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(December 19, 1787) "This is true liberty, when free born men Having to advise the public may speak free; Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise; Who neither can, nor will, may hold his peace; What can be juster in a state than this?" My Fellow Citizens, If the arbitrary proceedings of the convention of Pennsylvania do not rouse your attention to the rights of yourselves and your children, there is nothing that I can say will do it. If the contempt and obloquy with which that body (whose legality even may be questioned) has treated your petitions, can not bring you to think seriously, what then will? When a few Demagogues despising every sense of order and decency, have rejected the petitions of the people, and in the most supercilious manner, triumphed over the freemen of America, as if they were their slaves, and they themselves their lords and masters. I say that if such barefaced presumption and arrogance, such tyrannical proceedings of the men, who, if acting constitutionally, were the servants of the people, be not sufficient to awaken you to a sense of your duty and interest, nothing less than the goad and the whip can succeed: your condition must be like that of the careless and insecure sinner, whom neither the admonitions nor entreaties of his friends, nor even the threatnings of awaiting justice, could reclaim or convince of his error; his reformation is neglected until it is too late, when he finds himself in a state of unutterable and endless woe. It may be asserted with confidence, that besides the petitions that Mr. Whitehill presented to the convention from Cumberland county against the adoption of the new constitution, there is not a county or town in the state that should not have followed the example, if a reasonable time had been allowed for the petitions to come in. Now if we consider but for a moment how contemptuously the people were treated on this occasion, we may form some idea of the way in which they are hereafter to be governed by their well born masters. "The petitions being read from the chair. Mr. M'Kean said he was sorry that at this stage of the business so improper an attempt should be made; he hoped therefore that the petitions would not be attended to." (Pennsylvania Herald.) Where is the freeman in America that can tamely suffer such an insult to his dignity to pass with impunity; where is that pusillanimous wretch who can submit to this contumely? Is not this the language of Britain, in the years 1775 and 1776, renewed. What said George the third and his pampered ministers, more than this, to the petitions of America? Is it improper for freemen to petition for their rights? If it be; then I say that the impropriety consisted only in their not demanding them. Propriety requires that the people should approach their representatives with a becoming humility; but the governors of a free people must ever be considered as their servants, and are therefore bound to observe decency towards them, and to act according to their instructions and agreeably to conscience. If the petitions of the freemen of America, couched in decent and respectful terms, will not be attended to; then be it known, that their demands must and will be granted: If no better will do, the ultima ratio regum must secure to the people their rights. God in his providence has crowned them with success once already on this head; and their is little doubt, with the same assistance, but a second attempt will terminate just as much in favor of liberty. The indignity offered to the people and their petitions, by the haughty lordlings of the convention, proclaims the chains of despotism already firmly riveted; like a herald it cries aloud, hush ye slaves, how dare you interrupt your mighty rulers, who alone have a divine right to establish constitutions and governments calculated to promote their own agrandizement and honor. Ah my friends, the days of a cruel Nero approach fast; the language of a monster, of a Caligula, could not be more imperious. I challenge the whole continent, the well born and their parasites, to show an instance of greater insolence than this, on the part of the British tyrant and his infernal junto, to the people of America, before our glorious revolution. My fellow citizens, this is an awful crisis; your situation is alarming indeed; yourselves and your petitions are despised and trampled under the feet of self-important nabobs; whose diabolical plots and secret machinations have been carried on since the revolution, with a view to destroy your liberties, and reduce you to a state of slavery and dependence; and alas! I fear they have found you off your guard, and taken you by surprise: these aspiring men have seized the government, and secured all power, as they suppose, to themselves, now openly browbeat you with their insolence, and assume majesty; and even treat you like menial servants, your representatives as so many conquered slaves, that, they intend to make pass under the yoke, as soon as leisure from their gluttony and rioting on the industry of the poor, shall permit them to attend such a pleasing piece of sport. But I trust, these petty tyrants will soon find to their confussion, that their own imprudent zeal has defeated their designs. Providence has ordered, that they should begin to carry their arbitrary schemes too soon into execution, that, their boundless ambition should precipitate their destruction, and that the glory of God should be made perfect in the salvation of the poor. Blessed be his name, "He hath shewed strength with his arm; he hath scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts. He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and exalted them of low degree. He hath filled the hungry with good things, and the rich he hath sent empty away." As a villain, who, secreted to rob and murder in the silent hour of night, issues forth from his lurking place before the people have retired to sleep, and thus frustrates his infernal design by impatience; so in like manner the lust of dominion has urged these despots on to the adoption of measures that will inevitably, and, I hope, immediately unhinge every part of their conspiracy against the rights of their fellow-men, and bring on themselves infamy and disgrace. Figure to yourselves, my brethren, a man with a plantation just sufficient to raise a competency for himself and his dear little children; but by reason of the immoderate revenue necessary to support the emperor, the illustrious well born Congress, the standing army, &c. &c. he necessarily fails in the payment of his taxes; then a hard-hearted federal officer seizes, and sells, his cows, his horses, and even the land itself must be disposed of to answer the demands of government: He pleads unfruitful seasons, his old age, and his numerous, and helpless family. But alas! these avail him nothing, his farm, his cattle, and his all are sold for less than half their value to his wealthy neighbour, already possessed of half the land in the county, to whom also himself and his children must become servants and slaves, or else perish with hunger and want. Do I exaggerate here? No truly. View the misery of the poor under the despotic governments of Europe and Asia, and then deny the truth of my position, if you can. It is a common saying among the poor of Indostan, that to lie is better than to stand, to sleep is better than to wake, but death is best of all; for it delivers them from the cruelty of their nabobs. Even in the freest country in Europe, a lady's lap-dog is more esteemed than the child of a poor man. O God, what a monster is man! that a dog should be nourished and pampered up by him with dainties; whilst a being, possessed of knowledge, reason, judgement, and an immortal soul, bought with no less a price than the blood of our divine Redeemer, should be driven from his door, without admitting him even for a moment to assuage his hunger with the crumbs that might fall from his table. But the members of the Federal Convention were men who have been all tried in the field of action, say some; they have fought for American liberty: Then the more to their shame be it said; curse on the villain who protects virgin innocence only with a view that he may himself become the ravisher; so that if the assertion were true, it only turns to their disgrace; but as it happens it is not true, or at least only so in part: This was a scheme taken by the despots and their sycophants to biass the public mind in favor of the constitution; for the convention was composed of a variety of characters; ambitious men Jesuites, tories, lawyers, &c. formed the majority, whose similitude to each other, consisted only in their determination to lord it over their fellow citizens; like the rays that converging from every direction meet in a point, their sentiments and deliberations concentered in tyranny alone; they were unanimous in forming a government that should raise the fortunes and respectability of the well born few, and oppress the plebians. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-v-1787-12-19/20130122081553/

(February 7, 1788) Instamus tamen immemores, coecique furore, Et monstrum infelix sacrata sistimus arce. VIRG. TRANSLATION. Thus we, by madness blinded and 0'ercome, Lodge the dire monster in the sacred dome. My Fellow-Citizens, Before martial law is declared to be the supreme law of the land, and your character of free citizens be changed to that of the subjects of a military king, which are necessary consequences of the adoption of the proposed constitution, let me admonish you in the name of sacred liberty, to make a solemn pause. Permit a freeman to address you, and to solicit your attention to a cause wherein yourselves and your posterity are concerned. The sun never shone upon a more important one: It is the cause of freedom-of a whole continent-of yourselves and of your fellow men. Men who have so gloriously asserted the rights of human nature, and overcome tyranny, one ought reasonably to suppose could not have their spirits so much broken as peaceably to submit to it a few years afterwards. By the declaration of peace, wherein Britain acknowledged the independence and sovereignty of the United States, the people of America became citizens of the freest country under heaven. But under the proposed plan of government the least fragment of liberty cannot exist. The writers against the proposed constitution are denominated, by the aristocratics, incendiaries, and enemies to America, men whose writings tend to involve this devoted country in anarchy, and in all the horrors of a civil war. Now, in reply to this charge; let me ask the friends of this government, Is that man an incendiary who advocates the unalienable rights of the people? Is he an enemy to America who endeavors to protect the oppressed from the oppressor; who opposes a conspiracy against the liberties of his country, concerted by a few tyrants, whose views are to lord it over the rest of their fellow citizens, to trample the poorer part of the people under their feet, that they may be rendered their servants and slaves? If such a writer is an incendiary, and an enemy to America, then I glory in the character. A conspiracy against the freedom of America, both deep and dangerous, has been formed by an infernal junto of demagogues. Our thirteen free commonwealths are to be consolidated into one despotic monarchy. Is not this a position obvious? Its evidence is intuitive; and the address and dissent of the minority of the convention of Pennsylvania add such strength to its illustration, that no man of common sense can refuse his assent. But why need I attempt to prove a point, that that honest man and firm patriot, Mr. MARTIN, says the monarchy men of the federal convention declared was their intention. Who can deny but the president general will be a king to all intents and purposes, and one of the most dangerous kind too; a king elected to command a standing army? Thus our laws are to be administered by this tyrant; for the whole, or at least the most important part of the executive department is put in his hands. A quorum of 65 representatives, and of 26 senators, with a king at their head, are to possess powers, that extend to the lives, the liberties, and property of every citizen of America. This novel system of government, were it possible to establish it, would be a compound of monarchy and aristocracy, the most accursed that ever the world witnessed. About 50 (these being a quorum) of the well born, and a military king, with a standing army devoted to his will, are to have an uncontrouled power over our lives, our liberties, and property, in all cases whatsoever. Is he an incendiary who abhors the thought of such a government, who declares it his opinion, that none but a sycophant or a slave could submit to it? I think not; and there is no power under heaven that could cause me to change my opinion; which has the joint evidences of reason and experience for its foundation. There is not a tincture of democracy in the proposed constitution, except the nominal elections of the president general and the illustrious Congress be supposed to have some colour of that nature; but this is a mere deception, invented to gull the people into its adoption. Its framers were well aware that some appearance of election ought to be observed, especially in regard to the first Congress; for without such an appearance there was not the smallest probability of their having it organized and set in operation. But let the wheels of this government be once cleverly set in motion, and I'll answer for it, that the people shall not be much troubled with future elections, especially in choosing their king, the standing army will do that business for them. The thoughts of a military officer possessing such powers, as the proposed constitution vests in the president general, are sufficient to excite in the mind of a freeman the most alarming apprehensions; and ought to rouse him to oppose it at all events. Every freeman of America ought to hold up this idea to himself, that he has no superior but God and the laws. But this tyrant will be so much his superior, that he can at any time he thinks proper, order him out in the militia to exercise, and to march when and where he pleases. His officers can wantonly inflict the most disgraceful punishment on a peaceable citizen, under pretence of disobedience, or the smallest neglect militia duty. Among the substantial objections to the great powers of the president, that of his negative upon the laws, is one of the most inconsiderable, indeed it is more a sound than any thing else; For, if he be a bold enterprising fellow, there is little fear of his ever having to exercise it. The two branches of the legislature, will be at his service; no law contrary to his sentiments, however salutary in its operation, dare be mentioned by them. As a body, and as individuals, they will be his sycophants and flatterers. But, if on the contrary he should not be a man of spirit, a thing very improbable, as none but an ambitious man, well versed in the ways of men, could have the address to be raised to that elevated station; if, however, I say, he should not be a man of an enterprising spirit, in that case he will be a minion of the aristocratics, doing according to their will and pleasure, and confirming every law they may think proper to make, without any regard to their public utility. Every idea of such unlimited powers being lodged in so small a number of the well born, elevated so far above the rest of their fellow citizens, and supported by a king with a standing army at his disposal, ought to cause the blood of a free citizen to boil with indignation: the very mentioning of it shocks my whole frame. I abhor the thought from my soul: And I flatter myself that the people of this continent will not suffer such a government to be placed over them. Indeed it astonishes me, that the conspirators who framed it, had not the most dreadful apprehensions of their personal safety, from the just resentment of the freemen of an insulted country. To such lengths have these bold conspirators carried their scheme of despotism, that your most sacred rights and privileges are surrendered at discretion. When government thinks proper, under the pretence of writing a libel, &c. it may imprison, inflict the most cruel and unusual punishment, seize property, carry on prosecutions, &c. and the unfortunate citizen has no magna charta, no bill of rights, to protect him; nay, the prosecution may be carried on in such a manner that even a jury will not be allowed him. Where is that base slave who would not appeal to the ultima ratio, before he submits to this government? If the despots persist in pushing it on, let them answer the consequences; they may fall a sacrifice to their own obstinacy; for liberty will triumph over every obstacle, even were a standing army opposed to it. To preserve the peace of the country, every patriot should exert himself at this awful crisis, and use his influence to have another federal convention called as soon as possible; either to amend the old articles of confederation, or to frame a constitution on revolution principles, that may secure the freedom of America to the remotest time. If the State of Massachusetts should reject the proposed constitution, of which there is a strong probability, what a contemptible figure must its advocates make, who, after it made its appearance from the dark conclave, affirmed that there was but five men opposed to it in the United States. The convention of that state was chosen in the moment of blind enthusiasm, and yet we find it so much divided that the issue is doubtful. The sentiments of the people are changing every day, and were that convention to be elected now, I doubt not but four fifths would be against it. In the back counties of Pennsylvania, where the well born have no influence, the opposition is said to have become so powerful that a person would be in danger of losing his life, if he ventured to speak a word in its favor. The conspirators saw clearly, that such a system of government could never be established over freemen, except they were taken by surprize; and hence they hurried matters forward with that view; in short, the people were made to believe, that they were all dead men, if they did not adopt it immediately. Even still they are endeavoring to hold up the idea of anarchy being the consequence of rejection: But he must have very weak intellects indeed, and little acquainted with the spirit of freemen, to whom it is not obvious that adoption will produce anarchy and ruin. No evil can result from calling another general convention, but much good would be the consequence. The distresses of America are not of that nature to be healed all of a sudden; some of them indeed have arisen from the defects in the general government; but there are others of a different kind, that must be removed by time, and by the prudence of the people at large. Ye patriots! ye lovers of peace, of liberty, and of your fellow men! Ye are called upon at this solemn juncture, to stand forth and save your country; before the breach is too wide, and while the parties may still be reconciled to each other; before anarchy stalks through the land; and before the sword of civil discord is unsheathed. For the sake of every thing that is great and good, and as you shall answer for it at the great tribunal, use your influence to procure another general convention with all possible speed, as the only way left to preserve the union of America, and to save your fellow citizens from misery and destruction. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-ix-1788-2-7/20130122075944/

(November 28, 1787) My Fellow-Citizens, The present time will probably form a new epoch in the annals of America. This important, this awful crisis bids fair to be the theme of our posterity for many generations. We are now publicly summoned to determine whether we and our children are to be freemen or slaves; whether the liberty, which we have so recently purchased with the blood of thousands of our fellow countrymen, is to terminate in a blessing or a curse. The establishment of a new government is a matter of such immense magnitude, that any other human transaction is small indeed when compared to it. Great circumspection is therefore necessary on this interesting occasion: the temporal, and in some measure the eternal happiness of millions of souls is involved in this important work: I say even in some measure our eternal happiness is concerned; for, that a good or a bad government naturally influences religion and morality, is a principle indisputably confirmed by fact. Under a free and patriotic government, the bulk of the people will necessarily be virtuous: but under a tyrannical and unjust one, the greater part of the people will as necessarily be wicked: the complexion of the governing is ever the colour of the governed. Every freeman possessed of the smallest portion of patriotism and general philanthropy, ought, at this critical juncture, to think seriously, to deliberate coolly, and to determine cautiously. All that is dear to him, nay all that constitutes life itself happy or miserable, is at this very moment about to be unalterably fixed: the rivet of tyranny may now be clenched, that will bind forever the freedom of America in the indissoluble chains of cursed slavery. In the adoption of the new constitution in its present form, we will lose more than all that we have fought for, and gained in a glorious and successful war of seven years; yea, and still more than this, our very character of citizens and freemen will be changed to that of subjects and slaves. In this act the bright orb of glorious liberty will go down under the horizon of cruel oppression, never never to illuminate our western hemisphere again! How much better, that she had never cast a ray upon Columbia, than thus to blaze for a moment, and then to vanish forever! In regard to religious liberty, the cruelty of the new government will probably be felt sooner in Pennsylvania than in any state in the union. The number of religious denominations in this state, who are principled against fighting or bearing arms, will be greatly distressed indeed.1 In the new constitution there is no declaration in their favour; but on the contrary, the Congress and President are to have an absolute power over the standing army, navy, and militia; and the president, or rather emperor, is to be commander in chief Now, I think, that it will appear plain, that no exemption whatever from militia duty, shall be allowed to any set of men, however conscientiously scrupulous they may be against bearing arms. Indeed, from the nature and qualifications of the president, we may justly infer, that such an idea is altogether preposterous: he is by profession a military man, and possibly an old soldier; now, such a man, from his natural temper, necessarily despises those who have a conscientious aversion to a military profession, which is probably the very thing in which he principally piques himself. Only men of his own kind will be esteemed by him; his fellow soldier he will conceive to be his true friend, and the only character worthy of his notice and confidence. Since, in the new constitution no provision is made for securing to these peaceable citizens their religious liberties, it follows then by implication, that no such provision was intended. Their influence in the state of Pennsylvania is fully sufficient to save them from suffering very materially on this account; but in the great vortex of the whole continent, it can have no weight. How can we expect that a special law will be made by the new Congress merely on their account; and yet it will be absolutely necessary that such a law shall be made, before this privilege is secured to them? Can any man rationally suppose that the president will give his assent to a law in favor of the men whom he heartily despises; a law also, that in its operation must curtail his own dignity and splender, by reducing the number of his military? No certainly. There is not probably military man on earth that could bear the thought. So that such a supposition is absurd. The friends of this scheme of government may possibly attempt to say, that this religious liberty is sufficiently secured by the constitution of the state. But I say not; for, this is a case in which the United States are a party, and every case of this kind, according to the new plan, must be determined by the supreme law of the land; that is, by the Congress and president, who are to have the sole direction of the militia.4 This will be a matter then, in which a particular state can have no concern. From the proceedings of the convention, respecting liberty of conscience, foreign politicians might be led to draw a strange conclusion, viz. that the majority of that assembly were either men of no religion, or all of one religion; such a conclusion naturally follows their silence on that subject; they must either have been indifferent about religion, or determined to compel the whole continent to conform to their own. For my own part, I really think, that their conduct in this instance is inexplicable: it is impossible to divine what might have been their intentions. To illustrate this —defect in the new constitution, by a familiar instance: we shall suppose that the negroes of Georgia, or some of the southern states, prompted by the love of sacred liberty, shall attempt to free themselves from cruel slavery, by a noble appeal to arms. In this case the Congress may order the militia of Pennsylvania to march off to quell this insurrection: now on such an occasion, what must the condition of that Pennsylvanian be, who, besides being conscientiously scrupulous against bearing arms, on any account whatever, has, over and above, made the manumission of slavery, a part of his religious creed? Miserable must be the state of such a man's mind indeed! More to be pitied is he, than the wretches against whom he is compelled to fight! The foregoing supposition is by no means an unnatural one; and truly, if the new constitution be adopted, I have little doubt, but the thing itself will some time or other be realized. I shall by way of digression add one sentiment, namely, that I should have no objection, that the slaves in the United States would free themselves to-morrow from their present thraldom, provided no lives be lost on this occasion; and with this proviso, I sincerely pray, that God may grant them success in their first attempt. Freedom is the birth-right of every man; and who is he that hath dared to rob his fellow men of this glorious privilege, with whom God will not enter into judgment? Before I dismiss this subject, I cannot help taking notice of the inconsistency of some Pennsylvanians, in respect to this new government. The very men, who should oppose it with all their influence, seem to be the most zealous for establishing it. Strange indeed! that the professed enemies of negro and every other species of slavery, should themselves join in the adoption of a constitution whose very basis is despotism and slavery, a constitution that militates so far against freedom, that even their own religious liberty may probably be destroyed by it. Alas! what frail, what inconsistent beings we are! To the catalogue of human weaknesses and mistakes, this is one to be added. Ah! my countrymen, our situation is critical indeed! Let us make a solemn pause then! The eyes of the world are upon us; the patriots and friends of America, in Europe, are now anxiously concerned, lest the whirlwind of tyranny should raze from its tender root the hallowed plant of Columbian liberty. Before we confirm this new constitution, let us ask ourselves this question-For what did we withdraw our allegiance from Great Britain; was it because the yoke of George the third was not sufficiently galling, that we cast it off at the expence of so much blood and treasure, in order to accommodate ourselves with one of our own construction more intolerable? or, was it because the tyrant was three thousand miles off, that we revolted, in order to appoint one at home, who should correct us with scorpions instead of whips? If this were your design, I congratulate you on your success; hesitate not a moment then in the adoption of the new constitution: It is a perfect model, and answers your intentions completely. It certainly is capable of carrying tyranny and despotism to their ne plus ultra, no second revolution will be necessary, no further attempt need be made on this head; for this government will answer the end proposed to all intents and purposes. Are these groundless conjectures, mere declamations unsupported by evidence, or affirmations without proof? No truly-Read the Old Whig, read the Centinels, read Brutus, Cincinnatus, &c. and then say, if you can, that these things are not real. Perhaps better arguments were never advanced in the demonstration of any truth, than these writers have given to illustrate this matter; whilst the writers on the opposite side have not been able to refute them in a single instance. I shall close this essay with one observation, viz. that should this despotic scheme of government be overthrown, (which God grant) to what cause then are we to attribute this glorious triumph? The answer is obvious-to that palladium of liberty, that inestimable privilege of freemen, that scourge of tyranny, the freedom of the press. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-ii-1787-11-28/20160502205546/

(November 8, 1787) When the advocates of a cause use their endeavours to stop a free and thorough investigation of the subject, we as naturally and as justly infer that the cause is a bad one, as that two and two make four. A good cause, like pure gold may be tried in the fire, and yet retain its full weight and value; or like the utensils of husbandry, grow brighter and fitter for use the more is handled. The application of this observation in regard to the friends of the new constitution, is easy. They see, that the more this new scheme of government is discussed, the more tyrannical and ill-adapted to the present circumstances of America does it appear. We find, say they, that to reason in favour of the constitution, is only to give its enemies more latitude to condemn: for although we could call in to our aid a sufficient stock of sophistical arguments and circumstances, by which we might dispose the incautious part of the people to join us in establishing this government; yet we have already experienced that by such means, we defeat ourselves; as we thereby give a greater scope for those of more penetration, to write against the constitution. The advocates of this government have also tried an expedient which has been known to succeed upon some occasions, namely, to answer reason and argument with scurrility and personal invective; but even here they have failed; for the magnitude of the object is so great, as to reduce every little circumstance of this kind, to a mere point. In little matters, this kind of procedure might do well enough; but in an affair of such vast importance to the whole Continent of America, its operation is nugatory. In this desperate situation of affairs, it need not to be wondered at, that the friends of this despotic scheme of government, were driven to the last and only alternative from which there was any probability of success; namely, the abolition of the freedom of the Press. And accordingly, we find in the Independent Gazetteer of the 29th of October, a writer who signs himself a Pennsylvania Mechanic, says, "It appears by a late eastern paper, that the publisher of the Massachusetts Gazette, is determined to publish no sentiments on this important subject, (viz the new constitution) unless the writers leave their names with the printer; that anyone who may be desirous of knowing the author, may be informed. No honest man, no true friend to America or to the liberty and happiness of mankind, can object to this-For your imitation, gentlemen, I humbly propose the conduct of this your worthy brother, the publisher of the Massachusetts gazette." This Pennsylvania Mechanic one would take to be a blacksmith, whose true employment, is to construct chains to confine to perpetual slavery, the freemen of America; but be that as it may, we find that he can soon call in more of his fellow craftsmen to his assistance, who even seem to be more expert at their occupation than our mechanic above-mentioned: One of these tradesmen has given us a small portion of his skill of chain-making, in the dependent Gazetteer of the 31st of October, under the signature of Galba; which small scrap of his workmanship, I beg leave to transcribe, that we may be the better able to judge of its excellency: He says, "Mr. Oswald, The hint in your paper of last Monday, that everyone ought to leave his name with the printer who writes for or against the new form of government proposed by the honorable convention, is only, in my opinion, true in part; for what reason is there that the patriotic gentlemen who write in favour of a scheme of government that holds forth peace, happiness and prosperity to our distressed country, should by leaving their names with the printers, be exposed to the malevolence of those wretches who pretend to find fault with it. Indeed I think it perfectly right that those who wantonly write against it should leave their names, that they may be justly exposed to the contempt and indignation of their fellow citizens, as enemies and traitors to their country; and I hope every patriotic printer in the union, will for the future pay proper attention to the justness and absolute propriety of this hint." Stop and pause a little Galba, I really believe you were not in your right senses when you wrote this your hint; for if you had been studying for seven years how you might effectually injure the new constitution, you could not have hit upon a thought more to your purpose: Your zeal has transported you so far beyond the bounds of propriety and discretion, that the haughtiest lordling and friend to arbitrary government in America, must hang down his head and blush upon reading your ill-timed hint.-I assure you sir, I think you have explained yourself right cleverly: You have given us a specimen of the genius and spirit of our new government: Here we see pretty plainly through your excellent regulation of the press, how things are to be carried on after the adoption of the new constitution: All the writings must be on ONE SIDE. The new constitution appears so glorious and immaculate to Galba, that all those who have sufficient spirit to avow their sentiments on the occasion, are to be called traitors and enemies to their country, if they do not think just as he does: And to render them still more odious and execrable, he would have the printers throughout the union, to publish their names with their pieces, should any of them have the imprudence of writing on the subject.-I wonder that Galba did not propose a suit of tar and feathers; but as the taylors have of late become a little bashful about trying on this sort of apparel, and the conceit is therefore a little stale, he would have those obnoxious writers to leave their names with the printers, that they may be cloathed by their fellow citizens with indignation and contempt as with a garment; whilst he would have the patriotic writers in favor of the constitution, entirely exempted from such an abstracted kind of a coat and jacket.-We thank you Galba for your kind and very liberal hint; for it certainly merits our attention. I make no doubt but it is the wish of a thousand of our well born as well as of yourself, that the printers would comply with your request: Such a thought is natural enough;-it must natively [naturally] be the wish of every little petty tyrant in the United States.-But most of the printers in Philadelphia are men of sentiment; they are lovers of liberty and the rights of mankind, and will necessarily despise such hints, and treat them with the contempt they deserve: There is such a degree of meanness in the requisition especially in that of Galba-longhead, as must insult the understanding and integrity of every independent printer who sees it. Galba your hint was rather calculated for the meridian of Boston, than that of Philadelphia; and I doubt not, but you and the Boston printers have one and the same object: Self is an old fellow: This trite saying will apply.-In Boston the liberty of the press is now completely abolished; and hence all other privileges and rights of the people will in a short time be destroyed: No wonder then that the printers in Boston could exert themselves in favor of this new government: Their present condition is a drawing in miniature and that in which the adoption of the new constitution will certainly place the whole union; so that after the nature of the prince of darkness, they wish to have all their fellow citizens in the same dreadful situation with themselves.-Russell, the printer of the Massachusetts Centinel, has the effrontery to insult the freemen of America so far, as to say in his paper of October the 10th, "That aiming thereby to be just, he is determined not to give place to any piece against the new constitution except the writers leave their names to be made public if desired."-Russell I would not hire a mob to bear you aloft as an object of hatred and contempt, nor would I bribe them to hang you in effigy, although you really deserve it; I am sensible of the danger of inflaming the multitude under a free government; for when a public tumult has once been raised, justice has often been sacrificed to appease it; so that I do not intend to raise a fatal prejudice against you; my intention is to consider the nature and consequences of your conduct, as an advocate for the new constitution, which as far as it respects the liberty of the press, has done more prejudice to your cause, than its enemies can do by the violence of their accusations, however well they may be founded. On so momentous a subject as the new constitution, it is as plain as any axiom in geometry, that it is of no importance whether or not a writer gives his name; it is with the illustrations and arguments he affords us, and not with his name, we have any concern: Besides this practice would tend to draw off the mind of the writer from the calm investigation of the subject, to recriminations and personal invective: And moreover men of ability, of a modest, timid, or diffident cast of mind, would be detered altogether from publishing their sentiments.- Of what use could it be to the public to know the name of the writer of the piece signed Lucius, that Russell refused to publish? Certainly of no use at all. Non quis sed quid: It was not with the author of Lucius that the freemen of Massachusetts had any thing to do, but with his reasoning, which if it were just ought not to be suppressed, and if it were fallacious should be refuted.-Let candor and impartiality be the characteristics of our printers, in respect to this new government which involves in its consequences the happiness or misery of millions yet unborn: This is the line of conduct which men of honor and integrity will naturally pursue, and I find an unspeakable satisfaction, when I every day behold the printers of Philadelphia following this path almost to a man: And hence I am led to conclude that the Pennsylvania mechanic and his successor Galba, must find their hints to be a little premature; such doctrine might have suited finely about the time of the mock ringing of the bells in this city,2 for joy and gladness that Congress had recommended the adoption of this new plan of government to the different states, which, by the by, they unluckily forgot to recommend to this present hour. The gentlemen who are friends to the new constitution had better not blab so freely; especially in regard to the freedom of the press; they ought to wait until this government of governments is once established; and then instead of a coat and jacket of indignation and contempt, they may speak boldly about a gallows, a gibbet, or at least a dungeon, for such writers as the Old Whig, or Centinel, who have dared to speak like freemen. I wonder that our well born should allow such mean fellows to write against this their government; such base wretches ought not to live in the same country with gentlemen; and as soon as our new government is confirmed, these vile enemies to its splendor and dignity, shall quit their capring, I'll warrant them; a federal soldier with a fixed bayonet will soon give such daring dogs their quietis. Ah! what glorious days are coming; how I anticipate the brilliancy of the American court! Behold that gilded chariot, set with diamonds, and drawn by eight Arabian horses; off with your hats you paltrons, here is the president going in state to the senate house to confirm the law for the abolition of the liberty of the press. Men and brethren will not these things be so? Yes most assuredly if we adopt the new constitution in its present form, these things will be so. Rouse then; rouse my fellow-citizens, and show yourselves to be freemen: This is the most important object that ever presented itself to your understanding: The independence of America, which God himself vouched safe through his infinite mercy to confer upon us, must end in a curse, if this tyrannical government be suffered to be established. But forbid it Heaven! I was told, last Saturday evening [3 November], by a gentleman of veracity whom I met at the meeting at the state-house, that several persons had waited that day on Mrs. Oswald, for the purpose of requesting her not to publish any pieces against the new constitution, at the same time intimating, that if she persisted, she would forfeit their interests; and that in consequence of her spirited reply, several had that very day withdrawn their subscriptions for the paper. This is truly an alarming circumstance. Where is the freeman in America that this is not sufficient to rouse from a state of supineness? My brethren, be circumspect on this momentous occasion,-"And, take unto you the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all to stand. Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness. And your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace. Above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked." Amen. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-i-1787-11-8/20160329022814/

December 5, 1787 My Fellow-Citizens, Are you disposed to hear plain arguments, simple truths, and pure facts? If you are; then let me tell you, thro' the voice of reason, that the preservation of your little ones and yourselves, the love of mankind in general, and the liberty of your dear country, now demand your most serious attention. The peace, the freedom, and happiness of the present generation, and possibly many succeeding ones, are the great subjects now under discussion. Was there ever such an important time for America as this is? Can there be greater objects than these are, presented to the human understanding? I say there cannot: and I affirm it, that there is not a man in the United States, except some base assassin, or mean coward, who can be indifferent on this momentous occasion. Is there any one now among us who can remain unconcerned or neutral? If there be, I say he is not a man; no certainly, he is unworthy of that character; such a wretch can have no claim to the title of a free citizen of America, he is a pitiful sycophant, a cringing spaniel, a menial slave. The independence of America, with great propriety, was thought, during our late glorious struggle, an object of such immense value, that we could scarce pay too high a price for it; an object that even dignified human nature; and that thousands of our countrymen magnanimously and cheerfully paid their blood for its purchase. But, great as this was, I say that the adoption of the new constitution is an object of much greater concern. The parents of a child may rejoice at his birth, as a happy circumstance, but his character and conduct in manhood only can give real and permanent pleasure; if these be bad, their pain is increased by disappointment; the recollection of their former joyous hopes, now augments their misery; yea, the misconduct of a son has frequently compelled his parents to curse the very day of his nativity. In this relation, the independence of America, and the new constitution exactly coincide. For if we adopt this plan of government in its present form; I say that we shall have reason to curse the day that America became independent. Horrid thought! that the greatest blessing God ever bestowed on a nation, should terminate in its misery and disgrace. Strange reverse this! that the freemen of America, the favored of heaven, should submit to a government so arbitrary in its embrio, that even a bill of rights cannot be obtained, to secure to the people their unalienable privileges. It was a common saying among many sensible men in Great Britain and Ireland, in the time of the war, that they doubted whether the great men of America, who had taken an active part in favor of independence, were influenced by pure patriotism: that it was not the love of their country they had so much at heart, as their own private interest; that a thirst after dominion and power, and not to protect the oppressed from the oppressor, was the great operative principle that induced these men to oppose Britain so strenuously. This seemingly illiberal sentiment, was however generally denied by the well-hearted and unsuspecting friends of American liberty in Europe, who could not suppose that men would engage in so noble a cause through such base motives. But alas! the truth of the sentiment is now indisputably confirmed; facts are stubborn things, and these set the matter beyond.controversy. The new constitution, and the conduct of its despotic advocates, shew that these men's doubts were really well founded. Unparalleled duplicity! that men should oppose tyranny under a pretence of patriotism, that they might themselves become the tyrants. How does such villainy disgrace human nature! Ah, my fellow-citizens, you have been strangely deceived indeed; when the wealthy of your own country assisted you to expel the foreign tyrant, only with a view to substitute themselves in his stead. But < we want an efficient federal government; we want an efficient federal government: this is the constant theme of the day. Well, my friends, I grant this. But what is the ultimate end of an efficient government: in what should it be efficient? I hope you anticipate my answer. The only thing in which a government should be efficient, is to protect the liberties, lives, and property of the people governed, from foreign and domestic violence. This, and this only is what every government should do effectually. For any government to do more than this is impossible, and every one that falls short of it is defective.> Let us now compare the new constitution with this legitimate definition of an efficient government, and we shall find that it has scarce a particle of an efficient government in its whole composition. In the first place then it does not protect the people in those liberties and privileges that all freemen should hold sacred—The liberty of conscience, the liberty of the press, the liberty of trial by jury, &c. are all unprotected by this constitution. And in respect to protecting our property it can have no pretensions whatever to that; for the taxes must and will be so enormously oppressive, for supporting this expensive government, that the whole produce of our farms would not be sufficient to pay them. As to this government being efficient, or rather sufficient to protect the people from the violence of a foreign enemy; the idea is so absurd that it offends common sense; it can neither have strength, energy, nor respectability, in the great scale of nations. For a new country to become strong and energetic, so as to be able to repel a foreign foe; the government must be free and patriotic, and the people must be wealthy and well-affected to it. Now if these requisites be wanting, that country is in jeopardy every moment; in fact it is on the direct road of falling a prey to the surrounding nations. In this miserable predicament, then, must America stand if we adopt the new constitution: for the government will neither be free nor patriotic, but on the contrary, despotic and oppressive; and the people will be abject slaves toiling to support a government, which they curse in their hearts: a government composed only of an emperor and a few lordlings, surrounded by thousands of blood-suckers, and cringing sycophants. And in respect to the standing army, it will only be made up of profligate idle ruffians, whose prowess will chiefly consist in feats of cruelty exercised on their innocent fellow citizens; but in facing a foreign foe, they will prove themselves a body' of mean cowards; like the Turkish janizaries, better acquainted with plundering their country than fighting for its protection. In regard to a militia defending the country, the thing is still more absurd if possible. Who in his senses could suppose that people with their spirits broken by oppression, should voluntarily fight for that government, to which they are necessarily disaffected? No truly, common sense would point out to government that its safety could not be the object of the people arming: and hence it is plain, that even were the militia willing to act, such a government would not trust them. Lastly, in respect to a navy, it is matter of mere moonshine, such an expensive government as this would be, could not spare as much money in fifty years, as would build three ships of the line. This is a short portrait of the efficiency of our efficient federal govern ment. What think you of it, my fellow citizens? Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-iii-1787-12-5/20160502212955/

December 25, 1788 Observations the New Federal Constitution In order to form a good Constitution of Government, the legislature should be properly organized, and be vested with plenary powers for all the purposes for which the government was instituted, to be exercised for the public good as occasion may require. The greatest security that a people can have for the enjoyment of their rights and liberties, is that no laws can be made to bind them nor any taxes imposed upon them without their consent by representatives of their own chusing, who will participate with them in the public burthens and benefits; this was the great point contended for in our controversy with Great Britain, and this will be fully secured to us by the new constitution. The rights of the people will be secured by a representation in proportion to their numbers in one branch of the legislature, and the rights of the particular states by their equal representation in the other branch. The President and Vice-President as well as the members of Congress will be eligible for the fixed periods, and may be re-elect as often as the electors shall think fit, which will be a great security for their fidelity in office, and give greater stability and energy to government than an exclusion by rotation, and will be an operative and effectual security against arbitrary government, either monarchial or aristocratic. The immediate security of the civil and domestic rights of the people will be in the government of the particular states. And as the different states have different local interests and customs which can be best regulated by their own laws, it should not be expedient to admit the federal government to interfere with them, any farther than may be necessary for the good of the whole. The great end of the federal government is to protect the several states in the enjoyment of those rights, against foreign invasion, and to preserve peace and a beneficial intercourse among themselves; and to regulate and protect our commerce with foreign nations. These were not sufficiently provided for by the former articles of confederation, which was the occasion of calling the late Convention to make amendments. This they have done by forming a new constitution containing the powers vested in the federal government, under the former, with such additional powers as they deemed necessary to attain the ends the states had in view, in their appointment. And to carry those powers into effect, they though it necessary to make some alterations in the organization of the government: this they supposed to be warranted by their commission. The powers vested in the federal government are clearly defined, so that each state still retain its sovereignty in what concerns its own internal government, and a right to exercise every power of a sovereign state not particularly delegated to the government of the United States. The new powers vested in the United States, are, to regulate commerce; provide for a uniform practice respecting naturalization, bankruptcies, and organizing, arming and training the militia; and for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States; and for promoting the progress of science in the mode therein pointed out. There are some other matters which Congress has power under the present confederation to require to be done by the particular states, which they will be authorized to carry into effect themselves under the new constitution; these powers appear to be necessary for the common benefit of the states, and could not be effectually provided for by the particular states. The objects of expenditure will be the same under the new constitution, as under the old; nor need the administration of government be more expensive; the number of members of Congress will be the same, nor will it be necessary to increase the number of officers in the executive department or their salaries; the supreme executive will be in a single person, who must have an honourable support; which perhaps will not exceed the present allowance to the President of Congress, and the expence of supporting a committee of the states in the recess of Congress. It is not probable that Congress will have occasion to sit longer than two or three months in a year, after the first session, which may perhaps be something longer. Nor will it be necessary for the Senate to sit longer than the other branch. The appointment of officers may be made during the session of Congress, and trials on impeachment will not often occur, and will require little time to attend to them. The security against keeping up armies in time of peace will be greater under the new constitution than under the present, because it can’t be done without the concurrence of two branches of the legislature, nor can any appropriation of money for that purpose be in force more than two years; whereas there is no restriction under the present confederation. The liberty of the press can be in no danger, because that is not put under the direction of the new government. If the federal government keeps within its proper jurisdiction, it will be the interest of the state legislatures to support it, and they will be a powerful and effectual check to its interfering with their jurisdiction. But the objects of federal government will be so obvious that there will be no great danger of any interference. The principal sources of revenue will be imposts on goods imported, and sale of the western lands, which will probably be sufficient to pay the debts and expences of the United States while peace continues; but if there should be occasion to resort to direct taxation, each state’s quota will be ascertained according to a rule which has been approved by the legislatures of eleven of the states, and should any state neglect to furnish its quota, Congress may raise it in the same manner that the state ought to have done; and what remedy more easy and equitable could be devised, to obtain the supplies from a delinquent state? Some object, that the representation will be too small; but the states have not thought fit to keep half the number of representatives in Congress that they are entitled to under the present confederation; and of what advantage can it be to have a large assembly to transact the few general matters that will come under the direction of Congress.–The regulating of time, place and manner of elections seems to be as well secured as possible; the legislature of each state may do it, and if they neglect to do it in the best manner, it may be done by Congress;–and what motive can either have to injure the people in the exercise of that right? the qualifications of the electors are to remain as fixed by the constitutions and laws of the several states. It is by some objected, that the executive is blended with the legislature, and that those powers ought to be entirely distinct and unconnected, but is not this a gross error in politics? The united wisdom and various interests of a nation should be combined in framing the laws. But the execution of them should not be in the whole legislature; that would be too troublesome and expensive; but it will not thence follow that the executive should have no voice or influence in legislation. The executive in Great Britain is one branch of the legislature, and has a negative on all laws; perhaps that is an extreme not to be imitated by a republic, but the partial negative vested in the President by the new Constitution on the acts of Congress and the subsequent revision, may be very useful to prevent laws being passed without mature deliberation. The Vice-President while he acts as President of the Senate will have nothing to do in the executive department; his being elected by all the states will incline him to regard the interests of the whole, and when the members of the senate are equally divided on any question, who so proper to give a casting vote as one who represents all the states? The power of the President to grant pardons extends only to offences committed against the United States, which can’t be productive of much mischief, especially as those on Impeachment are excepted, which will include offenders from office. It was thought necessary in order to carry into effect the laws of the Union, to promote justice, and preserve harmony among the states, to extend the judicial powers of the United States to the enumerated cases, under such regulations and with such exceptions as shall be provided by law, which will doubtless reduce them to cases of such magnitude and importance as cannot safely be trusted to the final decision of the courts of particular states; and the constitution does not make it necessary that any inferior tribunals should be instituted, but it may be done if found necessary; ’tis probable that the courts of particular states will be authorized by the laws of the union, as has been heretofore done in cases of piracy, &c., and the Supreme Court may have a circuit to make trials as convenient, and as little expensive as possible to the parties; nor is there anything in the constitution to deprive them of trial by jury in cases where that mode of trial has been heretofore used. All cases in the courts of common law between citizens of the same state, except those claiming lands under grants of different states, must be finally decided by courts of the state to which they belong, so that it is not probable that more than one citizen to a thousand will ever have a cause that can come before a federal court. Every departure and officer of the federal government will be subject to the regulation and control of the laws, and the people will have all possible securities against oppression. Upon the whole, the constitution appears to be well framed to secure the rights and liberties of the people and for preserving the governments of the individual states, and if well administered, to restore and secure public and private credit, and to give respectability to the states both abroad and at home. Perhaps a more perfect one could not be formed on mere speculation; and if upon experience it shall be found deficient, it provides an easy and peaceable mode to make amendments. It is not much better to adopt it than to continue in present circumstances? Its being agreed to by all the states present in Convention, is a circumstance in its favour, so far as any respect is due to their opinions. Source: https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/a-citizen-of-new-haven-ii/

December 18, 1788 Observations on the Alterations Proposed as Amendments to the new Federal Constitution Six of the states have adopted the new constitution without proposing any alteration, and the most of those proposed by the conventions of other states may be provided for by congress in a code of laws without altering the constitution. If congress may be safely trusted with the affairs of the Union, and have sufficient powers for that purpose, and possess no powers but such as respect the common interest of the states (as I have endeavored to show in a former piece), then all the matters that can be regulated by law may safely be left to their discretion, and those will include all that I have noticed except the following, which I think on due consideration will appear to be improper or unnecessary. 1. It is proposed that the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the members present in this branch of the congress shall be required for passing certain acts. On which I would observe, that this would give a minority in congress power to controul the majority, joined with the concurrent voice of the president, for if the president dissents, no act can pass without the consent of two-thirds of the members in each branch of congress; and would not that be contrary to the general principles of republican government? 2. That impeachments ought not to be tried by the senate, or not by the senate alone. But what good reason can be assigned why the senate is not the most proper tribunal for that purpose? The members are to be chosen by the legislatures of the several states, who will doubtless appoint persons of wisdom and probity, and from their office can have no interested motives to partiality. The house of peers in Great Britain try impeachments and are also a branch of the legislature. 3. It is said that the president ought not to have power to grant pardons in cases of high treason, but the congress. It does not appear that any great mischief can arise from the exercise of this power by the president (though perhaps it might as well have been lodged in congress). The president cannot pardon in case of impeachment, so that such offenders may be excluded from office notwithstanding his pardon. 4. It is proposed that members of congress be rendered ineligible to any other office during the time for which they are elected members of that body. This is an objection that will admit of something plausible to be said on both sides, and it was settled in convention on full discussion and deliberation. There are some offices which a member of congress may be best qualified to fill, from his knowledge of public affairs acquired by being a member, such as minister to foreign courts, &c., and on accepting any other office his seat in congress will be vacated, and no member is ineligible to any office that shall have been instituted or the emoluments increased while he was a member. 5. It is proposed to make the president and senators ineligible after certain periods. But this would abridge the privilege of the people, and remove one great motive to fidelity in office, and render persons incapable of serving in offices on account of their experience, which would best qualify them for usefulness in office–but if their services are not acceptable they may be left out at any new election. 6. It is proposed that no commercial treaty should be made without the consent of two-thirds of the senators, nor any cession of territory, right of navigation or fishery, without the consent of three-fourths of the members present in each branch of congress. It is provided by the constitution that no commercial treaty shall be made by the president without the consent of two-thirds of the senators present, and as each state has an equal representation and suffrage in the senate, the rights of the state will be as well secured under the new constitution as under the old; and it is not probable that they would ever make a cession of territory or any important national right without the consent of congress. The king of Great Britain has by the constitution a power to make treaties, yet in matters of great importance he consults the parliament. 7. There is one amendment proposed by the convention of South Carolina respecting religious tests, by inserting the word other, between the words no and religious in that article, which is an ingenious thought, and had that word been inserted, it would probably have prevented any objection on that head. But it may be considered as a clerical omission and be inserted without calling a convention; as it now stands the effect will be the same. On the whole it is hoped that all the states will consent to make a fair trial of the constitution before they attempt to alter it; experience will best show whether it is deficient or not, on trial it may appear that the alterations that have been proposed are not necessary, or that others not yet thought of may be necessary; everything that tends to disunion ought to be avoided. Instability ion government and laws tends to weaken a state and render the rights of the people precarious. If another convention should be called to revise the constitution, ’tis not likely they would be more unanimous than the former; they might judge differently in some things, but is it certain that they would judge better? When experience has convinced the states and people in general that alterations are necessary, they may be easily made, but attempting it at present may be detrimental if not fatal to the union of the states. The judiciary department is perhaps the most difficult to be precisely limited by the constitution, but congress have full power to regulate it by law, and it may be found necessary to vary the regulations at different times as circumstances may differ. Congress may make requisitions for supplies previous to direct taxation, if it should be thought to be expedient, but if requisitions be made and some states comply and others not, the noncomplying states must be considered and treated as delinquents, which will tend to excite disaffection and disunion among the states, besides occasioning delay; but if congress lay the taxes in the first instance these evils will be prevented, and they will doubtless accommodate the taxes to the customs and convenience of the several states. Some suppose that the representation will be too small, but I think it is in the power of congress to make it too large, but I believe that it may be safely trusted with them. Great Britain contains about three times the number of the inhabitants in the United States, and according to Burgh’s account in his political disquisitions, the members of parliament in that kingdom do not exceed 131, and if 69 more be added from the principal cities and towns the number would be 200; and strike off those who are elected by the small boroughs, which are called the rotten part of the constitution by their best patriots and politicians, that nation would be more equally and better represented than at present; and if that would be a sufficient number for their national legislature, one-third of that number will be more than sufficient for our federal legislature who will have few general matters to transact. But these and other objections have been considered in a former paper, before referred to. I shall therefore conclude this with my best wishes for the continuance of the peace, liberty and union of these states. Source: https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/a-citizen-of-new-haven-i/

(February 6, 1788) MR. PRINTER, It is the fate of political controversies to begin with argument and end with abuse: And hence we find, in many instances, that a subject which for a time, has engaged the most earnest attention of the people, is at length quitted with horror and disgust. The question, however, concerning the total adoption of the plan of government, proposed by the late federal convention, is too important for good men to suffer themselves to be diverted from giving it a full consideration by the bouncing of squibs or the whizzing of political firebrands. I therefore persuade myself that a few candid observations on this subject will yet be heard with attention. The real question is this;-Whether the people of this country ought to adopt the proposed constitution in its present form, without limitation or alteration, or whether we ought to insist upon amendments being made previous to its adoption. Most men seem to agree that amendments ought to be made in the proposed plan in some stage of the business; and all seem agreed that an efficient form of continental government ought to be established. Shall we then first adopt the constitution and afterwards amend it; or shall we first amend it and afterwards adopt it? Let us for a moment consider the propriety of adopting it first, and trusting to its being afterwards amended. These necessary amendments, after the constitution is adopted, can only be made in one or two ways;-either by our future rulers in the continental legislature by their own act-or in the way provided for in the fifth article, by a convention to be called for proposing amendments, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, or whenever the legislatures of two-thirds of the states shall make application for that purpose, such amendments afterwards to be valid if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, if Congress should think proper to call them. This latter mode is so intricate, that an attempt to investigate it is like endeavouring to trace the windings of a labyrinth, and I have therefore observed that people willingly turn aside from the subject, as confused and disgusting. Some former observations on this article I found were very little attended to: However I will attempt once more to find a clue to its mazes, after I shall first have considered that more inviting ground of expectation to which most of those who assume the name of fœderalists turn their eyes with so much confidence. First then, the general expectation seems to be that our future rulers will rectify all that is amiss. If a bill of rights is wanting, they will frame a bill of rights. If too much power is vested in them, they will not abuse it; nay, they will divest themselves of it. The very first thing they will do, will be to establish the liberties of the people by good and wholesome ordinances, on so solid a foundation as to baffle all future encroachments from themselves or their sucessors. Much good no doubt might be done in this way; if Congress should possess the most virtuous inclinations, yet there are some things which it will not be in their power to rectify. For instance; the appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, which is given to the supreme court of the continent, and which annihilates the trial by jury in all civil causes, the Congress can only modify:-They cannot extinguish this power, so destructive to the principles of real liberty. It would not by any means be extravagant to say, that a new continental convention ought to be called, if it were only for the sake of preserving that sacred palladium-THE INESTIMABLE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY. - But even if we were to delude ourselves so far as to believe that it would be entirely in the power of the future legislature to set every thing right, to build up our liberties against all invasions, and to protect us from every political calamity, still we ought not to repose all our liberty and all our happiness in the virtue of our future rulers. I speak not with reference to any particular set of men. I pretend not to know who will be our rulers one year hence. In the state of Pennsylvania I have seen the administration of our constitution in the hands of its bitterest enemies, during near one half of its existence; and I shall not be at all surprized to find that if the new continental government shall be set a-going, that the jockies who at present have vaulted into the saddle; should be the first to be thrown into the dirt and trampled upon; nor, on the other hand, that some of those who are foremost in contending for a permanent security to the rights of the people, should be in the first rank of oppressors. These things have frequently happened; and the only safe way of reasoning on political subjects is, to consider men, abstractly as men, with like passions and infirmities throughout the world, in every age, and every country; and to believe that the same guards and checks against arbitrary power, which were necessary two thousand years ago, are equally necessary at present, and will be so two thousand years hence. Idolatry is the parent of errors in politics as well as religion;-and an implicit confidence in our rulers now, will be abused as much as implicit confidence in priests ever was in the days of superstition. I know well that instances of political moderation may be found, and a tyrant has before now descended from the plenitude of power, satiated with dominion, or worn out with care; but there is not one instance on record in all history of a number of men voluntarily abandoning the powers of an aristocracy. Look at the Decemviri, look at the thirty tyrants of Athens, look at all the lordly aristocracies that ever existed, and shew me one instance-such an instance cannot be shewn. Nay farther, a single monarch has many times used his power with moderation; but a number of men combined in an aristocracy, never knew what moderation meant. They are all struggling to be most powerful, all aiming to enrich themselves and provide for their friends, and all of them plundering the people. And shall we foolisly, after so many thousand examples, trust to the virtue and moderation of our future rulers, to divest themselves of those powers which may be abused to our prejudice, and are no way useful to our protection? Not to insist upon Swift's ludicrous tale of Jack's hanging himself at the instigation of Humphry Hocus, on the promise of being cut down before he should be dead, and when he had hanged himself, of being left to kick his heels in the air, the moral of which, by the bye, is strictly founded in human nature;-let us attend to a more serious fable.-"A man, says Aesop, coming into a wood, begged the trees to grant him the favor of a handle to his axe. The whole forest consented; upon which he provided himself with a strong handle; which he had no sooner done, than he began to fell the trees without number, then the trees, though too late, repented of their weakness, and an universal groan was heard throughout the forest. At length, when the man came to cut down the tree which had furnished him with the handle, the trunk fell to the ground uttering these words: Fool that I was! I have been the cause of my own destruction." If we perish in America, we shall have no better comfort than the same mortifying reflection, that we have been the cause of our own destruction. I have said that many of the liberties which, by the proposed constitution, are to be surrendered up into the hands of our rulers, will be of no use towards the protection of the people; and a little reflection will convince us, that it is certainly the case. If, indeed, government were really strengthened by such surrender, if the body of the people were made more secure, or more happy by the means, we ought to make the sacrifice. An individual ought to submit to be tossed about, imprisoned and treated injuriously, if the good of his country should require it; and every individual in the community ought to strip himself of some convenience for the sake of the public good. I know it is an error not uncommon to believe, that a government is the more powerful in proportion as it is more tyrannical; but this is not the case: so far from it, that it has always been found, that free countries have been able to exert powers far superior to those in which a more absolute government prevailed. For instance, a senate which is master of its own elections, without any or with very little dependence on the people, would not be able to exert as much force as a senate which is freely elected by the people; because the chearful support which would be yielded in the latter case, would far exceed that which could be exacted by the mere force of authority. Again; how could the stripping people of the right of trial by jury conduce to the strength of the state? Do we find the government in England at all weakened by the people retaining the right of trial by jury? Far from it. Yet these things which merely tend to oppress the people, without conducing at all to the strength of the state, are the last which aristocratic rulers would consent to restore to the people; because they encrease the personal power and importance of the rulers. Judges, unincumbered by juries, have been ever found much better friends to government than to the people. Such judges will always be more desireable than juries to a self-created senate, upon the same principle that a large standing army, and the entire command of the militia and of the purse, is ever desireable to those who wish to enslave the people, and upon the same principle that a bill of rights is their aversion. In like manner, if we should trace the several branches of the proposed constitution, which are obnoxious to the liberties of the people, we shall find them to consist of such articles as are rather fitted to encrease the powers of the rulers, than the strength of the nation. Union is the great source of strength to a nation, not vassalage. To an aristocractic government vassalage is the great object even at the expence of union among the people. We ought not, therefore, by any means to rely upon the virtue of our future rulers for a reformation of those things which at present are amiss in the proposed constitution. The president and senate will ever be grasping at more and more power until they are completely masters of the people, and the president at last master of all. Let us then turn to the article in the proposed constitution, which provides for the making alterations at some future period; and let us figure to ourselves the time when two-thirds of both houses of Congress shall think it necessary to call a convention, or two-thirds of the legislatures of the individual states shall apply for the calling of a convention, and when a continental convention shall agree upon amendments, and when the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or three-fourths of the conventions to be called in the several states, if Congress shall prefer that mode of proceeding, shall ratify such amendments; and again, after all these strainings, and filtrings, and refinings, of the hopes and expectations of the people through the channels of power, when the amendments so asked for, proposed, digested, twistificated, altered, and at last ratified, will be of any essential importance. For my part I would full as soon sit down and take my chance of winning an important privilege to the people, by the casting the dice 'till I could throw sixes an hundred times in succession.-There is no doubt but the thing has been purposely contrived to make alterations extremely difficult; and so it certainly ought to be if the proposed constitution were a good one. I do not therefore so much blame the late federal convention for making their constitution very difficult of alteration, as I insist upon it as an argument in favor of making our amendments beforehand. A machine which cannot be taken to pieces after it is once set a-going, ought to be very well finished at first. Yet this is not all the difficulty. Inveterate power is at all times very hard to be controuled. Habits, connexions, dependence, and a thousand circumstances in course of time, rivet the chains of slavery 'till we grow either callous to their galling, or too feeble to shake them off, or too listless to resist. Ask the beaten Turk to resume his liberty, or the tired horse to resume his pristine freedom.-As well might you ask the galled sons of America, a few years hence, to assert the native rights of men, if the proposed constitution be once fixed upon us. It will be extremely difficult to change it for the better even in the beginning; but in a little time it will become utterly impossible. A little prudence, a little patience, and a little serious reflection, would lead us to concur in calling a new convention, to revise the constitution proposed to us. That convention, I have no doubt, if fully, freely, and deliberately chosen, would concur in some essential amendments; and we might yet be a united and a happy people. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/an-old-whig-viii-1788-2-6/20130122084431/

(November 28, 1787) Mr. PRINTER, Many people seem to be convinced that the proposed constitution is liable to a number of important objections; that there are defects in it which ought to be supplied, and errors which ought to be amended; but they apprehend that we must either receive this constitution in its present form, or be left without any continental government whatsoever. To be sure, if this were the case, it would be most prudent for us, like a man who is wedded to a bad wife, to submit to our misfortune with patience, and make the best of a bad bargain. But if we will summon up resolution sufficient to examine into our true circumstances, we shall find that we are not in so deplorable a situation as people have been taught to believe, from the suggestions of interested men, who wish to force down the proposed plan of government without delay, for the purpose of providing offices for themselves and their friends. We shall find, that, with a little wisdom and patience, we have it yet in our power, not only to establish a federal constitution, but to establish a good one. It is true that the continental convention has directed their proposed constitution to be laid before a convention of delegates to be chosen in each state, "for their assent and ratification," which seems to preclude the idea of any power in the several conventions, of proposing any alterations, or indeed of even rejecting the plan proposed, if they should disapprove of it.1 Still, however, the question recurs, what authority the late convention had to bind the people of the United States, to any particular form of government, or to forbid them to adopt such form of government as they should think fit I know it is a language frequent in the mouths of some heaven-born PHAETONS amongst us, who like the son of Apollo, think themselves entitled to guide the chariot of the sun; that common people have no right to judge of the affairs of government; that they are not fit for it; that they should leave these matters to their superiors. This however, is not the language of men of real understanding, even among the advocates for the proposed constitution; but these still recognize the authority of the people, and will admit, at least in words, that the people have a right to be consulted. Then I ask, if the people in the different states have a right to be consulted, in the new form of continental government, what authority could the late convention have to preclude them from proposing amendments to the plan they should offer? Had the convention any right to bind the people to the form of government they should propose? Let us consider this matter. The late convention were chosen by the general assembly of each state; they had the sanction of Congress;-for what? To consider what alterations were necessary to be made in the articles of confederation. What have they done? They have made a new constitution for the United States. I will not say, that in doing so, they have exceeded their authority; but on the other hand, I trust that no man of understanding amongst them will pretend to say, that any thing they did or could do, was of the least avail to lessen the rights of the people to judge for themselves in the last resort. This right, is perhaps, unalienable, but at all events, there is no pretence for saying that this right was ever meant to be surrendered up into the hands of the late continental convention. The people have an undoubted right to judge of every part of the government which is offered to them: No power on earth has a right to preclude them; and they may exercise this choice either by themselves or their delegates legally chosen to represent them in the State-Convention-I venture to say that no man, reasoning upon revolution principles, can possibly controvert this right. Indeed very few go so far as to controvert the right of the people to propose amendments; but we are told that the thing is impracticable; that if we begin to propose amendments there will be no end to them; that the several states will never agree in their amendments; that we shall never unite in any plan; that if we reject this we shall either have a worse or none at all; that we ought therefore to adopt this at once, without alteration or amendment.-Now these are very kind gentlemen, who insist upon doing so much good for us, whether we will or not. Idiots and maniacs ought certainly to be restrained from doing themselves mischief, and should be compelled to that which is for their own good. Whether the people of America are to be considered in this light, and treated accordingly, is a question which deserves perhaps, more consideration than it has yet received. A contest between the patients and their doctors, which are mad or which are fools, might possibly be a very unhappy one. I hope at least that we shall be able to settle this important business without so preposterous a dispute. What then would you have us do, it may be asked? Would you have us adopt the proposed Constitution or reject it? I answer that I would neither wish the one nor the other. Though I would be far from pretending to dictate to the representatives of the people what steps ought to be pursued, yet a method seems to present itself so simple, so perfectly calculated to obviate all difficulties, to reconcile us with one another, and establish unanimity and harmony among the people of this country, that I cannot forbear to suggest it. I hope that most of my readers have already anticipated me in what I am about to propose. Whether they have or not, I shall venture to state it, in the humble expectations that it may have some tendency to reconcile honest men of all parties with one another. The method I would propose is this- 1st. Let the Conventions of each state, as they meet, after considering the proposed Constitution, state their objections and propose their amendments. So far from these objections and amendments clashing with each other in irreconcileable discord, as it has been too often suggested they would do, it appears that from what has been hitherto published in the different states in opposition to the proposed Constitution, we have a right to expect that they will harmonize in a very great degree. The reason I say so, is, that about the same time, in very different parts of the continent, the very same objections have been made, and the very same alterations proposed by different writers, who I verily believe, know nothing at all of each other, and were very far from acting a premeditated concert, and that others who have not appeared as writers in the newspapers, in the different states, have appeared to act and speak in perfect unison with those objections and amendments, particularly in the article of a Bill of Rights. That in short, the very same sentiments seem to have been echoed from the different parts of the continent by the opposers of the proposed Constitution, and these sentiments have been very little contradicted by its friends, otherwise than by suggesting their fears, that by opposing the Constitution at present proposed, we might be disappointed any federal government or receive a worse one than the present.-It would be a most delightful surprize to find ourselves all of one opinion at last; and I cannot forbear hoping that when we come fairly to compare our sentiments, we shall find ourselves much more nearly agreed than in the hurry and surprize in which we have been involved on this subject, than we ever suffered ourselves to imagine. 2d. When the Conventions have stated these objections and amendments, let them transmit them to Congress and adjourn, praying that Congress will direct another Convention to be called from the different states, to consider of these objections and amendments, and pledging themselves to abide by whatever decision shall be made by such future Convention on the subject; whether it be to amend the proposed Constitution or to reject any alteration and ratify it as it stands. 3d. If a new Convention of the United States should meet, and revise the proposed Constitution, let us agree to abide by their decision.-It is past a doubt that every good citizen of America pants for an efficient federal government-I have no doubt we shall concur at last in some plan of continental government, even if many people could imagine exceptions to it; but if the exceptions which are made at present, shall be maturely considered and even be pronounced by our future representatives as of no importance; (which I trust they will not) even in that case, I have no doubt that almost every man, will give up his own private opinion and concur in that decision. 4th. If by any means another Continental Convention should fail to meet, then let the Conventions of the several states again assemble and at last decide the great solemn question whether we shall adopt the Constitution now proposed, or reject it? And, whenever it becomes necessary to decide upon this point, one at least who from the beginning has been invariably anxious for the liberty and independence of his country, will concur in adopting and supporting this Constitution, rather than none; -though I confess I could easily imagine, some other form of confederation, which should think better entitled to my hearty approbation;-and indeed I am not afraid of a worse. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/an-old-whig-vii-1787-11-28/20160502201616/

(November 2, 1787) Mr. PRINTER, I think it is an observation of Dean Swift, that, in political matters, all men can feel, though all cannot see. Agreeably to this doctrine we find, that the necessity of giving additional powers to Congress is at length felt by all men, though it was not foreseen by a great number of the people. As the states individually could not protect our trade, foreign nations, friends as well as enemies, have combined against it; and at the same time that our trade is more beneficial to any nation in Europe, than the trade of any nation in Europe is to us, because we export provisions and raw materials and receive manufactures in return: we are not suffered to be the carriers of our own produce-foreign bottoms engross the whole of our carrying trade, and we are obliged to pay them for doing that which it is the interest of every people to do for themselves. Our shipwrights are starved, our seamen driven abroad for want of employ, our timber left useless on our hands, our ironworks, once a very profitable branch of business, now almost reduced to nothing, and our money banished from the country. These with the train concomitant evils which always attend the loss of trade, or a state of trade which is unprofitable, have justly alarmed us all; and I am firmly pursuaded that scarcely a man of common sense can be found, that does not wish for an efficient federal government, and lament that it has been delayed so long. Yet at the same time it is matter of immense consequence, in establishing a government which is to last for ages, and which, if it be suffered to depart from the principles of liberty in the beginning, will in all probability, never return to them, that we consider carefully what sort of government we are about to form. Power is very easily encreased; indeed it naturally grows in every government; but it hardly ever lessens. The misfortunes under which we have for some time laboured, and which still press us severely, would be in a great measure alleviated, if not wholly removed, by devolving upon Congress the power of regulating trade and laying and collecting duties and imposts. If these powers were once fully vested in Congress, trade would immediately assume a new face, money and people would flow in upon us, and the vast tracts of ungranted lands would be a mine of wealth for many years to come. I am pursuaded, that with this addition to the powers of Congress, we should soon find them sufficient for every purpose; and it is very certain that if we did not find them sufficient, we could easily encrease them.1 But instead of being contented with this, the late convention by their proposed constitution, seem to have resolved to give the new continental government every kind of power whatsoever, throughout the United States. This power I have already attempted to show, is not limited by any stipulations in favour of the liberty of the subject, and it is easy to shew, that it will be equally unchecked by any restraint from the individual states. The treasure of the whole continent will be entirely at their command. "The Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." And what are the individual states to do, or how are they to subsist? may they also lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises? If they should, the miserable subject will be like sheep twice shorne; the skin must follow the fleece. But the fact is, that no individual state can collect a penny, unless by the permission of Congress; for the "laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary, notwithstanding." The laws of the individual states, will be only Leges sub graviore Lege: for the power of enacting laws necessarily implies the power of repealing laws; and therefore Congress, being the supreme legislatures, may annul or repeal the laws of the individual states, whenever they please. Not a single source of revenue will remain to any state, which Congress may not stop at their sovereign will and pleasure; for if any state attempt to impose a tax or levy a duty, contrary to the inclination of Congress, they have only to exert their supreme legislative power and the law imposing such tax or duty, is done away in a moment. For instance, it will very soon be found inconvenient to have two sets of excise officers in each town or county in every state, they will be in danger of clashing with each other, it will then be found "necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or in some department or officer thereof," to forbid the individual states to levy anymore excise. Congress may chuse to impose a stamp-duty. It will be very inconvenient for people to run back and forward to different offices, to procure double stamps, and therefore it will be thought "necessary and proper" to forbid any state to meddle with stamp-duties. The same will be the case with many other taxes. They will be in danger of clashing with each other, if Congress and the several states should happen to lay taxes on the same article. The States therefore individually, will be restrained from imposing any taxes upon such articles as Congress shall think proper to tax. They must then try to find out other articles for taxation, which Congress have not thought proper to touch. This I fear will be a difficult task: for the expensive court to be maintained by the great president, the pay of the standing army and the numerous crouds of hungry expectants, who have lost their all, and it will be said, have lost it by their zeal for the new constitution, must necessarily employ the sharpest wits among their ablest financiers, to devise every possible mode of taxation; and besides, if an individual state should hit upon a new tax that should happen to be productive, there is no doubt but it would soon be taken from it and appropriated to the use of the United States. The inhabitants of the TEN MILE SQUARE, would find ways and means to dispose of all the money that could possibly be raised in every part of the United States. What then will become of the separate governments? They will be annihilated; absolutely annihilated; for no man will ever submit to the wretchedness and contempt of holding any office under them. The advocates of the proposed constitution, seem to be aware of the difficulty I have hinted at, and therefore it is, I presume, that in conversation as well as in their publications, we are told that under the proposed constitution, "direct taxation will be unnecessary;" that "it is probable the principal branch of revenue will be duties on imports." Some of those who have used such language in public and private, I believe to be very honest men; and would therefore ask of them, what security they can give us, that the future government of the continent will in any measure confine themselves to the duties upon imports, or that the utmost penny will not be exacted which can possibly be collected - either by direct or indirect taxation? How can they answer for the conduct of our future rulers? We have heard enough of these fair promises for the good behaviour of men in office, to learn to doubt of their fulfilment, unless we guard ourselves by much better security, there will be no bounds to the new government. They will not have as much to spare for the separate states to collect as Lazarus picked up of the fragments from the rich man's table. There are mouths at this moment gaping in the United States for all that can possibly be collected;- a confederacy is already formed for dividing the public cake to the last crum; and I wish they may not quarrel for more. But if I were mistaken in this opinion; if in the language of these gentlemen, "it is probable that the principal branch of the public revenue will be duties on imports;" -if it is probable that these with the back lands and the post-office will be sufficient, where was the necessity of being in such haste to grant more;- to grant all without limits or restrictions? Men do not usually give up their whole purse where they can pay with part. Why might we not try at least how far the customs and back lands would go before we give all away from the seperate states, without reserving any thing for their support. The true line of distinction which should have been drawn in describing the powers of Congress, and those of the several states, should have been that between internal and external taxation. I am persuaded that the existence of the several states in their separate capacities, and of the United States in their collective capacity, depends upon the maintaining such distinction. Without the power of imposing duties on foreign commerce and regulating trade, the United States will be weak and contemptible, and, indeed, their union must be speedily dissolved: And on the other hand, if the Legislature of the United States shall possess the powers of internal as well as external taxation, the individual states in their separate capacities, will be less than the shadows of a name. I observe that the late delegates of Connecticut, their letter to the Governor, speak of the power of direct taxation as an authority which need not be exercised if each state will "furnish the quota." Yet there is no doubt but they may exercise this power if they choose to do it; and they alone will have the right of judging what quotas the several states shall be required to furnish. They may ask as much as they please, and if the states do not furnish all they ask, they may tax at their pleasure; under these circumstances the power of internal taxation will undoubtedly be exercised by the Continental Legislature. If it be said that it is to be expected that the Congress will exercise this power with moderation, I venture to pronounce that those who indulge such hopes, are not acquainted with the principles of human nature. Independent of the multitudinous expectations which the followers of the proposed Constitution entertain in their own favor, which alone, if gratified, would consume the treasures of two such continents as this; there is a spirit of rivalship in power, which will not suffer two suns to shine in the same firmament, one will speedily darken the other, and the individual states will be as totally eclipsed, as the stars in the meridian blaze of the sun. We have seen too much of this spirit in the several states, under the present loose and futile confederation. A jealousy of the powers of Congress in the separate states, which is founded in the same rivalship of power, and which, however contemptible it may appear, was alike founded in the principles of human nature, may furnish us an exemplary lesson upon this head: And when we verge to the other extreme by vesting all power in Congress, we shall find them equally jealous of any power in the individual states, and equally possessed of the same spirit of rivalship, which heretofore denied the necessary supplies from the states to Congress.- We shall never be able to support the collective powers of the United States in Congress, and the powers of the individual states in their separate capacities, without drawing the line fairly between them. If we leave the states individually to the mercy of the Continental Government, they will be stript of the last penny which is necessary for their support: if we give all powers to one, there will be nothing left for the others. The lust of dominion, where it is indulged, will swallow up the whole. But I shall be told that if Congress are left to depend upon requisitions from the individual states for any part of the necessary supplies, the same difficulty will remain which has hitherto existed; and I may be asked, what shall we do if the supplies should fall short? I answer that although nothing but a very serious necessity of money for continental purposes will ever procure supplies upon requisition from the separate states, yet when that necessity exists in any degree that is really alarming to the whole community, I do not think that such supplies are to be dispaired of. We have seen many instances of aid being furnished, even voluntarily upon pressing occasions, which should teach us to rely on the exertions of the states upon occasions of real and not mere imaginary necessity. One thing will certainly follow from the Continental Governments being restrained to external taxation;- that it will be under the necessity of exercising more oeconomy than it has done, especially during the late war. We have been witnesses of such a profuse expenditure of public money at some periods, as these states could never support. This profusion ought to convince us that if all the treasures of the continent are intrusted to the power of Congress, there is too much reason to fear that the whole will be consumed by them, and nothing left to the individual states;4 and judging from past experience we may venture to presage that the people will be fleeced without mercy, if no check is maintained upon the power of Congress in the articles of taxation. We ought to be very fully convinced of an absolute necessity existing before we entrust the whole power of taxation to the hands of Congress; and the moment we do so, we ought by consent to annihilate the individual states; for the powers of the individual states will be as effectually swallowed as a drop of water in the ocean; and the next consequence will be a speedy dissolution of our republican form of government. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/an-old-whig-vi-1787-11-2/20130122080425/

(November 1, 1787) MR. PRINTER, In order that people may be sufficiently impressed, with the necessity of establishing a BILL OF RIGHTS in the forming of a new constitution, it is very proper to take a short view of some of those liberties, which it is of the greatest importance for Freemen to retain to themselves, when they surrender up a part of their natural rights for the good of society. The first of these, which it is of the utmost importance for the people to retain to themselves, which indeed they have not even the right to surrender, and which at the same time it is of no kind of advantages to government to strip them of, is the LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE. I know that a ready answer is at hand, to any objections upon this head. We shall be told that in this enlightened age, the rights of conscience are perfectly secure: There is no necessity of guarding them; for no man has the remotest thoughts of invading them. If this be the case, I beg leave to reply that now is the very time to secure them.—Wise and prudent men always take care to guard against danger beforehand, and to make themselves safe whilst it is yet in their power to do it without inconvenience or risk.—who shall answer for the ebbings and flowings of opinion, or be able to say what will be the fashionable frenzy of the next generation? It would have been treated as a very ridiculous supposition, a year ago, that the charge of witchcraft would cost a person her life in the city of Philadelphia; yet the fate of the unhappy old woman called Corbmaker, who was beaten—repeatedly wounded with knives—mangled and at last killed in our streets, in obedience to the commandment which requires “that we shall not suffer a witch to live,” without a possibility of punishing or even of detecting the authors of this inhuman folly, should be an example to warn us how little we ought to trust to the unrestrained discretion of human nature. Uniformity of opinion in science, morality, politics or religion, is undoubtedly a very great happiness to mankind; and there have not been wanting zealous champions in every age, to promote the means of securing so invaluable a blessing. If in America we have not lighted up fires to consume Heretics in religion, if we have not persecuted unbelievers to promote the unity of the faith, in matters which pertain to our final salvation in a future world, I think we have all of us been witness to something very like the same spirit, in matters which are supposed to regard our political salvation in this world. In Boston it seems at this very moment, that no man is permitted to publish a doubt of the infallibility of the late convention, without giving up his name to the people, that he may be delivered over to speedy destruction; and it is but a short time since the case was little better in this city. Now this is a portion of the very same spirit, which has so often kindled the fires of the inquisition: and the same Zealot who would hunt a man down for a difference of opinion upon a political question which is the subject of public enquiry, if he should happen to be fired with zeal for a particular species of religion, would be equally intolerant. The fact is, that human nature is still the same that ever it was: the fashion indeed changes; but the seeds of superstition, bigotry and enthusiasm, are too deeply implanted in our minds, ever to be eradicated; and fifty years hence, the French may renew the persecution of the Huguenots, whilst the Spaniards in their turn may become indifferent to their forms of religion. They are idiots who trust their future security to the whim of the present hour. One extreme is always apt to produce the contrary, and those countries, which are now the most lax in their religious notions, may in a few years become the most rigid, just as the people of this country from not being able to bear any continental government at all, are now flying into the opposite extreme of surrendering up all the powers of the different states, to one continental government. The more I reflect upon the history of mankind, the more I am disposed to think that it is our duty to secure the essential rights of the people, by every precaution; for not an avenue has been left unguarded, through which oppression could possibly enter in any government; without some enemy of the public peace and happiness improving the opportunity to break in upon the liberties of the people; and none have been more frequently successful in the attempt, than those who have covered their ambitious designs under the garb of a fiery zeal for religious orthodoxy. What has happened in other countries and in other ages, may very possibly happen again in our own country, and for aught we know, before the present generation quits the stage of life. We ought therefore in a bill of rights to secure, in the first place, by the most express stipulations, the sacred rights of conscience. Has this been done in the constitution, which is now proposed for the consideration of the people of this country?—Not a word on this subject has been mentioned in any part of it; but we are left in this important article, as well as many others, entirely to the mercy of our future rulers. But supposing our future rulers to be wicked enough to attempt to invade the rights of conscience; I may be asked how will they be able to effect so horrible a design? I will tell you my friends—The unlimited power of taxation will give them the command of all the treasures of the continent; a standing army will be wholly at their devotion, and the authority which is given them over the militia, by virtue of which they may, if they please, change all the officers of the militia on the continent in one day, and put in new officers whom they can better trust; by which they can subject all the militia to strict military laws, and punish the disobedient with death, or otherwise, as they shall think right: by which they can march the militia back and forward from one end of the continent to the other, at their discretion; these powers, if they should ever fall into bad hands, may be abused to the worst of purposes. Let us instance one thing arising from this right of organizing and governing the militia. Suppose a man alledges that he is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing Arms.—By the bill of rights of Pennsylvania he is bound only to pay an equivalent for his personal service.—What is there in the new proposed constitution to prevent his being dragged like a Prussian soldier to the camp and there compelled to bear arms?—This will depend wholly upon the wisdom and discretion of the future legislature of the continent in the framing their militia laws; and I have lived long enough to hear the practice of commuting personal service for a paltry fine in time of war and foreign invasion most severely reprobated by some persons who ought to have judged more rightly on the subject—Such flagrant oppressions as these I dare say will not happen at the beginning of the new government; probably not till the powers of government shall be firmly fixed; but it is a duty we owe to ourselves and our posterity if possible to prevent their ever happening. I hope and trust that there are few persons at present hardy enough to entertain thoughts of creating any religious establishment for this country; although I have lately read a piece in the newspaper, which speaks of religious as well as civil and military offices, as being hereafter to be disposed of by the new government; but if a majority of the continental legislature should at any time think fit to establish a form of religion, for the good people of this continent, with all the pains and penalties which in other countries are annexed to the establishment of a national church, what is there in the proposed constitution to hinder their doing so? Nothing; for we have no bill of rights, and every thing therefore is in their power and at their discretion. And at whose discretion? We know not any more than we know the fates of those generations which are yet unborn. It is needless to repeat the necessity of securing other personal rights in the forming a new government. The same argument which proves the necessity of securing one of them shews also the necessity of securing others. Without a bill of rights we are totally insecure in all of them; and no man can promise himself with any degree of certainty that his posterity will enjoy the inestimable blessings of liberty of conscience, of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their thoughts on public matters, of trial by jury, of holding themselves, their houses and papers free from seizure and search upon general suspicion or general warrants; or in short that they will be secured in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property without depending on the will and pleasure of their rulers. If we pass over the consideration of this subject so essential to the preservation of our liberties, and turn our eyes to the form of the government which the Convention have proposed to us, I apprehend that changing the prospect will not wholly alleviate our fears.—A few words on this head, will close the present letter. In the first place the office of President of the United States appears to me to be clothed with such powers as are dangerous. To be the fountain of all honors in the United States, commander in chief of the army, navy and militia, with the power of making treaties and of granting pardons, and to be vested with an authority to put a negative upon all laws, unless two thirds of both houses shall persist in enacting it, and put their names down upon calling the yeas and nays for that purpose, is in reality to be a KING as much a King as the King of Great Britain, and a King too of the worst kind;—an elective King.—If such powers as these are to be trusted in the hands of any man, they ought for the sake of preserving the peace of the community at once to be made hereditary.—Much as I abhor kingly government, yet I venture to pronounce where kings are admitted to rule they should most certainly be vested with hereditary power. The election of a King whether it be in America or Poland, will be a scene of horror and confusion; and I am perfectly serious when I declare that, as a friend to my country, I shall despair of any happiness in the United States until this office is either reduced to a lower pitch of power or made perpetual and hereditary.—When I say that our future President will be as much a king as the king of Great-Britain, I only ask of my readers to look into the constitution of that country, and then tell me what important prerogative the King of Great-Britain is entitled to, which does not also belong to the President during his continuance in office.—The King of Great-Britain it is true can create nobility which our President cannot; but our President will have the power of making all the great men, which comes to the same thing.—All the difference is that we shall be embroiled in contention about the choice of the man, whilst they are at peace under the security of an hereditary succession.—To be tumbled headlong from the pinnacle of greatness and be reduced to a shadow of departed royalty is a shock almost too great for human nature to endure. It will cost a man many struggles to resign such eminent powers, and ere long, we shall find, some one who will be very unwilling to part with them.—Let us suppose this man to be a favorite with his army, and that they are unwilling to part with their beloved commander in chief; or to make the thing familiar, let us suppose, a future President and commander in chief adored by his army and the militia to as great a degree as our late illustrious commander in chief; and we have only to suppose one thing more, that this man is without the virtue, the moderation and love of liberty which possessed the mind of our late general, and this country will be involved at once in war and tyranny. So far is it from its being improbable that the man who shall hereafter be in a situation to make the attempt to perpetuate his own power, should want the virtues of General Washington; that it is perhaps a chance of one hundred millions to one that the next age will not furnish an example of so disinterested a use of great power. We may also suppose, without trespassing upon the bounds of probability, that this man may not have the means of supporting in private life the dignity of his former station; that like Caesar, he may be at once ambitious and poor, and deeply involved in debt.—Such a man would die a thousand deaths rather than sink from the heights of splendor and power into obscurity and wretchedness. We are certainly about giving our president too much or too little; and in the course of less than twenty years we shall find that we have given him enough to enable him to take all. It would be infinitely more prudent to give him at once as much as would content him, so that we might be able to retain the rest in peace; for if once power is seized by violence not the least fragment of liberty will survive the shock. I would therefore advise my country-men seriously to ask themselves this question;—Whether they are prepared TO RECEIVE A KING? If they are to say at once, and make the kingly office hereditary; to frame a constitution that should set bounds to his power, and, as far as possible secure the liberty of the subject. If we are not prepared to receive a king, let us call another convention to revise the proposed constitution, and form it anew on the principles of a confederacy of free republics; but by no means, under pretence of a republic, to lay the foundation for a military government, which is the worst of all tyrannies. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/an-old-whig-v-1787-11-1/20130122083017/

(October 27, 1787) Mr. PRINTER, This is certainly very important crisis to the people of America; experience seems to have convinced everyone, that the articles of confederation, under which Congress have hitherto attempted to regulate the affairs of the United States, are insufficient for the purposes intended; that we are a ruined people unless some alteration can be effected. The public mind has therefore been raised to the highest pitch expectation, and the evident need of relief from the many distresses , public and private, in which we are involved has reduced us to such a state, that we can hardly endure a disappointment. Scarcely anything that could be proposed by the convention, in this state of people's minds, would fail of being eagerly embraced. Like a person in the agonies of a violent disease, who is willing to swallow any medicine, that gives the faintest hope of relief; the people stood ready to receive the new constitution, in almost any form in which it could be presented to them. The zealous supporters of the proposed constitution, seem to be not unwilling to avail themselves of this disposition: and therefore it is strongly inculcated, that if we do not adopt this constitution, we shall not be able to establish another, but be left to our present weakness, confusion and distress. If I was pursuaded that this is really the case, I hardly know whether I should vote for rejecting any government however unfriendly to the liberties of the people, which promised to give vigour to the councils of this country; for any government is better than none. However, I do not see that it is by any means impracticable, for us yet to correct such errors and imperfections, as appear to exist in the proposed constitution; and whilst there is a possibility of procuring better a constitution, it is the duty of every good man to accomplish it. By the proposed constitution, every law, before it passes, is to undergo repeated revisions; and the constitution of every state in the union provide, for the reversion of the most trifling laws, either by their passing through different houses of assembly and senate, or by requiring them to be published for the consideration of the people. Why then is a constitution which affects all the inhabitants of the United States, which is to be the foundation of all laws and the source of misery or happiness to one quarter of the globe; why is this to be so hastily adopted or rejected, that it cannot admit of a revision?- If a law to regulate highways, requires to be liesurely considered and undergo the examination of different bodies of men, one after another, before it be passed, why is it that the framing of a constitution for the government of a great people; a work which has been justly considered as the greatest effort of human genius, and which, from the beginning of the world has so often balled the skill of the wisest men in every age, shall be considered as a thing to be thrown out, in the first shape which it may happen to assume? Where is the impracticability a revision? Cannot the same power which called the late convention, call another? Are not the people still their own masters? If when the several state conventions come to consider this constitution, they should not approve of it, in its present form, they may easily apply to Congress and state their objections. Congress may as easily direct the calling another convention, as they did the calling the last. The plan may then be reconsidered , deliberately received and corrected; so as to meet the approbation of every friend to his country. A few months only will be necessary for this purpose; and if we consider the magnitude of the object, we shall deem it well worth a little time and attention- It is much better to pause and reflect beforehand, than to repent when it is too late; when no peaceable remedy will be left us, and unanimity will be forever banished. The struggles of the people against a bad government, when it is once fixed, afford but a gloomy picture in the annals of mankind. They are often unfortunate, they are always destructive of public and and private happiness; but the peaceable consent of a people to establish a free and effective government, is one of the most glorious objects that is ever exhibited in the theatre of human affairs. Some I know, have objected, that another convention will not be likely to agree upon any thing-I am far however from being of that opinion. The public voice cries so loudly for a new constitution, that I have no doubt we shall have one of some sort.- My only fear is, that the impatience of the people will lead them to accept the first that is offered them, without examining whether it is right or wrong; and after all, if a new convention cannot agree upon any amendments in the constitution, which is at present proposed, we can still adopt this in its present form; and all further opposition being vain, it is to be hoped we shall be unanimous in endeavouring to make the best of it. The experiment is at least worth trying, and I shall be much astonished, if a new convention called together for the purpose of revising the proposed constitution, do not greatly reform it. I find that a number of pens are employed, in pointing out the defects in the proposed constitution- Without descending therefore, into minute particulars, I shall confine the remainder of my observations in this letter, to one or two of the most important considerations. It is beyond a doubt that the new federal constitution, if adopted, will in a great measure destroy, if it do not totally annihilate, the separate governments of the several states. We shall, in effect, become one great Republic.- Every measure of any importance, will be Continental What will be the consequence of this? One thing is evident- that no Republic of so great a magnitude, ever did, or ever can exist. But a few years elapsed, from the time in which ancient Rome extended her dominions beyond the bounds of Italy, until the downfal of her Republic; and all political writers agree, that a Republican government can exist only in a narrow territory: but a confederacy of different Republics has, in many instances, existed and flourished for a long time together- The celebrated Helvetian league, which exists at this moment in full vigor, and with unimpaired strength, whilst its origin may be traced to the confines of antiquity, is one, among many examples on this head; and at the same time furnishes an eminent proof of how much less importance it is, that the constituent parts of a confederacy of Republics may be rightly framed than it is, that the confederacy itself should be rightly organized;- for hardly any two of the Swiss cantons have the same form of government, and they are almost equally divided in their religious principles, which have so often rent asunder the firmest establishments. A confederacy Republics must be the establishment in America, or we must cease altogether to retain the Republican form of government. From the moment we become one great Republic, either in form or substance, the period is very shortly removed, when we shall sink first into monarchy, and then into despotism. -If there were no other fault in the proposed constitution, it must sink by its own weight. The continent of North-America can no more be governed by one Republic, than the fabled Atlas could support the heavens. Is it not worthy few months labour, to attempt the rescuing this country from the despotism, which at this moment holds the best and fairest regions of the earth in thraldom and wretchedness?- To attempt the forming plan confederation, which may enable us at once to support our continental union with vigor and efficacy, and to maintain the rights of the separate states and the invaluable liberty of the subject? These ideas of political felicity, to some people, may seem like the visions of an Utopian fancy; and I am persuaded that some amongst us have as little disposition to realize them, as they have to recollect the principles, which inspired us in our revolt from Great-Britain. But there is at least, this consolation in aiming at excellence, that, if we do not obtain our object, we can make considerable progress towards it.- The science of politics has very seldom had fair play. So much of passion, interest and temporary prospects of gain are mixed in the pursuit, that a government has been much oftener established, with a view to the particular advantages or necessities of a few individuals, than to the permanent good of society. If the men, who, at different times, have been entrusted to form plans of government for the world, had been really actuated by no other views than a regard to the public good, the condition of human nature in all ages would have been widely different, from that which has been exhibited to us in history. In this country perhaps we are possessed of more than our share of political virtue. If we will exercise a little patience, and bestow our best endeavours on the business, I do not think it impossible, that we may yet form a federal constitution, much superior to any form of government, which has ever existed in the world;- but, whenever this important work shall be accomplished, I venture to pronounce, that it will not be done without a careful attention to the framing of a bill of rights. Much has been said and written, on the subject of a bill of rights;- possibly without sufficient attention to the necessity of conveying distinct and precise ideas of the true meaning of a bill of rights. Your readers, I hope, will excuse me, if I conclude this letter with an attempt to throw some light on this subject. Men when they enter into society, yield up a part of their natural liberty, for the sake of being protected by government. If they yield up all their natural rights hey are absolute slaves to their governors. If they yield up less than is necessary, the government is so feeble, that it cannot protect them. To yield up so much, as is necessary for the purposes of government; and to retain all beyond what is necessary, is the great without exception, we ought carefully to guard ourselves by a BILL OF RIGHTS, against the invasion of those liberties which it is essential for us to retain, which it is of no real use to government to strip us of; but which in the course of human events have been too often insulted with all the wantonness of an idle barbarity. Yours, An Old Whig Source: https://www.consource.org/document/an-old-whig-iv-1787-10-27/20130122083948/