilege of either King or any of the two Houses cannot be constitutional, whatever would prevent the Crown in the execution of those laws made by the Legislative cannot be supported, and if the Crown has any power that may restrain freedom of debate, or abridge the liberty of giving and granting in the House of Commons, or impede them in business, otherwise than by adjournment, prorogation, or dissolution, I cannot see how the House may be conceived free and independent in their deliberations. I believe few men will deny any of these principles; let them be kept in constant view when we enquire into the question whether the Crown has a right to reject a Speaker duly chosen and presented for approbation. The House of Commons must have a Speaker. All Assemblies met for consultation have found it necessary to place one over themselves to keep up order and regulate their debates; if 500 men were all to speak at once, and none have authority to call them to order, the voice of wisdom must be lost in noise, and prudent counsel swallowed up in confusion. Formerly both Houses are said to have had but one Speaker between them, but as both Houses became more distinct, and the Commons more important, they of course had a Speaker of their own, who is so necessary that ordinarily they do no business without him. This Speaker they must either chuse themselves, or he must be placed over them by the Crown. “The Speaker of the House of Lords is the Lord Chancellor or Keeper of the Great Seal, or any other Appointed by the King’s Commission; and if none be so appointed, the House of Lords (it is said) may elect”; Blackstone, vol. 1. p. 181. The Speaker of the House of Commons is chosen by the House, but must be approved of by the King, ibid. “It is true the Commons are to chuse their Speaker,” Coke. How far the King’s approbation is necessary is the question in dispute, but all agree that the Commons must chuse their Speaker, and it seems the choice is of more importance than presentation or approbation, because without choice there can be no such thing as either. The Speaker chosen ought to be a person properly qualified. If every Member of Parliament ought to be independent and uninfluenced by any views of honour or interest but the public good, the Speaker ought to be so much more. He ought to be equally well acquainted with the privileges of the House and the rights of Prerogative, and of sufficient fortitude to act consistent with both on every occasion, neither courting popularity by disputing the just rights of the Crown, nor have an eye to gain or promotion by betraying any right of the subject. The election of any Member to be Speaker is a solemn declaration of the House that they judge him the man best qualified for that business. I believe it seldom, if ever, happened, that a Member was chosen Speaker the first time of his serving as a Member. A person is usually pitched upon who, from long experience, is well acquainted with the privileges and proceedings of the House, and of whose abilities also the House have had long and sufficient experience. The Speaker has been called a servant of the House, and as the King has an undoubted right to chuse, and must be the best judge of his own servants, so the Commons are best acquainted with the character of every Member of their House, and thereby best able to judge who is the fittest for any particular business that may be assigned. The Speaker sits in the House, not in the name or as a Commissioner of the King, but though his seat is a little raised as a Member upon a par with the rest, chosen and appointed by themselves; not to do any business for the King, but their business, to be their mouth, regulate their debates, and execute their orders; neither is he to have “eyes to see, or ears to hear, but as directed by the House.” It is not denied by any that the Commons must chuse, nor that their choice ought to be free, and it has been allowed that they are not obliged to chuse a person nominated or recommended by the Crown, supposing the Crown should think proper to recommend or make such a nomination, but as it has always been customary to present the Speaker so chosen to the King for approbation, it is hence concluded that the King may set aside the choice of his Commons, and reject a Speaker so presented. If the want of such a right of rejection had any apparent tendency to render some other absolute rights of the King more precarious, or to endanger his Crown or the Constitution, the King ought undoubtedly to have it, for he ought to have his right, and every thing that may legally secure it; if the exercise of that right, though not necessary to the King, might add to his greater dignity, and in no case whatever bring any danger to the subject, I would in mere decency make a compliment of it to the King; but if it should appear that the claim and exercise of that right had even a distant tendency to hurt the subject, and wound the Constitution, I would then wish that the King had and insisted to have all the just rights of his Royal Prerogative, and no more. That I may treat the question in the most inoffensive manner, I declare that I mean not to write against the right claimed by the Crown; I only propose some doubts which I shall be glad to see cleared up, and with pleasure will I join all my fellow loyal subjects to acquiesce in any claim that may appear the constitutional right of the Crown. As it is agreed on all hands the Commons must chuse their Speaker, in the very nature of things it seems implied that he whom they chose ought to be considered as Speaker. Whom are they to chuse? A Speaker. By whose authority are they to chuse him? By the King’s command, and as the Representatives of the people; if, after having thus received the King’s command, and sitting as the Representatives of the people, they have chosen a man to be Speaker, the person so chosen is not what they chose him, it will be equally difficult to assert what it seems just as difficult to deny, that they made a choice, or that they had not authority to make the choice they actually have made. It has been allowed “that the Commons may freely chuse whom they please for their Speaker,” but asserted, “that the Crown, for its own preservation, has a right to reject an improper person,” (Georgia Gazette, June 10.) By an improper person here must be understood one whom the Commons thought proper, but who is thought improper by the Crown. Now let any one ask himself whether he should think he enjoyed the right of freely chusing whomsoever he pleased for his own servant if another had the right to put a negative on the servant he had actually chosen, under pretence of being improper for the service of him by whom chosen, and thereby deprive him of his service at pleasure. To talk of a free choice, which yet may be controuled and annulled by another, seems inconsistent with the very nature of choice, and at most it can only be called a freedom to chuse upon condition that another do not invalidate the choice; if the person chosen be equally acceptable to him that chuses and to him that must approve, it matters very little by whom such a choice is made; but if acceptable and necessary only to those by whom the choice was made, I cannot see what their choice avails if it may be set aside at pleasure by another, perhaps too it might be set aside for that very reason because the person chosen is suspected of being more in the interest of those by whom he is chosen than may be consistent with the designs of him by whom he is rejected. Those that chuse a Speaker to do the business of the House have first been chosen themselves to do the business of the nation; they are not met by their own authority, nor to do their own business, nor the King’s business, but the business of the nation; they cannot debate the concerns of the nation without a Speaker to direct and regulate their debates; but it is of infinite concern to the nation that no man mislead, restrain, or impede their debates; a Speaker might do all this, and were he to do it to serve the Crown, it would be in vain to look to the Crown for relief, he would be a dead weight to them, and they unable to help themselves; it seems therefore that the choice of a Speaker by the Representatives should be as free and final as the choice of the people of the Representatives who are to chuse the Speaker. The sitting of the Commons, though called by the King’s writ; the privileges of the House, though prayed for of the King; the freedom of debate; are all matter of right, and not of favour; the very design of the House of Commons is to prevent too extensive or an undue influence of the Crown; if any proceedings of the House become matters of favour of the Crown, what becomes of the intrinsick right and authority of the Commons? A Speaker was excepted against, because, “if the King always should accept a person pitched upon by the House, then it would be no great favour to be chosen a Speaker.” Here the exception against a Speaker was however sweetened with a reason being given; but if the Speaker holds his place, not by the choice of the Representatives, but by the favour of the Crown, it is then evident that the principal man in the House of Commons holds his place under the favour and influence of that very power to prevent whose too powerful influence, and restrain it within its proper bounds, is, or ought to be, the principal object of the Representatives of a free people. The whole of the law and custom of Parliament has its original from this one maxim, that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged, in that House to which it relates, and not elsewhere, Blackstone Com. 1. 163. In consequence of this the Commons may judge void the elections of Members already sitting, and declare those duly elected, who have not been returned so by the proper Officer; and it would seem strange if they, who have a right to judge of every election in the kingdom, should not have a right to chuse their own Speaker, if they were judges who is properly elected a Representative of the whole nation, and yet liable to have a negative put on a choice made by themselves of their own servant. The House of Commons have an undoubted right by their own act, and without any concurrence or interfering of the Crown, to expell any of their Members, the Speaker not excepted, for misbehaviour, the reason of which seems to be, as the Crown is not supposed to interfere in elections, neither ought it in expulsions; but if the Speaker holds his place by the King’s favour and approbation, so as without that he is not Speaker “pleno jure,”2 it would seem strange that the Commons should have a right to drive a man by their sole authority from a post where they never could have placed him without the King’s command and favour. To depose a man from a post which he could not hold, nor be chosen to, but with the King’s approbation, seems to be a greater power than to chuse their Officer without the King’s approbation. If the King has a right to reject a Speaker chosen, he must hold that right either in virtue of some act of Parliament, or it must be a part of his Royal Prerogative; the former was never asserted, the latter is the subject in question. Upon a supposition the King had a clear constitutional right to nominate, or even impose a Speaker, as soon as the House meets, that right seems clearly given up, by his ordering or giving the House leave to chuse a Speaker themselves. As it is said even the Lords may elect, unless the King appoints a Speaker for them, it seems clearly to follow that the King requiring the Commons to chuse, he means that the person by them chosen shall actually be Speaker, for they are not commanded to make choice of one or more persons of whom the King may chuse one, but simply and absolutely to chuse a Speaker for themselves. That the King does not interfere in the choice of a Prolocutor of the Law vocation, which has been called a Parliament in miniature, I conclude, because when Dr. Jane was preferred to Dr. Tillotson, King William did not reject, though certainly not as agreeable to the King’s principles, as that excellent man Dr. Tillotson; and as elections are to be made, according to Coke, sine prece, without prayer or gift, so he observes they ought also to be made sine praecepto, without the King’s command by writ or otherwise, and he saith an act for that purpose was a close and prudent salve, not only for that sore, but for all other in like case, and is but an act declaratory of the ancient law and custom of Parliament. If we would argue from facts, but one instance has been produced where the choice of the Commons was excepted against, and none whatever where the Commons submitted to a rejection; but the case of Sir Edward Seymour will come in more fully hereafter. It is difficult to conceive how the House may preserve freedom in debate if they are not at liberty to chuse the person by whom these debates are to be directed. That they may chuse any man whom the King shall approve is in reality saying they may chuse no man but whom the King approves, and that would seem perfectly equivalent to they have no right to chuse any man but whom the King chuseth; the King will not approve of any person but who he is morally sure will enter into all his measures; if by any means, whether by influence, nomination, choice, refusal of approbation of any other, the King gets a man of such a cast in the chair of the House of Commons, the King then has so far the direction, and a most powerful influence over the whole House.* It is only in behalf of such a Speaker that it can be the Crown’s interest to contend. Such a Speaker, under pretence of calling to order, may interrupt the freedom of debate, and stop an enquiry into any mal practice or escape; by a sham sickness, or his absence from the House, an offender may escape; but, supposing the Crown should reject a Speaker, on account of his being too popular, or having too great an influence in the House, it would not only be treating the body of Representatives as men that are not able to judge for themselves, but it is apparent that the power of rejecting a man because he is popular and disagreeable to the Crown is as dangerous a power in the hands of a bad ruler as can well be imagined. When a Speaker is presented to a King for approbation the King must either be willing that all things should continue and proceed according to the known Laws and Constitution of the land, or he must have contrary views; in the former case he can hardly have any motive or cause to reject any person that is presented, the Speaker alone can make no alteration, and if the Commons should attempt any thing against the Crown a dissolution would legally ensue; but should a ruler intend to make any alteration in the laws, a Speaker might be a proper instrument in his hand for that purpose. The King it should seem can have no reason or motive to reject any Speaker, but on a suspicion of his having a stronger bias to the popular side than to the just Royal Prerogative; but besides, that the King, in case of rejecting such a one, must also harbour very hard thoughts of his Commons, it is easily seen what such a power might lead to. Of a wise and good Prince nothing is to be apprehended, but against wicked or weak Princes, or rather pernicious and evil Counsellors, the people can never be too much upon their guard. It is not to be supposed, when a Speaker is presented, his character and principles can be unknown to the King’s Ministers, but supposing they were, I cannot see how that should be any ground for rejection; if he is known to be a fit tool the right of rejection will be immaterial, he will be sure not to be rejected; if known to be a man zealous for the just rights and liberties of the nation, a patriot Prince can have no thought to reject such an one; and that an arbitrary Sovereign, who will not reject a man of a contrary stamp, should have a right to reject the only man that is fittest to oppose him and serve the nation, I think a very dangerous part of the Prerogative, and I am at a perfect loss how to reconcile such a power with the spirit and design of the Constitution of a free people. These considerations I must own strongly influence me to doubt whether the Crown has a constitutional right to set aside and reject a Speaker chosen by the Representatives of the people. It is but fair, however, to hear what has been said in support of this right, and I do not mean that the arguments in favour of it should lose any of their force in my hands, I mean to represent them in all their weight, and as to these arguments and my remarks valeant quantum valere possunt, let them go as far as they may. Two writers have appeared among us in favour of this claim of the Prerogative; what Neuter advanced, like his signature, is nothing neither here nor there; but, as he talks of a contagious political delirium, I am much afraid he has been in the neighborhood of the contagion, however I wish him well over. I intend to consider every argument of G. B. si pergama dextra defendi potuissent hac vice defensa fuissent.3 I dare say what books and arguments in this cause are not found with him will in vain be looked for any where else in this province. Two passages have been quoted from Coke in support of this negative; Coke saith: “The Commons shall present their Speaker in the Upper House to the King, who shall disable himself, and in most humble manner intreat the King to command them to chuse a more sufficient man.” From this passage it is said to appear that the new Speaker in the face of the whole House of Commons admits a power of rejection in the Crown; but is not this rather a large conclusion from small premises? Does not the Speaker’s intreaty that the King would order a fitter man to be chosen savour as much of compliment as any thing else? Does it not at least look as much like compliment as like an acknowledgment of the right of rejection? However, if this proves any such right, the argument I conceive must stand thus: The Speaker is to disable himself (i.e. plead his inability) and intreat the King to command the Commons to chuse a fitter man; therefore (because he pleads his inability, and wisheth a fitter man may be chosen) the Crown has a clear right to put a negative on any man the Commons shall chuse as their Speaker. I despair to convince that man of any thing, except what he himself pleaseth, who can be convinced by such an argument. Coke also saith: It is true the Commons are to chuse, but seeing that after their choice the King may refuse him, for avoiding of expence and time, and contestation, the use is, (as in the congé d’eslier of a Bishop) that the King doth name a discreet and learned man, whom the Commons elect, but without their election no Speaker can be appointed for them. The only expression in this passage that may be construed in support of his claim is, that the King may refuse. It has been observed that all this may mean no more than that the King may do it though he has no constitutional right so to do; and to this it has been answered, that Coke declares what he writes is grounded upon the authority and reason of books, rolls of Parliament, and judicial records, and that to make any objection against it is to make objections not against Coke, but (forsooth) against the Constitution itself; but as no book, authority, reason, parliamentary roll, or judicial record, has been produced older than this passage, I apprehend all this, notwithstanding what Coke saith with regard to the King’s may may be bare narrative still, and no legal declaration of what the King may legally do; and I am the more inclined to doubt this matter, because I find Coke does not always speak like a Legislator, or one that declares the law; in this case, e.g. he saith every Member of the House being a Counsellor, he should have three properties of the elephant—that he has no gall—that he is inflexible and cannot bow—and that he is of ripe and most perfect memory. Now this seems a very good simile, but that any law declares a Member of Parliament should be like an elephant I still doubt, though I think all that write and act in publick ought to be without gall, and all Legislators inflexibly right. I don’t know when Coke wrote, but should any writer now assert, while the Parliament sits, the King has as much authority in the choice of their Speaker as in the election of a Bishop by congé d’eslier, he would hardly be in any danger of receiving the thanks of the House; but perhaps these things may better suit the meridian of Georgia, and, great as the authority is, I presume it is no treason to say that the Constitution is now better understood than even a Coke explained it in the days of the Stuarts; and yet after all he expressly saith, though he seems to begin rather abruptly: True it is the Commons must chuse their own Speaker, and he cannot be appointed for them. All that was thought law in the days of Coke has not been thought so since. I am really surprised at the stress that has been laid on the case of Sir Edward Seymour, rejected by Charles II. in 1679. It has been said, “he was rejected,” “the King never gave the matter up,” “prorogued the House for a few days,” “that the House dropt the matter, which it seems they had mistaken,” “and proceeded to the choice of another person,” (See Georgia Gazette for April 29, 1772:) And again, (Georgia Gazette for May 13) “that the King asserted the right of nomination,” “rejected one Speaker and nominated another,” and, N. B. because, “the House declined to chuse him prorogued them,” “that the House did not assert their right but chused Gregory,” “and did not shew a want of publick spirit by impeding publick business, had they done so it is supposed Charles would have dissolved them, lest they should serve him the same trick that had been served his father: And again, (Georgia Gazette May 29) “that in the next session they repaired their mistake, and chose a different person.” Now, whoever puts all this together will naturally conclude, that the Commons chose a Speaker disagreeable to the King, whom the King rejected; that, on their not rescinding their choice, the King insisted on his having such a right, and never gave it up, but prorogued them for some days, and that then they dropt the matter, repaired their mistake, gave up their claim so far that now “it can’t be said to be undecided,” chose another person, and so all was well, the King’s right established, and whoever now thinks and saith otherwise is a fiery Republican, and as bad (or nearly) as the Long Parliament. I do not mean to criticize upon this account given by an author of whom it has been said “that he writes unsoured by party, and with an apparent view to give candid information”; but I advise the reader next to peruse a different account given by two authors who have never been deemed partial, and who at least cannot be said to be influenced by our Georgia disputes. Thus Rapin: The Parliament began with a warm dispute between the King and the Commons about the choice of a Speaker. The Commons having chosen Mr. Edward Seymour, the King, who knew Seymour was a particular enemy of the Earl of Danby, refused his approbation, and ordered the Commons to proceed to a new choice. The House was extremely displeased with this refusal, alledging, that it was never known that a person should be excepted against, and no reason given, and that the thing itself of preventing a Speaker to the King was but a bare compliment. The King, on his side, insisted on the approbation or refusal of a Speaker when presented to him as a branch of his Prerogative. During a six days dispute, the Commons made several representations to the King, to which he gave very short answers. At last, as the Commons would not desist from what they thought their right, the King went to the Parliament, and prorogued it from the 13th to the 15th, that is, for one day’s interval between the two sessions. The Parliament meeting the 15th, the King ordered the Commons to proceed to the choice of a Speaker; then, to avoid a revival of the dispute, they chose Mr. William Gregory, Serjeant at Law, who was approved by the King. Rapin, vol. 2 p. 703. The account given in the Parliamentary Debates is still fuller: The Chancellor, by the King’s commands, ordered the House of Commons to proceed to the choice of a Speaker, who was to be presented to the King the next day, and being returned to their House, Colonel Birch did nominate and recommend the Right Honourable Edward Seymour, Knight of the Shire for the county of Devon, Treasurer of the Navy, one of his Majesty’s most Honourable Privy-Council, and Speaker of the last Parliament: Being a person acceptable to the King, and one who for his great integrity, ability, and long experience in the employment, was the fittest person for so great a trust. And Mr. Seymour being unanimously called upon to the chair, was conducted thither by Sir Thomas Lee, Sir Thomas Whitmore, and divers other members, and being there placed, he made a gratulatory speech to the House for their great kindness and affection towards him, in their unanimous choice of him: But still he desired the House that they would proceed to a new election, “For the long sittings of the late Parliament had so impaired his health, that he doubted he should not be well able to undergo the service of the House as would be expected from him:” But the House not admitting of any excuse, confirmed their choice, upon which he desired leave, “That he might intercede with his Majesty, that he would be pleased to discharge him of the duty.” But it appears, that he need not have been so urgent; for the King and the Earl of Danby taking this choice to be an ill presage, that this Parliament would begin where the last ended, were resolved not to approve of it: And as soon as he appeared to be presented, the Lord Chancellor stood up, and said, That if his Majesty should always accept a person pitcht upon by the House of Commons, then it would be no great favour to be chosen a Speaker; and therefore his Majesty, being the best judge of persons and things, thought fit to except against Mr. Seymour, as being fitly qualifyed for other services and imployments, without giving any reason to the persons chusing or the persons chosen. And therefore he ordered them to fix upon some other person by tomorrow morning, to be presented to the King for his approbation. The Commons immediately returned back to their own House, where Sir John Ernly stood up and acquainted them, “He had orders from his Majesty to recommend Sir Thomas Meers to them to be their Speaker, as a person well known in the method and practice of Parliaments, and a person that he thought would be very acceptable and serviceable to them.” But the House in a great heat cryed out, No, no! and fell into a warm debate. Mr. Sacheverell said, It was never known that a person should be excepted against, and no reason at all given, and therefore concluded, that it was done purposely to gratify some particular persons. Mr. Williams said for above a hundred years, it had not been known that a Speaker presented was ever excepted against; and the thing itself of presenting him to the King, as he humbly conceived, was but a bare compliment. Sir Thomas Clarges alledged, that there were Parliaments long before there were speakers chosen, and afterwards, for the ease of the House among themselves, they pitched upon a Speaker.—All our lives and liberties are preserved by this House, therefore we are to preserve the liberties of it. Mr. Garraway objected, if Mr. Seymour be rejected and no reason given, pray who must chuse a Speaker, the King or we? It is plain not we?—Sir Thomas Lee said, we address’d ourselves to his Majesty the last Parliament, as fearing his person to be in danger, but we received no answer at all in a whole week; we were immediately prorogued unexpectedly; and a little after dissolved, as unexpectedly: and I suppose, the same persons that gave that advice, gave this also. Others concluded, that all this was only for a bone of contention, fearing they should agree, and so called to adjourn, which was soon agreed to. These heats were so much the greater, because they reasonably supposed that it was all occasioned by the Earl of Danby; whose power was not wholly at an end; and between whom and Mr. Seymour there was a particular resentment. However, the first thing resolved on the next day, being Saturday, was, That an humble application be made to the King, to acquaint his Majesty, that the matter yesterday delivered by the Lord Chancellor, relating to the Speaker, is of so great importance, that this House cannot immediately come to a resolution therein: And therefore do humbly desire his Majesty, that he will graciously be pleased, to grant some further time for this House to take the matter into consideration. And they ordered the Chancellor of the dutchy, the Lord Cavendish, the Lord Russel, and Sir Henry Capel, immediately to attend his Majesty with this vote. Being returned in a short time, the Lord Russel acquainted the House, That they had attended his Majesty, who was sitting in Council; and that his Majesty, as soon as he was informed they were to wait upon him from the House immediately came out, and received them with great chearfulness and kindness: And having delivered their message, his Majesty retired to the Council-Chamber, and coming out again, was pleased to return the following answer by word of mouth, which they had reduced to writing: Gentlemen, I have considered of your message, and do consent to a further time, which I appoint to be on Tuesday next, unless you shall find some expedient in the mean time; for as I would not have my prerogative intrenched upon, so I would not do any thing against the privileges of the House. Upon the said Tuesday they drew up this humble Representation. We your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, do with all obedience return your Majesty most hearty thanks for the favourable reception, and gracious answer your Majesty was pleased to return to our late message; wherein your Majesty was pleased, not only to allow us longer time, to deliberate of what was delivered to us by the Lord Chancellor, relating to the choice of a Speaker, but likewise to express so great a care not to infringe our privileges. And we desire your Majesty to believe no subjects ever had a more tender regard, than ourselves, to the rights of your Majesty, and your Royal Prerogative; which we shall always acknowledge to be vested in the Crown, for the benefit and protection of your people. And therefore for the clearing all doubts that may arise in your Royal mind, upon this occasion now before us, we crave leave humbly to represent unto your Majesty, That it is the undoubted right of the Commons to have the free election of one of their Members to be their Speaker, and to perform the service of the House: And that the Speaker so elected, and presented according to custom, hath by the constant practice of all former ages, been continued Speaker and executed that employment, unless such persons have been excused for some corporal disease, which has been alledged, either by themselves, or some others in their behalf, in full Parliament. According to this usage, Mr. Edward Seymour was unanimously chosen, upon the consideration of his great ability and sufficiency for that place, of which we had large experience in the last Parliament, and was presented by us to your Majesty, as a person we conceived, would be most acceptable to your Majesty’s Royal judgment. This being the true state of the case, we do in all humility lay it before your Majesty’s view; hoping that your Majesty, upon due consideration of former precedents, will rest satisfied with our proceedings, and will think fit not to deprive us of so necessry a Member, by employing him in any other service; but to give us such a gracious answer, as your Majesty, and your Royal predecessors, have always done heretofore upon the like occasions; that so we may, without more loss of time, proceed to the dispatch of those important affairs, for which we were called hither: Wherein we doubt not but we shall so behave ourselves, as to give an ample testimony to the whole world of our duty and affection to your Majesty’s service, and of our care of the peace and prosperity of your kingdoms. To this Representation the King immediately gave this short answer: Gentlemen, All this is but loss of time; and therefore I desire you to go back again, and do as I have directed you. This giving no satisfaction to the House, the next day, March 12th, the Commons, after a warm debate, drew up this following Address: Most Gracious Sovereign. Whereas by the gracious answer your Majesty was pleased to give to our first message in Council, whereby your Majesty was pleased to declare a resolution, not to infringe our just rights and privileges, we your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal Commons were encouraged to make an humble representation to your Majesty upon the choice of our Speaker, which on Tuesday last was presented by some of our Members: We do, with great trouble and infinite sorrow, find by the report made to us by those Members, at their return, that your Majesty was pleased to give us an immediate answer to the same, without taking any further consideration; which we are persuaded, if your Majesty had done, what we then offered to your Majesty would so far have prevailed upon your Royal judgment, as to have given your Majesty satisfaction in the reasonableness of our desire; and preserved us in your Majesty’s favourable opinion of our proceedings. And since we do humbly conceive, that the occasion of this question hath arisen from your Majesty’s not being truly informed of the state of the case; we humbly beseech your Majesty to take the said representation into your further consideration, and give us such a gracious answer, that we may be put in a capacity to manifest our readiness to enter into these consultations which necessarily tend to the preservation and welfare of your Majesty and your kingdoms. Upon reading this address to the King, he immediately gave this quick and sharp return: Gentlemen, I will send you an answer to-morrow. Accordingly, as he had often done before upon great difficulties, he resolved to put an end to the dispute; and on the next morning, being Thursday the 13th of March, he came to the House of Peers, and sending for the Commons, he immediately prorogued the Parliament till Saturday following, after the Commons had sat without a Speaker but six days. And thus the King found a way to gain his point, but with very little advantage to his own business and affairs. On the appointed day, March 15th, his Majesty came to the House of Peers in his Royal robes, and the House of Commons attending, his Majesty was pleased to put both Houses in mind of what he said to them at the opening of the Parliament: And then the Lord Chancellor, by the King’s command, directed the Commons to return to their House, and to proceed to the choice of a Speaker. And being returned, the Lord Russel put the House in mind of the King’s commands, and immediately recommended William Gregory Sergeant at law, as a person, for his great learning and integrity, fit for the employment. And Mr. Sergeant Gregory being unanimously called upon to the chair, he in a short speech modestly excused himself, and desired of the House, that another might be nominated; but no excuse being admitted, he was formally conducted to the chair, by his two intimate friends, the Lord Russel and the Lord Cavendish, and there confirmed in the place. “On the Monday following, he was presented by the Commons to the King, in the House of Lords, who without hesitation approved of the choice.” I shall not make many remarks on these accounts, but I cannot forbear observing that the only instance where a Speaker appears rejected by the Crown was in the reign of a Stuart, when there was a settled design against the religion and liberties of the nation, which is far from being a presumption favourable to such a claim; even then the King does not reject ex plenitudine potestatis,4 but assigns as a reason that Sir Edward Seymour was proper for other services; and yet the Commons tell the King, that to chuse their Speaker without being deprived of their choice is their undoubted right. When Charles recommended another as one who he thought would be very acceptable and serviceable to them, they cried, No, no, and never would nor did chuse him; the King wisheth then to find an expedient, did not insist on his nomination, but prorogued them for a single day, which was plainly done to compromise the matter; when they met again, he recommended nobody, but Lord Russel, who afterwards fell a martyr to liberty, nominated Gregory, who was unanimously chosen, and formally conducted to the chair, and there confirmed in the place, and Monday after the King approved of him without hesitation. Burnet, in his memoirs, expressly saith the point was settled, that the right of electing was in the House, and that the confirmation was a thing of course. The argument, that if the King has no right to reject he may be under a necessity of admitting disagreeable persons into his presence, as persons may be chosen disaffected to his Majesty’s person and government, of which Wilkes being made Sheriff is given as an example, I cannot think of any great strength. I suppose the law calls no man disaffected who takes the oaths prescribed by law, and if any should be personally disagreeable to the King there is no necessity for his coming into his presence. Wilkes I believe never did, but I conceive the Constitution disables no man to serve his country in any place not in the gift of the Crown merely because he may be disagreeable to the King. The same Parliament that chose Seymour deputed Lord Russel to the King, who never was a friend to the King’s measures, and yet Charles had more grace than to receive him otherwise than politely. The right of rejecting a disagreeable person can be of no manner of service to the Crown, unless it may be exercised as often as a disagreeable person is chosen. Supposing the case to happen, it can hardly be expected that a House so ill disposed as to chuse a disagreeable person at first would become so good-natured, by the afront of a rejection, as to chuse a person more agreeable in a second election; or, supposing elections were repeated till the Commons gave way and chose a person perfectly agreeable to the Crown, what must be the natural consequence to the people? it can be no other than an express introduction of a Member would have to represent the King. The Speaker is not the King’s Representative, but if the Crown insists none shall be Speaker but one that will obey the orders, or, which may be just the same, is agreeable to the King, he might as well; in that case the King would have an Officer in the House, introduced, not by bribery and corruption, but by refusing to approve any other, and he might have the casting vote in a place where he ought to have no vote at all. That to present a Speaker for approbation implies a right of rejection has been alledged with greater shew; but that it is the Commons choice, and not the King’s approbation, that constitutes the Speaker, seems very plain, because he is placed in the chair immediately after the election, and sometimes acts as such some days before he is presented and approved of by the King. It would be very indecent to vest him in the office, and place him in the chair, if after all the King’s negative might set aside the choice; and I would apply here what Sir R. Atkins saith with regard to a form observed at the same time when the Speaker is presented, “That humble and modest way of the people’s addressing their Sovereign,—for granting privileges,” (of which the right to chuse and have a Speaker seems necessarily one) “shews great reverence and becomes the majesty of the Prince to be addressed to: but let it not be made an argument that either the laws thereupon made, or the privileges allowed, are precarious, and merely a favour, or may be refused them of right.” There are many presentations in law which allow not of rejection. The usual privileges, without which the House cannot act nor subsist, must be asked for; but as this is a petition, not of favour, but of right, so it seems the approbation of a Speaker is as much so. If the Constitution requires some applications to the King it also obliges the Crown never to put a negative on some applications. The new Speaker humbly prays for the privileges of the House, but should any Prince be so ill advised as to look upon that application as a matter which he may refuse, he might perhaps be informed that such a refusal implied no less than a breach of the original contract between him and his people, and that in this case it would be in vain to say that the power of giving (or approving) also implies a power of refusing. It has been said that this claim of the Crown was but once denied by Parliament; I believe it was always denied; but it might as well have been said it was but once claimed by the Crown. Some weight is laid on the circumstance that a Speaker was recommended as acceptable to the King, but it seems the King also recommended a man as one whom he supposed very acceptable to Parliament. When a superior recommends to an inferior it is no argument that those to whom he recommends have not a final choice. That a person (caeteris paribus)5 is acceptable to the King may be no improper recommendation to or motive with his electors. To establish this claim of the Crown, it has been observed, that Speakers have been disallowed, like Sir John Popham; but the case amounts to no more than his excuse was admitted; formerly every Speaker begged leave of the House that he might excuse himself to the King; this request of leave seems rather a proof that the election of the House is looked upon as final than otherwise, and Popham, though his excuse must have been very good, appears the only instance in which it was admitted, and cannot be of much weight against so many instances where no excuse was allowed. It is very certain the King did not approve Seymour, but it is not less so that, in order to get rid of the choice, he was obliged to prorogue the House, and that all he gained is, that the commons did not revive the dispute. The acquiescing of the Representatives of New England under a negative put on their choice is entirely owing to the tenor of their charter, and I am still of opinion that what rights the King reserved to himself in that charter are not such as are the undoubted prerogative of the Crown, but such as every Assembly or Parliament has a just claim to where the contrary is not expressly stipulated by charter. It has been advanced, that “when the King gave the Commons leave to chuse a speaker he reserved to himself the right of rejecting a Speaker that might be disagreeable to him, and that there was a compact between the King and Commons for that purpose.” This would be a strong argument indeed; but when and where was that compact made? What author or historian speaks of it? What authority is cited in proof of it? “Why it is natural to conclude,” but is it not as natural to conclude that, because no traces of any such compact are to be found, and that the Commons always regularly chose their own Speaker, and that not even an attempt was ever made to reject him, but in the case of Sir Edward Seymour, and that then the King never made any mention of such an original compact, but submitted to have his own nomination treated with a negative, and approved of one chosen in opposition to his own former recommendation, that therefore no such compact ever existed? And as this country is very “scarce of books,” I am clearly of opinion that book is not on this side of the water where this compact stands upon record, but if a copy, or direction where this compact may be found, is left with the Printer, it shall be duly acknowledged, and, if the owner chuses it, a promise given that his name shall not be mentioned. I ought to take notice of one argument more, (Georgia Gazette June 24:) “If the Massachusetts-Bay hold their provincial Legislation under charter, do not we in this province hold it under his Majesty’s commission and instruction to his Representative? And if that charter has reserved the power of negation upon their choice of a Speaker, will not the commissions and instructions to the Governor of this province have the same effect!” I conceive a very great difference between his Majesty’s instructions and charters; an Englishman I should think entitled to English laws, which I suppose implies Legislation any where and every where in the British dominions; that this right is prior to any charter or instruction, and is held not by instructions to a Governor, but is his natural right, which nothing but outlawry can deprive him of. Whatever is not law cannot be binding upon a British subject, and I suppose no man will say that, because the King has an undoubted right to instruct his servants, that therefore he has also a right to give instructions contrary to the Constitution, or derogatory of the right of the subject; such an instruction a Governor might look upon as a law to himself, but it is only the King can do no wrong, and the reason is plain, because the King can do nothing against law or the Constitution. It has been said that a Speaker may have an undue influence to the prejudice of the Crown; but he can have no undue influence as Speaker before he is really such, and it cannot appear that he has any undue influence before he has actually entered on his office, and in this case the Crown is sufficiently guarded by its indisputable negative on every act of Legislature, and of dissolution whenever it shall be thought necessary. By this also it would seem as if the Crown had a right to reject a Speaker actually approved of whenever his influence should become disagreeable, which doctrine I believe is entirely new, perhaps not free from danger. The Assembly of this province sometimes consisted only of 19 Members; 9 then made a House, and 5 a majority; as the number of Representatives increased it was thought necessary that the number to constitute a House should be increased in proportion; 19 now make a House, and 10 a majority, to do any business relating to the province. The remark that the strenuous advocate of the right of negative makes upon this alteration is this: “Such resolutions (which by the way were unanimous) could be made with no other view than the putting it in the power of a few leading men to impede the publick business by a secession whenever they pleased; which remark, as I suppose it had not been made had any Assembly subsisted, so every reader will judge with what justice and temper it was made. That he wishes 5 men might have the power rather than 10 is self-evident, and that 1 man may more easily influence 4 or 5 than 9 or 10 need not be doubted. I shall conclude with a citation from a debate in the House of Lords in 1675: The Lords plainly spoke out, That men had been, might and were likely to be, in either House, too much for the King, as they called it, and that whoever did endeavour to give more power to the King than the law and Constitution had given,—might justly be said to do too much for the King, and to be corrupted in his judgment by the prospect of advantages and rewards, though when it is considered that every deviation of the Crown towards absolute power lessens the King in the love and affections of his people,—a wise Prince will not think it a service done him. Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/exploring-the-bounds-of-liberty-political-writings-of-colonial-british-america-from-the-glorious-revolution-to-the-american-revolution-vol-3-1755-1774#lf1670-03_label_431

An ESSAY in vindication of the Continental Colonies of AMERICA, from A Censure of Mr Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. With some Reflections on Slavery in general. By an AMERICAN. Refellere sine iracundia, et refelli sine pertinacia, paratus sum. Cic. Tusc. Disp. lib. ii. LONDON: Printed for the Author. Sold by T. Becket and P. A. De Hondt, in the Strand. MDCCLXIV. Advertisement. Four years having now elapsed since the publication of Mr Smith’s Theory of moral sentiments, the world may well be surprised, that the censure we are hereafter to refute, should have remained so long unanswered. For that reason, perhaps, this answer may be deemed somewhat late; but the author hopes, that the vindication of truth from misrepresentation; of innocence from unjust aspersion, though it be late, will never be unacceptable. The charge is general. It seems to aim at all the American colonies which employ the African slaves; and yet he will venture to assert, that it is not applicable to any one of them. The slaves in the French, Spanish, and Portuguese settlements are not treated with more, if with so much severity, as those of some of our colonies; nor do the inhabitants consist of the refuse of their respective countries. For the truth of this he appeals to their histories. He flatters himself with having proved, in the following essay, that the charge is not applicable, with the least shadow of truth, to our continental colonies. In the West-India islands, it must be acknowledged that the slaves undergo a very severe labour; but could this authorise Mr Smith to reflect on the inhabitants, in such opprobrious terms? Could he justly infer from thence, that they were utterly destitute of every virtue, or abandoned to the influence of every infamous and detested vice? The Africans he might have exalted into heroes, however little they deserve that name, with less offence. Where the motive appears benevolent, we more easily pardon a trespass against truth. But was it necessary to this end that the Americans should be debased into monsters? that they should be treated with reproaches more rigorous than the severest justice, unmitigated by the least humanity, would utter against the most perfectly vicious? And here, though it relate not immediately to our subject, yet, as an American, the author may presume to offer a few remarks on what Mr Smith has related, concerning the American savages. The virtues with which he has endowed them, and the particular customs he has said to prevail among them, are not in the least conformable to our experience. We have ever found them perfidious to the last degree; actuated in all their wars by the most atrocious and ungovernable cruelty; of natures at once so cowardly and cruel, that whilst they dare not ever face an enemy prepared, they will butcher him, if unguarded or defenceless, with the most ruthless barbarity. When their kings or chiefs visit us in the colonies, they are frequently accompanied by their wives and concubines; so far are they from blushing at their female connections. They are not upon an equality, as it hath pleased Mr Smith to observe, but governed universally, as far as we know, by their kings or chiefs. His instances of magnanimity and fortitude, in sustaining the pains of torture and death with the most intrepid firmness, are applicable only to the Mexicans and Peruvians; such as the Spaniards first found them; for at present, even among them, this spirit is almost wholly extinguished. But surely Mr Smith cannot style these the savages of America. Whoever will read their history, may see how little they merit this indignity. “The police of the Mexicans,” says Mr Voltaire, “was in every other respect, prudent and humane? Astronomy was carried to as great a height among them as among the Egyptians. They had reduced war to a regular art. Their public treasury was managed with the greatest exactness.” From his description of Mexico, it appears to have been at once the residence of gaiety, magnificence, police, and arts. “The city,” says he, "abounded with spacious and convenient houses, built of stone; noble squares, market-places, and shops full of the most curious pieces of workmanship, carved and engraved in gold and silver, rich vessels of painted porcelaine; cotton stuffs, and ornaments of feathers, which formed the most beautiful patterns, by the variety of their colours and shades." Near the great market-place stood a palace, where all disputes between the traders were decided in an expeditious manner, like those justice-courts of the consuls at Paris, which were first established by Charles IX. after the destruction of the empire of Mexico. Several palaces belonging to the Emperor Montezuma added to the magnificence of the city. One of them raised on columns of jasper, was set apart for containing the curiosities which minister only to pleasure; another was filled with offensive and defensive weapons, richly adorned with gold and precious stones; a third was surrounded with spacious gardens, wholly destined to the raising of medicinal plants, which proper officers distributed to the sick, and gave an account of the success attending the use of them to the king. These physicians likewise kept a register of cases, after their manner, being unacquainted with writing. The other articles of magnificence only prove the progress of arts in that kingdom; this latter shews the progress of morality. Thus much being premised, the author now entreats the reader to proceed with candour to the perusal of the following sheets. An Essay in Vindication of the Continental Colonies of America. In the 316th page, 2d edition, of the Theory of moral sentiments, by Mr Smith, Professor of morality in the college of Glasgow, are these words: There is not a negro from the coast of Africa, who does not, in this respect, possess a degree of magnanimity, which the soul of his sordid master is scarce capable of conceiving. Fortune never exerted more cruelly her empire over mankind, than when she subjected those nations of heroes to the refuse of the jails of Europe, of wretches who possess the virtues neither of the countries which they go to, nor of those which they come from, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly expose them to the contempt of the vanquished. That I may give my reader a just idea of the equity and humanity which could dictate this extraordinary paragraph, I must beg leave to lay before him two things. First, An authentic account of the African slaves, who are the objects of its praise and compassion; and, secondly, Of the American colonists, who are here the objects of as bitter an invective as ever fell from the tongue of man. An Account of the Africans. It is not to our purpose to give any account of the inhabitants of Africa in general, but of those parts only which furnish us with slaves, namely, of Negroland and Guinea. We learn, from the most authentic accounts, that the negroes in Africa have just as much natural sagacity as fits them for very dextrous rogues. They are so prone to lying, that they exercise this faculty on every occasion. No contracts are sacred with them, for they break these whenever they have the least prospect of advantage, and sometimes out of mere wantonness. This genius prevails in all their compacts; as well domestic as national. It is on this account that their marriages are perpetually violated. They either expose their wives publicly for gain, or employ them as decoy-ducks for strangers, whom they, by that means, surprise and plunder. In private life they are frequently guilty of the most horrid murders. It is usual for one nation to fall upon another without either cause or warning, but as whim or villany shall prompt. In the field, they are without either discipline or courage. “Their natural cowardice,” says Churchill, “is the reason that few men are killed in battle; for they are so extremely timorous, that as soon as ever they see a man fall by them, they betake themselves to their heels, and run home with all possible expedition.” The cruelty which is inseparable from cowardice, impels them, when victorious, to the most savage barbarities. They slaughter their vanquished or defenceless foes with the most unbounded fury: nor age, nor innocence, nor impotence is spared: one bloody and undistinguished massacre overwhelms them all. We read, with horrour, of their sucking the blood of their enemies; of their ripping open the teeming womb, and dashing the infant against the stones, in view of the agonized mother. Some they dismember alive, and leave to groan out their miserable lives in helpless anguish. Blood and desolation attend their steps, devoting every thing that is defenceless.|| Thus do they endeavour to satiate their savage appetite for blood; an appetite that burns with implacable fury, and urges them to the most horrid barbarities, in violation of every sentiment of justice, humanity, or magnanimity. At their burials they sacrifice slaves, and, what is horrible above all names of horrour, they have a market on purpose to answer this diabolical demand. Cruelty, cunning, perfidy, and cowardice, are their characteristics. In their trade with the Europeans they practise all manner of frauds. Their method of feeding is not one remove above absolute brutes; no degree of corruption will deter them from preying on whatever they find, and that in the most voracious and filthy manner. Their religious worship is perfectly conformable to the universal depravity and barbarism of their natures. They are involved in the most gross idolatry, worshipping almost every thing, animate and inanimate, with the most stupid reverence. To snakes of every kind they pay a constant worship, and they honour the devil with what may be truly termed infernal rites. But endless were the list of their barbarities. I have already recounted enough to shock the most common humanity; I shall therefore close the ungrateful subject with Baron Montesquieu’s account of this people. “The greatest part of the people on the coast of Africa,” says he, are savages and barbarians. The principal reason of this is, I believe, that the small countries capable of being inhabited, are separated from each other by large and almost uninhabitable tracts of land. They have gold in abundance, received immediately from the hand of Nature; but they are without industry or arts. Every civilized nation is therefore in a condition to traffic with them to advantage, by raising their esteem of things of no value, and receiving a very high price in return. To this I shall add the character which the author of the account of America gives them as slaves; an author who cannot be suspected of partiality. In his history of the Spanish settlements, he says, “The blacks here, as they are imported from Africa, have the same character as the blacks of our colonies, stubborn, hardy, of an ordinary understanding, and fitted for the gross slavery they endure.” “Nothing,” says he, in another place, “could excuse the slave-trade but the necessity we are under of peopling our colonies, and the consideration, that the slaves we buy were in the same condition in Africa, either hereditary, or taken in war. I know they are stubborn and untractable, and must be ruled with a rod of iron.” It is this stubborn, stupid, and untractable disposition to which it hath pleased some to give the name of magnanimity and heroism. ———O name! O sacred name of magnanimity profan’d! Magnanimity, according to Mr Hutcheson, is an elevation and firmness of soul, which no circumstances of fortune can move; aiming solely at moral excellence in all its conduct. The opposite extreme is pusillanimity, or cowardice, rendering a man useless and miserable. Which of these characters is most applicable to the disposition of the negroes, I shall leave to the determination of the candid reader. Abandoned indeed, beyond all instance of depravation, must they be, whose stronger vices should justly expose them to the contempt of this people. Of the Continental Colonies of America. Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, are the chief and almost only colonies on the continent, which employ the African slaves. On these, then, the censure must fall heaviest, and from these only I shall endeavour to repel it. Account of Virginia. In the year 1584, Sir Walter Raleigh, attended by many persons of eminence, and many reputable merchants, with letters patent from her Majesty Queen Elisabeth, settled the first British colony in North America, and, in honour of his Queen, called it, in general, Virginia. That settlement, however, was not what we now properly call Virginia. Innumerable losses had almost utterly destroyed the colony, notwithstanding the reinforcements sent from time to time, under Sir Thomas Gates, Sir Richard Grenville, Sir George Summers, and others; when the Lord Delaware, a nobleman of very uncommon virtues, arrived in the bay of Chesapeak, and, with his own men and the remainder of the former colony, established on that bay a settlement, which gave birth to the present colony of Virginia. The wisdom and care of this worthy Lord made the young colony prosper; and in this condition he left it under the governance of a son, who inherited his father’s virtues. A council he had to assist him, composed of Sir Thomas Gates, Sir George Summers, Sir Ferdinand Wenman, the Honourable George Peircy, and Mr Newport. Such was the settlement of Virginia, than which, perhaps, no colony had ever a nobler foundation. Her founders were distinguished, even in Britain, for rank, for fortune, and for abilities. Not urged by vice or want, they voluntarily exposed themselves to a thousand hardships, to extend the dominion of their country. They braved the dangers of an unknown sea and savage land, to enrich her commerce, and exalt her power. I know it will be said, their views were not so disinterested; they acted with the hope of promoting their own fortunes. Perhaps they might; yet this detracts not from their merit. That individual who best promotes the interest of the public with his own, is most laudable. The nature of man admits not of such disinterested action, and the nature of society seldom demands it; for the good of the whole is rarely to be separated from that of the individual. Were such action to be the criterion of a good citizen, how few would stand the test? Does the merchant wind through the laborious and uncertain labyrinth of commerce for the public, or for his own emolument? does the warriour brave the field of death, or tempt the hideous wave, to serve his country or himself? It cannot therefore be denied, that the founders of this colony deserved the highest veneration and esteem of their country. ———Coelestes animae! Nulla dies unquam memori vos eximet aevo! And here I cannot help lamenting the unequal condition of their descendents the present inhabitants. Their manufacturing hands tied up; their commerce confined; and their staple commodity oppressed with such intolerable exactions, that it yields to the labouring planter scarce one tenth of its original value. By these means they are subjected to the arbitrary impositions of the British merchants, who fix, like cankers, on their estates, and utterly consume them. Every means that the most confined and puny policy can suggest, are employed to depress them, and prevent their growth! They are treated, not as the fellow-subjects, but as the servants of Britain. The French colonies were nourished and endeared to their mother-country by the most humane and gentle government; whilst here the hardest discipline is used to check their growth, and alienate their affections from Britain. When shall we learn the virtues, and shun the vices of our enemies? Here let me thank, thank from my heart, the generous man, who, despising the little, abject, selfish, coward politics of others, has remonstrated against these grievances in the colonies with equal humanity and truth. But solitary is the voice of universal benevolence, and like the notes of the dying swan, sweet, but unavailing. I return to my subject. The colony continued to flourish and increase, though gradually, until the unfortunate reign of Charles I. when it received a considerable reinforcement in the depressed royalists, who, flying from the ruin that threatened them at home, took refuge in Virginia. This colony long resisted the efforts of Cromwell and the parliament to subdue them, nor was it vanquished at length but by stratagem; and it is said to have been the first which threw off the yoke, and proclaimed King Charles II. Since that period the colony has received gradual increases by men from Britain, and other countries, who chose to seek their fortunes in a new and rising world. Before that time, in the year 1620, began a trade, the most unfortunate that could be devised, namely, the importation of African slaves, and, unhappily, it has to this day continued to increase. In the reign of Charles II. an act passed for the transportation of convicts to the British plantations in America. Virginia received her part of those who were transported. Amid such a number as are condemned, some will often be really innocent. Others, though guilty of the fault for which they suffer, may have been driven to it by the insupportable demands of want. For trespasses of this kind proceed oftener from necessity and indigence than from any wanton or ungovernable propensity to vice. When such criminals are transported to a country where there is little opportunity, and still less necessity for stealing, it is not surprising that they reform, and become honest men. We cannot otherwise account for the extreme rarity of criminal executions in this colony. But such persons have been very rarely the founders of families which became afterwards eminent; there are certainly few, if any, in this colony, which can be traced from so mean an original. The government of Virginia, at this time, is pretty exactly conformable to the constitution of England. A governor represents the King. The council is composed of twelve gentlemen, appointed by the King and council in England, and invested with the title of Honourable. The lower house consists of members elected by their respective counties. The counsellors preside at the general court, and each county has its peculiar court, in which justice is impartially administered. The established and very universally received religion, is that of the church of England. This colony distinguished itself in the late war, by contributing largely to its support in men and money; for the behaviour of her troops I appeal to the accounts of the campaigns in America. I shall finish this account with the character of the inhabitants of this colony, given by a gentleman, whose veracity and knowledge cannot be questioned. “The inhabitants of Virginia are a cheerful, hospitable, and many of them a genteel, though somewhat vain and ostentatious people. They are, for the greater part, of the established church of England, nor until lately did they tolerate any other.” “The same author, in speaking of the negroes, says, “These do not here stand in need of such recruits, as in the West Indies; they rather increase than diminish; a blessing derived from a more moderate labour, better food, and a more healthy climate.” I am sensible it is a common creed, that the negro slaves here are very barbarously treated: A creed that takes its rise from the reports of wretches, who frame falsehoods to catch the ear of vulgar credulity, or to gratify that strange propensity in some minds to calumny and misrepresentation. But no creed can be more ill founded, or more repugnant to truth. How it could ever have operated on a man of sense, as it seems to have done on Mr Smith, is to me really inconceivable. I have travelled through most parts of Scotland and Ireland; and I can safely assert, that the habitations of the negroes are palaces, and their living luxurious; when compared with those of the peasants of either of these countries. There is, I confess, an inexpressible misery, to the generous mind, in the very idea of slavery; but abstracting this, the condition of those slaves is far happier than that of the Scotch or Irish vulgar. Of Maryland. Lord Baltimore, a Roman-Catholic nobleman, in the year 1632, obtained a patent from King Charles I. for a part of Virginia. Soon after he sent his brother, the Hon. Leonard Calvert, accompanied by a number of Roman-Catholic gentlemen, to settle the land so granted. This they executed, and, in honour of the Queen, called the colony Maryland. The uneasy situation of the Catholics in England, especially at a time when their religion was an object of public jealousy, as well as odium, made them frequently seek an asylum in this colony; where they lived in safety and happiness under a proprietor of their own persuasion. This Lord was not, however, so bigotted a Catholic, but that he made his religion listen to political motives. He, therefore, gave his assent to an act, permitting a free and unquestioned exercise of their religion to all who professed Christianity. Encouraged by this toleration, men of every denomination, who were uneasy in their circumstances, from whatever cause, pursued a happier fortune in Maryland. The colony, by these means, increased daily, and has, ever since, enjoyed a state of almost uninterrupted tranquillity. One revolution it has suffered, namely, that of having the religion of the church of England established in it. The inhabitants of Maryland are in general richer than their neighbours of Virginia, because more attentive to merchandise, and to their own interests; but they are therefore less sumptuous, as well as less hospitable. Carolina, North and South. The first settlement in this country was made by the French, under the celebrated, but unfortunate, Admiral Chatillon. The inhuman tragedy of St Bartholomew, which cut off this illustrious man, destroyed also this settlement, the fate of which was grafted on his. The religious politics, which fatally engaged the French court at this period, diverted their attention from external objects, and therefore from the support of this colony. The country lay thus entirely neglected until the year 1663, when a proprietary, composed of the noblest personages in Britain was impowered to settle there an English colony. This was executed upon a plan drawn up by the illustrious and learned Mr Locke. Its success, however, was not answerable to the brilliancy and wisdom of its foundation. Intestine broils had almost reduced it to ruin; when it was guarded from the destruction that hung over it, by the interposition of the British government. In 1728, the whole country was divided into the two separate districts of North and South. These were settled on the same establishment with Virginia and Maryland. The prosperity of the colony may be dated from this period; for since that time its inhabitants have continued to flourish, and are now both rich and happy; blessed with a very delightful country, and a prospering commerce. Charlestown is the chief town of note in either colony. “This,” says the account of America, "is one of the first in North America, for size, beauty, and traffic. The planters and merchants are rich and well-bred; the people are showy and expensive in their dress and way of living; so that every thing conspires to make this by much the liveliest and politest place, as it is one of the richest too in all America." Having thus presented my reader with a true account of the African slaves, and of the colonies which chiefly employ them; I must entreat him to read, once more, Mr Smith’s charge. There is not a negro from the coast of Africa, who does not, in this respect, possess a degree of magnanimity, which the soul of his sordid master is scarce capable of conceiving. Fortune never exerted more cruelly her empire over mankind, than when she subjected those nations of heroes to the refuse of the jails of Europe, of wretches who possess the virtues neither of the countries which they go to, nor of those which they come from, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly expose them to the contempt of the vanquished. We have seen that this his nation of heroes is a race the most detestable and vile that ever the earth produced. On the contrary, that the inhabitants of the colonies are descended from worthy ancestors, from whom he has not proved them to have degenerated, whilst others acknowledge them to be, at this period, a humane, hospitable, and polished people. Is it then to be conceived, that the former could merit the title of a nation of heroes, or the latter the ignominy of being styled, the refuse of jails, inhuman, brutal, base? Could prejudice operate so strongly on a human mind, as to make it sacrifice to an ill-conceived resentment, every principle of justice and humanity? Should not his own interest have taught him to reflect, that calumny, unsupported by proof, affects those only who utter it. Can the mind of a man of sense, a philosopher, a moralist, be so strangely perverted? Prejudice is indeed a stain that will fasten on the best minds, yet that mind cannot surely be ranked among the best, wherein it sinks so deep as to produce such an outrageous trespass against truth. The ingenious theory of morals has, very deservedly, gained the world’s esteem; and I am sorry it should contain any thing so unworthy of its general character. I am sorry, because I admire it, and wish I could have esteemed its author. It strikes me indeed at once with astonishment and concern, that the same heart which could dictate the goodness of the one, should ever be debased with the malignity of the other. As the question touching the encouragement or abolition of slavery, is of the utmost importance to the colonies I have here presumed to vindicate; I shall not, I hope, be blamed, if my zeal should prompt me further to offer a few remarks on this subject. Life and liberty were both the gifts of God. In a state of nature they were both equally sacred. When the increase, and other necessities of men, made the establishment of societies requisite; it followed necessarily, that a portion of natural liberty should be sacrificed, to the more effectual preservation of the rest. This first subjected men to laws. The power of enacting these was lodged, by a majority of suffrages in each society, in a select number, denominated from thence the legislative body. Penal laws became soon necessary to the well-being of society; and were proportioned to the nature of offences. For atrocious crimes, a deprivation of life was the most general punishment. Now, as liberty was subjected to the same power which made life the atonement for certain crimes, that might certainly have been sacrificed for similar or different offences. In this view therefore the origin of slavery seems just and legal; whether it be equally political, is not the present question. Let us now examine whether it may be lawful on any other foundation. Puffendorf admits two lawful causes of slavery, namely, consent and force. But, with submission to so great authority, I cannot help thinking, that neither of these is founded in justice. The introduction of slavery into any society is a matter of very great importance; it cannot, then, be presumed, that such an innovation ought to be at the option of every individual; whose consent alone can, therefore, never constitute him a slave. But further, every member of society owes some obedience and duty for the protection and immunities he enjoys; nor can he refuse those, without renouncing these. Whoever then consents to be a slave, as he, by this act, yields all his duty and obedience to his master; is no longer entitled to any privileges or protection from society. A slave therefore of this kind would be constantly an outlaw. Force has never been esteemed sufficient authority for enslaving, except in the case of a conqueror and his captive: nor is it so here; since it is founded on a right which is itself unjust, I mean the power of inflicting death on a prisoner. I have Mr Hutcheson’s authority for asserting, that conquerors have no right to murder captives in cold blood; and it is plain from the nature of things, that they have no right to kill a prisoner, unless their own immediate safety absolutely requires it. When two men are in arms, they are both equally obnoxious, and may mutually destroy each other; but when one has laid down his arms, and submitted himself a prisoner, he ceases to be that dangerous person, and cannot justly be treated as such; nay more, he is in the place of one who has implored protection, which his adversary may, it is true, refuse him, or may confine him; but he cannot slay him, without violating the laws of justice and humanity: so that, unquestionably, all civilized nations concur in detesting the murder of prisoners in cold blood. Grotius indeed thought very differently, when he said, Nec tempore ullo excluditur potestas occidendi bello captos; an inhuman assertion, indeed, and more worthy an African savage than an European philosopher. He has adduced examples to confirm his opinion; but they are by no means conclusive. Even modern times may furnish some instances of captives put to death. That of Agincourt is remarkable: the situation of the victors there was certainly critical; yet could it be thence concluded to be legal at all times? He undoubtedly founded his opinion more upon ancient dogmatism than upon ancient practice. For the truth of this, I appeal to the histories of Greece and Rome, in their more enlightened ages. The practice of barbarous nations, does not influence the question. It would be absurd, to draw the principles of justice from the practice of those, who owned no law but their own savage wills. No opinion can be of more weight than that of Baron Montesquieu, and it is clear here and pointed. “From the right of killing,” says he, "politicians have drawn that of reducing to slavery; a consequence as ill grounded as the principle. There is no such right as reducing people to slavery, but when it becomes necessary to the preservation of the conquest. Preservation, but never servitude, is the end of conquest, though servitude may be sometimes a necessary means of preservation; even in that case it is contrary to the nature of things, that the slavery should be perpetual." In another place he has determined it to be expressly contrary, to both natural and civil law. Our question relates solely to perpetual slavery; which appears to be unjust from any other origin, than the legislative power in each society. To determine, then, whether the slavery imposed on the Africans be legal; we are only to examine on what it is founded. The most authentic accounts of Africa inform us, that the slaves we procure are such as have been taken in the wars of their native kings, and sold, as is their custom, to the European factors; or of such as have been trapanned into servitude by the Europeans, or by their own countrymen, who are allured to such wickedness by European bribes. As the former method is unjust, the latter is detestable; nor can any thing be more shocking to justice and humanity, than to encourage such barbarous tyranny, and such abominable craft. The violation, however, of justice and humanity, though great, is not the only evil that attends this encouragement. Aristotle, long ago, declared, that slaves could have no virtue; but he knew not any who were so utterly devoid of any semblance of virtue as are the Africans; whose understandings are generally shallow, and their hearts cruel, vindictive, stubborn, base, and wicked. Whether this proceeds from a native baseness that fits their minds for all villany; or that they never receive the benefit of education, I shall not presume to determine. Slavery indeed, of every kind, admits of little cultivation, and must therefore be always an enemy to virtue and science, which will be in danger whereever it prevails. Longinus, and with him many eminent men, have asserted, that even such a slavery as attends despotic government, is injurious, nay absolutely suppressive of all the noble exertions of the human mind. This they support by the example of many states, wherein the sciences flourished during their civil liberty, and were blasted immediately on the introduction of despotism. It must, however, be confessed, that modern times present many exceptions to this opinion; for we now see both arts and sciences attain the highest perfection under arbitrary governments. Yet there can be no question but that the slavery of which we are treating must be injurious to science; since the minds of our slaves are never cultivated. The same reason will always render it unfavourable to trade and manufactures, which have ever flourished in free states. Commerce especially flies from oppression, and rests only under the wings of liberty. If slavery then be necessarily an enemy to arts and sciences, good policy would surely direct us to suppress it. The danger too that threatens a state from the insurrections of slaves, furnishes a very strong argument against their admission. History, both ancient and modern, abounds with examples of the reality of this danger. The Helots had nearly destroyed the Spartan government, which so long derided the assaults of other foes. Rome herself, even in the meridian of her power and glory, was on the brink of destruction from the slaves whom she despised. Our ears are every day shocked with the barbarities, which attend the insurrections of the slaves in the American islands. Should not these warn the continent? why should those colonies trust that they alone, of all the nations which have yet tried, will escape the miseries of such rebellions? It is computed, that in the colony of Virginia the slaves exceed the freemen by more than one third; and that two or three thousand are yearly imported. Would not this be a fearful odds, should they ever be excited to rebellion? Much confidence may seem to arise from the native pusillanimity of this people, than whom the earth, I believe, never bore a more abject, coward race. But dastardly as they are, under an able leader, they may do much mischief; and as cowards are invariably cruel, should they ever be superior, not a shadow of mercy could be expected. History, in numberless instances, authorises this apprehension; and I remember, to this purpose, a remarkable saying of an experienced Athenian general, “That he would prefer an army of stags with a lion general, to an army of lions commanded by a stag.” “Slavery,” says the illustrious Baron Montesquieu, is in its own nature bad; it is neither useful to the master, nor to the slave. Not to the slave, because he can do nothing through a motive of virtue; not to the master, because, having an unlimited authority over his slaves, he insensibly accustoms himself to the want of all moral virtues, and, from thence, grows fierce, hasty, severe, choleric, voluptuous, and cruel. Happily this prediction is not yet verified. But can there be a more urgent reason for suppressing slavery than the very danger of it? Can any curse be apprehended, worse than such a depravation? A depravation, at which humanity shudders, and reason stands appalled. I know it has been argued, that none but negro slaves could undergo the arduous toil of American culture; exposed or to the fervid heat of summer, or winter’s piercing frost. But this is all imaginary. The freeborn Briton, in many labours, sustains fatigues; that would make the pusillanimous heart of a slave, faint within him. Nor is this wonderful. The will should ever animate the deed; the will of a slave is never with his arm, whose nerves are therefore unstrung, and its vigour damped. To sum up all, it is evident, that the bondage we have imposed on the Africans, is absolutely repugnant to justice. That it is highly inconsistent with civil policy; first, as it tends to suppress all improvements in arts and sciences; without which it is morally impossible that any nation should be happy or powerful. Secondly, as it may deprave the minds of the freemen; steeling their hearts against the laudable feelings of virtue and humanity. And, lastly, as it endangers the community by the destructive effects of civil commotions. Need I add to these, what every heart, which is not callous to all tender feelings, will readily suggest; that it is shocking to humanity, violative of every generous sentiment, abhorrent utterly from the Christian religion: for, as Montesquieu very justly observes, “we must suppose them not to be men, or a suspicion would follow, that we ourselves are not Christians.” And here I must beg leave to repeat a former quotation, as it requires some remarks, which are most proper in this place. The ingenious author of the account of America says, Nothing indeed could at all excuse the slave-trade but the necessity we are under of peopling our colonies, and the consideration, that the slaves we buy were in the same condition in Africa, either hereditary, or taken in war. There cannot be a more dangerous maxim, than that necessity is a plea for injustice. For who shall fix the degree of this necessity? What villain so atrocious, who may not urge this excuse; or, as Milton has happily expressed it, ———And with necessity, The tyrant’s plea, excuse his dev’lish deed? That our colonies want people, is a very weak argument for so inhuman a violation of justice; which, agreeable to Justinian, is constans et perpetua voluntas, jus suum cuique tribuendi. Nor is there more validity in the latter argument. Shall a civilized, a Christian nation, encourage slavery; because the barbarous, savage, lawless African hath done it? Monstrous thought! To what end do we profess a religion whose dictates we so flagrantly violate? Wherefore have we that pattern of goodness and humanity, if we refuse to follow it? How long shall we continue a practice; which policy rejects, justice condemns, and piety dissuades? Shall the Americans persist in a conduct, which cannot be justified; or persevere in oppression, from which their hearts must recoil? If the barbarous Africans shall continue to enslave each other, let the daemon Slavery remain among them, that their crime may include its own punishment. Let not Christians, by administering to their wickedness, confess their religion to be a useless refinement, their professions vain, and themselves as inhuman as the savages they detest. I shall not presume to prescribe any method, by which they might better accomplish the purposes they mean to answer by slaves: but I observe it is the opinion of Mr Postlethwayte, that the colonies might be more advantageously peopled from Europe; and that it would be for the interest of the Europeans, to abolish the slave-trade; which, though profitable itself, is yet an insuperable bar to other more valuable improvements in Africa. Had Mr Smith, whose unmerited censure gave birth to this essay, instead of listening to the gratification of a slanderous prejudice, exerted his abilities, in dissuading the Europeans from such a barbarous trade; how great, how noble had been his deed! How had he bless’d mankind, and rescu’d me. FINIS. Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/exploring-the-bounds-of-liberty-political-writings-of-colonial-british-america-from-the-glorious-revolution-to-the-american-revolution-vol-3-1755-1774#lf1670-03_label_215

Remarks on the Quebec Bill By Alexander Hamilton Remarks on the Quebec Bill: Part One By the Author of The Farmer Refuted, &c. [New York, June 15, 1775] In compliance with my promise to the public, and in order to rescue truth from the specious disguise, with which it has been cloathed, I shall now offer a few remarks on the act, intitled, “An Act for making more effectual provision, for the government of the province of Quebec, In North-America” whereby, I trust, it will clearly appear, that arbitrary power, and its great engine the Popish Religion, are, to all intents and purposes, established in that province. While Canada was under the dominion of France, the French laws and customs were in force there; which are regulated in conformity to the genius and complexion of a despotic constitution; and expose the lives and properties of subjects to continued depredations, from the malice and avarice of those in authority: But when it fell under the dominion of Britain, these laws so unfriendly to the happiness of society gave place, of course, to the milder influence of the English laws; and his Majesty, by proclamation, promised to all those who should settle there, a full enjoyment of the rights of British subjects. In violation of this promise, the act before us declares, “That the said proclamation, and the commission, under the authority whereof, the government of the said province is at present administered, be, and the same are hereby revoked, annulled and made void, from and after the first day of May, 1775.” This abolition of the privileges stipulated by the proclamation was not inflicted as a penalty for any crime, by which a forfeiture had been incurred, but merely on pretence of the present form of government having “been found, by experience, to be inapplicable to the state and circumstances of the province.” I have never heard any satisfactory account concerning the foundation of this pretence: for it does not appear, that the people of Canada, at large, ever expressed a discontentment with their new establishment, or solicited a restoration to their old. They were doubtless, the most proper judges of the matter, and ought to have been fully consulted, before the alteration was made. If we may credit the general current of intelligence, which we have had respecting the disposition of the Canadians, we must conclude they are averse to the present regulation of the Parliament; and had rather continue under the form of government instituted by the royal proclamation. However this may be, the French laws are again revived. It is enacted, “that in all matters of controversy relative to property and civil rights, resort shall be had to the laws of Canada, as the rule for the decision of the same; and all causes, that shall hereafter be instituted, in any of the courts of justice, shall, with respect to such property and rights, be determined agreeably to the said laws and customs of Canada, until they shall be varied and altered, by any ordinances, that shall, from time to time, be passed in the said province, by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor or commander in chief for the time being by and with the advice and consent of the legislative council of the same.” Thus the ancient laws of Canada are restored, liable to such variations and additions, as shall be deemed necessary, by the Governor and council, and as both the one and the other are to be appointed by the King, during pleasure, they will all be his creatures, and entirely subject to his will; which is thereby rendered the original fountain of law; and the property and civil rights of the Canadians are made altogether dependent upon it; because the power communicated of varying and altering, by new ordinances, is indefinite and unlimited. If this does not make the King absolute, in Canada, I am at a loss for any tolerable idea of absolute authority; which I have ever thought to consist, with respect to a monarch, in the power of governing his people according to the dictates of his own will. In the present case, he has only to inform the governor and council what new laws, he would chuse to have passed, and their situation will ensure their compliance. It is further provided, “that nothing contained, in the act, shall extend, or be construed to extend to prevent or hinder his Majesty, his heirs and successors, from erecting, constituting and appointing, from time to time, such courts of criminal, civil, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, within, and for the said province of Quebec; and appointing, from time to time, the judges and officers thereof, as his Majesty, his heirs and successors shall think necessary, for the circumstances of the said province.” Here a power of a most extraordinary and dangerous nature is conferred. There must be an end of all liberty, where the Prince is possessed of such an exorbitant prerogative, as enables him, at pleasure, to establish the most iniquitous, cruel, and oppressive courts of criminal, civil, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and to appoint temporary judges and officers, whom he can displace and change, as often as he pleases. For what can more nearly concern the safety and happiness of subjects, than the wise œconomy and equitable consitiution of these courts, in which, trials for life, liberty, property and religion are to be conducted? Should it ever comport with the designs of an ambitious and wicked minister, we may see an inquisition erected in Canada, and priestly tyranny may hereafter find as propitious a soil, in America as it ever has in Spain or Portugal. But, in order to varnish over the arbitrary complexion of the act, and to conciliate the minds of the Canadians, it is provided, that “whereas the certainty and lenity of the criminal law of England, and the benefits and advantages resulting, from the use of it, have been sensibly felt by the inhabitants, from an experience of more, than nine years; therefore, the same shall be administered, and shall be observed, as law, in the province of Quebec, to the exclusion of every rule of criminal law, which did, or might prevail, in the said province, before the year 1764.” As “it is on the goodness of criminal laws, that the liberty of the subject principally depends,” this would have been an important privilege, had it not been rendered uncertain and alienable, by the latter part of the same clause, which makes them “subject to such alterations and amendments, as the Governor, Lieut. Governor, and Commander in Chief, for the time being, by and with the advice and consent of the legislative council of the same, shall, from time to time, cause to be made therein.” Under the notion of necessary alterations and amendments, the King, through the medium of his creatures, the Governor and Council may intirely new mould the criminal laws of Canada, and make them subservient to the most tyrannical views: So that, in this respect also, the principle of arbitrary power, which is the soul of the act, is uniformly maintained and preserved, in full vigour, without the least real, or effectual diminution. It has been denied, with the most palpable absurdity, that the right of trials by juries is taken from the Canadians. It is said, that the provincial legislature of Canada may introduce them, as soon as they please; and it is expected, that they will, as “soon as the inhabitants desire them, or the state of the country will admit of them.” A civil right is that, which the laws and the constitution have actually conferred, not that, which may be derived, from the future bounty and beneficence of those in authority. The possibility that the legislature of Canada may hereafter introduce trials, by juries, does not imply a right, in the people, to enjoy them. For, in the same sense, it may be said, that the inhabitants of France or Spain have a right to trials by juries; because it is equally in the power of their legislatures to establish them. Since therefore it is apparent, that a system of French laws has been re-established, in the province of Quebec, and an indefinite power vested in the King, to vary and alter those laws, as also to constitute such courts of criminal civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and to introduce such a form of criminal law, as he shall judge necessary; I say since all this is deducible, from the express letter of the act; or in other words, since the whole legislative, executive, and judiciary powers are ultimately and effectually, though not immediately, lodged in the King, there can be no room to doubt, that an arbitrary government has been really instituted throughout the extensive region now comprised in the province of Quebec. Remarks on the Quebec Bill: Part Two By the Author of The Farmer Refuted, &c. [New York, June 22, 1775] Having considered the nature of this bill, with regard to civil government, I am next to examine it with relation to religion, and to endeavour to shew, that the Church of Rome has now the sanction of a legal establishment, in the province of Quebec. In order to do this the more satisfactorily, I beg leave to adopt the definition given of an established religion, by a certain writer, who has taken great pains to evince the contrary. “An established religion,” says he, “is a religion, which the civil authority engages, not only to protect, but to support.” This act makes effectual provision not only for the protection, but for the permanent support of Popery, as is evident from the following clause, “And for the more perfect security and ease of the minds of the inhabitants of the said province, it is hereby declared, that his Majesty’s subjects professing the religion of the church of Rome in the said province, may have, hold, and enjoy, the free exercise of the religion of the church of Rome, subject to the King’s supremacy, &c. and that the clergy of the said church may hold, receive and enjoy their accustomed dues and rights, &c.” This is represented as a bare permission to the clergy, to enjoy the usual emoluments of their functions; and not as a legal provision for their support. Much stress seems to be laid on the word may which is commonly italickised. But though the phraseology be artful, yet it is easy to perceive, that it operates to the same effect, as if it had been more positive and emphatical. The clergy may hold, receive and enjoy their accustomed dues and rights. They may, if they please: It is at their option, and must depend upon their will; and consequently there must be a correspondent obligation upon their parishoners, to comply with that will and to pay those dues, when required. What the law gives us an unconditional permission to enjoy, no person can legally withold from us. It becomes our property, and we can enforce our right to it. If the legislature of this colony were to decree, that the clergy of the different denominations may hold, receive and enjoy tithes of their respective congregations, we should soon find, that it would have the same efficacy, as if it were decreed, that the several congregations should pay tithes to their respective clergy. For otherwise the legislature might confer a right, which had no co-relative obligation, and which must therefore be void and inefficacious. But this is contradictory and impossible. “Tithes in Canada (it is said) are the property of the Romish Church; and permitting a tolerated church to enjoy its own property, is far short of the idea of an establishment.” But I should be glad to know, in the first place, how tithes can be the property of any but an established church; and, in the next, how they came to be the property of the Romish Church, in Canada, during the intermediate space between the surrender of that province to the English and the passing of this act. Nothing can be deemed my property, to which, I have not a perfect and uncontrolable right by the laws. If a church have not a similar right to tithes, it can have no property in them; and if it have, it is plain the laws must have made provision for its support, or in other words must have established it. Previous to the surrender of Canada, the Catholic religion was established there, by the laws of France; and tithes were on that account the legal property of the church of Rome; and could not be withheld by the laity, though eversomuch disposed to it. But, after the surrender, this circumstance took a different turn. The French laws being no longer in force, the establishment of the Romish church ceased of course, and, with it, the property which it before had in tithes. It is true, the clergy may have continued to receive and enjoy their customary dues; tithes and other perquisites; but they were not, for all that, the property of the church, because it had lost its legal right to them; and it was at the discretion of the laity to withhold them, if they had thought proper, or to abridge them, and place them upon a more moderate footing. Their voluntary concurrence was necessary, to give their priests a right to demand them, as before. But by the late act, this matter is again put into its former situation. Tithes are now become the property of the church as formerly; because it again has a legal claim to them, and the conditional consent of the people is set aside. Thus we see, that this act does not in fact, permit “a tolerated church to enjoy its own property;” but gives it a real and legal property in that, which it before held, from the bounty and liberality of its professors; and which they might withhold or diminish at pleasure. And this, in the most proper sense, converts it into an establishment. The characteristic difference between a tolerated and established religion consist in this—With respect to the support of the former, the law is passive and improvident; leaving it to those, who profess it, to make as much, or as little provision, as they shall judge expedient; and to vary and alter that provision, as their circumstances may require. In this manner, the Presbyterians and other sects are tolerated in England. They are allowed to exercise their religion without molestation; and to maintain their clergy as they think proper. These are wholly dependent upon their congregations, and can exact no more than they stipulate and are satisfied to contribute. But with respect to the support of the latter, the law is active and provident. Certain precise dues (tithes, &c.) are legally annexed to the clerical office, independent on the liberal contributions of the people; which is exactly the case with the Canadian priests, and therefore no reasonable impartial man will doubt, that the religion of the church of Rome is established in Canada. While tithes were the free, though customary, gift of the people, as was the case before the passing of the act in question, the Romish church was only in a state of toleration. But when the law came to take cognizance of them; and, by determining their permanent existence, destroyed the free agency of the people; it then resumed the nature of an establishment, which it had been divested of, at the time of the capitulation. As to the Protestant religion, it is often asserted, that ample provision has often been made, by the act, for its future establishment; to prove which, the writer before mentioned, has quoted a clause, in the following mutilated manner, “It is provided (says he) that his Majesty, his heirs, or successors, may make such provision out of the accustomed dues or rights, for the encouragement of the Protestant religion, and for the maintenance of a Protestant clergy, within the said province, as he, or they shall, from time to time, think necessary and expedient.” It must excite a mixture of anger and disdain, to observe the wretched arts, to which a designing administration and its abettors are driven, in order to conceal the enormity of their measures. This whole clause, in its true and original construction, is destitute of meaning; and was evidently inserted for no other end, than to deceive, by the appearance of a provident regard for the Protestant religion. The act first declares, “That his Majesty’s subjects professing the religion of the Church of Rome may have, hold and enjoy the free exercise of their religion; and that the clergy of the said church may hold, receive and enjoy their accustomed dues and rights.” Then follows this clause: “Provided nevertheless, that it shall be lawful for his Majesty, his heirs and successors, to make such provision out of the rest of the said accustomed dues and rights, for the encouragement of the Protestant religion, for the maintenance and support of a Protestant clergy, within the said province, as he, or they shall, from time to time, think necessary and expedient.” Thus we see, the Romish clergy are to have, hold and enjoy their accustomed dues and rights, and the rest, or remainder of them is to be applied towards the encouragement of the Protestant religion, but when they have had their wonted dues, I fancy it will puzzle administration, by any effort of political chymistry, to produce the rest or remainder. Suppose for instance, A had made an actual settlement of an hundred pounds upon B and, by a subsequent act, should declare that B should still continue to hold and enjoy his accustomed and annual bounty, and that the rest of the said bounty should be given to C, it is evident, that C would have nothing, because there would be no rest whatever. Exactly parallel and analogous is the case in hand. The Romish Priests are to have their accustomed dues and rights; and the rest of the said dues and rights is to be dedicated to the encouragement of the Protestant religion. In the above recited quotation, there is a chasm, the words the rest of being artfully omitted, to give the passage some meaning, which it has not in itself. With this amendment, the sense must be, that his Majesty might appropriate what portion of the customary revenues of the Romish clergy, he should think proper, to the support and maintenance of protestant churches: But according to the real words of the act, he can only devote the rest, or remainder of such revenues to that purpose, which, as I have already shewn, is nothing: So that the seeming provision in favour of the protestant religion is intirely verbal and delusory. Excellent must be the encouragement, it will derive from this source! But this is not all: Had there been really provision made, to be applied at the discretion of his Majesty, I should still consider this act as an atrocious infraction on the rights of Englishmen, in a point of the most delicate and momentous concern. No protestant Englishman would consent to let the free exercise of his religion depend upon the mere pleasure of any man, however great or exalted. The privilege of worshipping the deity in the manner his conscience dictates, which is one of the dearest he enjoys, must in that case be rendered insecure and precarious. Yet this is the unhappy situation, to which the protestant inhabitants of Canada are now reduced. The will of the King must give law to their consciences. It is in his power to keep them for ever dispossessed of all religious immunities; and there is too much reason to apprehend, that the same motives which instigated the act, would induce him to give them as little future encouragement as possible. I imagine, it will clearly appear from what has been offered, that “the Roman catholic religion instead of being tolerated as stipulated by the treaty of peace, is established” by the late act; and that the protestant religion has been left intirely destitute and unbefriended in Canada. But if there should be any, who think, that the indulgence granted does not extend to a perfect establishment, and that it may be justified by the terms of the treaty and the subsequent conduct of the Canadians; and if they should also be at a loss to perceive the dangerous nature of the act with respect to the other colonies, I would beg their further attention to the following considerations. However justifiable this act may be in relation to the province of Quebec with its ancient limits, it cannot be defended by the least plausible pretext, when it is considered as annexing such a boundless extent of new territory to the old. If a free form of government had “been found by experience, to be inapplicable to the state and circumstances of the province”; and if “a toleration less generous, although it might have fulfilled the letter of the articles of the treaty, would not have answered the expectations of the Canadians, nor have left upon their minds favourable impressions of British justice and honour:” if these reasons be admitted as true, and allowed their greatest weight, they only proved, that it might be just and polite to place the province of Quebec alone, with its former boundaries, in the circumstances of civil and religious government, which are established by this act. But when it is demanded why it has also added the immense tract of country that surrounds all these colonies, to that province, and has placed the whole under the same exceptionable institutions, both civil and religious, the advocates for administration must be confounded and silent. This act develops the dark designs of the ministry more fully than any thing they have done; and shews, that they have formed a systematic project of absolute power. The present policy of it is evidently this. By giving a legal sanction to the accustomed dues of the priests, it was intended to interest them in behalf of administration; and by means of the dominion they possess over the minds of the laity, together with the appearance of good will towards their religion, to prevent any dissatisfaction, which might arise from the loss of their civil rights, and to propitiate them to the great purposes in contemplation; first the subjugation of the colonies and afterwards that of Britain itself. It was necessary to throw out some such lure, to reconcile them to the exertions of that power, which has been communicated to the King, and which the emergencies of the times may require in a very extensive degree. The future policy of it demands particular attention. The nature of civil government will hereafter put a stop to emigrations from other parts of the British dominions thither, and from all other free countries. The preeminent advantages secured to the Roman catholic religion will discourage all protestant soldiers of whatsoever nation: And on these accounts the province will be settled and inhabited by none, but papists. If lenity and moderation are observed in administering the laws, the natural advantages of this fertile infant country, united to the indulgence given to their religion, will attract droves of emigrants, from all the Roman catholic states in Europe; and these colonies, in time, will find themselves encompassed with innumerous hosts of neighbours, disaffected to them, both because of difference in religion and government. How dangerous their situation would be, let every man of common sense judge. What can speak in plainer language, the corruption of the British Parliament, than its act; which invests the King with absolute power over a little world, (if I may be allowed the expression) and makes such ample provision for the popish religion, and leaves the protestant, in such dependent disadvantageous situation that he is like to have no other subjects, in this part of his domain, than Roman catholics; who, by reason of their implicit devotion to their priests, and the superlative reverence they bear to those, who countenance and favour their religion, will be the voluntary instruments of ambition; and will be ready, at all times, to second the oppressive designs of administration against the other parts of the empire. Hence while our ears are stunned with the dismal sounds of New-England’s republicanism, bigotry, and intolerance, it behoves us to be upon our guard against the deceitful wiles of those, who would persuade us, that we have nothing to fear from the operation of the Quebec act. We should consider it as being replete with danger, to ourselves, and as threatening ruin to our posterity. Let us not therefore suffer ourselves to be terrified at the prospect of an imaginary and fictitious Sylla, and, by that means, be led blindfold into a real and destructive Charybdis. Part I Source: https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Project%3A%22Hamilton%20Papers%22%20Author%3A%22Hamilton%2C%20Alexander%22&s=1511311111&r=37 Part II Source: https://founders.archives.gov/?q=%20Author%3A%22Hamilton%2C%20Alexander%22%20quebec&s=1111311111&r=4