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Tuesday September 14, 1787 IN CONVENTION The Report of the Committee of Stile & arrangement being resumed, Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to reconsider in order to increase the number of Representatives fixed for the first Legislature. His purpose was to make an addition of one half generally to the number allotted to the respective States; and to allow two to the smallest States. On this motion N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. Art. 1. sect. 3.-the words "by lot" were struck out nem: con: on motion of Mr. MADISON, that some rule might prevail in the rotation that would prevent both the members from the same State from going out at the same time. "Ex officio" struck out of the same section as superfluous: nem: con: and "or affirmation." after "oath" inserted also unanimously. Mr. RUTLIDGE and Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved "that persons impeached be suspended from their office until they be tried and acquitted" Mr. MADISON. The President is made too dependent already on the Legislature, by the power of one branch to try him in consequence of an impeachment by the other. This intermediate suspension, will put him in the power of one branch only. They can at any moment, in order to make way for the functions of another who will be more favorable to their views, vote a temporary removal of the existing Magistrate. Mr. KING concurred in the opposition to the amendment On the question to agree to it N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Art. 1. sect. 4. "except as to the places of choosing Senators" added nem: con: to the end of the first clause, in order to exempt the seats of Govt. in the States from the power of Congress. Art. 1. Sect. 5. "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secresy." Col: MASON & Mr. GERRY moved to insert after the word "parts" the words "of the proceedings of the Senate" so as to require publication of all the proceedings of the House of Representatives. It was intimated on the other side that cases might arise where secresy might be necessary in both Houses. Measures preparatory to a declaration of war in which the House of Reps. was to concur, were instanced. On the question, it passed in the negative N. H. no. (Rh. I abs) Mas. no. Con: no. (N. Y. abs) N. J. no. Pen. ay. Del. no. Mary. ay. Virg. no. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. Geor. no. Mr. BALDWIN observed that the clause, Art. 1. Sect 6. declaring that no member of Congs. "during the time for which he was elected; shall be appointed to any Civil office under the authority of the U.S. which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time," would not extend to offices created by the Constitution; and the salaries of which would be created, not increased by Congs. at their first session. The members of the first Congs. consequently might evade the disqualification in this instance. -He was neither seconded nor opposed; nor did any thing further pass on the subject. Art. 1. Sect. 8. The Congress "may by joint ballot appoint a Treasurer" Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out this power, and let the Treasurer be appointed in the same manner with other officers. Mr. GORHAM & Mr. KING said that the motion, if agreed, to would have a mischievous tendency. The people are accustomed & attached to that mode of appointing Treasurers, and the innovation will multiply objections to the System. Mr. Govr. MORRIS remarked that if the Treasurer be not appointed by the Legislature, he will be more narrowly watched, and more readily impeached. Mr. SHERMAN. As the two Houses appropriate money, it is best for them to appoint the officer who is to keep it; and to appoint him as they make the appropriation, not by joint but several votes. Genl. PINKNEY. The Treasurer is appointed by joint ballot in South Carolina. The consequence is that bad appointments are made, and the Legislature will not listen to the faults of their own officer. On the motion to strike out N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Art 1. sect. 8. "but all such duties imposts & excises, shall be uniform throughout the U.S." was unanimously annexed to the power of taxation. To define & punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, and "punish" offences against the law of nations. Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to strike out "punish" before the words "offences agst. the law of nations," so as to let these be definable as well as punishable, by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence. Mr. WILSON hoped the alteration would by no means be made. To pretend to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the civilized nations of the world, would have a look of arrogance, that would make us ridiculous. Mr. Govr. The word define is proper when applied to offences in this case; the law of nations being often too vague and deficient to be a rule. On the question to strike out the word "punish" it passed in the affirmative N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. Docr. FRANKLIN moved to add after the words "post roads" Art I. Sect. 8. "a power to provide for cutting canals where deemed necessary" Mr. WILSON 2ded. the motion Mr. SHERMAN objected. The expence in such cases will fall on the U. States, and the benefit accrue to the places where the canals may be cut. Mr. WILSON. Instead of being an expence to the U.S. they may be made a source of revenue. Mr. MADISON suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power "to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative provisions of individual States may be incompetent." His primary object was however to secure an easy communication between the States which the free intercourse now to be opened, seemed to call for. The political obstacles being removed, a removal of the natural ones as far as possible ought to follow. Mr. RANDOLPH 2ded. the proposition Mr. KING thought the power unnecessary. Mr. WILSON. It is necessary to prevent a State from obstructing the general welfare. Mr. KING. The States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by it. In Philada. & New York, It will be referred to the establishment of a Bank, which has been a subject of contention in those Cities. In other places it will be referred to mercantile monopolies. Mr. WILSON mentioned the importance of facilitating by canals, the communication with the Western Settlements. As to Banks he did not think with Mr. King that the power in that point of view would excite the prejudices & parties apprehended. As to mercantile monopolies they are already included in the power to regulate trade. Col: MASON was for limiting the power to the single case of Canals. He was afraid of monopolies of every sort, which he did not think were by any means already implied by the Constitution as supposed by Mr. Wilson. The motion being so modified as to admit a distinct question specifying & limited to the case of canals, N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C no. Geo. ay. The other part fell of course, as including the power rejected. Mr. MADISON & Mr. PINKNEY then moved to insert in the list of powers vested in Congress a power-"to establish an University, in which no preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of Religion." Mr. WILSON supported the motion Mr. Govr. MORRIS. It is not necessary. The exclusive power at the Seat of Government, will reach the object. On the question N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont. divd. Dr. Johnson ay. Mr. Sherman no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. Col: MASON, being sensible that an absolute prohibition of standing armies in time of peace might be unsafe, and wishing at the same time to insert something pointing out and guarding against the danger of them, moved to preface the clause (Art I sect. 8) "To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia &c" with the words" "And that the liberties of the people may be better secured against the danger of standing armies in time of peace" Mr. RANDOLPH 2ded. the motion Mr. MADISON was in favor of it. It did not restrain Congress from establishing a military force in time of peace if found necessary; and as armies in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil, it is well to discountenance them by the Constitution, as far as will consist with the essential power of the Govt. on that head. Mr. Govr. MORRIS opposed the motion as setting a dishonorable mark of distinction on the military class of Citizens Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. BEDFORD concurred in the opposition. On the question N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Maryd. no Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. Col: MASON moved to strike out from the clause (art I sect 9.) "No bill of attainder nor any expost facto law shall be passed" the words "nor any ex post facto law." He thought it not sufficiently clear that the prohibition meant by this phrase was limited to cases of a criminal nature, and no Legislature ever did or can altogether avoid them in Civil cases. Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion but with a view to extend the prohibition to "Civil cases," which he thought ought to be done. On the question; all the States were-no Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. GERRY, moved to insert a declaration "that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed." Mr. SHERMAN. It is unnecessary. The power of Congress does not extend to the Press. On the question, it passed in the negative N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. Art. I. Sect. 9. "No capitation tax shall be laid, unless &c" Mr. READ moved to insert after "capitation" the words, "or other direct tax" He was afraid that some liberty might otherwise be taken to saddle the States, with a readjustment by this rule, of past requisitions of Congs.-and that his amendment by giving another cast to the meaning would take away the pretext. Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion which was agreed to, On motion of col: MASON  "or enumeration" inserted after, as explanatory of "Census" Con. & S. C. only, no. Here insert the amendment added in the lateral margin. At the end of the clause "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State" was added the following amendment conformably to a vote on the ----- day of ----- viz-no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another. Col. MASON moved a clause requiring "that an Account of the public expenditures should be annually published" Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion Mr. Govr. MORRIS urged that this wd. be impossible in many cases. Mr. KING remarked, that the term expenditures went to every minute shilling. This would be impracticable. Congs. might indeed make a monthly publication, but it would be in such general statements as would afford no satisfactory information. Mr. MADISON proposed to strike out "annually" from the motion & insert "from time to time," which would enjoin the duty of frequent publications and leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature. Require too much and the difficulty will beget a habit of doing nothing. The articles of Confederation require half-yearly publications on this subject. A punctual compliance being often impossible, the practice has ceased altogether. Mr. WILSON 2ded. & supported the motion. Many operations of finance can not be properly published at certain times. Mr. PINKNEY was in favor of the motion. Mr. FITZIMMONS. It is absolutely impossible to publish expenditures in the full extent of the term. Mr. SHERMAN thought "from time to time" the best rule to be given. "Annual" was struck out-& those words-inserted nem: con: The motion of Col: Mason so amended was then agreed to nem: con: and added after-"appropriations by law as follows-"and a regular statement and account of the receipts & expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time" Here insert the Amendment at the foot of the page The first clause of Art. I Sect 10-was altered so as to read-'No State shall enter into any Treaty alliance or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold & silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility." Mr. GERRY entered into observations inculcating the importance of public faith, and the propriety of the restraint put on the States from impairing the obligation of contracts, alledging that Congress ought to be laid under the like prohibitions, he made a motion to that effect. He was not 2ded. Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 13, 1787 IN CONVENTION Col: MASON. He had moved without success for a power to make sumptuary regulations. He had not yet lost sight of his object. After descanting on the extravagance of our manners, the excessive consumption of foreign superfluities, and the necessity of restricting it, as well with oeconomical as requblican views, he moved that a Committee be appointed to report articles of association for encouraging by the advice the influence and the example of the members of the Convention, oeconomy frugality and american manufactures. Docr. JOHNSON 2ded. the motion which was without debate agreed to; nem: con: and a Committee appointed, consisting of Col: Mason, Docr. Franklin, Mr. Dickenson, Docr. Johnson, and Mr. Livingston. Col: MASON renewed his proposition of yesterday on the subject of inspection laws, with an additional clause giving to Congress a controul over them in case of abuse-as follows, "Provided that no State shall be restrained from imposing the usual duties on produce exported from such State, for the sole purpose of defraying the charges of inspecting, packing, storing, and indemnifying the losses on such produce, while in the custody of public officers: but all such regulations shall in case of abuse, be subject to the revision and controul of Congress." There was no debate & on the question N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. The Report from the Committee of stile & arrangement, was taken up, in order to be compared with the articles of the plan as agreed to by the House & referred to the Committee, and to receive the final corrections and sanction of the Convention. Art. 1. sect. 2. On motion of Mr. RANDOLPH the word "servitude" was struck out, and "service" unanimously inserted, the former being thought to express the condition of slaves, & the latter the obligations of free persons. Mr. DICKENSON & Mr. WILSON moved to strike out "and direct taxes," from sect. 2. art. 1. as improperly placed in a clause relating merely to the Constitution of the House of Representatives. Mr. Govr. MORRIS. The insertion here was in consequence of what had passed on this point; in order to exclude the appearance of counting the negroes in the Representation. The including of them may now be referred to the object of direct taxes, and incidentally only to that of Representation. On the motion to strike out "and direct taxes" from this place N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. Art. 1. sect. 7 "-if any bill shall not be returned by the president within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him &c" Mr. MADISON, moved to insert between "after" and "it" in Sect. 7. Art. 1 the words "the day on which," in order to prevent a question whether the day on which the bill be presented, ought to be counted or not as one of the ten days. Mr. RANDOLPH 2ded. the motion. Mr. GOVERNUr. MORRIS. The amendment is unnecessary. The law knows no fractions of days. A number of members being very impatient & calling for the question N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no S. C. no. Geo. no- Docr. JOHNSON made a further report from the Committee of stile &c of the following resolutions to be substituted for 22 & 23 articles "Resolved that the preceding Constitution be laid before the U. States in Congress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its Legislature, for their assent & ratification; & that each Convention assenting & ratifying the same should give notice thereof to the U.S. in Congs. assembled. "Resolved that it is the opinion of this Convention that as soon as the Conventions of nine States, shall have ratified this Constitution, the U.S. in Congs. assembled should fix a day on which electors should be appointed by the States which shall have ratified the same; and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President; and the time and place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution-That after such publication the Electors should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the day fixed for the election of the President, and should transmit their votes certified signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the U. States in Congs. assembled: that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the time & place assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President for the sole purpose of receiving, opening, and counting the votes for President, and that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President should without delay proceed to execute this Constitution." Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 12, 1787 IN CONVENTION Docr. JOHNSON from the Committee of stile &c. reported a digest of the plan, of which printed copies were ordered to be furnished to the members. He also reported a letter to accompany the plan, to Congress. (Here insert a transcript of the former from the annexed sheet as printed and of the latter from the draft as finally agreed to. WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO FORM a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. ARTICLE I Sect. 1. ALL legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Sect. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every forty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative: and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New-Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New-Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Deleware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North-Carolina five, South- Caroline five, and Georgia three. When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers; and they shall have the sole power of impeachment. Sect. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years: and each senator shall have one vote. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided [by lot] as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year: and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any state, the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature. No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen. The Vice-President of the United States shall be, ex officio President of the senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law. Sect. 4. The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof: but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. Sect. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business: but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorised to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each house may provide. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings; punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. Sect. 6. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office. Sect. 7. The enacting stile of the laws shall be, "Be it enacted by the senators and representatives in Congress assembled." All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives: but the senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives and the senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of the United States. If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by three-fourths of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. Sect. 8. The Congress may by joint ballot appoint a treasurer. They shall have power To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. To borrow money on the credit of the United States. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States. To establish post offices and post roads. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and [punish] offences against the law of nations. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. To raise and support armies: but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. To provide and maintain a navy. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings -And To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Sect. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as the several states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto law. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census herein before directed to be taken. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States. And no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state. Sect. 10. No state shall coin money, nor  emit bills of credit, nor make any thing but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor pass any bill of attainder, nor ex post facto laws, nor  laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, nor grant any title of nobility. No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or duties on imports or exports, nor with such consent, but to the use of the treasury of the United States. Nor keep troops nor ships of war in time of peace, nor enter into any agreement or compact with another state, nor  with any foreign power. Nor engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of delay until the Congress can be consulted. II Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the vice-president, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner: Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state may be entitled in Congress: but no senator or representative shall be appointed an elector, nor any person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the general government, directed to the president of the senate. The president of the senate shall in the presence of the senate and house of representatives open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the house of representatives shall immediately chuse by ballot one of them for president; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said house shall in like manner choose the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by states and not per capita, the representation from each state having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the president by the representatives, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the vice-president. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the senate shall choose from them by ballot the vice-president. The Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and the time in which they shall give their votes; but the election shall be on the same day throughout the United States. No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of president; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States. In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-president, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring what officer shall then act as president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or the period for chusing another president arrive. The president shall, at stated times, receive a fixed compensation for his services, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I --------, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will to the best of my judgment and power, preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States." Sect. 2. The president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States: he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, when called into the actual service of the United States, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for. The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient: he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper: he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers: he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States. Sect. 4. The president, vice-president and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. III Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, both in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. To all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. To all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party. To controversies between two or more States; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. IV Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled be delivered up, and removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. No person legally held to service or labour in one state, escaping into another, shall in consequence of regulations subsisting therein be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due. Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress. The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States: and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state. Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature or executive, against domestic violence. V The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two-thirds of the legislatures of the several states, shall propose amendments to this constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three- fourths at least of the legislatures of the several states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided, that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the ----- and ----- section of ----- article VI All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the confederation. This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. The senators and representatives beforementioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States. VII The ratification of the conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the States so ratifying the same. LETTER We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which as appeared to us the most adviseable. The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union: but the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident-Hence results the necessity of a different organization. It is obviously impracticable in the foederal government of these States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all-Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the present occasion this difficulty was encreased by a difference among the several States as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests. In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each State in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensible. That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that had her interest alone been consulted, the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish. Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to reconsider the clause requiring three fourths of each House to overrule the negative of the President, in order to strike out 3/4 and insert 2/3 . He had he remarked himself proposed 3/4 instead of 2/3 , but he had since been convinced that the latter proportion was the best. The former puts too much in the power of the President. Mr. SHERMAN was of the same opinion; adding that the States would not like to see so small a minority and the President, prevailing over the general voice. In making laws regard should be had to the sense of the people, who are to be bound by them, and it was more probable that a single man should mistake or betray this sense than the Legislature Mr. Govr. MORRIS. Considering the difference between the two proportions numerically, it amounts in one House to two members only; and in the other to not more than five; according to the numbers of which the Legislature is at first to be composed. It is the interest moreover of the distant States to prefer 3/4 as they will be oftenest absent and need the interposing check of the President. The excess rather than the deficiency of laws was to be dreaded. The example of N. York shews that 2/3 is not sufficient to answer the purpose. Mr. HAMILTON added his testimony to the fact that 2/3 in N. York had been ineffectual either where a popular object, or a legislative faction operated; of which he mentioned some instances. Mr. GERRY. It is necessary to consider the danger on the other side also. 2/3 will be a considerable, perhaps a proper security. 3/4 puts too much in the power of a few men. The primary object of the revisionary check of the President is not to protect the general interest, but to defend his own department. If 3/4 be required, a few Senators having hopes from the nomination of the President to offices, will combine with him and impede proper laws. Making the vice-President Speaker increases the danger. Mr. WILLIAMSON was less afraid of too few than of too many laws. He was most of all afraid that the repeal of bad laws might be rendered too difficult by requiring 3/4 to overcome the dissent of the President. Col: MASON had always considered this as one of the most exceptionable parts of the System. As to the numerical argument of Mr. Govr. Morris, little arithmetic was necessary to understand that 3/4 was more than 2/3 , whatever the numbers of the Legislature might be. The example of New York depended on the real merits of the laws. The Gentlemen citing it, had no doubt given their own opinions. But perhaps there were others of opposite opinions who could equally paint the abuses on the other side. His leading view was to guard against too great an impediment to the repeal of laws. Mr. Govr. MORRIS dwelt on the danger to the public interest from the instability of laws, as the most to be guarded against. On the other side there could be little danger. If one man in office will not consent where he ought, every fourth year another can be substituted. This term was not too long for fair experiments. Many good laws are not tried long enough to prove their merit. This is often the case with new laws opposed to old habits. The Inspection laws of Virginia & Maryland to which all are now so much attached were unpopular at first. Mr. PINKNEY was warmly in opposition to 3/4 as putting a dangerous power in the hands of a few Senators headed by the President. Mr. MADISON. When 3/4 was agreed to, the President was to be elected by the Legislature and for seven years. He is now to be elected by the people and for four years. The object of the revisionary power is twofold. 1. to defend the Executive Rights 2.  to prevent popular or factious injustice. It was an important principle in this & in the State Constitutions to check legislative injustice and incroachments. The Experience of the States had demonstrated that their checks are insufficient. We must compare the danger from the weakness of 2/3 with the danger from the strength of 3/4 . He thought on the whole the former was the greater. As to the difficulty of repeals, it was probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of limiting the duration of laws so as to require renewal instead of repeal. The reconsideration being agreed to. On the question to insert 2/3 in place of 3/4. N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Mr. Mc.Henry no. Va. no. Genl. Washington Mr. Blair, Mr. Madison no. Col. Mason, Mr. Randolph ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. WILLIAMSON, observed to the House that no provision was yet made for juries in Civil cases and suggested the necessity of it. Mr. GORHAM. It is not possible to discriminate equity cases from those in which juries are proper. The Representatives of the people may be safely trusted in this matter. Mr. GERRY urged the necessity of Juries to guard agst. corrupt Judges. He proposed that the Committee last appointed should be directed to provide a clause for securing the trial by Juries Col: MASON perceived the difficulty mentioned by Mr. Gorham. The jury cases can not be specified. A general principle laid down on this and some other points would be sufficient. He wished the plan had been prefaced with a Bill of Rights, & would second a Motion if made for the purpose. It would give great quiet to the people; and with the aid of the State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours. Mr. GERRY concurred in the idea & moved for a Committee to prepare a Bill of Rights. Col: MASON 2ded. the motion. Mr. SHERMAN, was for securing the rights of the people where requisite. The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and being in force are sufficient. There are many cases where juries are proper which can not be discriminated. The Legislature may be safely trusted. Col: MASON. The Laws of the U. S. are to be paramount to State Bills of Rights. On the question for a Come. to prepare a Bill of Rights N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. The Clause relating to exports being reconsidered, at the instance of Col: Mason, who urged that the restriction on the States would prevent the incidental duties necessary for the inspection & safe-keeping of their produce, and be ruinous to the Staple States, as he called the five Southern States, he moved as follows-"provided nothing herein contained shall be construed to restrain any State from laying duties upon exports for the sole purpose of defraying the charges of inspecting, packing, storing and indemnifying the losses, in keeping the commodities in the care of public officers, before exportation." In answer to a remark which he anticipated, towit, that the States could provide for these expences, by a tax in some other way, he stated the inconveniency of requiring the Planters to pay a tax before the actual delivery for exportation. Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion. It would at least be harmless; and might have the good effect of restraining the States to bona fide duties for the purpose, as well as of authorising explicitly such duties; tho' perhaps the best guard against an abuse of the power of the States on this subject, was the right in the Genl. Government to regulate trade between State & State. Mr. Govr. MORRIS saw no objection to the motion. He did not consider the dollar per Hhd laid on Tobo. in Virga. as a duty on exportation, as no drawback would be allowed on Tobo. taken out of the Warehouse for internal consumption. Mr. DAYTON was afraid the proviso wd. enable Pennsylva. to tax N. Jersey under the idea of Inspection duties of which Pena. would Judge. Mr. GORHAM & Mr. LANGDON, thought there would be no security if the proviso shd. be agreed to, for the States exporting thro' other States, agst. the oppressions of the latter. How was redress to be obtained in case duties should be laid beyond the purpose expressed? Mr. MADISON. There will be the same security as in other cases. The jurisdiction of the supreme Court must be the source of redress. So far only had provision been made by the plan agst. injurious acts of the States. His own opinion was, that this was insufficient. A negative on the State laws alone could meet all the shapes which these could assume. But this had been overruled. Mr. FITZIMMONS. Incidental duties on Tobo. & flour, never have been & never can be considered as duties on exports. Mr. DICKINSON. Nothing will save States in the situation of N. Hampshire N Jersey Delaware &c from being oppressed by their neighbors, but requiring the assent of Congs. to inspection duties. He moved that this assent shd. accordingly be required. Mr. BUTLER 2ded. the motion. Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 11, 1787 IN CONVENTION The Report of the Committee of Stile & arrangement not being made & being waited for, The House Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 10, 1787 IN CONVENTION Mr. GERRY moved to reconsider Art XIX. viz. "On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the U. S. shall call a Convention for that purpose." [see Aug. 6.]This Constitution he said is to be paramount to the State Constitutions. It follows, hence, from this article that two thirds of the States may obtain a Convention, a majority of which can bind the Union to innovations that may subvert the State-Constitutions altogether. He asked whether this was a situation proper to be run into. Mr. HAMILTON 2ded. the motion, but he said with a different view from Mr. Gerry. He did not object to the consequence stated by Mr. Gerry. There was no greater evil in subjecting the people of the U. S. to the major voice than the people of a particular State. It had been wished by many and was much to have been desired that an easier mode for introducing amendments had been provided by the articles of Confederation. It was equally desireable now that an easy mode should be established for supplying defects which will probably appear in the New System. The mode proposed was not adequate. The State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a view to increase their own powers. The National Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of amendments, and ought also to be empowered, whenever two thirds of each branch should concur to call a Convention. There could be no danger in giving this power, as the people would finally decide in the case. Mr. MADISON remarked on the vagueness of the terms, "call a Convention for the purpose," as sufficient reason for reconsidering the article. How was a Convention to be formed? by what rule decide? what the force of its acts? On the motion of Mr. Gerry to reconsider N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. GEO ay. Mr. SHERMAN moved to add to the article "or the Legislature may propose amendments to the several States for their approbation, but no amendments shall be binding until consented to by the several States." Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion Mr. WILSON moved to insert "two thirds of" before the words "several States"- on which amendment to the motion of Mr. Sherman N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. WILSON then moved to insert "three fourths of" before "the several Sts" which was agreed to nem: con: Mr. MADISON moved to postpone the consideration of the amended proposition in order to take up the following, "The Legislature of the U. S. whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Legislature of the U S:" Mr. HAMILTON 2ded. the motion. Mr. RUTLIDGE said he never could agree to give a power by which the articles relating to slaves might be altered by the States not interested in that property and prejudiced against it. In order to obviate this objection, these words were added to the proposition: "provided that no amendments which may be made prior to the year 1808, shall in any manner affect the 4 & 5 sections of the VII article"-The postponement being agreed to, On the question on the proposition of Mr. Madison & Mr. Hamilton as amended N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo ay. Mr. GERRY moved to reconsider art: XXI and XXII. from the latter of which "for the approbation of Congs." had been struck out. He objected to proceeding to change the Government without the approbation of Congress, as being improper and giving just umbrage to that body. He repeated his objections also to an annulment of the confederation with so little scruple or formality. Mr. HAMILTON concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the indecorum of not requiring the approbation of Congress. He considered this as a necessary ingredient in the transaction. He thought it wrong also to allow nine States as provided by art XXI. to institute a new Government on the ruins of the existing one. He Wd. propose as a better modification of the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the plan should be sent to Congress in order that the same if approved by them, may be communicated to the State Legislatures, to the end that they may refer it to State Conventions; each Legislature declaring that if the Convention of the State should think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying States, the same shd. take effect accordingly. Mr. GORHAM. Some States will say that nine States shall be sufficient to establish the plan, others will require unanimity for the purpose. And the different and conditional ratifications will defeat the plan altogether. Mr. HAMILTON. No Convention convinced of the necessity of the plan will refuse to give it effect on the adoption by nine States. He thought this mode less exceptionable than the one proposed in the article, and would attain the same end. Mr. FITZIMMONS remarked that the words "for their approbation" had been struck out in order to save Congress from the necessity of an Act inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation under which they held their authority. Mr. RANDOLPH declared, if no change should be made in the this part of the plan, he should be obliged to dissent from the whole of it. He had from the beginning he said been convinced that radical changes in the system of the Union were necessary. Under this conviction he had brought forward a set of republican propositions as the basis and outline of a reform. These Republican propositions had however, much to his regret, been widely, and in his opinion, irreconcileably departed from. In this state of things it was his idea and he accordingly meant to propose, that the State Conventions shd. be at liberty to offer amendments to the plan; and that these should be submitted to a second General Convention, with full power to settle the Constitution finally. He did not expect to succeed in this proposition, but the discharge of his duty in making the attempt, would give quiet to his own mind. Mr. WILSON was against a reconsideration for any of the purposes which had been mentioned. Mr. KING thought it would be more respectful to Congress to submit the plan generally to them; than in such a form as expressly and necessarily to require their approbation or disapprobation. The assent of nine States be considered as sufficient; and that it was more proper to make this a part of the Constitution itself, than to provide for it by a supplemental or distinct recommendation. Mr. GERRY urged the indecency and pernicious tendency of dissolving in so slight a manner, the solemn obligations of the articles of confederation. If nine out of thirteen can dissolve the compact, Six out of nine will be just as able to dissolve the new one hereafter. Mr. SHERMAN was in favor of Mr. King's idea of submitting the plan generally to Congress. He thought nine States ought to be made sufficient: but that it would be best to make it a separate act and in some such form as that intimated by Col: Hamilton, than to make it a particular article of the Constitution. On the question for reconsidering the two articles, XXI & XXII- N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. Mr. HAMILTON then moved to postpone art XXI in order to take up the following, containing the ideas he had above expressed, viz Resolved that the foregoing plan of a Constitution be transmitted to the U. S. in Congress assembled, in order that if the same shall be agreed to by them, it may be communicated to the Legislatures of the several States, to the end that they may provide for its final ratification by referring the same to the Consideration of a Convention of Deputies in each State to be chosen by the people thereof, and that it be recommended to the said Legislatures in their respective acts for organizing such convention to declare, that if the said Convention shall approve of the said Constitution, such approbation shall be binding and conclusive upon the State, and further that if the said Convention should be of opinion that the same upon the assent of any nine States thereto, ought to take effect between the States so assenting, such opinion shall thereupon be also binding upon such State, and the said Constitution shall take effect between the States assenting thereto" Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion. Mr. WILSON. This motion being seconded, it is necessary now to speak freely. He expressed in strong terms his disapprobation of the expedient proposed, particularly the suspending the plan of the Convention on the approbation of Congress. He declared it to be worse than folly to rely on the concurrence of the Rhode Island members of Congs. in the plan. Maryland has voted on this floor; for requiring the unanimous assent of the 13 States to the proposed change in the federal System. N. York has not been represented for a long time past in the Convention. Many individual deputies from other States have spoken much against the plan. Under these circusmtances can it be safe to make the assent of Congress necessary. After spending four or five months in the laborious & arduous task of forming a Government for our Country, we are ourselves at the close throwing insuperable obstacles in the way of its success. Mr. CLYMER thought that the mode proposed by Mr. Hamilton would fetter & embarrass Congs. as much as the original one, since it equally involved a breach of the articles of Confederation. Mr. KING concurred with Mr. Clymer. If Congress can accede to one mode, they can to the other. If the approbation of Congress be made necessary, and they should not approve, the State Legislatures will not propose the plan to Conventions; or if the States themselves are to provide that nine States shall suffice to establish the System, that provision will be omitted, every thing will go into confusion, and all our labor be lost. Mr. RUTLIDGE viewed the matter in the same light with Mr. King. On the question to postpone in order to take up Col: Hamilton's motion N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. A Question being then taken on the article XXI. It was agreed to unanimously. Col: HAMILTON withdrew the remainder of the motion to postpone art XXII, observing that his purpose was defeated by the vote just given; Mr. WILLIAMSON & Mr. GERRY moved to re-instate the words "for the approbation of Congress" in art: XXII which was disagreed to nem: con: Mr. RANDOLPH took this opportunity to state his objections to the System. They turned on the Senate's being made the Court of Impeachment for trying the Executive-on the necessity of 3/4 instead of 2/3 of each house to overrule the negative of the President-on the smallness of the number of the Representative branch,-on the want of limitation to a standing army-on the general clause concerning necessary and proper laws-on the want of some particular restraint on navigation acts-on the power to lay duties on exports-on the Authority of the General Legislature to interpose on the application of the Executives of the States-on the want of a more definite boundary between the General & State Legislatures-and between the General and State Judiciaries-on the the unqualified power of the President to pardon treasons-on the want of some limit to the power of the Legislature in regulating their own compensations. With these difficulties in his mind, what course he asked was he to pursue? Was he to promote the establishment of a plan which he verily believed would end in Tyranny? He was unwilling he said to impede the wishes and Judgment of the Convention, but he must keep himself free, in case he should be honored with a seat in the Convention of his State, to act according to the dictates of his judgment. The only mode in which his embarrassments could be removed, was that of submitting the plan to Congs. to go from them to the State Legislatures, and from these to State Conventions having power to adopt reject or amend; the process to close with another General Convention with full power to adopt or reject the alterations proposed by the State Conventions, and to establish finally the Government. He accordingly proposed a Resolution to this effect. Docr. FRANKLIN 2ded. the motion Col: MASON urged & obtained that the motion should lie on the table for a day or two to see what steps might be taken with regard to the parts of the system objected to by Mr. Randolph. Mr. PINKNEY moved "that it be an instruction to the Committee for revising the stile and arrangement of the articles agreed on, to prepare an Address to the People, to accompany the present Constitution, and to be laid with the same before the U. States in Congress." The motion itself was referred to the Committee, nem: con: Mr. RANDOLPH moved to refer to the Committee also a motion relating to pardons in cases of Treason-which was agreed to nem: con: Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 8, 1787 IN CONVENTION The last Report of Committee of Eleven (see Sepr. 4) was resumed. Mr. KING moved to strike out the "exception of Treaties of peace" from the general clause requiring two thirds of the Senate for making Treaties Mr. WILSON wished the requisition of two thirds to be struck out altogether If the majority cannot be trusted, it was a proof, as observed by Mr. Ghorum, that we were not fit for one Society. A reconsideration of the whole clause was agreed to. Mr. Govr. MORRIS was agst. striking out the "exception of Treaties of peace" If two thirds of the Senate should be required for peace, the Legislature will be unwilling, to make war for that reason, on account of the Fisheries or the Mississippi, the two great objects of the Union. Besides, if a majority of the Senate be for peace, and are not allowed to make it, they will be apt to effect their purpose in the more disagreeable mode, of negativing the supplies for the war. Mr. WILLIAMSON remarked that Treaties are to be made in the branch of the Govt. where there may be a majority of the States without a majority of the people. Eight men may be a majority of a quorum, & should not have the power to decide the conditions of peace. There would be no danger, that the exposed States, as S. Carolina or Georgia, would urge an improper war for the Western Territory. Mr. WILSON If two thirds are necessary to make peace, the minority may perpetuate war, against the sense of the majority. Mr. GERRY enlarged on the danger of putting the essential rights of the Union in the hands of so small a number as a majority of the Senate, representing, perhaps, not one fifth of the people. The Senate will be corrupted by foreign influence. Mr. SHERMAN was agst. leaving the rights established by the Treaty of peace, to the Senate, & moved to annex a "proviso that no such rights shd. be ceded without the sanction of the Legislature. Mr. Govr. MORRIS seconded the ideas of Mr. Sherman. Mr. MADISON observed that it had been too easy in the present Congress to make Treaties altho' nine States were required for the purpose. On the question for striking "except Treaties of peace" N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. WILSON & Mr. DAYTON move to strike out the clause requiring two thirds of the Senate for making Treaties-on which, N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. no. Pa. no Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. RUTLIDGE & Mr. GERRY move that "no Treaty be made without the consent of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate"-according to the example in the present Congs. Mr. GHORUM. There is a difference in the case, as the President's consent will also be necessary in the new Govt. On the question N. H. no. Mass. no. (Mr. Gerry ay) Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. SHARMAN movd. that no Treaty be made without a Majority of the whole number of the Senate. Mr. GERRY seconded him. Mr. WILLIAMSON. This will be less security than 2/3 as now required . Mr. SHERMAN. It will be less embarrassing. On the question, it passed in the negative. N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. MADISON movd. that a Quorum of the Senate consist of 2/3 of all the members. Mr. Govr. MORRIS-This will put it in the power of one man to break up a Quorum. Mr. MADISON, This may happen to any Quorum. On the Question it passed in the negative N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. WILLIAMSON & Mr. GERRY, movd. "that no Treaty shd. be made witht. previous notice to the members, & a reasonable time for their attending." On the Question All the States no, except N. C. S. C. & Geo. ay. On the question on clause of the Report of the Come. of Eleven relating to Treaties by 2/3 of the Senate. All the States were ay-except Pa. N. J. & Geo. no. Mr. GERRY movd. that no officer be appd. but to offices created by the Constitution or by law"-This was rejected as unnecessary by six no's & five ays; The Ayes. Mas. Ct. N. J. N. C. Geo.-Noes. N. H. Pa.: Del. Md. Va. S. C. The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments agst. the President, for Treason & bribery, was taken up. Col. MASON. Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above defined. As bills of attainder which have saved the British Constitution are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend: the power of impeachments. He movd. to add after "bribery" "or maladministration." Mr. GERRY seconded him. Mr. MADISON So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate. Mr. Govr. MORRIS, it will not be put in force & can do no harm. An election of every four years will prevent maladministration. Col. MASON withdrew "maladministration" & substitutes "other high crimes & misdemesnors agst. the State" On the question thus altered N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.  Geo. ay. Mr. MADISON, objected to a trial of the President by the Senate, especially as he was to be impeached by the other branch of the Legislature, and for any act which might be called a misdemesnor. The President under these circumstances was made improperly dependent. He would prefer the Supreme Court for the trial of impeachments, or rather a tribunal of which that should form a part. Mr. Govr. MORRIS thought no other tribunal than the Senate could be trusted. The supreme Court were too few in number and might be warped or corrupted. He was agst. a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, considering the Legislative tyranny the great danger to be apprehended; but there could be no danger that the Senate would say untruly on their oaths that the President was guilty of crimes or facts, especially as in four years he can be turned out. Mr. PINKNEY disapproved of making the Senate the Court of Impeachments, as rendering the President too dependent on the Legislature. If he opposes a favorite law, the two Houses will combine agst. him, and under the influence of heat and faction throw him out of office. Mr. WILLIAMSON thought there was more danger of too much lenity than too much rigour towards the President, considering the number of cases in which the Senate was associated with the President. Mr. SHERMAN regarded the Supreme Court as improper to try the President, because the Judges would be appointed by him. On motion by Mr. MADISON to strike out the words-"by the Senate" after the word "conviction" N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. In the amendment of Col: Mason just agreed to, the word "State" after the words "misdemeanors against" was struck out, and the words "United States" inserted unanimously, in order to remove ambiguity. On the question to agree to clause as amended, N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont ay N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del ay Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. On motion "The vice-President and other Civil officers of the U. S. shall be removed from office on impeachment and conviction as aforesaid" was added to the clause on the subject of impeachments. The clause of the report made on the 5th. Sepr. & postponed was taken up, to wit-"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." It was moved to strike out the words "and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate" and insert the words used in the Constitution of Massachussetts on the same subject- "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other bills"-which was agreed too nem: con: On the question On the first part of the clause-"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of Representatives' N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to add to clause (3) of the report made on Sepr. 4. the words "and every member shall be on oath" which being agreed to, and a question taken on the clause so amended viz-"The Senate of the U. S. shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present; and every member shall be on oath" N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. GERRY repeated his motion above made on this day, in the form following "The Legislature shall have the sole right of establishing offices not herein provided for," which was again negatived: Mas. Cont. & Geo. only being ay. Mr. Me. HENRY observed that the President had not yet been any where authorised to convene the Senate, and moved to amend Art. X. sect. 2. by striking out the words "he may convene them [the Legislature] on extraordinary occasions" & insert "He may convene both or either of the Houses on extraordinary occasions." This he added would also provide for the case of the Senate being in Session at the time of convening the Legislature. Mr. WILSON said he should vote agst. the motion, because it implied that the senate might be in Session, when the Legislature was not, which he thought improper. On the question N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. A Committee was then appointed by Ballot to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House. The committee consisted of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr. Madison and Mr. King. Mr. WILLIAMSON moved that previous to this work of the Committee the clause relating to the number of the House of Representatives shd. be reconsidered for the purpose of increasing the number. Mr. MADISON 2ded. the Motion. Mr. SHERMAN opposed it. he thought the provision on that subject amply sufficient. Col: HAMILTON expressed himself with great earnestness and anxiety in favor of the motion. He avowed himself a friend to a vigorous Government, but would declare at the same time, that he held it essential that the popular branch of it should be on a broad foundation. He was seriously of opinion that the House of Representatives was on so narrow a scale as to be really dangerous, and to warrant a jealousy in the people for their liberties. He remarked that the connection between the President & Senate would tend to perpetuate him, by corrupt influence. It was the more necessary on this account that a numerous representation in the other branch of the Legislature should be established. On the motion of Mr. Williamson to reconsider, it was negatived N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. Adjd. Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 7, 1787 IN CONVENTION The mode of constituting the Executive being resumed, Mr. RANDOLPH moved, to insert in the first Section of the report made yesterday "The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the U. S. shall act as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the President and Vice-President; and such officer shall act accordingly until the time of electing a President shall arrive." Mr. MADISON observed that this, as worded, would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election of the President, and moved to substitute- "until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion, which was agreed to. It seemed to be an objection to the provision with some, that according to the process established for chusing the Executive there would be difficulty in effecting it at other than the fixed periods; with others, that the Legislature was restrained in the temporary appointment to "officers" of the U. S: They wished it to be at liberty to appoint others than such. On the Motion of Mr. Randolph as amended, it passed in the affirmative N. H. divided. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. GERRY moved "that in the election of President by the House of Representatives, no State shall vote by less than three members, and where that number may not be allotted to a State, it shall be made up by its Senators; and a concurrence of a majority of all the States shall be necessary to make such choice." Without some such provision five individuals might possibly be competent to an election; these being a majority of two thirds of the existing number of States; and two thirds being a quorum for this business. Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion Mr. READ observed that the States having but one member only in the House of Reps. would be in danger of having no vote at all in the election: the sickness or absence either of the Representative or one of the Senators would have that effect. Mr. MADISON replied that, if one member of the House of Representatives should be left capable of voting for the State, the states having one Representative only would still be subject to that danger. He thought it an evil that so small a number at any rate should be authorized, to elect. Corruption would be greatly facilitated by it. The mode itself was liable to this further weighty objection that the representatives of a Minority of the people, might reverse the choice of a majority of the States and of the people. He wished some cure for this inconveniency might yet be provided. Mr. GERRY withdrew the first part of his motion; and on the,-Question on the 2d. part viz. "and a concurrence of a majority of all the States shall be necessary to make such choice" to follow the words "a member or members from two thirds of the States"- It was agreed to nem: con: The section 2 (see Sepr. 4) requiring that the President should be a natural- born Citizen, &c & have been resident for fourteen years, & be thirty five years of age, was agreed to nem: con: Section 3. (see Sepr. 4). "The vice President shall be ex-officio President of the Senate" Mr. GERRY opposed this regulation. We might as well put the President himself at the head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist between the President & vice-president makes it absolutely improper. He was agst. having any vice President. Mr. Govr. MORRIS. The vice president then will be the first heir apparent that ever loved his father. If there should be no vice president, the President of the Senate would be temporary successor, which would amount to the same thing. Mr. SHERMAN saw no danger in the case. If the vice-President were not to be President of the Senate, he would be without employment, and some member by being made President must be deprived of his vote, unless when an equal division of votes might happen in the Senate, which would be but seldom. Mr. RANDOLPH concurred in the opposition to the clause. Mr. WILLIAMSON, observed that such an officer as vice-President was not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time. Col: MASON, thought the office of vice-President an encroachment on the rights of the Senate; and that it mixed too much the Legislative & Executive, which as well as the Judiciarydepartments, ought to be kept as separate as possible. He took occasion to express his dislike of any reference whatever of the power to make appointments to either branch of the Legislature. On the other hand he was averse to vest so dangerous a power in the President alone. As a method for avoiding both, he suggested that a privy Council of six members to the president should be established; to be chosen for six years by the Senate, two out of the Eastern two out of the middle, and two out of the Southern quarters of the Union, & to go out in rotation two every second year; the concurrence of the Senate to be required only in the appointment of Ambassadors, and in making treaties, which are more of a legislative nature. This would prevent the constant sitting of the Senate which he thought dangerous, as well as keep the departments separate & distinct. It would also save the expence of constant sessions of the Senate. He had he said always considered the Senate as too unwieldy & expensive for appointing officers, especially the smallest, such as tide waiters &c. He had not reduced his idea to writing, but it could be easily done if it should be found acceptable. On the question shall the vice President be ex officio President of the Senate? N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del ay. Mas no. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. The other parts of the same Section (3) were then agreed to. The Section 4.-to wit, "The President by & with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have power to make Treaties &c" Mr. WILSON moved to add, after the word "Senate" the words, "and House of Representatives." As treaties he said are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also. The circumstance of secrecy in the business of treaties formed the only objection; but this he thought, so far as it was inconsistent with obtaining the Legislative sanction, was outweighed by the necessity of the latter. Mr. SHERMAN thought the only question that could be made was whether the power could be safely trusted to the Senate. He thought it could; and that the necessity of secresy in the case of treaties forbade a reference of them to the whole Legislature. Mr. FITZIMMONS 2ded. the motion of Mr. Wilson, & on the question N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. The first sentence as to making treaties was then Agreed to: nem: con: "He shall nominate &c Appoint Ambassadors &c." Mr. WILSON objected to the mode of appointing, as blending a branch of the Legislature with the Executive. Good laws are of no effect without a good Executive; and there can be no good Executive without a responsible appointment of officers to execute. Responsibility is in a manner destroyed by such an agency of the Senate. He would prefer the council proposed by Col: Mason, provided its advice should not be made obligatory on the President. Mr. PINKNEY was against joining the Senate in these appointments, except in the instance of Ambassadors whom he thought ought not to be appointed by the President. Mr. Govr. MORRIS said that as the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security. As Congress now make appointments there is no responsibility. Mr. GERRY. The idea of responsibility in the nomination to offices is chimerical. The President can not know all characters, and can therefore always plead ignorance. Mr. KING. As the idea of a Council proposed by Col. Mason has been supported by Mr. Wilson, he would remark that most of the inconveniencies charged on the Senate are incident to a Council of Advice. He differed from those who thought the Senate would sit constantly. He did not suppose it was meant that all the minute officers were to be appointed by the Senate, or any other original source, but by the higher officers of the departments to which they belong. He was of opinion also that the people wold be alarmed at an unnecessary creation of new Corps which must increase the expence as well as influence of the Government. On the question on these words in the clause viz-"He shall nominate & by & with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, and other public ministers (and Consuls) Judges of the Supreme Court." Agreed to nem: con: the insertion of "and consuls" having first taken place. On the question on the following words "And all other officers of U.S." N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. On motion of Mr. SPAIGHT-"that the President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of the next Session of the Senate" It was agreed to nem: con: Section 4. "The President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have power to make Treaties"-"But no treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present"-this last  being before the House. Mr. WILSON thought it objectionable to require the concurrence of 2/3 which puts it in  the power of a minority to controul the will of a majority. Mr. KING concurred in the objection; remarking that as the Executive was here joined in the business, there was a check which did not exist in Congress where The concurrence of 2/3 was required. Mr. MADISON moved to insert after the word "treaty" the words "except treaties of peace" allowing these to be made with less difficulty than other treaties-It was agreed to nem: con: Mr. MADISON then moved to authorise a concurrence of two thirds of the Senate to make treaties of peace, without the concurrence of the President."-The President he said would necessarily derive so much power and importance from a state of war that he might be tempted, if authorised, to impede a treaty of peace. Mr. BUTLER 2ded. the motion Mr. GORHAM thought the precaution unnecessary as the means of carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President, but of the Legislature. Mr. Govr. MORRIS thought the power of the President in this case harmless; and that no peace ought to be made without the concurrence of the President, who was the general Guardian of the National interests. Mr. BUTLER was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary security against ambitious & corrupt Presidents. He mentioned the late perfidious policy of the Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of the Duke of Marlbro' to prolong the war of which he had the management. Mr. GERRY was of opinion that in treaties of peace a greater rather than less proportion of votes was necessary, than in other treaties. In Treaties of peace the dearest interests will be at stake, as the fisheries, territory &c. In treaties of peace also there is more dander to the extremities of the Continent, of being sacrificed, than on any other occasions. Mr. WILLIAMSON thought that Treaties of peace should be guarded at least by requiring the same concurrence as in other Treaties. On the motion of Mr. Madison & Mr. Butler N.H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N.J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. On the part of the clause concerning treaties amended by the exception as to Treaties of peace, N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no. "and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices," being before the House Col: MASON said that in rejecting a Council to the President we were about to try an experiment on which the most despotic Governments had never ventured. The Grand Signor himself had his Divan. He moved to postpone the consideration of the clause in order to take up the following "That it be an instruction to the Committee of the States to prepare a clause or clauses for establishing an Executive Council, as a Council of State, for the President of the U. States, to consist of six members, two of which from the Eastern, two from the middle, and two from the Southern States, with a Rotation and duration of office similar to those of the Senate; such Council to be appointed by the Legislature or by the Senate." Doctor FRANKLIN 2ded. the motion. We seemed he said too much to fear cabals in appointments by a number, and to have too much confidence in those of single persons. Experience shewed that caprice, the intrigues of favorites & mistresses, &c were nevertheless the means most prevalent in monarchies. Among instances of abuse in such modes of appointment, he mentioned the many bad Governors appointed in G. B. for the Colonies. He thought a Council would not only be a check on a bad President but be a relief to a good one. Mr. Govr. MORRIS. The question of a Council was considered in the Committee, where it was judged that the Presidt. by persuading his Council, to concur in his wrong measures, would acquire their protection for them. Mr. WILSON approved of a Council in preference to making the Senate a party to appointmts. Mr. DICKENSON was for a Council. It wd. be a singular thing if the measures of the Executive were not to undergo some previous discussion before the President. Mr. MADISON was in favor of the instruction to the Committee proposed by Col: Mason. The motion of Mr. Mason was negatived. Maryd. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay- N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no Pa. no. Del. no. Va. no. N C no. On the question, "authorising the President to call for the opinions of the Heads of Departments, in writing": it passed in the affirmative, N. H. only being no. The clause was then unanimously agreed to- Mr. WILLIAMSON & Mr. SPAIGHT moved "that no Treaty of Peace affecting Territorial rights shd.; be made without the concurrence of two thirds of the members of the Senate present. Mr. KING. It will be necessary to look out for securities for some other rights, if this principle be established; he moved to extend the motion-"to all present rights of the U. States." Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 6, 1787 IN CONVENTION Mr. KING and Mr. GERRY moved to insert in the (5) clause of the Report (see Sepr. 4 ) after the words "may be entitled in the Legislature" the words following-"But no person shall be appointed an elector who is a member of the Legislature of the U. S. or who holds any office of profit or trust under the U. S." which passed nem: con: Mr. GERRY proposed, as the President was to be elected by the Senate out of the five highest candidates, that if he should not at the end of his term be re-elected by a majority of the Electors, and no other candidate should have a majority, the eventual election should be made by the Legislature. This he said would relieve the President from his particular dependence on the Senate for his continuance in office. Mr. KING liked the idea, as calculated to satisfy particular members & promote unanimity, & as likely to operate but seldom. Mr. READ opposed it, remarking that if individual members were to be indulged, alterations would be necessary to satisfy most of them. Mr. WILLIAMSON espoused it as a reasonable precaution against the undue influence of the Senate. Mr. SHERMAN liked the arrangement as it stood, though he should not be averse to some amendments. He thought he said that if the Legislature were to have the eventual appointment instead of the Senate, it ought to vote in the case by States, in favor of the small States, as the large States would have so great an advantage in nominating the candidates. Mr. Govr. MORRIS thought favorably of Mr. Gerry's proposition. It would free the President from being tempted in naming to Offices, to Conform to the will of the Senate, & thereby virtually give the appointments to office, to the Senate. Mr. WILSON said that he had weighed carefully the report of the Committee for remodelling the constitution of the Executive; and on combining it with other parts of the plan, he was obliged to consider the whole as having a dangerous tendency to aristocracy; as throwing a dangerous power into the hands of the Senate. They will have in fact, the appointment of the President, and through his dependence on them, the virtual appointment to offices; among others the offices of the Judiciary Department. They are to make Treaties; and they are to try all impeachments. In allowing them thus to make the Executive & Judiciary appointments, to be the Court of impeachments, and to make Treaties which are to be laws of the land, the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers are all blended in one branch of the Government. The power of making Treaties involves the case of subsidies, and here as an additional evil, foreign influence is to be dreaded. According to the plan as it now stands, the President will not be the man of the people as he ought to be, but the Minion of the Senate. He cannot even appoint a tide-waiter without the Senate. He had always thought the Senate too numerous a body for making appointments to office. The Senate, will moreover in all probability be in constant Session. They will have high salaries. And with all those powers, and the President in their interest, they will depress the other branch of the Legislature, and aggrandize themselves in proportion. Add to all this, that the Senate sitting in conclave, can by holding up to their respective States various and improbable candidates, contrive so to scatter their votes, as to bring the appointment of the President ultimately before themselves. Upon the whole, he thought the new mode of appointing the President, with some amendments, a valuable improvement; but he could never agree to purchase it at the price of the ensuing parts of the Report, nor befriend a system of which they make a part. Mr. Govr. MORRIS expressed his wonder at the observations of Mr. Wilson so far as they preferred the plan in the printed Report to the new modification of it before the House, and entered into a comparative view of the two, with an eye to the nature of Mr. Wilsons objections to the last. By the first the Senate he observed had a voice in appointing the President out of all the Citizens of the U. S: by this they were limited to five candidates previously nominated to them, with a probability of being barred altogether by the successful ballot of the Electors. Here surely was no increase of power. They are now to appoint Judges nominated to them by the President. Before they had the appointment without any agency whatever of the President. Here again surely no additional power. If they are to make Treaties as the plan now stands, the power was the same in the printed plan. If they are to try impeachments, the Judges must have been triable by them before. Wherein then lay the dangerous tendency of the innovations to establish an aristocracy in the Senate? As to the appointment of officers, the weight of sentiment in the House, was opposed to the exercise of it by the President alone; though it was not the case with himself. If the Senate would act as was suspected, in misleading the States into a fallacious disposition of their votes for a President, they would, if the appointment were withdrawn wholly from them, make such representations in their several States where they have influence, as would favor the object of their partiality. Mr. WILLIAMSON. replying to Mr. Morris: observed that the aristocratic complexion proceeds from the change in the mode of appointing the President which makes him dependent on the Senate. Mr. CLYMER said that the aristocratic part to which he could never accede was that in the printed plan, which gave the Senate the power of appointing to offices. Mr. HAMILTON said that he had been restrained from entering into the discussions by his dislike of the Scheme of Govt. in General; but as he meant to support the plan to be recommended, as better than nothing, he wished in this place to offer a few remarks. He liked the new modification, on the whole, better than that in the printed Report. In this the President was a Monster elected for seven years, and ineligible afterwards; having great powers, in appointments to office, & continually tempted by this constitutional disqualification to abuse them in order to subvert the Government. Although he should be made re-eligible, still if appointed by the Legislature, he would be tempted to make use of corrupt influence to be continued in office. It seemed peculiarly desireable therefore that some other mode of election should be devised. Considering the different views of different States, & the different districts Northern Middle & Southern, he concurred with those who thought that the votes would not be concentered, and that the appointment would consequently in the present mode devolve on the Senate. The nomination to offices will give great weight to the President. Here then is a mutual connection & influence, that will perpetuate the President, and aggrandize both him & the Senate. What is to be the remedy? He saw none better than to let the highest number of ballots, whether a majority or not, appoint the President. What was the objection to this? Merely that too small a number might appoint. But as the plan stands, the Senate may take the candidate having the smallest number of votes, and make him President. Mr. SPAIGHT & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert "seven" instead of "four" years for the term of the President- On this motion N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. SPAIGHT & Mr. WILLIAMSON, then moved to insert "six" instead of "four." On which motion N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no On the term "four" all the States were ay, except N. Carolina, no. On the question (Clause 4. in the Report) for Appointing President by electors-down to the words,-"entitled in the Legislature" inclusive. N. H. ay. Mas: ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. It was moved that the Electors meet at the seat of the Genl. Govt. which passed in the Negative. N. C. only being ay. It was moved to insert the words "under the seal of the State" after the word "transmit" in 4th clause of the Report which was disagreed to; as was another motion to insert the words "and who shall have given their votes" after the word "appointed" in the 4th. Clause of the Report as added yesterday on motion of Mr. Dickinson. On several motions, the words "in presence of the Senate and House of Representatives" were inserted after the word "counted" and the word "immediately" before the word "choose"; and the words "of the Electors" after the word "votes." Mr. SPAIGHT said if the election by Electors is to be crammed down, he would prefer their meeting altogether and deciding finally without any reference to the Senate and moved "That the Electors meet at the seat of the General Government." Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion, on which all the States were in the negative except N: Carolina. On motion the words "But the election shall be on the same day throughout the U. S." were added after the words "transmitting their votes" N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo-ay. On a question on the sentence in clause (4). "if such number be a majority of that of the Electors appointed." N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. On a question on the clause referring the eventual appointment of the President to the Senate N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. Here the call ceased. Mr. MADISON made a motion requiring 2/3 at least of the Senate to be present at the choice of a President. Mr. PINKNEY 2ded. the motion Mr. GORHAM thought it a wrong principle to require more than a majority in any case. In the present case it might prevent for a long time any choice of a President. On the question moved by Mr. M. & Mr. P. N. H. ay: Mas. abst. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del.no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. WILLIAMSON suggested as better than an eventual choice by the Senate, that this choice should be made by the Legislature, voting by States and not per capita. Mr. SHERMAN suggested the House of Reps as preferable to the Legislature, and moved, accordingly, To strike out the words "The Senate shall immediately choose &c." and insert "The House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President, the members from each State having one vote." Col: MASON liked the latter mode best as lessening the aristocratic influence of the Senate. On the Motion of Mr. Sherman N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. Govr. MORRIS suggested the idea of providing that in all cases, the President in office, should not be one of the five Candidates; but be only re- eligible in case a majority of the electors should vote for him. [This was another expedient for rendering the President independent of the Legislative body for his continuance in office.] Mr. MADISON remarked that as a majority of members wd. make a quorum in the H. of Reps. it would follow from the amendment of Mr. Sherman giving the election to a majority of States, that the President might be elected by two States only, Virga. & Pena. which have 18 members, if these States alone should be present On a motion that the eventual election of Presidt. in case of an equality of the votes of the electors be referred to the House of Reps. N. H. ay. Mas. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. KING moved to add to the amendment of Mr. Sherman "But a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the States," and also of a majority of the whole number of the House of Representatives." Col: MASON liked it as obviating the remark of Mr. Madison-The motion as far as "States" inclusive was agd. to. On the residue to wit, "and also of a majority of the whole number of the House of Reps. it passed in the Negative. N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. The Report relating to the appointment of the Executive stands as amended, as follows, "He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner. Each State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature: But no person shall be appointed an Elector who is a member of the Legislature of the U. S. or who holds any office of profit or trust under the U. S. The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the General Government, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives open all the certificates & the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President (if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed) and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President, the Representation from each State having one vote. But if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the House of Representatives shall in like manner choose by ballot the President. In the choice of a President by the House of Representatives, a Quorum shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the States [ and the concurrence of a majority of all the States shall be necessary to such choice.] -And in every case after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the Electors shall be the vicepresident: But, if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them the vice-President. The Legislature may determine the time of choosing the Electors, and of their giving their votes; and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes- But the election shall be on the same day throughout the U. States." Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 5, 1787 IN CONVENTION Mr. BREARLEY from the Committee of Eleven made a farther report as follows, (1) To add to the clause "to declare war" the words "and grant letters of marque and reprisal" (2) To add to the clause "to raise and support armies" the words "but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years" (3) Instead of sect: 12. art 6. say-"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate: no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." (4) Immediately before the last clause of sect. 1. art. 7. insert "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may by Cession of particular States and the acceptance of the Legislature become the seat of the Government of the U. S. and to exercise like authority over all places purchased for the erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful buildings" (5) "To promote the progress of Science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries" This report being taken up. -The (1) clause was agreed to nem: con: To the (2) clause Mr. GERRY objected that it admitted of appropriations to an army, for two years instead of one, for which he could not conceive a reason. that it implied that there was to be a standing army which he inveighed against as dangerous to liberty, as unnecessary even for so great an extent of Country as this, and if necessary, some restriction on the number & duration ought to be provided: Nor was this a proper time for such an innovation. The people would not bear it. Mr. SHERMAN remarked that the appropriations were permitted only, not required to be for two years. As the Legislature is to be biennially elected, it would be inconvenient to require appropriations to be for one year, as there might be no Session within the time necessary to renew them. He should himself he said like a reasonable restriction on the number and continuance of an army in time of peace. The clause (2) was agreed to nem: con: The (3) clause, Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to postpone. It had been agreed to in the Committee on the ground of compromise, and he should feel himself at liberty to dissent to it, if on the whole he should not be satisfied with certain other parts to be settled. - Mr. PINKNEY 2ded. the motion Mr. SHERMAN was for giving immediate ease to those who looked on this clause as of great moment, and for trusting to their concurrence in other proper measures. On the question for postponing N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. So much of the (4) clause as related to the seat of Government was agreed to nem: con: On the residue, to wit, "to exercise like authority over all places purchased for forts &c. Mr. GERRY contended that this power might be made use of to enslave any particular State by buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the Genl. Government. Mr. KING thought himself the provision unnecessary, the power being already involved: but would move to insert after the word "purchased" the words "by the consent of the Legislature of the State" This would certainly make the power safe. Mr. Govr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion, which was agreed to nem: con: as was then the residue of the clause as amended. The (5) clause was agreed to nem: con: The following resolution & order being reported from the Committee of eleven, to wit, "Resolved that the U. S. in Congress be requested to allow and cause to be paid to the Secretary and other officers of this Convention such sums in proportion to their respective times of service, as are allowed to the Secretary & similar officers of Congress." "Ordered that the Secretary make out & transmit to the Treasury office of the U. S. an account for the said Services, & for the incidental expenses of this Convention" The resolution & order were separately agreed to nem: con: Mr. GERRY gave notice that he should move to reconsider articles XIX. XX. XXI. XXII. Mr. WILLIAMSON gave like notice as to the Article fixing the number of Representatives, which he thought too small. He wished also to allow Rho: Island more than one, as due to her probable number of people, and as proper to stifle any pretext arising from her absence on the occasion. The Report made yesterday as to the appointment of the Executive being taken up. Mr. PINKNEY renewed his opposition to the mode, arguing 1. that the electors will not have sufficient knowledge of the fittest men, & will be swayed by an attachment to the eminent men of their respective States. Hence 2dly. the dispersion of the votes would leave the appointment with the Senate, and as the President's reappointment will thus depend on the Senate he will be the mere creature of that body. 3. He will combine with the Senate agst. the House of Representatives. 4. This change in the mode of election was meant to get rid of the ineligibility of the President a second time, whereby he will become fixed for life under the auspices of the Senate Mr. GERRY did not object to this plan of constituting the Executive in itself, but should be governed in his final vote by the powers that may be given to the President. Mr. RUTLIDGE was much opposed to the plan reported by the Committee. It would throw the whole power into the Senate. He was also against a re-eligibility. He moved to postpone the Report under consideration & take up the original plan of appointment by the Legislature, to wit. "He shall be elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to which election a majority of the votes of the members present shall be required: He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time." On this motion to postpone N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. Col. MASON admitted that there were objections to an appointment by the Legislature as originally planned. He had not yet made up his mind, but would state his objections to the mode proposed by the Committee. 1. It puts the appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate, as it will rarely happen that a majority of the whole votes will fall on any one candidate: and as the Existing President will always be one of the 5 highest, his reappointment will of course depend on the Senate. 2. Considering the powers of the President & those of the Senate, if a coalition should be established between these two branches, they will be able to subvert the Constitution-The great objection with him would be removed by depriving the Senate of the eventual election. He accordingly moved to strike out the words "if such number be a majority of that of the electors." Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion. He could not agree to the clause without some such modification. He preferred making the highest tho' not having a majority of the votes, President, to a reference of the matter to the Senate. Referring the appointment to the Senate lays a certain foundation for corruption & aristocracy. Mr. Govr. MORRIS thought the point of less consequence than it was supposed on both sides. It is probable that a majority of votes will fall on the same man. As each elector is to give two votes, more than 1/4 will give a majority. Besides as one vote is to be given to a man out of the State, and as this vote will not be thrown away, 1/2 the votes will fall on characters eminent & generally known. Again if the President shall have given satisfaction, the votes will turn on him of course, and a majority of them will reappoint him, without resort to the Senate: If he should be disliked, all disliking him, would take care to unite their votes so as to ensure his being supplanted. Col. MASON those who think there is no danger of there not being a majority for the same person in the first instance, ought to give up the point to those who think otherwise. Mr. SHERMAN reminded the opponents of the new mode proposed that if the small states had the advantage in the Senate's deciding among the five highest candidates, the large States would have in fact the nomination of these candidates On the motion of Col: Mason N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. WILSON moved to strike out "Senate" and insert the word "Legislature" Mr. MADISON considered it as a primary object to render an eventual resort to any part of the Legislature improbable. He was apprehensive that the proposed alteration would turn the attention of the large States too much to the appointment of candidates, instead of aiming at an effectual appointment of the officer, as the large States would predominate in the Legislature which would have the final choice out of the Candidates. Whereas if the Senate in which the small States predominate should have this final choice, the concerted effort of the large States would be to make the appointment in the first instance conclusive. Mr. RANDOLPH. We have in some revolutions of this plan made a bold stroke for Monarchy. We are now doing the same for an aristocracy. He dwelt on the tendency of such an influence in the Senate over the election of the President in addition to its other powers, to convert that body into a real & dangerous Aristocracy. Mr. DICKINSON was in favor of giving the eventual election to the Legislature, instead of the Senate. It was too much influence to be superadded to that body. On the question moved by Mr. Wilson N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to strike out the word "majority" and insert "one third" so that the eventual power might not be exercised if less than a majority, but not less than 1/3 of the Electors should vote for the same person. Mr. GERRY objected that this would put it in the power of three or four States to put in whom they pleased. Mr. WILLIAMSON. There are seven States which do not contain one third of the people. If the Senate are to appoint, less than one sixth of the people will have the power. On the question N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. GERRY suggested that the eventual election should be made by six Senators and seven Representatives chosen by joint ballot of both Houses. Mr. KING observed that the influence of the Small States in the Senate was somewhat balanced by the influence of the large States in bringing forward the candidates; and also by the Concurrence of the small States in the Committee in the clause vesting the exclusive origination of Money bills in the House of Representatives. Col: MASON moved to strike out the word "five" and insert the word "three" as the highest candidates for the Senate to choose out of. Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion Mr. SHERMAN would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer seven or thirteen. On the question moved by Col: Mason & Mr. Gerry N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Delaware Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. SPAIGHT and Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out "five" and insert "thirteen"- to which all the States disagreed-except N. C. & S. C. Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert after "Electors" the words "who shall have balloted" so that the non voting electors not being counted might not increase the number necessary as a majority of the whole, to decide the choice without the agency of the Senate. On this question N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. DICKINSON moved, in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of the clause as explained by the vote, to add, after the words "if such number be a majority of the whole number of the electors" the word "appointed" On this motion N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Delaware Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Col: MASON. As the mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not forbear expressing his opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put all power into the hands of seven or eight men, and fix an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy. The words "and of their giving their votes" being inserted on motion for that purpose, after the words "The Legislature may determine the time of chusing and assembling the electors." The House adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 4, 1787 IN CONVENTION Mr. BREARLY from the Committee of eleven made a further partial Report as follows "The Committee of Eleven to whom sundry resolutions &c were referred on the 31st. of August, report that in their opinion the following additions and alterations should be made to the Report before the Convention, viz (1.) The first clause of sect: 1. art. 7. to read as follow-'The Legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes duties imposts & excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence & general welfare, of the U. S.' (2). At the end of the 2d. clause of sect. 1. art. 7. add 'and with the Indian Tribes.' (3) In the place of the 9th. art. Sect. 1. to be inserted 'The Senate of the U. S. shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.' (4) After the word 'Excellency' in sect. 1. art. 10. to be inserted. 'He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner, viz. Each State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the House of Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Genl. Government, directed to the President of the Senate-The President of the Senate shall in that House open all the certificates; and the votes shall be then & there counted. The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President: but if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall choose by ballot the President. And in every case after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes shall be vice- president: but if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them the vice-President. The Legislature may determine the time of choosing and assembling the Electors, and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes.' (5) 'Sect. 2. No person except a natural born citizen or a Citizen of the U. S. at the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the office of President; nor shall any person be elected to that office, who shall be under the age of thirty five years, and who has not been in the whole, at least fourteen years a resident within the U. S.' (6) 'Sect. 3. The vice-president shall be ex officio President of the Senate, except when they sit to try the impeachment of the President, in which case the Chief Justice shall preside, and excepting also when he shall exercise the powers and duties of President, in which case & in case of his absence, the Senate shall chuse a President pro tempore-The vice President when acting as President of the Senate shall not have a vote unless the House be equally divided.' (7) 'Sect. 4. The President by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties; and he shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, and other public Ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the U. S., whose appointments are not otherwise herein provided for. But no Treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present.' (8) After the words-"into the service of the U. S." in sect. 2. art: 10. add 'and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.' The latter part of Sect. 2. Art: 10. to read as follows. (9)  'He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for Treason, or bribery, and in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office, the vice-president shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.' The (1st.) clause of the Report was agreed to, nem. con. The (2) clause was also agreed to nem: con: The (3) clause was postponed in order to decide previously on the mode of electing the President. The (4) clause was accordingly taken up. Mr. GORHAM disapproved of making the next highest after the President, the vice-President, without referring the decision to the Senate in case the next highest should have less than a majority of votes. as the regulation stands a very obscure man with very few votes may arrive at that appointment Mr. SHERMAN said the object of this clause of the report of the Committee was to get rid of the ineligibility, which was attached to the mode of election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive independent of the Legislature. As the choice of the President was to be made out of the five highest, obscure characters were sufficiently guarded against in that case; and he had no objection to requiring the vice-President to be chosen in like manner, where the choice was not decided by a majority in the first instance Mr. MADISON was apprehensive that by requiring both the President & vice President to be chosen out of the five highest candidates, the attention of the electors would be turned too much to making candidates instead of giving their votes in order to a definitive choice. Should this turn be given to the business, the election would, in fact be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the effect at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the candidates to the largest States. Mr. Govr. MORRIS concurred in, & enforced the remarks of Mr. Madison. Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. PINKNEY wished for a particular explanation & discussion of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the Executive. Mr. Govr. MORRIS said he would give the reasons of the Committee and his own. The 1st. was the danger of intrigue & faction if the appointmt. should be made by the Legislature. 2.  the inconveniency of an ineligibility required by that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3. The difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments, other than the Senate which would not be so proper for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the Legislature, 4. No body had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. 5. Many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people. 6. the indispensible necessity of making the Executive independent of the Legislature. -As the Electors would vote at the same time throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of the impeachment. Col: MASON confessed that the plan of the Committee had removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was liable however to this strong objection, that nineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose Mr. BUTLER thought the mode not free from objections, but much more so than an election by the Legislature, where as in elective monarchies, cabal faction & violence would be sure to prevail. Mr. PINKNEY stated as objections to the mode 1.  that it threw the whole appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate. 2. The Electors will be strangers to the several candidates and of course unable to decide on their comparative merits. 3. It makes the Executive reeligible which will endanger the public liberty. 4. It makes the same body of men which will in fact elect the President his Judges in case of an impeachment. Mr. WILLIAMSON had great doubts whether the advantage of reeligibility would balance the objection to such a dependence of the President on the Senate for his reappointment. He thought at least the Senate ought to be restrained to the two highest on the list Mr. Govr. MORRIS said the principal advantage aimed at was that of taking away the opportunity for cabal. The President may be made if thought necessary ineligible on this as well as on any other mode of election. Other inconveniences may be no less redressed on this plan than any other. Mr. BALDWIN thought the plan not so objectionable when well considered, as at first view. The increasing intercourse among the people of the States, would render important characters less & less unknown; and the Senate would consequently be less & less likely to have the eventual appointment thrown into their hands. Mr. WILSON. This subject has greatly divided the House, and will also divide people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan on the whole a valuable improvement on the former. It gets rid of one great evil, that of cabal & corruption; & Continental Characters will multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as to enable the electors in every part of the Union to know & judge of them. It clears the way also for a discussion of the question of reeligibility on its own merits, which the former mode of election seems to forbid. He thought it might be better however to refer the eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a smaller number than five of the Candidates. The eventual election by the Legislature wd. not open cabal anew, as it would be restrained to certain designated objects of choice, and as these must have had the previous sanction of a number of the States: and if the election be made as it ought as soon as the votes of the electors are opened & it is known that no one has a majority of the whole, there can be little danger of corruption. Another reason for preferring the Legislature to the Senate in this business, was that the House of Reps. will be so often changed as to be free from the influence & faction to which the permanence of the Senate may subject that branch. Mr. RANDOLPH preferred the former mode of constituting the Executive, but if the change was to be made, he wished to know why the eventual election was referred to the Senate and not to the Legislature? He saw no necessity for this and many objections to it. He was apprehensive also that the advantage of the eventual appointment would fall into the hands of the States near the Seat of Government. Mr. Govr. MORRIS said the Senate was preferred because fewer could then, say to the President, you owe your appointment to us. He thought the President would not depend so much on the Senate for his re-appointment as on his general good conduct. The further consideration of the Report was postponed that each member might take a copy of the remainder of it. The following motion was referred to the Committee of Eleven-to wit,-"To prepare & report a plan for defraying the expences of the Convention" Mr. PINKNEY moved a clause declaring "that each House should be judge of the privilege of its own members. Mr. Govr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. MADISON expressed doubts as to the propriety of giving such a power, & wished for a postponement. Mr. Govr. MORRIS thought it so plain a case that no postponement could be necessary. Mr. WILSON thought the power involved, and the express insertion of it needless. It might beget doubts as to the power of other public bodies, as Courts &c. Every Court is the judge of its own privileges. Mr. MADISON distinguished between the power of Judging of privileges previously & duly established, and the effect of the motion which would give a discretion to each House as to the extent of its own privileges. He suggested that it would be better to make provision for ascertaining by law, the privileges of each House, than to allow each House to decide for itself. He suggested also the necessity of considering what privileges ought to be allowed to the Executive. Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 3, 1787 IN CONVENTION Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to amend the Report concerning the respect to be paid to Acts Records &c of one State, in other States (see Sepr. 1.) by striking out "judgments obtained in one State shall have in another" and to insert the word "thereof" after the word "effect" Col: MASON favored the motion, particularly if the "effect" was to be restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings Mr. WILSON remarked, that if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations. Docr. JOHNSON thought the amendment as worded would authorise the Genl. Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one State, in another State. Mr. RANDOLPH considered it as strengthening the general objection agst. the plan, that its definition of the powers of the Government was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. He was for not going farther than the Report, which enables the Legislature to provide for the effect of Judgments. On the amendment as moved by Mr. Govr. Morris Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. On motion of Mr. MADISON, "ought to" was struck out, and "shall" inserted; and "shall" between "Legislature" & "by general laws" struck out, and "may" inserted, nem: con: On the question to agree to the report as amended viz "Full faith & credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records & judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts records & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof" Agreed to witht. a count of Sts. The clause in the Report "To establish uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" being taken up. Mr. SHERMAN observed that Bankruptcies were in some cases punishable with death by the laws of England, & He did not chuse to grant a power by which that might be done here. Mr. Govr. MORRIS said this was an extensive & delicate subject. He would agree to it because he saw no danger of abuse of the power by the Legislature of the U. S. On the question to agree to the clause N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. PINKNEY moved to postpone the Report of the Committee of Eleven (see Sepr. 1) in order to take up the following, "The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for which they or any other for their benefit, receive any salary, fees or emoluments of any kind, and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively." He was strenuously opposed to an ineligibility of members to office, and therefore wished to restrain the proposition to a mere incompatibility. He considered the eligibility of members of the Legislature to the honorable offices of Government, as resembling the policy of the Romans, in making the temple of virtue the road to the temple of fame. On this question N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. KING moved to insert the word "created" before the word "during" in the Report of the Committee. This he said would exclude the members of the first Legislature under the Constitution, as most of the offices wd. then be created. Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion. He did not see why members of the Legislature should be ineligible to vacancies happening during the term of their election. Mr. SHERMAN was for entirely incapacitating members of the Legislature. He thought their eligibility to offices would give too much influence to the Executive. He said the incapacity ought at least to be extended to cases where salaries should be increased as well as created, during the term of the member. He mentioned also the expedient by which the restriction could be evaded to wit: an existing officer might be translated to an office created, and a member of the Legislature be then put into the office vacated. Mr. Govr. MORRIS contended that the eligibility of members to office wd. lessen the influence of the Executive. If they cannot be appointed themselves, the Executive will appoint their relations & friends, retaining the service & votes of the members for his purposes in the Legislature. Whereas the appointment of the members deprives him of such an advantage. Mr. GERRY. thought the eligibility of members would have the effect of opening batteries agst. good officers, in order to drive them out & make way for members of the Legislature. Mr. GORHAM was in favor of the amendment. Without it we go further than has been done in any of the States, or indeed any other Country. The experience of the State Governments where there was no such ineligibility, proved that it was not necessary; on the contrary that the eligibility was among the inducements for fit men to enter into the Legislative service Mr. RANDOLPH was inflexibly fixed against inviting men into the Legislature by the prospect of being appointed to offices. Mr. BALDWIN remarked that the example of the States was not applicable. The Legislatures there are so numerous that an exclusion of their members would not leave proper men for offices. The case would be otherwise in the General Government. Col: MASON. Instead of excluding merit, the ineligibility will keep out corruption, by excluding office-hunters. Mr. WILSON considered the exclusion of members of the Legislature, as increasing the influence of the Executive as observed by Mr. Govr. Morris at the same time that it would diminish, the general energy of the Government. He said that the legal disqualification for office would be odious to those who did not wish for office, but did not wish either to be marked by so degrading a distinction. Mr. PINKNEY. The first Legislature will be composed of the ablest men to be found. The States will select such to put the Government into operation. Should the Report of the Committee or even the amendment be agreed to, The great offices, even those of the Judiciary Department which are to continue for life, must be filled whilst those most capable of filling them will be under a disqualification. On the question on Mr. King's motion N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. The amendment being thus lost by the equal division of the States, Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert the words "created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased" before the word "during" in the Report of the Committee Mr. KING 2ded. the motion, & On the question N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. ay N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divided. The last clause rendering a Seat in the Legislature & an office incompatible was agreed to nem. con: The Report as amended & agreed to is as follows. "The members of each House shall be ineligible to any Civil office under the authority of the U. States, created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during the time for which they shall respectively be elected-and no person holding any office under the U. S. shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office." Adjourned Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 1, 1787 IN CONVENTION Mr. BREARLEY from the Comme. of eleven to which were referred yesterday, the postponed parts of the Constitution, & parts of Reports not acted upon, made the following partial report. That in lieu of the 9th. Sect: of art: 6. the words following be inserted viz "The members of each House shall be ineligible to any civil office under the authority of the U. S. during the time for which they shall respectively be elected, and no person holding an office under the U. S. shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office." Mr. RUTLIDGE from the Committee to whom were referred sundry propositions (see Aug: 29), together with art: XVI, reported that the following additions be made to the Report-viz After the word "States" in the last line on the Margin of the 3d. page (see the printed Report)-add "to establish uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies." And insert the following as Art: XVI viz "Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the public acts, records, and Judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature shall by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, Records, & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect which Judgments obtained in one State, shall have in another." After receiving these reports The House adjourned to 10 OC. on Monday next Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp