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(October 9, 1787) LETTER II. OCTOBER 9, 1787. DEAR SIR, The essential parts of a free and good government are afull and equal representation of the people in the legislature, and the jury trial of the vicinage in the administration of justice-a full and equal representation, is that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the people themselves would were they all assembled-a fair representation, therefore, should be so regulated, that every order of men in the community, according to the common course of elections, can have a share in it-in order to allow professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, &c. to bring a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the legislature, the representation must be considerably numerous-We have about 200 state senators in the United States, and a less number than that of federal representatives cannot, clearly, be a full representation of this people, in the affairs of internal taxation and police, were there but one legislature for the whole union. The representation cannot be equal, or the situation of the people proper for one government only-if the extreme parts of the society cannot be represented as fully as the central-It is apparently impracticable that this should be the case in this extensive country-it would be impossible to collect a representation of the parts of the country five, six, and seven hundred miles from the seat of government. Under one general government alone, there could be but one judiciary, one supreme and a proper number of inferior courts. I think it would be totally impracticable in this case, to preserve a due administration of justice, and the real benefits of the jury trial of the vicinage-there are now supreme courts in each state in the union; and a great number of county and other courts subordinate to each supreme court-most of these supreme and inferior courts are itinerant, and hold their sessions in different parts every year of their respective states, counties and districts-with these moving courts, our citizens, from the vast extent of the country must travel very considerable distances from home to find the place where justice is administered. I am not for bringing justice so near to individuals as to afford them any temptation to engage in law suits; though I think it one of the greatest benefits in a good government, that each citizen should find a court of justice within a reasonable distance, perhaps, within a day's travel of his home; so that, without great inconveniences and enormous expences, he may have the advantages of his witnesses and jury-it would be impracticable to derive these advantages from one judiciary-the one supreme court at most could only set in the centre of the union, and move once a year into the centre of the eastern and southern extremes of it-and, in this case, each citizen, on an average, would travel 150 or 200 miles to find this court-that, however, inferior courts might be properly placed in the differentcounties, and districts of the union, the appellate jurisdiction would be intolerable and expensive. If it were possible to consolidate the states, and preserve the features of a free government, still it is evident that the middle states, the parts of the union, about the seat of government, would enjoy great advantages, while the remote states would experience the many inconveniences of remote provinces. Wealth, officers, and the benefits of government would collect in the centre: and the extreme states; and their principal towns become much less important. There are other considerations which tend to prove that the idea of one consolidated whole, on free principles, is ill-founded-the laws of a free government rest on the confidence of the people, and operate gently and never can extend their influence very far-if they are executed on free principles, about the centre, where the benefits of the government induce the people to support it voluntarily; yet they must be executed on the principles of fear and force in the extremes-This has been the case with every extensive republic of which we have any accurate account. There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which informing the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed-a free and enlightened people, in forming this compact, will not resign all their rights to those who govern, and they will fix limits to their legislators and rulers, which will soon be plainly seen by those who are governed, as well as by those who govern: and the latter will know they cannot be passed unperceived by the former, and without giving a general alarm-These rights should be made the basis of every constitution; and if a people be so situated, or have such different opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining and fixing them, it is a very strong argument against their attempting to form one entire society, to live under one system of laws only-I confess, I never thought the people of these states differed essentially in these respects; they having derived all these rights, from one common source, the British systems; and having in the formation of their state constitutions, discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are very similar. However, it is now said that the states differ so essentially in these respects, and even in the important article of the trial by jury, that when assembled in convention, they can agree to no words by which to establish that trial, or by which to ascertain and establish many other of these rights, as fundamental articles in the social compact If so, we proceed to consolidate the states on no solid basis whatever. But I do not pay much regard to the reasons given for not bottoming the new constitution on a better bill of rights. I still believe a completefederal bill of rights to be very practicable. Nevertheless acknowledge the proceedings of the convention furnish my mind with many new and strong reasons, against a complete consolidation of the states. They tend to convince me, that it cannot be carried with propriety very far-that the convention have gone much farther in one respect than they found it practicable to go in another; that is, they propose to lodge in the general government very extensive powers-powers nearly, if not altogether, complete and unlimited, over the purse and the sword. But, in its organization - , they furnish the strongest proof that the proper limbs, or parts of a government, to support and execute those powers on proper principles (or in which they can be safely lodged) cannot be formed. These powers must be lodged somewhere in every society; but then they should be lodged where the strength and guardians of the people are collected. They can be wielded, or safely used, in a free country only by an able executive and judiciary, a respectable senate, and a secure, full, and equal representation of the people. I think the principles I have premised or brought into view, are well founded-I think they will not be denied by any fair reasoner. It is in connection with these, and other solid principles, we are to examine the constitution. It is not a few democratic phrases, or a few well formed features, that will prove its merits; or a few small omissions that will produce its rejection among men of sense; they will enquire what are the essential powers in a community, and what are nominal ones, where and how the essential powers shall be lodged to secure government, and to secure true liberty. In examining the proposed constitution carefully, we must clearly perceive an unnatural separation of these powers from the substantial representation of the people. The state governments will exist, with all their governors, senators, representatives, officers and expences; in these will be nineteen-twentieths of the representatives of the people; they will have a near connection, and their members an immediate intercourse with the people; and the probability is, that the state governments will possess the confidence of the people, and be considered generally as their immediate guardians. The general government will consist of a new species of executive, a small senate, and a very small house representatives. As many citizens will be more than three hundred miles from the seat of this government as will be nearer to it, its judges and officers cannot be very numerous, without making our government very expensive. Thus will stand the state and the general governments, should the constitution be adopted without any alterations in their organization: but as to powers, the general government will possess all essential ones, at least on paper, and those of the states a mere shadow of power. And therefore, unless the people shall make some great exertions to restore to the state governments their powers in matters of internal police; as the powers to lay and collect, exclusively, internal taxes, to govern the militia, and to hold the decisions of their own judicial courts upon their own laws final, the balance cannot possibly continue long; but the state governments must be annihilated, or continue to exist for no purpose. It is however to be observed, that many of the essential powers given the national government are not exclusively given; and the general government may have prudence enough to forbear the exercise of those which may still be exercised by the respective states. But this cannot justify the impropriety of giving powers, the exercise of which prudent men will not attempt, and imprudent men will, or probably can, exercise only in a manner destructive of free government. The general government, organized as it is, may be adequate to many valuable objects, and be able to carry its laws into execution on proper principles in several cases; but I think its warmest friends will not contend, that it can carry all the powers proposed to be lodged in it into effect, without calling to its aid a military force, which must very soon destroy all elective governments in the country, produce anarchy, or establish despotism. Though we cannot have now a complete idea of what will be the operations of the proposed system, we may, allowing things to have their common course, have a very tolerable one. The powers lodged in the general government, exercised by it, must ultimately effect the internal police of the states, as well as external concerns; and there is no reason to expect the numerous state governments, and their connections, will be very friendly to the execution of federal laws in those internal affairs, which hitherto have been under their own immediate management - There is more reason to believe, that the general government, far removed from the people, and none of its members elected oftener than once in two years, will be forgot or neglected, and its laws in many cases disregarded, unless a multitude of officers and military force be continually kept in view, and employed to enforce the execution of the laws, and to make the government feared and respected. No position can be truer than this That in this country either neglected laws, or a military execution of them, must lead to a revolution, and to the destruction of freedom. Neglected laws must first lead to anarchy and confusion; and a military execution of laws is only a shorter way to the same point-despotic government. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/federal-farmer-letters-to-the-republican-ii-1787-10-9/20130122080154/

AFRICAN SLAVERY IN AMERICA. Messrs. BRADFORD, Please to insert the following, and oblige yours A. B. TO AMERICANS. That some desperate wretches should be willing to steal and enslave men by violence and murder for gain, is rather lamentable than strange. But that many civilized, nay, christianized people should approve, and be concerned in the savage practice, is surprising; and still persist, though it has been so often proved contrary to the light of nature, to every principle of Justice and Humanity, and even good policy, by a succession of eminent men,∗ and several late publications. Our Traders in MEN (an unnatural commodity!) must know the wickedness of that SLAVE-TRADE, if they attend to reasoning, or the dictates of their own hearts; and such as shun and stiffle all these, wilfully sacrifice Conscience, and the character of integrity to that golden Idol. The Managers of that Trade themselves, and others, testify, that many of these African nations inhabit fertile countries, are industrious farmers, enjoy plenty, and lived quietly, averse to war, before the Europeans debauched them with liquors, and bribing them against one another; and that these inoffensive people are brought into slavery, by stealing them, tempting Kings to sell subjects, which they can have no right to do, and hiring one tribe to war against another, in order to catch prisoners. By such wicked and inhuman ways the English are said to enslave towards one hundred thousand yearly; of which thirty thousand are supposed to die by barbarous treatment in the first year; besides all that are slain in the unnatural wars excited to take them. So much innocent blood have the Managers and Supporters of this inhuman Trade to answer for to the common Lord of all! Many of these were not prisoners of war, and redeemed from savage conquerors, as some plead; and they who were such prisoners, the English, who promote the war for that very end, are the guilty authors of their being so; and if they were redeemed, as is alleged, they would owe nothing to the redeemer but what he paid for them. They show as little Reason as Conscience who put the matter by with saying—“Men, in some cases, are lawfully made Slaves, and why may not these?” So men, in some cases, are lawfully put to death, deprived of their goods, without their consent; may any man, therefore, be treated so, without any conviction of desert? Nor is this plea mended by adding—“They are set forth to us as slaves, and we buy them without farther inquiry, let the sellers see to it.” Such men may as well join with a known band of robbers, buy their ill-got goods, and help on the trade; ignorance is no more pleadable in one case than the other; the sellers plainly own how they obtain them. But none can lawfully buy without evidence that they are not concurring with Men-Stealers; and as the true owner has a right to reclaim his goods that were stolen, and sold; so the slave, who is proper owner of his freedom, has a right to reclaim it, however often sold. Most shocking of all is alledging the Sacred Scriptures to favour this wicked practice. One would have thought none but infidel cavillers would endeavour to make them appear contrary to the plain dictates of natural light, and Conscience, in a matter of common Justice and Humanity; which they cannot be. Such worthy men, as referred to before, judged otherways; Mr. BAXTER declared, the Slave-Traders should be called Devils, rather than Christians; and that it is a heinous crime to buy them. But some say, “the practice was permitted to the Jews.” To which may be replied, 1. The example of the Jews, in many things, may not be imitated by us; they had not only orders to cut off several nations altogether, but if they were obliged to war with others, and conquered them, to cut off every male; they were suffered to use polygamy and divorces, and other things utterly unlawful to us under clearer light. 2. The plea is, in a great measure, false; they had no permission to catch and enslave people who never injured them. 3. Such arguments ill become us, since the time of reformation came, under Gospel light. All distinctions of nations, and privileges of one above others, are ceased; Christians are taught to account all men their neighbours; and love their neighbours as themselves; and do to all men as they would be done by; to do good to all men; and Man-stealing is ranked with enormous crimes. Is the barbarous enslaving our inoffensive neighbours, and treating them like wild beasts subdued by force, reconcilable with all these Divine precepts? Is this doing to them as we would desire they should do to us? If they could carry off and enslave some thousands of us, would we think it just?—One would almost wish they could for once; it might convince more than Reason, or the Bible. As much in vain, perhaps, will they search ancient history for examples of the modern Slave-Trade. Too many nations enslaved the prisoners they took in war. But to go to nations with whom there is no war, who have no way provoked, without farther design of conquest, purely to catch inoffensive people, like wild beasts, for slaves, is an hight of outrage against Humanity and Justice, that seems left by Heathen nations to be practised by pretended Christians. How shameful are all attempts to colour and excuse it! As these people are not convicted of forfeiting freedom, they have still a natural, perfect right to it; and the Governments whenever they come should, in justice set them free, and punish those who hold them in slavery. So monstrous is the making and keeping them slaves at all, abstracted from the barbarous usage they suffer, and the many evils attending the practice; as selling husbands away from wives, children from parents, and from each other, in violation of sacred and natural ties; and opening the way for adulteries, incests, and many shocking consequences, for all of which the guilty Masters must answer to the final Judge. If the slavery of the parents be unjust, much more is their children’s; if the parents were justly slaves, yet the children are born free; this is the natural, perfect right of all mankind; they are nothing but a just recompense to those who bring them up: And as much less is commonly spent on them than others, they have a right, in justice, to be proportionably sooner free. Certainly one may, with as much reason and decency, plead for murder, robbery, lewdness, and barbarity, as for this practice: They are not more contrary to the natural dictates of Conscience, and feelings of Humanity; nay, they are all comprehended in it. But the chief design of this paper is not to disprove it, which many have sufficiently done; but to entreat Americans to consider. 1. With what consistency, or decency they complain so loudly of attempts to enslave them, while they hold so many hundred thousands in slavery; and annually enslave many thousands more, without any pretence of authority, or claim upon them? 2. How just, how suitable to our crime is the punishment with which Providence threatens us? We have enslaved multitudes, and shed much innocent blood in doing it; and now are threatened with the same. And while other evils are confessed, and bewailed, why not this especially, and publicly; than which no other vice, if all others, has brought so much guilt on the land? 3. Whether, then, all ought not immediately to discontinue and renounce it, with grief and abhorrence? Should not every society bear testimony against it, and account obstinate persisters in it bad men, enemies to their country, and exclude them from fellowship; as they often do for much lesser faults? 4. The great Question may be—What should be done with those who are enslaved already? To turn the old and infirm free, would be injustice and cruelty; they who enjoyed the labours of their better days should keep, and treat them humanely. As to the rest, let prudent men, with the assistance of legislatures, determine what is practicable for masters, and best for them. Perhaps some could give them lands upon reasonable rent, some, employing them in their labour still, might give them some reasonable allowances for it; so as all may have some property, and fruits of their labours at their own disposal, and be encouraged to industry; the family may live together, and enjoy the natural satisfaction of exercising relative affections and duties, with civil protection, and other advantages, like fellow men. Perhaps they might sometime form useful barrier settlements on the frontiers. Thus they may become interested in the public welfare, and assist in promoting it; instead of being dangerous, as now they are, should any enemy promise them a better condition. 5. The past treatment of Africans must naturally fill them with abhorrence of Christians; lead them to think our religion would make them more inhuman savages, if they embraced it; thus the gain of that trade has been pursued in opposition to the Redeemer’s cause, and the happiness of men: Are we not, therefore, bound in duty to him and to them to repair these injuries, as far as possible, by taking some proper measures to instruct, not only the slaves here, but the Africans in their own countries? Primitive Christians laboured always to spread their Divine Religion; and this is equally our duty while there is an Heathen nation: But what singular obligations are we under to these injured people! These are the sentiments of JUSTICE AND HUMANITY. Source: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/paine-the-writings-of-thomas-paine-vol-i-1774-1779#lf0548-01_label_026

LETTER I. OCTOBER 8th, 1787. DEAR SIR, My letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well balanced national government for the United States, were the result of free enquiry; when I passed from that subject to enquiries relative to our commerce, revenues, past administration, &c. anticipated the anxieties I feel, on carefully examining the plan of government proposed by the convention., It appears to be a plan retaining some federal features; but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly to one consolidated government of the United States. It leaves the powers of government, and the representation of the people, so unnaturally divided between the general and state governments, that the operations of our system must be very uncertain. My uniform federal attachments, and the interest I have in the protection of property, and a steady execution of the laws, will convince you, that, if I am under any biass at it, 1 it isin favor of any general system which shall promise those advantages. The instability of our laws increase my wishes for firm and steady government; but then, I can consent to no government, which, in my opinion, is not calculated equally to preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community. My object has been to join with those who have endeavoured to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a steady and proper administration of them. Though I have long apprehended that fraudulent debtors, and embarrassed men, on the one hand, and men, on the other, unfriendly to republican equality, would produce an uneasiness among the people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate reforms in the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the interests of particular orders of men. Acquit me, sir, of any agency in the formation of the new system; I shall be satisfied with seeing, if it should be adopted, a prudent administration. Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope's maxim, that-"That which is best administered is best," that I am much inclined to subscribe to it from experience. I am not disposed to unreasonably contend about forms. I know our situation is critical, and it behoves us to make the best of it. A federal government of some sort is necessary. We have suffered the present to languish; and whether the confederation was capable or not originally of answering any valuable purposes, it is now but of little importance. I will pass by the men, and states, who have been particularly instrumental in preparing the way for a change, and, perhaps, for governments not very favourable to the people at large. A constitution is now presented, which we may reject, or which we may accept, with or without amendments; and to which point we ought to direct our exertions, is the question. To determine this question, with propriety, we must attentively examine the system itself, and the probable consequences of either step. This I shall endeavour to do, so far as I am able, with candour and fairness; and leave you to decide upon the propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how far my conclusions are well drawn. Whatever may be the conduct of others, on the present occasion, I do not mean, hastily and positively to decide on the merits of the constitution proposed. I shall be open to conviction, and always disposed to adopt that which, all things considered, shall appear to me to be most for the happiness of the community. It must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt a system of government, they will as hastily and as blindly be led to alter or abolish it; and changes must ensue, one after another, till the peaceable and better part of the community will grow weary with changes, tumults and disorders, and be disposed to accept any government, however despotic, that shall promise stability and firmness. The first principal question that occurs, is, Whether, considering our situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution? If we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate danger of any commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of invasions; the state governments are in the full exercise of their powers; and our governments answer all present exigencies, regulation of trade, securing credit, in some cases, and providing for the interest, in some instances, of the public debts; and whether we adopt a change, three or nine months hence, can make but little odds with the private circumstances of individuals; their happiness and prosperity, after all, depend principally upon their own exertions. We are hardly recovered from a long and distressing war: The farmers, fish-men, &c. have not yet fully repaired the waste made by it. Industry and frugality are again assuming their proper station. Private debts are lessened, and public debts incurred by the war, have been, by various ways, diminished; and the public lands have now become a productive source for diminishing them much more. I know uneasy men, who wish very much to precipitate, do not admit all these facts; but they are facts well known to all men who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this country. It must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is defective, and that some of the state governments are not well administered; but, then, we impute to the defects in our governments, many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly the result of the late war. We must allow men to conduct on the present occasion, as on all similar one's. They will urge a thousand pretences to answer their purposes on both sides. When we want a man to change his condition, we describe it as miserable, wretched, and despised; and draw a pleasing picture of that which we would have him assume. And when we wish the contrary, we reverse our descriptions. Whenever a clamor is raised, and idle men get to work, it is highly necessary to examine facts carefully, and without unreasonably suspecting men of falshood, to examine, and enquire attentively, under what impressions they act. It is too often the case in political concerns, that men state facts not as they are, but as they wish them to be; and almost every man, by calling to mind past scenes, will find this to be true. Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men, conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if (time should be taken fully to examine and consider the system proposed. Men who feel easy in their circumstances, and such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to the consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet under the existing governments. Many commercial and monied men, who are uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be respected; and, by no means, unreasonably disappointed in their expectations and hopes; but as to those who expect employments under the new constitution; as to those weak and ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions, and whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into another, they are very little to be regarded: and as to those who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, they are to be despised. It is natural for men, who wish to hasten the adoption of a measure, to tell us, now is the crisis-now is the critical moment which must be seized, or all will be lost: and to shut the door against free enquiry, whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time and investigation will probably discover. This has been the custom of tyrants and their dependants in all ages. If it is true, what has been so often said, that the people of this country cannot change their condition for the worse, I presume it still behoves them to endeavour deliberately to change it for the better. The fickle and ardent, in any community, are the proper tools for establishing despotic government. But it is deliberate and thinking men, who must establish and secure governments on free principles. Before they decide on the plan proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably be a blessing or a curse to this people The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs. Our object has been all along, to reform our federal system, and to strengthen our governments-to establish peace, order and justice in the community but - a new object now presents. The plan of government now proposed, is evidently calculated totally to change, in time, our condition as a people. Instead of being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is clearly designed to make us one consolidated government. Of this, I think, I shall fully convince you, in my following letters on this subject. This consolidation of the states has been the object of several men in this country for some time past. Whether such a change can ever be effected in any manner; whether it can be effected without convulsions and civil wars; whether such a change will not totally destroy the liberties of this country-time only can determine. To have a just idea of the government before us, and to shew that a consolidated one is the object in view, it is necessary not only to examine the plan, but also its history, and the politics of its particular friends. The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the respective states; and the framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so limited and checked the powers, that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the exigencies of the union. We find, therefore, members of congress urging alterations in the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted. It was earlyproposed to vest congress with powers to levy an impost, to regulate trade, &c. but such was known to be the caution of the states in parting with power, that the vestment, even of these, was proposed to be under several checks and limitations. During the war, the general confusion, and the introduction of paper money, infused in the minds of people vague ideas respecting government and credit. We expected too much from the return of peace, and of course we have been disappointed. Our governments have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures, by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government; and this very abuse of power in the legislatures, which, in some cases, has been charged upon the democratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and those very means, with which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favourite object. And should an oppressive government be the consequence of the proposed change, posterity may reproach not only a few overbearing, unprincipled men, but those parties in the states which have misused their powers. The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which otherwise they would not have thought of-when by the evils, on the one hand, and by the secret instigations of artful men, on the other, the minds of men were become sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually followed by a revolution, or a civil war. A general convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for the authors of this measure saw that the people's attention was turned solely to the amendment of the federal system; and that, had the idea of a total change been started, probably no state would have appointed members to the convention. The idea of destroying, ultimately, the state government, and forming one consolidated system, could not have been admitted-a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress power to regulate trade, was proposed. This was pleasing to the commercial towns; and the landed people had little or no concern about it. September, 1786, a few men from the middle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a convention to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, of amending the confederation-this was done before the delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived still not a word was said about destroying the old constitution, and making a new one-The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new convention, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the confederation-and, probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United States, till within these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old ship was to be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the new ship presented, or of being left in danger sinking-The States, I believe, universally supposed the convention would report alterations in the confederation, which would pass an examination in congress, and after being agreed to there, would be confirmed by all the legislatures, or be rejected. Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at the head of it the first man in America-In this appointment there was a mixture of political characters; but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who are esteemed aristocratical. Here the favourite moment for changing the government was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with address. Ten other states appointed, and tho' they chose men principally connected with commerce and the judicial department, yet they appointed many good republican characters-had they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded, a better system presented. The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the United States.-Had they attended, I am pretty clear that the result of the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the plan. There would not have been so great an accummulation of powers, especially as to the internal police of the country, in a few hands, as the constitution reported proposes to vest in them-the young visionary men, and the consolidating aristocracy, would have been more restrained than they have been. Eleven states met in the convention, and after four months close attention, presented the new constitution, to be adopted or rejected by the people. The uneasy and fickle part of the community may be prepared to receive any form of government; but, I presume, the enlightened and substantial part will give any constitution, presented for their adoption, a candid and thorough examination: and silence those designing or empty men, who weakly and rashly attempt to precipitate the adoption of a system of so much importance-We shall view the convention with proper respect-and, at the same time, that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity in it, we must recollect how disproportionably the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community were represented-Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to let it rest solely on its own mer-its, or be condemned for its own defects. In the first place, I shall premise, that the plan proposed, is a plan of accommodation-and that it is in this way only, and by giving up a part of our opinions, that we can ever expect to obtain a government foundedin freedom and compact. This circumstance candid men will always keep in view, in the discussion of this subject. The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but principally however, calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government The first interesting question, therefore, suggested, is, how far the states can be consolidated into one entire government on free principles. In considering this question extensive objects are to be taken into view, and important changes in the forms of government to be carefully attended to in all their consequences. The happiness of the people at large must be the great object with every honest statesman, and he will direct every movement to this point. If we are so situated as a people, as not to be able to enjoy equal happiness and advantages under one government, the consolidation of the states cannot be admitted. There are three different forms of free government under which the United States may exist as one nation; and now is, perhaps, the time to determine to which we will direct our views. 1 Distinct republics connected under a federal head. In this case the respective state governments must be the principal guardians of the peoples rights, and exclusively regulate their internal police; in them must rest the balance of government. The congress of the states, or federal head, must consist of delegates amenable to, and removeable by the respective states: This congress must have general directing powers; powers to require men and monies of the states; to make treaties; peace and war; to direct the operations of armies, &c. Under this federal modification of government, the powers of congress would be rather advisary or recommendatory than coercive. 2. We may do away the several state governments, and form or consolidate all the states into one entire government, with one executive, one judiciary, and one legislature, consisting of senators and representatives collected from all parts of the union: In this case there would be a compleat consolidation of the states. 3. We may consolidate the states as to certain national objects, and leave them severally distinct independent republics, as to internal police generally. Let the general government consist of an executive, a judiciary and ballanced legislature, and its powers extend exclusively to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the seas, to commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, peace and war, and to a few internal concerns of the community; to the coin, post-offices, weights and measures, a general plan for the militia, to naturalization, and perhaps to bankruptcies, leaving the internal police of the community, in other respects, exclusively to the state governments; as the administration of justice in all causes arising internally, the laying and collecting of internal taxes, and the formingof the militia according to a general plan prescribed. In this case there would be a compleat consolidation, quoad certain objects only. Touching the first, or federal plan, I do not think much can be said in its favor: The sovereignty of the nation, without coercive and efficient powers to collect the strength of it, cannot always be depended on to answer the purposes of government; and in a congress of representatives of foreign states, there must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture of powers in the same hands. As to the second, or compleat consolidating plan, it deserves to be carefully considered at this time by every American: If it be impracticable - , it is a fatal error to model our governments, directing our views ultimately to it. The third plan, or partial consolidation, is, in my opinion, the only one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this people. I once had some general ideas that the second plan was practicable, but from long attention, and the proceedings of the convention, I am fully satisfied, that this third plan is the only one we can with safety and propriety proceed upon. Making this the standard to point out, with candour and fairness, the parts of the new constitution which appear to be improper, is my object. The convention appears to have proposed the partial consolidation evidently with a view to collect all powers ultimately, in the United States into one entire government; and from its views in this respect, and from the tenacity, of the small states to have an equal vote in the senate, probably originated the greatest defects in the proposed plan. Independant of the opinions of many great authors, that a free elective government cannot be extended over large territories, a few reflections must evince, that one government and general legislation alone never can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs, and opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform system of laws would be unreasonably invaded. The United States contain about a million of square miles, and in half a century will, probably, contain ten millions of people; and from the center to the extremes is about 800 miles. Before we do away the state governments, or adopt measures that will tend to abolish them, and to consolidate the states into one entire government several principles should be considered and facts ascertained-These, and my examination into the essential parts of the proposed plan, I shall pursue in my next. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/federal-farmer-letters-to-the-republican-i-1787-10-8/20130122081119/

29 November 1787 Sir, In my former observations on your speech, to your fellow-citizens, explanatory and defensive of the new constitution; it has appeared, by arguments to my judgment unanswerable, that by ratifying the constitution, as the convention proposed it, the people will leave the liberty of the press, and the trial by jury, in civil cases, to the mercy of their rulers–that the project is to burthen them with enormous taxes, in order to raise and maintain armies, for the purposes of ambition and arbitrary power–that this power is to be vested in an aristocratic senate, who will either be themselves the tyrants, or the support of tyranny, in a president, who will know how to manage them, so as to make that body at once the instrument and the shield of his absolute authority.–Even the Roman Emperors found it necessary to have a senate for this purpose. To compass this object, we have seen powers, in every branch of government, in violation of all principle, and all safety condensed in this aristocratic senate: we have seen the representative, or democratic branch, weakened exactly in proportion to the strengthing the aristocratic, or, what means the same thing, and will be more pleasing to your ear, Mr. Wilson, the republican branch. We have seen with what cunning the power of impeachment is apparently given to the representative of the people, but really to the senate; since, as they advise these measures of government, which experience has shewn, are the general matters of impunity the executive officers will be sure of impeachment when they act in conformity to their will. Impeachment will therefore have no terrors, but for those who displease or oppose the senate. Let us suppose that the privy councils who advise the executive government in England, were vested with the sole power of trying impeachments; would any man say that this would not render that body absolute; and impeachment to all popular purposes, negatory? I shall appeal to those very citizens, Mr. Wilson, whom you was misleading, for the propriety of what I am going to observe. They know that their constitution was democratic–that it secured the powers of government in the body of the people. They have seen an aristocratical party rise up against this constitution, and without the aid of such a senate, but from the mere influence of wealth, however unduly obtained, they have seen this aristocracy, under the orignatical title of republicans, procure such a preference in the legislature, as to appoint a majority of the state members in the late convention, out of their body. Had such a senate, as they have now proposed, been part of your constitution, would the popular part of it, have been in effect more than a name. Can your fellow citizens then doubt that these men planned this senate, to effect the very purpose which has been the constant object of their endeavors, that is to overthrow the present constitution. And can you, O citizens of Philadelphia, so soon forget the constitution which you formed, for which you fought, which you have solemnly engaged to defend–can you so soon forget all this, as to be the willing ministers of that ambition, which aims only at making you its footstool–the confirmers of that constitution, which gives your aristocratic enemies their wish, and must trample your state constitution in the dust. Reflect a moment–who wish to erect an aristocracy among you–Mr. Wilson and his party; who were your delegates in framing the constitution now proposed to you–Mr. Wilson, and his party; who harangues you to smooth its passage to your approbation–Mr. Wilson; who have you chosen to approve of it in your state convention–Mr. Wilson.–O sense where is your guard! shame where is your blush! ... Source: https://www.consource.org/document/brutus-iv-1789-6-8/20160502210715/

(December 6, 1787) Sir, When I stated the monied difficulties, which the new government will have to encounter, my chief object was to prove to our fellow citizens, the delusion into which you have led them in your speech, when you ventured "to predict that the great revenue of the United States, must, and always will be, raised by impost."1 This is not the land, Sir, of second sight; and I have shewn that your prediction, is not founded on any knowledge of the subject. It is one of those numerous deceptions, that are practised upon the people to delude them into the toils that are spread for them by the proposed constitution. To satisfy them more fully on the subject of the revenue, that is to be raised upon them, in order to give enormous fortunes to the jobbers in public securities, I shall lay before them a proposition to Congress, from Mr. Robert Morris, when superintendant of finance. It is dated, I think the 29th of June, 1782, and is in these words:- "The requisition of a five per cent. impost, made on the 3d of February, 1781, has not yet been complied with by the state of Rhode-Island, but as there is reason to believe, that there compliance is not far off, this revenue may be considered as already granted.- It will, however, be very inadequate to the purposes intended. If goods be imported, and prizes introduced to the amount of twelve millions annually, the five per cent. would be six hundred thousand, from which at least one sixth must be deducted, as well for the cost of collection as for the various defalcations which will necessarily happen, and which it is unnecessary to enumerate. It is not safe therefore, to estimate this revenue at more than, half a million of dollars; for though it may produce more, yet probably it will not produce so much. It was in consequence of this, that on the 27th day of February last, I took the liberty to submit the propriety of asking the states for a land tax of one dollar for every hundred acres of land-a poll- tax of one dollar on all freemen, and all male slaves, between sixteen and sixty, excepting such as are in the federal army, or by wounds or otherwise rendered unfit for service; and an excise of one eighth of a dollar [per gallon], on all distilled spiritous liquors. Each of these may be estimated at half a million; and should the product be equal to the estimation, the sum total of revenues for funding the public debts, would be equal to two millions." You will readily perceive, Mr. Wilson, that there is a vast difference between your prediction and your friends proposition. Give me leave to say, Sir, that it was not discreet, in you, to speak upon finance without instructions from this great financier. Since, independent of its delusive effect upon your audience, it may excite his jealousy, lest you should have a secret design of rivalling him in the expected office of superintendant under the new constitution. It is true, there is no real foundation for it; but then you know jealousy makes the food it feeds on. A quarrel between two such able and honest friends to the United States, would, I am persuaded, be felt as a public calamity. I beseech you then to be very tender upon this point in your next harrangue. And if four months study will not furnish you with sufficient descretion, we will indulge you with six. It may be said, that let the government be what it may, the sums I have stated must be raised, and the same difficulties exist. This is not altogether true. For first, we are now in the way of paying the interest of the domestic debt, with paper, which under the new system is utterly reprobated. This makes a difference between the specie to be raised of 1,800,000 dollars per annum. If the new 'government raises this sum in specie on the people, it will certainly support public credit, but it will overwhelm the people. It will give immense fortunes to the speculators; but it will grind the poor to dust. Besides the present government is now redeeming the principal of the domestic debt by the sale of western lands. But let the full interest be paid in specie, and who will part with the principal for those lands. A principal, which having been generally purchased for two shillings and six pence on the pound, will yield to the holders two hundred and forty per cent. This paper system therefore, though in general an evil, is in this instance attended with the great benefit of enabling the public to cancel a debt upon easy terms, which has been swelled to its enormous size, by as enormous impositions. And the new government, by promising too much, will involve itself in a disreputable breech of faith, or in a difficulty of complying with it, insuperable. The present government promises nothing.- The intended government, every thing- From the present government little is expected:- From the intended one, much. Because it is conceived that to the latter much is given- to the former, little. And yet the inability of the people to pay what is required in specie, remaining the same, the funds of the one will not much exceed those of the other. The public creditors are easy with the present government from a conviction of its inability- they will be urgent with the new one from an opinion, that as it promises, so it can and will perform every thing. Whether the change will be for our prosperity and honour, is yet to be tried. Perhaps it will be found, that the supposed want of power in Congress to levy taxes, is at present a veil happily thrown over the inability of the people; and that the large powers given to the new government, will to every eye, expose the nakedness of our land. Certain it is, that if the expectations which are grafted on the gift of these plenary powers, are not answered, our credit will be irretrievably ruined. Once more, Mr. Wilson, be pleased to pardon me for digressing. We come now to your last argument, or rather observation, which is in these terms- That as establishing the new government will- "turn the stream of influence and emolument into a new channel, therefore every person who enjoys or expects to enjoy a place of profit under the present establishment, will object to the proposed innovation, not in truth, because it is injurious to the liberties of his country, but because it affects his schemes of wealth and consequence." This reflection, sir, is as ingenious as it is liberal. It reaches every man who will not worship the new idol. It is the shibboleth of your party. Every man who differs in opinion with you, upon the new constitution, if he is not actually a placeman under the present establishment, may be an expectant; and then, according to your liberal and gentlemanly conclusion, his opinion must be imputed to his pursuit of wealth and consequence. But how could it escape you, that this was a two-edged argument, and might cut its inventor. Perhaps these very violent gentlemen for the new establishment, may be actuated by the same undue motives. Perhaps some of its framers, might have had its honours and emoluments in view. When you have let loose suspicion, Mr. Wilson, there is no knowing where it will end. Perhaps some may be audacious enough to suspect even-you. They may think, that the emoluments of an attorney generalship, or of a chief justice largely provided for, under a government gifted with almost chemic powers to extract gold from the people, might happily repair your shattered fortunes. Let us, Sir, suppose a man fallen from opulence into the most gloomy depths of monied distress, by an unsatiable love of wealth and as unwise a pursuit of it: would not such a man be a fit instrument in the hands of others to agitate the introduction of the new constitution. Such a man would have no objection to the golden speculations which such a constitution holds forth. Such a man, albeit unused to speak without a fee, and a large one too, would deign to harrangue gratis for such an object. His crest would be brightened, his eloquence animated by an anticipation of that happy hour, when he might sail down this new pactolean channel, accompanied by his pathetic Doctor, to sing a requiem to our expired liberties, and chant hallelujahs to his approach- to wealth and consequence. Such a man, Sir, in such a mood, would, as you do, regard the new constitution, in every point of view, with a candid and disinterested mind, and be bold to assert, "that it is the best -form of government which has ever been offered to the world." Such a man as I have painted, you know, Mr. Wilson, is not a fiction. What I have said was not to insult his distresses, but to admonish his discretion. He ought not to have touched ground, on which he, and his swelled superior, who dances him forth to the people, is so very vulnerable. Upon my honor, Sir, I do not know two men in the United States more tender in this point. Permit me then to admonish them, through you, never again to insult the patience of the public with insinuations about the judgment of men on the proposed constitution, being affected by schemes of wealth and consequence. There is one very material power given to the proposed Congress, on which you have thought proper to be silent, and which as not coming within the scope of your speech I have reserved to this place. In the 4th section, it is said- "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of chusing senators." In all our constitutions, the regulation of elections is fixed; not left to the legislature, because it is a fundamental right, in which the essence of liberty resides. It is in fact the root of all rights. Nothing can be plainer than that Congress, under the pretence of regulating, might in various ways annihilate the freedom of elections. If ever the aristocracy should meet with a pliant representative, it will be easy so to regulate the times, places, and manner of holding elections- as to secure the complaisance of future representatives. This power over elections is another proof of a prediction for the senate, and a determination to have a complete controul over the people. It participates precisely of the spirit, which dictated the rendering the power of impeachment nugatory, by the manner in which it is to be executed. Thus too, the right of election, under controul from time to time, in point of manner, times, and places, is but a shadow in the people; while the substance will necessarily reside with those to whom the regulation of it is resigned. But the senate was too sacred to be subjected to this unhallowed touch. The aristocracy is elevated on high, while the democracy is trampled in the dust. If the people can indeed be deluded into such a surrender of their most sacred rights; it must arise from the precipitation with which they are called upon to decide. Still, however, I trust, that they will have discernment to discover the parts which are incompatible with their rights and liberties, and spirit to insist upon those parts being amended. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/cincinnatus-vi-to-james-wilson-esquire-1789-9-26/20130122081351/

(November 22, 1787) Sir, The public appear to me, sir, to be much indebted to you, for informing them; for what purpose a power was given by the proposed Constitution, of raising and supporting armies.- Some, indeed, might have suspected, that such a power, uncontrouled by any declaration, that the military should always be subject to the civil power, might be intended for the purposes of ambition. Your declaration has removed all doubt. Every principle of policy, you say, would be subverted unless we kept up armies-for what-for our defence?-no,- to support declarations of war-to strike home, with dispatch and secrecy, before the enemy can be apprized of your intention. Upon the same principle a small army would be rediculous. Nothing less than the Prussian number, about 200,000 men would embrace this salutary object. And as you now say- "no man that regards the dignity and safety of his country can deny the necessity of a military force."- You will next affirm, that no one, for the same reason, can deny the necessity of a large army. The safety of the country, we have already experienced to depend, upon the militia. Switzerland has often experienced the same. Why then, sir, should you be so very positive, that for this purpose a military force is necessary?- But for the dignity of the country, that is for the ambition of its rulers, armies I confess are necessary; and not less in number than other ambitious rulers maintain, by grinding the face of the people. For every thousand in these armies a million of dollars must be levied upon the public, and such armies raised and supported, would at once maintain the dignity of government, and ensure the submission of the people. We shall be as dignified as the Turks, and equally free.- The sole power of voting men, and money, is retained by the representative of the people in England. This is their shield and their defence against arbitrary power. Never has the King been able to obtain the extension of this vote beyond a year. But we are called upon, with all the solemnity of a constitutional act, to give it up for two years. And yet, sir, you talk of the controul and the restrictions which the new Constitution provides. There is, I confess, some dexterity in the negative terms in which this power is conceived—not more than two years. But what the Constitution permits, and what it grants are essentially the same. And since it seemed necessary to this almost all confiding Convention, to limit our confidence in this particular, the only rule that observation suggests is, that of England; where this confidence has never exceeded one year. I come now, sir, to the most exceptionable part of the Constitution— the senate. In this, as in every other part, you are in the line of your profession, and on that ground assure your fellow citizens, that-"perhaps there never was a charge made with less reason, than that which predicts the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the Fœderal Senate." And yet your conscience smote you, sir, at the beginning, and compelled you to prefix a perhaps to this strange assertion. The senate, you say, branches into two characters- the one legislative and the other executive. This phraseology is quaint, and the position does not state the whole truth. I am very sorry, sir, to be so often obliged to reprehend the suppression of information at the moment that you stood forth to instruct your fellow citizens, in what they were supposed not to understand. In this character, you should have abandoned your professional line, and told them, not only the truth, but the whole truth. The whole truth then is, that the same body, called the senate, is vested with- legislative-executive-and judicial powers. The two first you acknowlege; the last is conveyed in these words, sec. 3d. The senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. On this point then we are to come to issue-whether a senate so constituted is likely to produce a baneful aristocracy, which will swallow up the democratic rights and liberties of the nation. To judge on this question, it is proper to examine minutely into the constitution and powers of the senate; and we shall then see with what anxious and subtle cunning it is calculated for the proposed purpose. 1st. It is removed from the people, being chosen by the legislatures-and exactly in the ratio of their removal from the people, do aristocratic principles constantly infect the minds of man. 2d. They endure, two thirds for four, and one-third for six years, and in proportion to the duration of power, the aristocratic exercise of it, and attempts to extend it, are invariably observed to increase. 3d. From the union of the executive with the legislative functions, they must necessarily be longer together, or rather constantly assembled; and in proportion to their continuance together, will they be able to form effectual schemes for extending their own power, and reducing that of the democratic branch. If anyone would wish to see this more fully illustrated, let him turn to the history of the Decemviri in Rome. 4th. Their advice and consent being necessary to the appointment of all the great officers of state, both at home and abroad, will enable them to win over any opponents to their measures in the house representatives, and give them the influence which, we see, accompanies this power in England; and which, from the nature of man, must follow it everywhere. 5th. The sole power of impeachment being vested in them, they have it in their power to controul the representative in this high democratic right; to screen from punishment, or rather from conviction, all high offenders, being their creatures, and to keep in awe all opponents to their power in high office .6th. The union established between them and the vice president, who is made one of the corps, and will therefore be highly animated with the aristocratic spirit of it, furnishes them a powerful shield against popular suspicion and enquiry, he being the second man in the United States who stands highest in the confidence and estimation of the people. And lastly, the right of altering or amending money-bills, is a high additional power given them as a branch of the legislature, which their analogous branch, in the English parliament, could never obtain, because it has been guarded by the representatives of the people there, with the most strenuous solicitude as one of the vital principles of democratic liberty. Is a body so vested with means to soften & seduce-so armed with power to screen or to condemn-so fortified against suspicion and enquiry- so largely trusted with legislative powers- so independent of and removed from the people- so tempted to abuse and extend these powers-is this a body which freemen ought ever to create, or which freemen can ever endure? Or is it not a monster in the political creation, which we ought to regard with horror? Shall we thus forge our own fetters? Shall we set up the idol, before which we shall soon be obliged, however, reluctantly to bow? Shall we consent to see a proud aristocracy erect his domineering crest in triumph over our prostrate liberties? But we shall yet see more clearly, how highly favored this senate has been, by taking a similar view of the representative body. This body is the true representative of the democratic part of the system; the shield and defence of the people. This body should have weight from its members, and the high controul which it should alone possess. We can form no idea of the necessary number in this untried system, to give due weight to the democratic part, but from the example of England. Had it not been intended to humble this branch, it would have been fixed, at least, at their standard. We are to have one representative for every thirty thousand-they have nearly one for ten thousand souls. Their number is about six millions; their representatives five hundred and fifteen. When we are six millions, we shall have only two hundred representatives. In point of number therefore and the weight derived from it, the representative proposed by the constitution is remarkably feeble. It is farther weakened by the senate being allowed not only to reject, but to alter and amend money-bills. Its transcendent and incommunicable power of impeachment-that high source of its dignity and controul-in which alone the majesty of the people feels his sceptre, and bears aloft his fasces-is rendered ineffectual, by its being triable before its rival branch, the senate, the patron and prompter of the measures against which it is to sit in judgment. It is therefore most manifest, that from the very nature of the constitution the right of impeachment apparently given, is really rendered ineffectual. And this is contrived with so much art, that to discover it you must bring together various and distant parts of the constitution, or it will not strike the examiner, that the same body that advises the executive measures of government which are usually the subject of impeachment, are the sole judges on such impeachments. They must therefore be both party and judge, and must condemn those who have executed what they advised. Could such a monstrous absurd- ity have escaped men who were not determined, at all events, to vest all power in this aristocratic body? Is it not plain, that the senate is to be exalted by the humiliation of the democracy. A democracy which, thus bereft of its powers, and shorn of its strength; will stand a melancholy monument of popular impotence. Hitherto I have examined your senate by its intrinsic and its comparative powers. Let us next examine, how far the principles of its constitution are compatible with what our own constitutions lay down, and what the best writers on the subject have determined to be essential to free and good government. In every state constitution, with a very trifling exception in that of Massachusetts, the legislative and executive powers are vested in different and independent bodies- Will anyone believe, that it is because we are become wiser, that in twelve years we are to overthrow every system which reason and experience taught us was right. Or is it, that a few men, forming plan at Philadelphia subversive of all former principles, then posting to Congress, and passing it there, and next dispersing themselves in the several states to propagate their errors, and, if they can, get chosen into the state conventions; are actuated by motives of interest and bad ambition? should be very unwilling to believe the latter, and yet it is utterly incomprehensible, how such a systematic violation-of all that has been deemed wise and right, from which no other result can be expected, but the establishment of a baneful aristocracy, could have been recommended to a free and enlightened people. "Lorsque dans la meme personne, says Montesquieu, ou dans le meme corps de magistrature, la puissance legislative est re-unie a la puissance executive; il n'y a point de liberte; parce qu'on peut craindre que le meme monarque, ou le meme Senat ne fasse des loix tyranniques, pour les executer tyranniquement." "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same corps, there can be no liberty. Because, it may be feared, that the same monarch or senate will make tyrannical laws, that they may execute them tyrannically." I am aware that this great man is speaking of a senate being the whole legislative; whereas the one before us is but a branch of the proposed legislature. But still the reason applies, inasmuch as the legislative power of the senate will enable it to negative all bills that are meant to controul the executive, and from being secure of preventing any abridgment, they can watch every pliant hour of the representative body to promote an enlargement of the executive powers. One thing at least is certain, that by making this branch of the legislature participant in the executive, you not only prevent the legislature from being a check upon the executive, but you inevitably prevent its being checked or controuled by the other branch. To the authority of Montesquieu, I shall add that of Mr. de Lolme; whose disquisition on government, is allowed to be deep, solid, and ingenious. "II ne suffisoit pas, says de, d'oter aux legislateurs 'execution des loix, par consequent, l'exemption qui en est la suite immediate; il falloit encore, leur oter ce qui eut produit les memes effects l'espoir de jamais se l'attribuer- It is not only necessary to take from the legislature the executive power which would exempt them from the laws; but they should not have even a hope of being ever able to arrogate to themselves that power." To remove this hope from their expectation, it would have been proper, not only to have previously laid down, in a declaration of rights, that these powers should be forever separate and incommunicable; but the frame of the proposed constitution, should have had that separation religiously in view, through all its parts. It is manifest this was not the object of its framers, but, that on the contrary there is a studied mixture of them in the senate as necessary to erect it into that potent aristocracy which it must infallibly produce. In pursuit of this darling object, than which no greater calamity can be brought upon the people, another egregious error in constitutional principles is committed. I mean that of dividing the executive powers, between the senate and the president. Unless more harmony and less ambition should exist between these two executives than ever yet existed between men in power, or than can exist while human nature is as it is: this absurd division must be productive of constant contentions for the lead, must clog the execution of government to a mischievous, and sometimes to a disgraceful degree, and if they should unhappily harmonize in the same objects of ambition, their number and their combined power, would preclude all fear of that responsibility, which is one of the great securities of good, and restraints on bad governments. Upon these principles M. de Lolme has foreseen that "the effect of a division of the executive power is the establishment of absolute power in one of continual contention"; he therefore lays it down, as a general rule "pour q'un etat soit tranquille il faut que le pouvoir executif y soit reunie"-for the tranquillity of the state it is necessary that the executive power should be in one. I will add, that this singlehood of the executive, is indispensably necessary to effective execution as well as to the responsibility and rectitude of him to whom it is entrusted. By this time I hope it is evident from reason and authority, that in the constitution of the senate there is much cunning and little wisdom; that we have much to fear from it, and little to hope, and then it must necessarily produce a baneful aristocracy, by which the democratic rights of the people will be overwhelmed. It was probably upon this principle that a member of the convention, of high and unexceeded reputation for wisdom and integrity, is said to have emphatically declared, that he would sooner lose his right hand than put his name to such a Constitution. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/cincinnatus-iv-to-james-wilson-esquire-1789-9-14/20130122082653/

(November 15, 1787) Sir, Your speech has varnished an iron trap, bated with some illustrious names, to catch the liberties of the people. And this you are pleased to call a constitution-"the best form of government that was ever offered to the world." May Heaven then have mercy on the world and on us. And in this prayer, I am persuaded, you will join me when you come to consider temperately, the unbounded powers given to this best of all possible governments; and then recollect, from your reading, what horrible abuses have grown from too unlimited confidence of the people in their rulers. It is always both easier and safer, to add to powers, which are found to be insufficient, than to recall those which are injuriously large. This is a maxim, which no people, who mean to be free, should ever forget. While the people have something to give, they will be respected by their rulers. When with Cappadocian baseness, they resign all at once, they will be deemed fit only to be hewers of wood and drawers of water. In my former papers, I have shewn, that the freedom of the press is left at the mercy of the proposed government- that the sacred trial by jury, in civil cases, is at best doubtful; and in all cases of appeal expressly taken away. In equal insecurity, or rather equally at mercy, are we left as to- liberty of conscience. We find nothing that regards it, except the following;- "but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." This exception implies, and necessarily implies, that in all other cases whatever liberty of conscience may be regulated. For, though no such power is expressly given, yet it is plainly meant to be included in the general powers, or else this exception would have been totally unnecessary- For why should it be said, that no religious test should be required as a qualification for office, if no power was given or intended to be given to impose a religious test of any kind?1 Upon the omission of the trial by jury in civil cases, you observe- "when this subject was in discussion, we were involved in difficulties which pressed on all sides, and no precedent could be discovered to direct our course. The cases open to trial by jury differed in the different states, it was therefore impracticable on that ground to have made a general rule."- So, because the extent of the trial by jury varied in the different states, therefore it was proper to abolish it in all. For what else can your words- "it was impracticable to have made a general rule" mean?- If ever the rule is made, it must be general. And if this is impracticable-it surely follows, that in the fœderal court we must go without it in civil cases. What sense is there in supposing, that what, for the reasons you alledge, was impracticable with the Convention, will be practicable with the Congress? What faculty can the one body have more than the other, reconciling contradictions? But the sophistry of this excuse consists in the word made-make you might not, but surely nothing hindered your proposing the general rule, which, approved by the several state Conventions, would make the rule. You have made nothing. You have only proposed. It rests with the several conventions, to make your propositions, rules. It is not possible to say, that the Convention could not have proposed, that there should be one similar general mode of trial by jury in the Fœderal court in all cases whatever. If the states would not have acceded to the proposition, we should only be where we are. And that this trial by jury is best, even in courts where the civil law process now prevails, I think no unbigoted man can doubt. Judge Blackstone is so explicit on this head, that I need only quote him to enforce conviction on every unprejudiced mind.- "This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice from the civil law; where a witness may frequently depose that in private which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal. Where an artful or careless scribe may make a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing up his depositions in his own forms and language; but he is here at liberty to correct and explain his meaning, misunderstood, which he can never do after a written deposition is once taken. Besides the occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a formal set of interrogatories previously penned and settled; and the confronting of adverse witnesses is also another opportunity of obtaining a clear discovery, which can never be had on any other method of trial. Nor is the presence of the judge, during the examination, a matter of small importance; for besides the respect, &c. with which his presence will naturally inspire the witness, he is able by use and experience to keep the evidence from wandering from the point in issue. In short, by this method examination, and this only, the persons who are to decide upon the evidence, have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness; in which points all persons must appear alike, when their depositions are reduced to writing and read to the judge, in the absence of those who made them; and yet as much may be frequently collected from the manner in which the evidence is delivered as from the matter of it. These are a few of the advantages attending this way of giving testimony oretenus; which was also, indeed, familiar among the ancient Romans." They who applaud the practice of civil law courts, must either have seen very little of such practice not to know that it is liable to infinite fraud, corruption, and oppression. As far as it prevails in the English system of jurisprudence, from which we derive ours, it is a remnant of ecclesiastical tyranny. The free and pure part of the system, that is the common law courts, have ever cautiously guarded against its encroachments, and restrained its operation. All great judges have reprobated it, except Lord Mansfield. He indeed, has been as desirious of extending it in England, as he was of extending parliamentary power into America; and with the same view- to establish tyranny. This noble Lord's principles, if we may judge from the proposed constitution, has too many admirers in America. But I shall be told, that almost all the nations in Europe have adopted the civil law. This is true; and it is equally true, that almost all European nations have adopted arbitrary power with the civil law. This ought to be a warning to us how we admit it, even as England has done. It would never have been admitted there, but from the ecclesiastical influence in the days of superstition. This, thank Heaven, is now no more; and I sincerely wish its offspring was also extinct. I have been thus particular on the subject of civil law, to shew how little propriety there was in leaving it upon as respectable a foot, as the common law, in civil cases. In fact, the constitution leaves them both to shift for themselves, in original process, and in appeal seems to favor the former by placing both law and fact, in the arbitrament of the judges. Upon standing armies, sir, your professional dexterity has not abandoned you. The Constitution proposes to give the power of raising and supporting armies and this- without any limitation as to number; and to appropriate money to that object for two years at a time. This you justify by saying, that you "do not know a nation in the world which has not found it necessary and useful to maintain the appearance of strength, in a season of profound tranquility:" your knowledge then, sir, has not extended to free nations.2 Your phraseology, it is true, is somewhat equivocal; but unless by the term, appearance of strength, we understand, a standing army, we must suppose you to have meant a disingenuous evasion. Your reading might have informed you, sir- that the Grecian republics, while free, never kept up any standing army that the Roman republic, while free, never kept up a standing army, but that with them, a standing army and tyranny were co-eval, and concomitant-that in the free Swiss Cantons, no standing army, was ever, or is now permitted; no, sir, in all these great and glorious republics, though surrounded with enemies, their military array was occasional, or at the utmost, annual; nor was there formerly, nor is there now, in the Swiss Cantons, anymore appearance of strength kept up in time of peace, than their militia gives: and yet they are free and formidable. You say a standing army has always been, "a topic of popular declamation." Is it indeed nothing more, sir? Is that which all free nations have studiously avoided, as the rock on which their liberties would suffer shipwreck; that which in fact, is the source and security of tyranny; that which all great political writers concur in condemning; that which has animated the ardor, and inflamed the eloquence of the first orators in the two houses of parliament, in Great-Britain-that which all the art and influence of the crown could never obtain from the people for more than a year-is all that, sir, nothing more than a topic of popular declamation? Is it surprising, that such knowledge, and such sentiments, as this declaration holds out, should have given us such a constitution? But the weightiest reason is, that without a standing army, "the government must declare war, before they are prepared to carry it on." This is without question a most warlike paragraph: whether we are to invade Great-Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, or all together, under the new constitution, and with the standing army it has given, you have not been pleased to inform us. To do this, a navy too will be necessary, and I see no provision for that: however, I suppose that, as well as every thing else, is included in the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing, and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Let then the people rightly understand, that one blessing of the constitution will be, the taxing them to support fleets and armies to conquer other nations, against whom the ambition of their new rulers may declare war. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/cincinnatus-iii-to-james-wilson-esquire-1787-11-15/20160502194212/

(November 8, 1787) Sir, I have proved, sir, that not only some power is given in the constitution to restrain, and even to subject the press, but that it is a power totally unlimited; and may certainly annihilate the freedom of the press, and convert it from being the palladium of liberty to become an engine of imposition and tyranny. It is an easy step from restraining the press to making it place the worst actions of government in so favorable a light, that we may groan under tyranny and oppression without knowing from whence it comes. But you comfort us by saying,-"there is no reason to suspect so popular a privilege will be neglected." The wolf, in the fable, said as much to the sheep, when he was persuading them to trust him as their protector, and to dismiss their guardian dogs. Do you indeed suppose, Mr. Wilson, that if the people give up their privileges to these new rulers they will render them back again to the people? Indeed, sir, you should not trifle upon a question so serious-You would not have us to suspect any ill. If we throw away suspicion-to be sure, the thing will go smoothly enough, and we shall deserve to continue a free, respectable, and happy people. Suspicion shackles rulers and prevents good government. All great and honest politicians, like yourself have reprobated it. Lord Mansfield is a great authority against it, and has often treated it as the worst of libels. But such men as Milton, Sidney, Locke, Montesquieu, and Trenchard, have thought it essential to the preservation of liberty against the artful and persevering encroachments of those with whom power is trusted. You will pardon me, sir, if I pay some respect to these opinions, and wish that the freedom of the press may be previously secured as a constitutional and unalienable right, and not left to the precarious care of popular privileges which may or may not influence our new rulers.2 You are fond of, and happy at, quaint expressions of this kind in your observation-that a formal declaration would have done harm, by implying, that some degree of power was given when we undertook to define its extent. This thought has really a brilliancy in it of the first water. But permit me, sir, to ask, why any saving clause was admitted into this constitution, when you tell us, every thing is reserved that is not expressly given? Why is it said in sec. 9th, "The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress, prior to the year, 1808." There is no power expressly given to the Congress to prohibit migrations and importations. By your doctrine then they could have none, and it was, according to your own position, nugatory to declare they should not do it. Which are we to believe, sir-you or the constitution? The text, or the comment. If the former, we must be persuaded, that in the contemplation of the framers of the constitution implied powers were given, otherwise the exception would have been an absurdity. If we listen to you we must affirm it to be a distinctive characteristic of the constitution, that-"what is not expressly given is reserved." Such are the inconsistences into which men over ingenuous, like yourself, are betrayed in advocating bad cause. Perhaps four months more consideration of the subject, would have rendered you more guarded. I come now to the consideration of the trial by jury in civil cases. And here you have, indeed, made use of your professional knowledge-But you did not tell the people that your profession was always to advocate one side of a question-to place it in the most favorable, though false, light-to rail where you could not reason-to pervert where you could not refute-and to practice every fallacy on your hearers-to mislead the understanding and pervert judgment. In right of this professional practice, you make a refutable objection of your own, and then triumphantly refute it. The objection you impute to your opponents is-the trial by jury is abolished in civil cases. This you call a disingenuous form-and truly it is very much so on your part and of your own fabrication. The objection in its true form is, that-trial by jury is not secured in civil cases. To this objection, you could not possibly give an answer; you therefore ingenuously coined one to which you could make a plausible reply. We expected, and we had a right to expect, that such an inestimable privilege as this would have been secured-that it would not have been less dependent on the arbitrary exposition of future judges, who, when it may suit the arbitrary views of the ruling powers will explain it away at pleasure. We may expect Tressellians, Jeffrees's, and Mansfield's here, and if they should not be native with us, they may possibly be imported. But, if taken even on your own ground it is not so clearly tenable. In point of legal construction, the trial by jury does seem to be taken away in civil cases. It is a law maxim, that the expression of one part is an exclusion of the other. In legal construction therefore, the reservation of trial by jury in criminal, is an exclusion of it in civil cases. Why else should it be mentioned all? Either it followed of course in both cases, or it depended on being stipulated. If the first, then the stipulation was nugatory-if the latter, then it was in part given up. Therefore, either we must suppose the Convention did a nugatory thing; or that by the express mention of jury in criminal, they meant to exclude it in civil cases. And that they did intend to exclude it, seems the more probable, as in the appeal they have taken special care to render the trial by jury of no effect by expressly making the court judges both of law and fact. And though this is subjected to the future regulation of Congress, yet it would be absurd to suppose, that the regulation meant its annihilation. We must therefore conclude, that in appeals the trial by jury is expressly taken away, and in original process it is by legal implication taken away in all civil cases. Here then I must repeat-that you ought to have stated fairly to the people, that the trial by jury was not secured; that they might know what, it was they were to consent to; and if knowing it, they consented, the blame could not fall on you.3 Before they decide, however, I will take leave to lay before them the opinion of that great and revered Judge Lord Camden, whose authority is, I hope, at least equal to that of Mr. Wilson.-"There is, says he, scarce any matter of challenge allowed to the judge, but several to the jurors, and many of them may be removed without any reason alledged. This seems to promise as much impartiality as human nature will admit, and absolute perfection is not attainable, I am afraid, either in judge or jury or any thing else. The trial by our country, is in my opinion, the great bulwark of freedom, and for certain, the admiration of all foreign writers and nations. The last writer of any distinguished note, upon the principles of government, the celebrated Montesquieu, is in raptures with this peculiar perfection in the English policy. From juries running riot, if I may say so, and acting wildly at particular seasons, I cannot conclude, like some Scottish Doctors of our law and constitutions, that their power should be lessened. This would, to use the words of the wise, learned, and intrepid Lord Chief Justice Vaughan, be-a strange newfangled conclusion, after a trial so celebrated for so many hundreds of years." Such are the opinions of Lord Camden and Vaughan, and multitudes of the first names, both English and other foreigners might be cited, who bestow unbounded approbation on this best of all human modes for protecting, life, liberty, and property. I own then, it alarms me, when I see these Doctors of our constitutions cutting in twain this sacred shield of public liberty and justice. Surely my countrymen will think a little before they resign this strong hold of freedom. Our state constitutions have held it sacred in all its parts. They have anxiously secured it. But that these may not shield it from the intended destruction in the new constitution, it is therein as anxiously provided, that "this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof; or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme laws of the land; and the judges in every state, shall be bound thereby; any thing in the constitution and laws of any state, to the contrary notwithstanding." Thus this new system, with one sweeping clause, bears down every constitution in the union, and establishes its arbitrary doctrines, supreme and paramount to all the bills and declarations of rights, in which we vainly put our trust, and on which we rested the security of our often declared, unalienable liberties. But I trust the whole people of this country, will unite, in crying out, as did our sturdy ancestors of old-Nolumus leges anglicae mutari.-We will not part with our birthright. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/cincinnatus-ii-to-james-wilson-esquire-1787-11-8/20130122080747/

(November 1, 1787) MR. GREENLEAF, A speech made to the citizens of Philadelphia, and said to be by Mr. WILSON, appears to me to abound with sophistry, so dangerous, as to require refutation. If we adopt the new Constitution, let us at least understand it. Whether it deserves adoption or not, we can only determine by a full examination of it, so as clearly to discern what it is that we are so loudly, I had almost said, indecently called upon to receive. Such an examination is the object of the papers which I am to entreat you to lay before the public, in answer to Mr. Wilson, and under the signature of -Cincinnatus. Sir, You have had the graciousness, Sir, to come forward as the defender and panegyrist of the plan of a new Constitution, of which you was one of the framers. If the defence you have thought proper to setup, and the explanations you have been pleased to give, should be found, upon a full and fair examination, to be fallacious or inadequate; I am not without hope, that candor, of which no gentleman talks more, will render you a convert to the opinion, that some material parts of the proposed Constitution are so constructed-that a monstrous aristocracy springing from it, must necessarily swallow up the democratic rights of the union, and sacrifice the liberties of the people to the power and domination of a few. If your defence of this new plan of power, has, as you say, been matured by four months constant meditation upon it, and is yet so very weak, as I trust will appear, men will begin to think, that-the thing itself is indefensible. Upon a subject so momentous, the public has a right to the sentiments of every individual that will reason: I therefore do not think any apology necessary for appearing in print; and I hope to avoid, at least, the indiscriminate censure which you have, with so much candor and liberality, thrown on those who will not worship your idol-"that they are industriously endeavouring to prevent and destroy it, by insidious and clandestine attempts." Give me leave just to suggest, that perhaps these clandestine attempts might have been owing to the terror of your mob, which so nobly endeavoured to prevent all freedom of action and of speech. The reptile Doctor who was employed to blow the trumpet of persecution, would have answered the public reasoning o fan opponent, by hounding on him the rage of a deluded populace. It was to such men, and under such impressions, that you made the speech which I am now to examine; no wonder then that it was received with loud and unanimous testamonies of their approbation. They were vociferating through you the panegyric of their own intemperate opinions. Your first attempt is to apologize for so very obvious a defect as-the omission of a declaration of rights. This apology consists in a very ingenious discovery; that in the state constitutions, whatever is not reserved is given; but in the congressional constitution, whatever is not given, is reserved. This has more the quaintness of a conundrum, than the dignity of an argument The conventions that made the state and the general constitutions, sprang from the same source, were delegated for the same purpose-that is, for framing rules by which we should be governed, and ascertaining those powers which it was necessary to vest in our rulers. Where then is this distinction to be found, but in your assumption? Is it in the powers given to the members of convention? no-Is it in the constitution? not a word of it:-And yet on this play of words, this dictum of yours, this distinction without a difference, you would persuade us to rest our most essential rights. I trust, however, that the good sense of this free people cannot be so easily imposed on by professional figments. The confederation, in its very outset, declares-that what is not expressly given, is reserved. This constitution makes no such reservation. The presumption therefore is, that the framers of the proposed constitution, did not mean to subject it to the same exception. You instance, Sir, the liberty of the press; which you would persuade us, is in no danger, though not secured, because there is no express power granted to regulate literary publications. But you surely know, Sir, that where general powers are expressly granted, the particular ones comprehended within them, must also be granted. For instance, the proposed Congress are empowered-to define and punish offences against the law of nations-mark well, Sir, if you please-to define and punish. Will you, will anyone say, can anyone even think that does not comprehend power to define and declare all publications from the press against the conduct of government, in making treaties, or in any other foreign transactions, an offence against the law of nations? If there should ever be an influential president, or arbitrary senate, who do not choose that their transactions with foreign powers should be discussed or examined in the public prints, they will easily find pretexts to prevail upon the other branch to concur with them, in restraining what it may please them to call-the licentiousness of the press. And this may be, even without the concurrence of the representative of the people; because the president and senate are empowered to make treaties, and these treaties are declared the supreme law of the land. What use they will make of this power, is not now the question. Certain it is, that such power is given, and that power is not restrained by any declaration-that the liberty of the press, which even you term, the sacred palladium of national freedom, shall be forever free and inviolable. I have proved that the power restraining the press, is necessarily involved in the unlimited power of defining offences, or of making treaties, which are to be the supreme law of the land. You acknowledge, that it is not expressly excepted, and consequently it is at the mercy of the powers to be created by this constitution. Let us suppose then, that what has happened, may happen again: That a patriotic printer, like Peter Zenger, should incur the resentment of our new rulers, by publishing to the world, transactions which they wish to conceal If he should be prosecuted, if his judges should be as desirous of punishing him, at all events, as the judges were to punish Peter Zenger, what would his innocence or his virtue avail him? This constitution is so admirably framed for tyranny, that, by clear construction, the judges might put the verdict of a jury out of the question.6 Among7 the cases in which the court is to have appellate jurisdiction, are-controversies, to which the United States are a party:-In this appellate jurisdiction, the judges are to determine, both law and fact. That is, the court is both judge and jury. The attorney general then would have only to move a question of law in the court below, to ground an appeal to the supreme judicature, and the printer would be delivered up to the mercy of his judges.8 Peter Zenger's case will teach us, what mercy he might expect. Thus, if the president, vice-president, or any officer, or favorite of state, should be censured in print, he might effectually deprive the printer, or author, of his trial by jury, and subject him to something, that will probably very much resemble the-Star Chamber of former times. The freedom of the press, the sacred palladium of public liberty, would be pulled down;-all useful knowledge on the conduct of government would be withheld from the people-the press would become subservient to the purposes of bad and arbitrary rulers, and imposition, not information, would be its object. The printers would do well, to publish the proceedings of the judges, in Peter Zenger's case-they would do well to publish lord Mansfield's conduct in, the King against Woodfall;-that the public mind may be properly warned of the consequences of agreeing to a constitution, which provides no security for the freedom of the press, and leaves it controversial least-whether in matter of libels against any of our intended rulers; the printer would even have the security of trial by jury. Yet it was the jury only, that saved Zenger, it was a jury only, that saved Woodfall, it can only be a jury that will save any future printer from the fangs of power. Had you, Mr. Wilson, who are so unmerciful against what you are pleased to call, the disingenuous conduct of those who dislike the constitution; had you been ingenuous enough to have stated this fairly to our fellow citizens; had you said to them-gentlemen, it is true, that the freedom of the press is not provided for; it is true, that it may be restrained at pleasure, by our proposed rulers; it is true, that a printer sued for a libel, would not be tried by a jury; all this is true, nay, worse than this is also true; but then it is all necessary to what I think, the best form of government that has ever been offered the world. To have stated these truths, would at least have been acting like an honest man; and if it did not procure you such unanimous testimonies approbation, what you would have received, would have been merited. But you choose to shew our fellow citizens, nothing but what would flatter and mislead them. You exhibited, that by a rush-light only, which, to dissipate its darkness, required the full force of the meridian sun. When the people are fully apprized of the chains you have prepared for them, if they choose to put them on, you have nothing to answer for. If they choose to be tenants at will of their liberties, by the new constitution; instead of having their freehold in them, secured by a declaration of rights; I can only lament it. There was a time, when our fellow citizens were told, in the words of Sir Edward Coke-For a man tobe tenant at will of his liberty, I can never agree to it-Etiam si Dominus non sit molestus, tamen miserremum est, posse, se vebit-Though a despot may not act tyrannically; yet it is dreadful to think, that if he will, he may. Perhaps you may also remember, Sir, that our fellow citizens were then warned against those-"smooth words, with which the most dreadful designs may be glossed over." You have given us a lively comment on your own text. You have varnished over the iron trap that is prepared, and bated with some illustrious names, to catch the liberties of the people. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/cincinnatus-i-to-james-wilson-esquire-1787-11-1/20130122082243/

George Mason’s Objections to the Constitution of Government formed by the Philadelphia Convention 1. There is no Declaration of Rights, and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and constitution of the several States, the Declarations of Rights in the separate States are no security. Nor are the people secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law. 2. In the House of Representatives there is not the substance but the shadow only of representation; which can never produce proper information in the legislature, or inspire confidence in the people; the laws will therefore be generally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with their effects and consequences. 3. The Senate have the power of altering all money bills, and of originating appropriations of money, and the salaries of the officers of their own appointment, in conjunction with the president of the United States, although they are not the representatives of the people or amenable to them. 4. These with their other great powers, viz.: their power in the appointment of ambassadors and all public officers, in making treaties, and in trying all impeachments, their influence upon and connection with the supreme Executive from these causes, their duration of office and their being a constantly existing body, almost continually sitting, joined with their being one complete branch of the legislature, will destroy any balance in the government, and enable them to accomplish what usurpations they please upon the rights and liberties of the people. 5. The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England, and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor. 6. The President of the United States has no Constitutional Council, a thing unknown in any safe and regular government. He will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favorites; or he will become a tool to the Senate--or a Council of State will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments; the worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for such a Council in a free country; From this fatal defect has arisen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment of public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between that branch of the legislature and the supreme Executive. 7. Hence also spurring that unnecessary officer the Vice- President, who for want of other employment is made president of the Senate, thereby dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers, besides always giving to some one of the States an unnecessary and unjust pre-eminence over the others. 8. The President of the United States has the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason, which may be sometimes exercised to screen from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt. 9. By declaring all treaties supreme laws of the land, the Executive and the Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legislation; which might have been avoided by proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of Representatives, where it could be done with safety. 10. By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and navigation laws, the five Southern States, whose produce and circumstances are totally different from that of the eight Northern and Eastern States, may be ruined, for such rigid and premature regulations may be made as will enable the merchants of the Northern and Eastern States not only to demand an exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the commodities at their own price, for many years, to the great injury of the landed interest, and impoverishment of the people; and the danger is the greater as the gain on one side will be in proportion to the loss on the other. Whereas requiring two-thirds of the members present in both Houses would have produced mutual moderation, promoted the general interest, and removed an insuperable objection to the adoption of this government. 11. Under their own construction of the general clause, at the end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe punishments, and extend their powers as far as they shall think proper; so that the State legislatures have no security for the powers now presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights. 12. There is no declaration of any kind, for preserving the liberty of the press, or the trial by jury in civil causes; nor against the danger of standing armies in time of peace. 13. The State legislatures are restrained from laying export duties on their own produce. 14. Both the general legislature and the State legislature are expressly prohibited making ex post facto laws; though there never was nor can be a legislature but must and will make such laws, when necessity and the public safety require them; which will hereafter be a breach of all the constitutions in the Union, and afford precedents for other innovations. 15. This government will set out a moderate aristocracy: it is at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt, tyrannical aristocracy; it will most probably vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the one or the other. 16. The general legislature is restrained from prohibiting the further importation of slaves for twenty odd years; though such importations render the United States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of defence. Source:https://www.archives.gov/files/legislative/resources/education/bill-of-rights/images/mason.pdf

Tuesday September 17, 1787 IN CONVENTION The engrossed Constitution being read, Docr. FRANKLIN rose with a speech in his hand, which he had reduced to writing for his own conveniency, and which Mr. Wilson read in the words following. Mr. President I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them: For having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better information, or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment of others. Most men indeed as well as most sects in Religion, think themselves in possession of all truth, and that wherever others differ from them it is so far error. Steele a Protestant in a Dedication tells the Pope, that the only difference between our Churches in their opinions of the certainty of their doctrines is, the Church of Rome is infallible and the Church of England is never in the wrong. But though many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as of that of their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain french lady, who in a dispute with her sister, said "I don't know how it happens, Sister but I meet with no body but myself, that's always in the right-Il n'y a que moi qui a toujours raison." In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such; because I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if well administered, and believe farther that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better Constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an assembly can a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of the Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best. The opinions I have had of its errors, I sacrifice to the public good. I have never whispered a syllable of them abroad. Within these walls they were born, and here they shall die. If every one of us in returning to our Constituents were to report the objections he has had to it, and endeavor to gain partizans in support of them, we might prevent its being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary effects & great advantages resulting naturally in our favor among foreign Nations as well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent unanimity. Much of the strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and securing happiness to the people, depends, on opinion, on the general opinion of the goodness of the Government, as well as well as of the wisdom and integrity of its Governors. I hope therefore that for our own sakes as a part of the people, and for the sake of posterity, we shall act heartily and unanimously in recommending this Constitution (if approved by Congress & confirmed by the Conventions) wherever our influence may extend, and turn our future thoughts & endeavors to the means of having it well administred. On the whole, Sir, I can not help expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who may still have objections to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this instrument.- He then moved that the Constitution be signed by the members and offered the following as a convenient form viz. "Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of the States present the 17th. of Sepr. &c-In Witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names." This ambiguous form had been drawn up by Mr. G. M. in order to gain the dissenting members, and put into the hands of Docr. Franklin that it might have the better chance of success. Mr. GORHAM said if it was not too late he could wish, for the purpose of lessening objections to the Constitution, that the clause declaring "the number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every forty thousand" which had produced so much discussion, might be yet reconsidered, in order to strike out 40,000 & insert "thirty thousand." This would not he remarked establish that as an absolute rule, but only give Congress a greater latitude which could not be thought unreasonable. Mr. KING & Mr. CARROL seconded & supported the idea of Mr. Gorham. When the PRESIDENT rose, for the purpose of putting the question, he said that although his situation had hitherto restrained him from offering his sentiments on questions depending in the House, and it might be thought, ought now to impose silence on him, yet he could not forbear expressing his wish that the alteration proposed might take place. It was much to be desired that the objections to the plan recommended might be made as few as possible. The smallness of the proportion of Representatives had been considered by many members of the Convention an insufficient security for the rights & interests of the people. He acknowledged that it had always appeared to himself among the exceptionable parts of the plan, and late as the present moment was for admitting amendments, he thought this of so much consequence that it would give much satisfaction to see it adopted No opposition was made to the proposition of Mr. Gorham and it was agreed to unanimously. On the question to agree to the Constitution enrolled in order to be signed. It was agreed to all the States answering ay. Mr. RANDOLPH then rose and with an allusion to the observations of Docr. Franklin apologized for his refusing to sign the Constitution notwithstanding the vast majority & venerable names that would give sanction to its wisdom and its worth. He said however that he did not mean by this refusal to decide that he should oppose the Constitution without doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be governed by his duty as it should be prescribed by his future judgment. He refused to sign, because he thought the object of the Convention would be frustrated by the alternative which it presented to the people. Nine States will fail to ratify the plan and confusion must ensue. With such a view of the subject he ought not, he could not, by pledging himself to support the plan, restrain himself from taking such steps as might appear to him most consistent with the public good. Mr. Govr. MORRIS said that he too had objections, but considering the present plan as the best that was to be attained, he should take it with all its faults. The majority had determined in its favor and by that determination he should abide. The moment this plan goes forth all other considerations will be laid aside, and the great question will be, shall there be a national Government or not? and this must take place or a general anarchy will be the alternative. He remarked that the signing in the form proposed related only to the fact that the States present were unanimous. Mr. WILLIAMSON suggested that the signing should be confined to the letter accompanying the Constitution to Congress, which might perhaps do nearly as well, and would he found to be satisfactory to some members who disliked the Constitution. For himself he did not think a better plan was to be expected and had no scruples against putting his name to it. Mr. HAMILTON expressed his anxiety that every member should sign. A few characters of consequence, by opposing or even refusing to sign the Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling the latent sparks which lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the Convention which may soon subside. No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his were known to be; but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy and Convulsion on one side, and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other. Mr. BLOUNT said he had declared that he would not sign, so as to pledge himself in support of the plan, but he was relieved by the form proposed and would without committing himself attest the fact that the plan was the unanimous act of the States in Convention. Docr. FRANKLIN expressed his fears from what Mr. Randolph had said, that he thought himself alluded to in the remarks offered this morning to the House. He declared that when drawing up that paper he did not know that any particular member would refuse to sign his name to the instrument, and hoped to be so understood. He professed a high sense of obligation to Mr. Randolph for having brought forward the plan in the first instance, and for the assistance he had given in its progress, and hoped that he would yet lay aside his objections, and by concurring with his brethren, prevent the great mischief which the refusal of his name might produce. Mr. RANDOLPH could not but regard the signing in the proposed form, as the same with signing the Constitution. The change of form therefore could make no difference with him. He repeated that in refusing to sign the Constitution, he took a step which might be the most awful of his life, but it was dictated by his conscience, and it was not possible for him to hesitate, much less, to change. He repeated also his persuasion, that the holding out this plan with a final alternative to the people, of accepting or rejecting it in toto, would really produce the anarchy & civil convulsions which were apprehended from the refusal of individuals to sign it. Mr. GERRY described the painful feelings of his situation, and the embarrassment under which he rose to offer any further observations on the subject wch. had been finally decided. Whilst the plan was depending, he had treated it with all the freedom he thought it deserved. He now felt himself bound as he was disposed to treat it with the respect due to the Act of the Convention. He hoped he should not violate that respect in declaring on this occasion his fears that a Civil war may result from the present crisis of the U. S. In Massachussetts, particularly he saw the danger of this calamitous event-In that State there are two parties, one devoted to Democracy, the worst he thought of all political evils, the other as violent in the opposite extreme. From the collision of these in opposing and resisting the Constitution, confusion was greatly to be feared. He had thought it necessary, for this & other reasons that the plan should have been proposed in a more mediating shape, in order to abate the heat and opposition of parties. As it has been passed by the Convention, he was persuaded it would have a contrary effect. He could not therefore by signing the Constitution pledge himself to abide by it at all events. The proposed form made no difference with him. But if it were not otherwise apparent, the refusals to sign should never be known from him. Alluding to the remarks of Docr. Franklin, he could not he said but view them as levelled at himself and the other gentlemen who meant not to sign; Genl. PINKNEY. We are not likely to gain many converts by the ambiguity of the proposed form of signing. He thought it best to be candid and let the form speak the substance. If the meaning of the signers be left in doubt, his purpose would not be answered. He should sign the Constitution with a view to support it with all his influence, and wished to pledge himself accordingly. Docr. FRANKLIN. It is too soon to pledge ourselves before Congress and our Constituents shall have approved the plan. Mr. INGERSOL did not consider the signing, either as a mere attestation of the fact, or as pledging the signers to support the Constitution at all events; but as a recommendation, of what, all things considered, was the most eligible. On the motion of Docr. Franklin N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. Geo. ay. Mr. KING suggested that the Journals of the Convention should be either destroyed, or deposited in the custody of the President. He thought if suffered to be made public, a bad use would be made of them by those who would wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitution. Mr. WILSON prefered the second expedient, he had at one time liked the first best; but as false suggestions may be propagated it should not be made impossible to contradict them. A question was then put on depositing the Journals and other papers of the Convention in the hands of the President, on which, N. H. ay. Mtts. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Md.  no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. The President having asked what the Convention meant should be done with the Journals &c, whether copies were to be allowed to the members if applied for. It was Resolved nem: con "that he retain the Journal and other papers, subject to the order of the Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution. The members then proceeded to sign the instrument. Whilst the last members were signing it Doctr. FRANKLIN looking towards the Presidents Chair, at the back of which a rising sun happened to be painted, observed to a few members near him, that Painters had found it difficult to distinguish in their art a rising from a setting sun. I have said he, often and often in the course of the Session, and the vicisitudes of my hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at that behind the President without being able to tell whether it was rising or setting: But now at length I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting Sun. The Constitution being signed by all the members except Mr. Randolph, Mr. Mason, and Mr. Gerry who declined giving it the sanction of their names, the Convention dissolved itself by an Adjournment sine die- The few alterations and corrections made in these debates which are not in my hand writing, were dictated by me and made in my presence by John C. Payne. JAMES MADISON. Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp

Tuesday September 15, 1787 IN CONVENTION Mr. CARROL reminded the House that no address to the people had yet been prepared. He considered it of great importance that such an one should accompany the Constitution. The people had been accustomed to such on great occasions, and would expect it on this. He moved that a Committee be appointed for the special purpose of preparing an Address. Mr. RUTLEDGE objected on account of the delay it would produce and the impropriety of addressing the people before it was known whether Congress would approve and support the plan. Congress, if an address be thought proper can prepare as good a one. The members of the Convention can also explain the reasons of what has been done to their respective Constituents. Mr. SHERMAN concurred in the opinion that an address was both unnecessary and improper. On the motion of Mr. Carrol N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. no Mr. LANGDON. Some gentlemen have been very uneasy that no increase of the number of Representatives has been admitted. It has in particular been thought that one more ought to be allowed to N. Carolina. He was of opinion that an additional one was due both to that State & to Rho: Island, & moved to reconsider for that purpose. Mr. SHERMAN. When the Committee of eleven reported the apportionment-five Representatives were thought the proper share of N. Carolina. Subsequent information however seemed to entitle that State to another. On the motion to reconsider N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pen. divd. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Mr. LANGDON moved to add 1 member to each of the Representations of N. Carolina & Rho: Island. Mr. KING was agst. any change whatever as opening the door for delays. There had been no official proof that the numbers of N. C. are greater than before estimated, and he never could sign the Constitution if Rho: Island is so be allowed two members that is, one fourth of the number allowed to Massts, which will be known to be unjust. Mr. PINKNEY urged the propriety of increasing the number of Reps. allotted to N. Carolina. Mr. BEDFORD contended for an increase in favor of Rho: Island, and of Delaware also On the question for allowing two Reps. to Rho: Island, it passed in the negative N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. On the question for allowing six to N. Carolina, it passed in the negative. N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Art 1. Sect. 10. (paragraph 2). "No State shall, without the consent of Congress lay imposts or duties on imports or exports; nor with such consent, but to the use of the Treasury of the U. States." In consequence of the proviso moved by Col: Mason: and agreed to on the 13 Sepr., this part of the section was laid aside in favor of the following substitute viz. "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its Inspection laws; and the nett produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the U. S; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and controul of the Congress" On a motion to strike out the last part "and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and controul of the Congress" it passed in the negative. N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. The substitute was then agreed to: Virga. alone being in the negative. The remainder of the paragraph being under consideration-viz-"nor keep troops nor ships of war in time of peace, nor enter into any agreement or compact with another State, nor with any foreign power. Nor engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so imminent as not to admit of delay, until Congress can be consulted" Mr. Mc. HENRY & Mr. CARROL moved that "no State shall be restrained from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbours and erecting light-houses." Col. MASON in support of this explained and urged the situation of the Chesapeak which peculiarly required expences of this sort. Mr. Govr. MORRIS. The States are not restrained from laying tonnage as the Constitution now Stands. The exception proposed will imply the contrary, and will put the States in a worse condition than the gentleman [Col Mason] wishes. Mr. MADISON. Whether the States are now restrained from laying tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power "to regulate commerce." These terms are vague, but seem to exclude this power of the States. They may certainly be restrained by Treaty. He observed that there were other objects for tonnage Duties as the support of Seamen &c. He was more & more convinced that the regulation of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to be wholly under one authority. Mr. SHERMAN. The power of the U. States to regulate trade being supreme can controul interferences of the State regulations when such interferences happen; so that there is no danger to be apprehended from a concurrent jurisdiction. Mr. LANGDON insisted that the regulation of tonnage was an essential part of the regulation of trade, and that the States ought to have nothing to do with it. On motion "that no State shall lay any duty on tonnage without the Consent of Congress" N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. The remainder of the paragraph was then remoulded and passed as follows viz- "No State shall without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." Art II. sect. 1. (paragraph 6) "or the period for chusing another president arrive" was changed into "or a President shall be elected" conformably to a vote of the ----- day of Mr. RUTLIDGE and Docr. FRANKLIN moved to annex to the end of paragraph 7. Sect. 1. art II-"and he [the President] shall not receive, within that period, any other emolument from the U. S. or any of them," on which question N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Art: II. Sect. 2. "he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the U. S. &c" Mr. RANDOLPH moved to "except cases of treason." The prerogative of pardon in these cases was too great a trust. The President may himself be guilty. The Traytors may be his own instruments. Col: MASON supported the motion. Mr. Govr. MORRIS had rather there should be no pardon for treason, than let the power devolve on the Legislature. Mr. WILSON. Pardon is necessary for cases of treason, and is best placed in the hands of the Executive. If he be himself a party to the guilt he can be impeached and prosecuted. Mr. KING thought it would be inconsistent with the Constitutional separation of the Executive & Legislative powers to let the prerogative be exercised by the latter. A Legislative body is utterly unfit for the purpose. They are governed too much by the passions of the moment. In Massachussets, one assembly would have hung all the insurgents in that State: the next was equally disposed to pardon them all. He suggested the expedient of requiring the concurrence of the Senate in Acts of Pardon. Mr. MADISON admitted the force of objections to the Legislature, but the pardon of treasons was so peculiarly improper for the President that he should acquiesce in the transfer of it to the former, rather than leave it altogether in the hands of the latter. He would prefer to either an association of the Senate as a Council of advice, with the President. Mr. RANDOLPH could not admit the Senate into a share of the Power. the great danger to liberty lay in a combination between the President & that body. Col: MASON. The Senate has already too much power. There can be no danger of too much lenity in legislative pardons, as the Senate must con concur, & the President moreover can require 2/3 of both Houses. On the motion of Mr. Randolph. N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. Art II. Sect. 2. (paragraph 2) To the end of this, Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS moved to annex "but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of Departments." Mr. SHERMAN 2ded. the motion Mr. MADISON. It does not go far enough if it be necessary at all. Superior officers below Heads of Departments ought in some cases to have the appointment of the lesser offices. Mr. Govr. MORRIS There is no necessity. Blank commissions can be sent- On the motion N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay. S C no. Geo. no. The motion being lost by the equal division of votes, It was urged that it be put a second time, some such provision being too necessary to be omitted, and on a second question it was agreed to nem. con. Art II. Sect. 1. The words, "and not per capita"-were struck out as superfluous-and the words "by the Representatives" also-as improper, the choice of a President being in another mode as well as eventually by the House of Reps. Art. II. Sect. 2. After "officers of the U. S. whose appointments are not otherwise provided for." were added the words "and which shall be established by law." Art III. Sect. 2. parag: 3. Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. GERRY moved to annex to the end, "And a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases." Mr. GORHAM. The constitution of Juries is different in different States and the trial itself is usual in different cases in different States. Mr. KING urged the same objections Genl. PINKNEY also. He thought such a clause in the Constitution would be pregnant with embarrassments. The motion was disagreed to nem: con: Art. IV. Sect 2. parag: 3. the term "legally" was struck out, and "under the laws thereof" inserted after the word "State," in compliance with the wish of some who thought the term legal equivocal, and favoring the idea that slavery was legal in a moral view. Art. IV. Sect 3. "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union: but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congs" Mr. GERRY moved to insert after "or parts of States" the words "or a State and part of a State" which was disagreed to by a large majority; it appearing to be supposed that the case was comprehended in the words of the clause as reported by the Committee. Art. IV. Sect. 4. After the word "Executive" were inserted the words "when the Legislature can not be convened." Art. V. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the 1 & 4 clauses in the 9. section of article 1" Mr. SHERMAN expressed his fears that three fourths of the States might be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Senate. He thought it reasonable that the proviso in favor of the States importing slaves should be extended so as to provide that no State should be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equality in the Senate. Col: MASON thought the plan of amending the Constitution exceptionable & dangerous. As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to depend, in the first immediately, in the second, ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he verily believed would be the case. Mr. Govr. MORRIS & Mr. GERRY moved to amend the article so as to require a Convention on application of 2/3 of the Sts. Mr. MADISON did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to propose amendments applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a call a Convention on the like application. He saw no objection however against providing for a Convention for the purpose of amendments, except only that difficulties might arise as to the form, the quorum &c. which in Constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible avoided. The motion of Mr. Govr. MORRIS & Mr. GERRY was agreed to nem: con: [see the first part of the article as finally past] Mr. SHERMAN moved to strike out of art. V. after "legislatures" the words "of three fourths" and so after the word "Conventions" leaving future Conventions to act in this matter, like the present Conventions according to circumstances. On this motion N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. GERRY moved to strike out the words "or by Conventions in three fourths thereof" On this motion N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. SHERMAN moved according to his idea above expressed to annex to the end of the article a further proviso "that no State shall without its consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." Mr. MADISON. Begin with these special provisos, and every State will insist on them, for their boundaries, exports &c. On the motion of Mr. Sherman N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. SHERMAN then moved to strike out art V altogether. Mr. BREARLEY 2ded. the motion, on which N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del divd. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to annex a further proviso-"that no State, without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate" This motion being dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small States was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the question, saying no. Col: MASON expressing his discontent at the power given to Congress by a bare majority to pass navigation acts, which he said would not only enhance the freight, a consequence he did not so much regard-but would enable a few rich merchants in Philada N. York & Boston, to monopolize the Staples of the Southern States & reduce their value perhaps 50 Per Ct.-moved a further proviso "that no law in nature of a navigation act be passed before the year 1808, without the consent of 2/3 of each branch of the Legislature" On this motion N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. ay. Mr. RANDOLPH animadverting on the indefinite and dangerous power given by the Constitution to Congress, expressing the pain he felt at differing from the body of the Convention, on the close of the great & awful subject of their labours, and anxiously wishing for some accomodating expedient which would relieve him from his embarrassments, made a motion importing "that amendments to the plan might be offered by the State Conventions, which should be submitted to and finally decided on by another general Convention" Should this proposition be disregarded, it would he said be impossible for him to put his name to the instrument. Whether he should oppose it afterwards he would not then decide but he would not deprive himself of the freedom to do so in his own State, if that course should be prescribed by his final judgment. Col: MASON 2ded. & followed Mr. Randolph in animadversions on the dangerous power and structure of the Government, concluding that it would end either in monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy; which, he was in doubt, but one or other, he was sure. This Constitution had been formed without the knowledge or idea of the people. A second Convention will know more of the sense of the people, and be able to provide a system more consonant to it. It was improper to say to the people, take this or nothing. As the Constitution now stands, he could neither give it his support or vote in Virginia; and he could not sign here what he could not support there. With the expedient of another Convention as proposed, he could sign. Mr. PINKNEY. These declarations from members so respectable at the close of this important scene, give a peculiar solemnity to the present moment. He descanted on the consequences of calling forth the deliberations & amendments of the different States on the subject of Government at large. Nothing but confusion & contrariety could spring from the experiment. The States will never agree in their plans, and the Deputies to a second Convention coming together under the discordant impressions of their Constituents, will never agree. Conventions are serious things, and ought not to be repeated. He was not without objections as well as others to the plan. He objected to the contemptible weakness & dependence of the Executive. He objected to the power of a majority only of Congs. over Commerce. But apprehending the danger of a general confusion, and an ultimate decision by the sword, he should give the plan his support. Mr. GERRY, stated the objections which determined him to withhold his name from the Constitution. 1. the duration and reeligibility of the Senate. 2. the power of the House of Representatives to conceal their journals. 3. the power of Congress over the places of election. 4 the unlimited power of Congress over their own compensation. 5. Massachusetts has not a due share of Representatives allotted to her. 6. 3/5 of the Blacks are to be represented as if they were freemen. 7. Under the power over commerce, monopolies may be established. 8. The vice president being made head of the Senate. He could however he said get over all these, if the rights of the Citizens were not rendered insecure 1.  by the general power of the Legislature to make what laws they may please to call necessary and proper. 2. raise armies and money without limit. 3. to establish a tribunal without juries, which will be a Star-chamber as to Civil cases. Under such a view of the Constitution, the best that could be done he conceived was to provide for a second general Convention. On the question on the proposition of Mr. Randolph. All the States answered- no On the question to agree to the Constitution, as amended. All the States ay. The Constitution was then ordered to be engrossed. And the House adjourned. Source: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp