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(April 22, 1788) OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION. It has been considered, what are the rights to be contributed, and how they are to be managed; and it has been said, that republican tranquility and prosperity have commonly been promoted, in proportion to the strength of government for protecting the worthy against the licentious. The protection herein mentioned, refers to cases between citizens and citizens, or states and states: But there is also a protection to be afforded to all the citizens, or states, against foreigners. It has been asserted, that this protection never can be afforded, but under an appropriation, collection, and application, of the general force, by the will of the whole combination. This protection is in a degree dependent on the former, as it may be weakened by internal discords and especially where the worst party prevails. Hence it is evident, that such establishments as tend most to protect the worthy against the licentious, tend most to protect all against foreigners. This position is found to be verified by indisputable facts, from which it appears, that when nations have been, as it were, condemned for their crimes, unless they first became suicides, foreigners have acted as executioners. This is not all. As government is intended for the happiness of the people, the protection of the worthy against those of contrary characters, is calculated to promote the end of legitimate government, that is, the general welfare; for the government will partake of the qualities of those whose authority is prevalent. If it be asked, who are the worthy, we may be informed by a Heathen Poet- "Vir bonus est quis? Qui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat" The best foundations of this protection, that can be laid by men, are a constitution and government secured, as well as can be, from the undue influence of passions either in the people or their servants. Then in a contest between citizens and citizens, or states and states, the standard of laws may be displayed, explained and strengthened by the well-remembered sentiments and examples of our fore-fathers, which will give it a sanctity far superior to that of their eagles so venerated by the former masters of the world. This circumstance will carry powerful aids to the true friends of their country, and unless counteracted by the follies of Pharsalia, or the accidents of Philippi, may secure the blessings of freedom to succeeding ages. It has been contended, that the plan proposed to us, adequately secures us against the influence of passi; ons in the federal servants. Whether it as adequately secures us against the influence of passions in the people, or in particular states, time will determine, and may the determination be propitious. Let us now consider the tragical play of the passions in similar cases ; or, in other words, the consequences of their irregularities. Duly governed, they produce happiness. Here the reader, is respectfully requested, to assist the intentions of the writer, by keeping in mind, the ideas of a single republic with one democratical branch in its government, and of a confederation of republics with one or several democratical branches in the government of the confederation, or in the government of its parts, so that as he proceeds, a comparison may easily run along, between any of these and the proposed plan. History is entertaining and instructive; but, if it be admired chiefly for amusement, it may yield little profit. If read for improvement, it is apprehended, a slight attention only will be paid to the vast variety of particular incidents, unless it be such as may meliorate the heart. A knowledge of the distinguishing features of nations, the principles of their governments, the advantages and disadvantages of their situations, the methods employed to avail themselves of the first, and to alleviate the last, their manners, customs, and institutions, the sources of events, their progresses, and determining causes, may be eminently useful, tho' obscurity may rest upon a multitude of connecting circumstances. Thus, one nation may become prudent and happy, by the errors and misfortunes of another. In Carthage, and Rome, there was a very numerous senate, strengthened by prodigious attachments, and in a great degree independent of the people. So there was in Athens, especially as the senate of that state was supported by the court of Areopagus. In each of these republics, their affairs at length became convulsed, and their liberty was subverted. What cause produced these effects? Encroachments of the senate upon the authority of the people? No! but directly the reverse, according to the unanimous voice of historians; that is, encroachments of the people upon the authority of the senate. The people of these republics absolutely laboured for their own destruction; and never thought themselves so free, as when they were promoting their sujugation. Though, even after these encroachments had been made, and ruin was spreading around, yet, the remnants of senatorial authority delayed the final catastrophe. In more modern times, the Florentines exhibited a memorable example. They were divided into violent parties; and the prevailing one vested exorbitant powers in the house of Medici, then possessed, as it was judged, of more money, than any crowned head in Europe. Though that house engaged and perserved in the attempt, yet the people were never despoiled of their liberty, until they were overwhelmed by the conjoined armies of foreign princes, to whose enterprizes their situation exposed them. Republics of later date and various form appeared. Their institutions consist of old errors tissued with hasty inventions, somewhat excusable, as the wills of the Romans, made with arms in their hands. Some of them were condensed by dangers. They are still compressed by them into a sort of solidity. Their well-known transactions witness, that their connection is not enough compact and arranged. They have all suffered, or are suffering through that defect. Their existence seems to depend more upon others, than themselves. The wretched mistake of the great men who were leaders in the long parliament of England, in attempting, by not filling up vacancies, to extend their power over a brave and sensible people accustomed to popular representation, and their downfall, when their victories and puissance by sea and land had thrown all Europe into astonishment and awe, shew, how difficult it is for rulers to usurp over a people who are not wanting to themselves. Let the fortunes of confederated republics be now considered. "The Amphictionic council," or "general court of Greece," claims the first regard. Its authority was very great: But, the parts were not sufficiently combined, to guard against the ambitious, avaricious, and selfish projects of some of them; or, if they had the power, they dared not to employ it, as the turbulent states were very sturdy, and made a sort of partial confederacies. "The Achcean league" seems to be the next in dignity. It was at first, small, consisting of few states: afterwards, very extensive, consisting of many. In their Diet or Congress, they enacted laws, disposed of vacant employments, declared war, made peace, entered into alliances, compelled every state of the union to obey its ordinance, and managed, other affairs. Not only their laws, but their magistrates, council, judges, money, weights and measures, were the same. So uniform were they, that all seemed to be but one state. Their chief officer called Strategos was chosen in the Congress by a majority of votes. He presided in the Congress and commanded the forces, and was vested with great power; especially in time of war: but was liable to be called to an account by the Congress, and punished, if convicted of misbehaviour. These states had been domineered by the kings of Macedon, and insulted by tyrants. From their incorporation, says Polybius, may be dated the birth of that greatness, that by a constant augmentation, at length arrived to a marvellous height of prosperity. The fame of their wise laws and mild government reached the Greek colonies in Italy, where the Crotoniates, the Sybarites, and the Cauloniates, agreed to adopt them, and to govern their states conformably. Did the delegates to the Amphictionic council, or to the Congress of the Achaean league, destroy the liberty of their country, by establishing a monarchy or an aristocracy among themselves? Quite the contrary. While the several states continued faithful to the union, they prospered. Their affairs were shattered by dissentions, emulations, and civil wars, artfully and diligently fomented by princes who thought it their interest; and in the case of the Achcean league, chiefly, by the folly and wickedness of Greeks not of the league, particularly the Etolians, who repined at the glories, that constantly attended the banner of freedom, supported by virtue and conducted by prudence. Thus weakened, they all sunk together, the envied and the envying, under the domination, first of Macedon, and then of Rome. Let any man of common sense peruse the mournful, but instructive pages of their stories, and he will be convinced, that if any nation could successfully have resisted those conquerers of the world, the illustrious deed had been achieved by Greece, that cradle of republics, if the several states had been cemented by some such league as the Achaean, and had honestly fulfilled its obligations. It is not pretended, that the Achcean league was perfect, or that there were not monarchical and aristocratical factions among the people of it. Every concession of that sort, that can be asked, shall be made. It had many defects; everyone of which, however, has been avoided in the plan proposed to us. It had also inveterately monarchical and aristocratical factions; from which, happily we are clear. With all it defects, with all its disorders, yet such was the life and vigor communicated through the whole, by the popular representation of each part, and by the close combination of all, that the true spirit of republicanism predominated, and thereby advanced the happiness and glory of the people to so pre-eminent a state, that our ideas upon the pleasing theme cannot be too elevated. Here is the proof of this assertion. When the Romans had laid Carthage in ashes; had reduced the kingdom of Macedon to a province; had conquered Antiochus the great, and got the better of all their enemies in the East; these Romans, masters of so much of the then known world, determined to humble the Achcean league, because as history expressly informs us, their great power began to raise no small jealousy at Rome. What an immense weight of argument do these circumstances and facts, add to the maintenance of the principle contended for by the writer of this address? Source: https://www.consource.org/document/fabius-v-1788-4-22/20130122080132/

(April 19, 1788) OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION. Another question remains. How are the contributed rights to be managed? The resolution has been in great measure anticipated, by what has been said concerning the system proposed. Some few reflections may perhaps finish it. If it can be considered separately, [a] Constitution is the organization of the contributed rights in society. Government is certainly the exercise of them. It is intended for the benefit of the governed; of course can have no just powers but what conduce to that end: & the awefulness of the trust is demonstrated in this—that it is founded on the nature of man, that is, on the will of his MAKER, and is therefore sacred. Let the reader be pleased to consider the writer, as treating of equal liberty with reference to the people and states of United America, and their meditated confederation. If the organization of a constitution be defective, it may be amended. A good constitution promotes, but not always produces a good administration. The government must never be lodged in a single body. From such an one, with an unlucky composition of its parts, rash, partial, illegal, and when intoxicated with success, even cruel, insolent, &contemptible edicts, may at times be expected. By these, if other mischiefs do not follow, the national dignity may be impaired. Several inconveniences might attend a division of the government into two bodies, that probably would be avoided in another arrangement. The judgment of the most enlightened among mankind, confirmed by multiplied experiments, points out the propriety of government being committed to such a number of great departments, as can be introduced without confusion, distinct in office, and yet connected in operation. It seems to be agreed, that three or four of these departments are a competent number. Such a repartition appears well calculated, to encrease the safety and repose of the governed, which, with the advancement of their happiness in other respects, are the objects of government; as thereby there will be more obstructions interposed, against errors, feuds, and frauds, in the administration, and the interference of the people need be less frequent. Thus, wars, tumults, and uneasinesses, are avoided. The departments so constituted, may therefore be said to be balanced. But, notwithstanding, it must be granted, that a bad administration may take place. What is then to be done? The answer is instantly found—Let the Fasces be lowered before—not the Majesty, it is not a term fit for mortals—but, before the supreme sovereignty of the people. IT IS THEIR DUTY TO WATCH, AND THEIR RIGHT TO TAKE CARE, THAT THE CONSTITUTION BE PRESERVED; or in the Roman phrase on perilous occasions—To PROVIDE, THAT THE REPUBLIC RECEIVE NO DAMAGE. Political bodies are properly said to be balanced, with respect to this primary origination and ultimate destination, not to any intrinsic or constitutional properties. It is the power from which they proceed, and which they serve, that truly and of right balances them. But, as a good constitution not always produces a good administration, a defective one not always excludes it. Thus, in governments very different from those of United America, general manners and customs, improvement in knowledge, and the education and disposition of princes, not unfrequently soften the features, and qualify the defects. Jewels of value are substituted, in the place of the rare and genuine orient of highest price and brightest lustre: and though the sovereigns cannot even in their ministers, be brought to account by the governed, yet there are instances of their conduct indicating veneration for the rights of the people, and an internal conviction of the guilt that attends their violation. Some of them appear to be fathers of their countries. Revered princes! Friends of mankind! May peace be in their lives, and hope sit smiling in their beds of death. By this animating, presiding will of the people, is meant a reasonable, not a distracted will. When frensy seizes the mass, it would be madness to think of their happiness, that is, of their freedom. They will infallibly have a Philip or a Cesar, to bleed them into soberness of mind. At present we are cool; and let us attend to our business. Our government under the proposed confederation, will be guarded by a repetition of the strongest cautions against excesses. In the senate the sovereignties of the several states will be equally represented; in the house representatives, the people of the whole union will be equally represented; and, in the president, and the federal independent judges, so much concerned in the execution of the laws, and in the determination of their constitutionality, the sovereignties of the several states and the people of the whole union, will be conjointly represented. Where was there ever or where is there now upon the face of the earth, a government so diversified and at tempered? If a work formed with so much deliberation, so respectful and affectionate an attention to the interests, feelings, and sentiments of all United America, will not satisfy, what would satisfy all United America? It seems highly probable, that those who would reject this labour of public love, would also have rejected the Heaven-taught institution of trial by jury, had they been consulted upon its establishment. Would they not have cried out, that there never was framed so detestable, so paltry, and so tyrannical a device for extinguishing freedom, and throwing unbounded domination into the hands of the king and barons, under a contemptible pretence of preserving it? What! Can freedom be preserved by imprisoning its guardians? Can freedom be preserved, by keeping twelve men closely confined without meat, drink, fire, or candle, until they unanimously agree, and this to be infinitely repeated? Can freedom be preserved, by thus delivering up a number of freemen to a monarch and an aristocracy, fortified by dependant and obedient judges and officers, to be shut up, until under duress they speak as they are ordered? Why can't the twelve jurors separate, after hearing the evidence, return to their respective homes, and there take time, and think of the matter at their ease? Is there not a variety of ways, in which causes have been, and can be tried, without this tremendous, unprecedented inquisition? Why then is it insisted on; but because the fabricators of it know that it will, and intend that it shall reduce the people to slavery? Away with it-Freemen will never be enthralled by so insolent, so execrable, so pitiful a contrivance. Happily for us our ancestors thought otherwise. They were not so over-nice &curious, as to refuse blessings, because, they might possibly be abused. They perceived, that the uses included were great and manifest. Perhaps they did not foresee, that from this acorn, as it were, would grow up oaks, that changing their native soil for another element, would bound over raging mountains of waters, bestow and receive benefits around the globe, and secure the just liberties of the nation for a long succession of ages. As to abuses, they trusted to their own spirit for preventing or correcting them: And worthy is it of deep consideration by every friend of freedom, that abuses that seem to be but "trifles may be attended by fatal consequences. What can be "trifling," that diminishes or detracts from the only defence, that ever was found against "open attacks and secret machinations) It originates from a knowledge of human nature. With a superior force, wisdom, and benevolence united, it rives the difficulties that have distressed, or destroyed the rest of mankind. It reconciles contradictions, immensity of power, with safety of private station. It is ever new & always the same. Trial by jury and the dependance of taxation upon representation, those corner stones of liberty, were not obtained by a bill of rights, or any other records, and have not been and cannot be preserved by them. They and all other rights must be preserved, by soundness of sense and honesty of heart. Compared with these, what are a bill of rights, or any characters drawn upon paper or parchment, those frail remembrancers? Do we want to be reminded, that the sun enlightens, warms, invigorates, and cheers? or how horrid it would be, to have his blessed beams intercepted, by our being thrust into mines or dungeons? Liberty is the sun of freemen, and the beams are their rights. "It is the duty which everyman owes to his country, his friends, his posterity, and himself, to maintain to the utmost of his power this valuable palladium in all its rights; to restore it to its antient dignity, if at all impaired by the different value of property, or otherwise deviated - from its first institution; to amend it, wherever it is defective; and above all, to guard with the most jealous circumspection against the new and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausible pretences, may in time imperceptibly undermine this best preservative of liberty." trial by jury is our birthright; and tempted to his own ruin, by some seducing spirit, must be the man, who in opposition to the genius of United America, shall dare to attempt its subversion. In the proposed confederation, it is preserved inviolable in criminal cases, and cannot be altered in other respects, but when the genius of United America demands it. There seems to be a disposition in men to find fault, no difficult matter, rather than to do right. The works of creation itself have been objected to: and one learned prince declared, that if he had been consulted, they would have been improved. With what book has so much fault been found, as with the Bible? Perhaps, principally, because it so clearly and strongly enjoins men to do right. How many, how plausible objections have been made against it, with how much ardor, with how much pains? Yet, the book has done an immensity of good in the world; would do more, if duly regarded; and might lead the objectors themselves and their posterity to perpetual happiness, if they would value it as they ought. When objections are made to a system of high import, should they not be weighed against the benefits? Are these great, positive, immediate? Is there a chance endangering them by rejection or delay? May they not be attained without admitting the objections, supposing the objections to be well founded? If the objections are well founded, may they not be hereafter admitted, without danger disgust, or inconvenience? Is the system so formed, that they may be thus admitted? May they not be of less efficacy, than they are thought to be by their authors? Are they not designed to hinder evils, which are generally deemed to be sufficiently provided against? May not the admission of them prevent benefits, that might otherwise be obtained? In political affairs, is it not more safe and advantageous, for all to agree in measures that may not be best, than to quarrel among themselves, what are best? When questions of this kind with regard to the plan proposed, are calmly considered, it seems reasonable to hope, that every faithful citizen of United America, will make up his mind, with much satisfaction to himself, and advantage to his country. (a) Blackstone, III, 379.4 (b) Idem, IV, 350.5 (c) Idem, III, 381.6 (d) See an enumeration of defects in trials by jury, Blackstone, III, 381.7 (e) Idem, 1111, 350. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/fabius-iv-1788-4-19/20130122081010/

(April 17, 1788) OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION The Writer of this Address hopes, that he will now be thought so disengaged from the objections against the part of the principle assumed, concerning the power of the people, that he may be excused for recurring to his assertion, that-the power of the people pervading the proposed system, together with the strong confederation of the states, willform an adequate security against every danger that has been apprehended. It is a mournful, but may be a useful truth, that the liberty of single republics has generally been destroyed by some of the citizens, and of confederated republics, by some of the associated states. It is more pleasing, and may be more profitable to reflect, that, their tranquility and prosperity have commonly been promoted, in proportion to the strength of their government for protecting the worthy against the licentious. As in forming political society, each individual contributes some of his rights, in order that he may, from a common stock of rights, derive greater benefits, than he could from merely his own; so, in forming confederation, each political society should contribute such a share of their rights, as will, from a common stock of rights, produce the largest quantity of benefits for them. But, what is that share? and, how to be managed? Momentous questions! Here, flattery is treason; and error, destruction. Are they unanswerable? No. Our most gracious Creator does not condemn us to sigh for unattainable blessedness: But one thing he demands-that we should seek for it in his way, and not in our own. Humility and benevolence must take place of pride and overweening selfishness. Reason, then rising above these mists, will discover to us, that we cannot be true to ourselves, without being true to others-that to be solitary, is to be wretched-that to love our neighbours as ourselves, is to love ourselves in the best manner-that is to give, is to gain-and, that we never consult our own happiness more effectually, than when we most endeavour to correspond with the Divine designs, communicating happiness, as much as we can, to our fellow creatures. INESTIMABLE TRUTH! sufficient, if they do not barely ask what it is, to melt tyrants into men, and soothe] the inflamed minds of a multitude into mildness-sufficient to overflow this earth with unknown - felicity)INESTIMABLE TRUTH! which our Maker, in his providence, enables us, not only to talk and write about, but to adopt in practice of vast extent, and of instructive example. Let us now enquire, if there be not some principle, simple as the laws of nature in other instances, from which, as from a source, the many benefits of society are deduced. We may with reverence say, that our Creator designed men for society, because otherwise they could not be happy. They cannot be happy without freedom; nor free without security; that is, without the absence of fear nor thus secure, without society. The conclusion is strictly syllogistic-that men cannot be free without society. Of course, they can not be equally free without society, which freedom produces the greatest happiness. As these premises are invincible, we have advanced a considerable way in our enquiry upon this deeply interesting subject If we can determine, what share of his rights, every individual must contribute to the common stock of rights in forming society, for obtaining equal freedom, we determine at the same time, what share of their rights each political society must contribute to the common stock of rights informing confederation, which is only a larger society, for obtaining equal freedom: For, if the deposit be not proportioned to the magnitude of the association in the latter case, it will generate the same mischief among the component parts of it, from their inequality, that would result from a defective contribution to association in the former case, among the component parts of it, from their inequality. Each individual then must contribute such a share of his rights, as is necessary for attaining that SECURITY that is essential to freedom; and he is bound to make this contribution by the law of his nature; that is, by the command of his creator; therefore, he must submit his will, in what concerns all, to the will of the whole society. What does he lose by this submission? The power of doing injuries to others-the dread of suffering injuries from them-and, the in commodities of mental or bodily weakness-What does he gain by it? The aid of those associated with him-protection against injuries from them or others-a capacity of enjoying his undelegated rights to the best advantage-a repeal of his fears-and tranquility of mindor, in other words, that perfect liberty better described in the Holy Scriptures, than any where else, in these expressions-"When everyman shall sit under his vine, and under his fig-tree, and NONE SHALL MAKE HIM AFRAID." The like submission, with a correspondent expansion and accommodation, must be made between states, for obtaining the like benefits in a confederation. Men are the materials of both. As the largest number is but a junction of units a confederation is but an assembly of individuals. The sanction of that law of his nature, upon which the happiness of a man depends in society, must attend him in confederation, or he becomes unhappy; for confederation should promote the happiness of individuals, or it does not answer the intended purpose. Herein there is a progression, not a contradiction. As man, he becomes a citizen; as a citizen, he becomes a fœderalist. The generation of one, is not the destruction of the other. He carries into society his naked rights: These thereby improved, he carries into confederation. If that sacred law before mentioned, is not here observed, the confederation would not be real, but pretended. He would confide, and be deceived. The dilemma is inevitable. There must either be one will, or several wills. If but one will, all the people are concerned; if several wills, few comparatively are concerned. Surprizing! that this doctrine should be contended for by those, who declare, that the constitution is not founded on a bottom broad enough; and, though THE WHOLE PEOPLE of the United States are to be TREBLY represented in it in THREE DIFFERENT MODES of representation, and their servants will have the most advantageous situation and opportunities of acquiring all requisite information for the welfare of the whole union, yet insist for a privilege of opposing obstructing, and confounding their measures taken with common consent for the general weal, by the delays, negligences, rivalries, or other selfish views of parts of the union. Thus, while one state should be relied upon by the union for giving aid, upon a recommendation of Congress, to another in distress, the latter might be ruined; and the state relied upon, might suppose, it would gain by such an event. When any persons speak of a confederation, do they, or do the ynot acknowledge, that the whole is interested in the safety of every part-in the agreement of parts-in the relation of parts to one another-to the whole-or, to other societies? If they do-then, the authority of the whole, must be co-extensive with its interests-and if it is, the will of the whole must and ought in such cases to govern. If they do not acknowledge, that the whole is thus interested, the conversation should cease. Such persons mean not a confederation, but something else. As to the idea, that this superintending sovereign will must of consequence destroy the subordinate sovereignties of the several states, it is begging concession of the question, by inferring that a manifest and great usefulness must necessarily end in abuse; and not only so, but it requires an extinction of the principle of all society: for, the subordinate sovereignties, or, in other words, the undelegated rights of the several states, in a confederation, stand upon the very same foundation with the undelegated rights of individuals in a society, the federal sovereign will being composed of the subordinate sovereign wills of the several confederated states. If as some persons seem to think, a bill of rights is the best security of rights, the sovereignties of the several states have this best security by the proposed constitution, & more than this best security, for they are not barely declared to be rights, but are taken into it as component parts, for their perpetual preservation by themselves. In short, the government of each State is, and is to be, sovereign andsupreme in all matters that relate to each state only. It is to be subordinate barely in those matters that relate to the whole; and it will be their own faults, if the several states suffer the federal sovereignty to interfere in things of their respective jurisdictions. An instance of such interference with regard to any single state, will be a dangerous precedent as to all, and therefore will be guarded against by all, as the trustees or servants of the several states will not dare, if they retain their senses, so to violate the independent sovereignty of their respective states, that justly darling object of American affections, to which they are responsible, besides being endeared by all the charities of life. The common sense of mankind agrees to the devolution of individual wills in society; and if it has not been as universally assented to in confederation, the reasons are evident, & worthy of being retained in remembrance by Americans. They were, want opportunities, or the loss of them, through defects of knowledge and virtue. The principle however has been sufficiently vindicated in imperfect combinations, as their prosperity has generally been commensurate to its operation. How beautifully and forcibly does the inspired Apostle Saint Paul, argue upon a sublimer subject, with a train of reasoning strictly applicable to the present ? His words are-"If the foot shall say, because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? and if the ear shall say, because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body?" As plainly inferring, as could be done in that allegorical manner, the strongest censure of such partial discontents and dissentions, especially, as his meaning is enforced by his description of the benefits of union in these expressions-"But, now they are many members, yet but one body: and the eye CANNOT say to the hand, I have no need of thee; nor again, the head to the feet, I have no need of you." When the commons of Rome upon a rupture with the senate, seceded in arms upon the Mons sacer, Menenius Agrippa used the like allusion to the human body, in his famous apologue of a quarrel among some of the members. The unpolished but honest-hearted Romans of that day, understood him, and were appeased. They returned to the city, and-the world was conquered. Another comparison has been made by statesmen and the learned, between a natural and a political body; and no wonder indeed, when the title of the latter was borrowed from the resemblance. It has therefore been justly observed, that if a mortification takes place in one or some of the limbs, and the rest of the body is sound, remedies maybe applied, and not only the contagion prevented from spreading, but the diseased part or parts saved by the connection with the body, & restored restored to former usefulness. When general putrefaction prevails, death is to be expected. History Historysacred sacred and prophane tells us, that, CORRUPTION OF MANNERS IS THE VERY BASIS OF SLAVERY. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/fabius-iii-1788-4-17/20130122084915/

(April 15, 1788) OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION. But besides the objections originating from the before mentioned cause, that have been called local, there are other objections that are supposed to arise from the maxims of liberty and policy.– Hence it is inferred, that the proposed system has such inherent vices, as must necessarily produce a bad administration, and at length the oppression of a monarchy or an aristocracy in the federal officers. The writer of this address being convinced by as exact an investigation as he could make, that such mistakes may lead to the perdition of his country, esteems it his indispensable duty, strenuously to contend, that–THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE pervading the proposed system, together with the STRONG CONFEDERATION OF THE STATES, forms an adequate security against every danger that has been apprehended. If this single assertion can be supported by facts and arguments, there will be reason to hope, that painful anxieties will be removed from the minds of some citizens, who are truely devoted to the interests of America , and who have been thrown into afflictive perplexities, by the never-ending mazes of multiplied, intricate, and contrariant disquisitions. The objectors agree, that the confederation of the states will be strong, according to the system proposed, and so strong, that many of them loudly complain of that strength. On this part of the assertion, there is no dispute: But some of the objections that have been published, strike at another part of the principle assumed, and deny, that the system is sufficiently founded on the power of the people. The course of regular enquiry demands, that these objections should be considered in the first place. If they are removed, then all the rest of the objections, concerning unnecessary taxations, standing armies, the abolishment of trials by jury, the liberty of the press, the freedom of commerce, the judicial, executive, and legislative authorities of the several states, & the rights of citizens, and the other abuses of federal government, must, of consequence, be rejected, if the principle contains the salutary, purifying, and preserving qualities attributed to it. The question then will be-Not what may be done when the government shall be turned into a tyranny but, how the government can be so turned? Thus unembarrassed by subordinate discussions, we may come fairly to the contemplation of that superior point, and be better enabled to discover, whether our attention to it will afford any lights, whereby we may be conducted to peace, liberty, and safety. The objections, denying that the system proposed is sufficiently founded on the power of the people, state, that the number of the federal trustees or officers, is too small, and that they are to hold their offices too long. One would really have supposed, that smallness of number could not be termed a cause of danger, as influence must encrease with enlargement. If this is a fault, it will soon be corrected, as an addition will be often made to the number of the senators, and, almost every year, to that of the representatives; and in all probability much sooner, than we shall be able and willing to bear the expence of the addition. As to the senate, it never can be, and it never ought to be large, if it is to possess the powers, which almost all the objectors seem inclined to allot to it, as will be evident to every intelligent person, who considers those powers. Tho' small, let it be remembered, that it is to be created by the sovereignties of the several states; that is, by the persons, whom the people of each state shall judge to be most worthy, and who, surely, will be religiously attentive to making a selection, in which the interest and honour of their state will be so extensively concerned. It should be remembered too, that this is the same manner, in which the members of Congress are now appointed; and that herein, the sovereignties of the states are so intimately involved, that however a renunciation of part of these powers may be desired by some of the states, it NEVER will be obtained from the rest of them. Peaceable, fraternal, and benevolent as these are, they think, the concessions they have made, ought to satisfy all. That the senate may always be kept full, without the interference of Congress, it is provided that if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments, until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill up such vacancies. As to the house representatives, it is to consist of a number of persons, not exceeding one for every thirty thousand. Thus, every member of that house will be elected by a majority of the electors of a whole state; or, by a majority of electors, among thirty thousand persons. These electors will reside, widely dispersed, over an extensive country. Cabal and corruption will be as impracticable, as, on such occasions, human institutions can render them. The will of freemen, thus circumstanced, will give the fiat. The purity of election thus obtained, will amply compensate for the supposed defect representation; and the members, thus chosen, will be most apt to harmonize in their proceedings, with the general interests, feelings, and sentiments of the people. Allowing such an increase of population as, from experience and a variety of causes, may be expected, the representatives, in a short period, will amount to several hundreds, and most probably long before any change of manners for the worse, that might tempt or encourage our rulers to mal-administration, will take place on this continent. That this house may always be kept full, without the interference of Congress, it is provided in the system, that when vacancies happen in any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. But, it seems, the number of the federal officers is not only too small: They are to hold their offices too long. This objection surely applies not to the house representatives, who are to be chosen every two years, especially if the extent of empire, and the vast variety and importance of their deliberations, be considered. In that view, they and the senate will actually be not only legislative but also diplomatic bodies, perpetually engaged in the arduous task of reconciling, in their determinations, the interests of several sovereign states, not to insist on the necessity of a competent knowledge of foreign affairs, relative to the states. They who desire the representatives to be chosen every year, should exceed Newton in calculations, if they attempt to evince, that the public business would, in that case, be better transacted, than when they are chosen every two years.6 The idea, however, should be excused for the zeal that prompted it. Is monarchy or aristocracy to be produced, without the consent of the people, by a house representatives, thus constituted? It has been unanimously agreed by the friends of liberty, that FREQUENT ELECTIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, ARE THEMOST SOVEREIGN REMEDY OF ALL GRIEVANCES IN A FREE GOVERNMENT. Let us pass on to the senate. At the end of two years after the first election, one third is to be elected for six years. Of the remaining thirds, one will constantly have but four years, and the other but two years to continue in office. The whole number at first will amount but to twenty-six, must ever continue very small, will be regularly renovated by the biennial election of one third, and will be overlooked, and overawed by the house representatives, nearly three times more numerous at the beginning, rapidly and vastly augmenting, and more enabled to overlook & overawe them, by holding their offices for two years, as thereby they will acquire better information, respecting national affairs. These representatives will also command the public purse, as all bills for raising revenue, must originate in their house. As in the Roman armies, when the Principes and Hastati had failed, there were still the Triarii, who generally put things to rights, so we shall be supplied with another resource. We are to have a president, to superintend, and if he thinks the public weal requires it, to controul any act of the representatives and senate. This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, because it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the empire should always have the necessary information, for directing their choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, lest it should disturb the national councils; nor BY ANY ONE BODY WHATEVER, for fear of undue influence. He is to be chosen in the following manner. Each state shall appoint, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives, to which the state shall be entitled in Congress: but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. As these electors are to be appointed, as the legislature of each state may direct, of course they will be appointed by the people of the state, if such be the pleasure of the people. Thus, the fairest, freest opening is given, for each state to chuse such electors for this purpose, as shall be most signally qualified to fulfil the trust. To guard against undue influence these electors, thus chosen, are to meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot; and still further to guard against it, Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes-WHICH DAY SHALL BE THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES. All the votes from the several states are to be transmitted to Congress, and therein counted. The president is to hold his office for four years. When these electors meet in their respective states, utterly vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived from partiality. The electors may throw away their votes, mark, with public disappointment, some person improperly favoured by them, or justly revering the duties of their office, dedicate their votes to the best interests of their country. This president will be no dictator. two thirds of the representatives and the senate may pass any law, notwithstanding his dissent; and he is removable and punishable for misbehaviour. Can the limitted, fluctuating senate, placed amidst, such powers, if it should become willing, ever become able, to make America pass under its yoke? The senators will generally be inhabitants of places very distant one from another. They can scarcely be acquainted till they meet. Few of them can ever act together for any length of time, unless their good conduct recommends them to a re-election; and then there will be frequent changes in a body dependent upon the choice of other bodies, the legislatures of the several states, that are altering every year. Machiavel and Cesar Borgia together could not form a conspiracy in such a senate, dangerous to any but themselves and their accomplices. It is essential to every good government, that there should be some council, permanent enough to get a due knowledge of affairs internal and external; so constituted, that by some deaths or removals, the current of information should not be impeded or disturbed; and so regulated, as to be responsible to, and controulable by the people. Where can the authority for combining these advantages, be more safely, beneficially or satisfactorily, lodged, than in the senate, to be formed according to the plan proposed? Shall parts of the trust be committed to the president, with counsellors who shall subscribe their advices? If assaults upon liberty are to be guarded against, and surely they ought to be with sleepless vigilance, why should we depend more on the commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, and on his counsellors, whom he may secretly influence, than on the senate to be appointed by the persons exercising, the sovereign authority of the several states? In truth, the objections against the powers of the senate originated from a desire to have them, or at least some of them, vested in a body, in which the several states should be represented, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, as in the house of representatives. This method is UNATTAINABLE, and the wish for it should be dismissed from every mind, that desires the existence of a confederation. What assurance can be given, or what probability be assigned, that a board of councillors would continue honest, longer than the senate? Or, that they would possess more useful information, respecting all the states, then the senators of all the states? It appears needless to pursue this argument any further. How varied, ballanced, concordant, and benign, is the system proposed to us? To secure the freedom, and promote the happiness of these and future states, by giving THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE a decisive influence over the whole, and over all the parts, with what a comprehensive arrangement does it embrace different modes of representation, from an election by a county to an election by an empire? What are the complicated ballot, and all the refined devices of Venice for maintaining her aristocracy, when compared with this plain dealing work for diffusing the blessings of equal liberty and common prosperity over myriads of the human race? All the foundations before mentioned, of the federal government, are by the proposed system to be established, in the most clear, strong, positive, unequivocal expressions, of which our language is capable. Magna charta, or any other law, never contained clauses more decisive and emphatic. While the people of these states have sense, they will understand them; and while they have spirit, they will make them to be observed. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/fabius-ii-1788-4-15/20130122081006/

(April 12, 1788) OBSERVATIONS on the CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION The Constitution proposed by the Federal Convention now engages the fixed attention of America. Every person appears to be affected. Those who wish the adoption of the plan, consider its rejection as the source of endless contests, confusions, and misfortunes; and they also consider a resolution to alter, without previously adopting it, as a rejection. Those who oppose the plan, are influenced by different views. Some of them are friends, others of them are enemies, to the United States. The latter are of two classes; either men without principles or fortunes, who think they may have a chance to mend their circumstances, with impunity, under a weak government, or in public convulsions, but cannot make them worse even by the last-or men who have been always averse to the revolution; and though at first confounded by that event, yet, their hopes reviving with the declension of our affairs, have since persuaded themselves, that at length the people, tired out with their continued distresses, will return to their former connection with Great Britain. To argue with these opposers, would be vain-The other opposers of the plan deserve the highest respect. What concerns all, should be considered by all; and individuals may injure a whole society, by not declaring their sentiments. It is therefore not only their right, but their duty, to declare them. Weak advocates of a good cause or artful advocates of a bad one, may endeavour to stop such communications, or to discredit them by clamor and calumny. This, however, is not the age for such tricks of controversy. Men have suffered so severely by being deceived upon subjects of the highest import, those of religion and freedom, that truth becomes infinitely valuable to them, not as a matter of curious speculation, but of beneficial practice-A spirit of enquiry is excited, information diffused, judgment strengthened. Before this tribunal, let everyone freely speak, what he really thinks, but with so sincere a reverence for the cause he ventures to discuss as to use the utmost caution, lest he should lead into errors, upon a point of such sacred concern as the public happiness. It is not the design of this address, to describe the present derangement of our affairs, the mischief that must ensue from its continuance, the horrors of a total dissolution of the union, or the division of it into partial confederacies. Nor is it intended to describe the evils that will result from pursuing the plan of another Federal Convention; as if a better temper of conciliation, or a more satisfactory harmony of decisions, could be expected from men, after their minds are agitated with disgust and disappointments, than before they were thus disturbed; though from an uncontradicted assertion it appears, that without such provocations, the difficulty of reconciling the interests of the several states was so near to INSUPERABLE, in the late Convention, that after many weeks spent in the most faithful labors to promote concord, the members were upon the very point of dispersing in the utmost disorder, jealousy and resentment, and leaving the states exposed to all the tempests of passions, that have been so fatal to confederacies of democratical republics. All these things have been laid before the public in a much better manner, than the writer of this address is capable of and to repeat what has been said, he means not. What he wishes, is to simplify the subject, so as to facilitate the enquiries of his fellow citizens. Many are the objections made to the system proposed. They should be distinguished. Some may be called local, because they spring from the supposed interests of individual states. Thus, for instance, some inhabitants of large states may desire the system to be so altered, that they may possess more authority in the decisions of the government; or some inhabitants of commercial states may desire it to be so altered, that the advantages of their trade may center almost wholly among themselves; and this predilection they may think compatible with the common welfare. Their judgment being thus warped at the beginning of their deliberation, objections are accumulated as very important, that, without this prepossession, would never have obtained their approbation. Certain it is, that strong understandings may be so influenced by this insulated patriotism, as to doubt, whether general benefits can be communicated by a general government. Probably nothing would operate so much for the correction of these errors, as a perusal of the accounts transmitted to us by the ancients, of the calamities occasioned in Greece by a conduct founded on similar errors. They are expressly ascribed to this cause that each city meditated apart on its own profit and ends-insomuch that those who seemed to contend for union, could never relinquish their own interests and advancement, while they deliberated for the public. Heaven grant! that our countrymen may pause in time—duly estimate the present moment—and solemnly reflect—whether their measures may not tend to draw down the same distractions upon us, that desolated Greece. They may now tolerably judge from the proceedings of the Federal Convention and of other Conventions, what are the sentiments of America upon her present and future prospects. Let the voice of her distress be venerated—and adhering to the generous Virginian declaration, let them resolve to CLING TO UNION AS THE POLITICAL ROCK OF OUR SALVATION. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/fabius-i-1788-4-12/20130122082312/

(February 20, 1788) My Fellow-Citizens, If stupid irony, falsehood, scurrility, and abusive language, be sufficient to silence a writer in the cause of freedom, my sentiments must have been suppressed long ago; but that old saying, that nothing cuts like the truth, has encouraged me to address you once more. Probably this essay may be more obnoxious to the friends of the proposed plan of government than any of my former publications; and if so, the above saying is farther confirmed. A freeman must have a little soul indeed, whose attention can be diverted from its proper object, by the schemes practised by the friends of unlimited dominion. His own happiness, as being connected with the happiness of his fellow-men, ought to be his chiefest good. The divine founder of our religion and his beatified followers had no aim but this, and they pursued it with a zeal consistent with its excellence. If the proposed plan be a good one upon the whole, why should its friends endeavour to prevent investigating its merits or defects? Why should they hurry it on us before we have even read it? Does not this look suspicious like? Is it not a proof that it is the works of darkness, and cannot bear the light? Why should they summon a Convention in Pennsylvania, before the tenth part of the people had time to judge for themselves, or to know whether it was a free or a tyrannical system of government? Why employ bullies to drag some members of the Assembly per force to the House to make a quorum, in order to call a Convention? The answers of these interrogatives are obvious, and the conclusions deduced from them will in time have their proper effect. The principles of its framers are now clearly understood; the proceedings of the dark conclave have undergone an ordeal in Maryland, that exhibits the monarchy-men in convention as a set of the basest conspirators that ever disgraced free country. At the time that these men were plotting the ruin of their country, and forming a system of national cruelty unequalled in the annals of time, the unsuspecting freemen of America were blessing them, were praying for them in their private families, and in their public churches, and looking up to them for relief they even called the federal convention an august body, the most excellent assembly of men that ever appeared in the world. The President-general, who is to be our king after this government is established, is vested with powers exceeding those of the most despotic monarch we know of in modern times. What a handsome return have these men made to the people of America for their confidence! Through the misconduct of these bold conspirators we have lost the most glorious opportunity that any country ever had to establish a free system of government. America under one purely democratical, would be rendered the happiest and most powerful nation in the universe; but under the proposed one, composed of an elective king and a standing army, officered by his sycophants, the starvelings of the Cincinnati, and an aristocratical Congress of the well born, an iota of happiness, freedom or national strength cannot exist. What a pitiful figure will these ungrateful men make in history; who, for the hopes of obtaining some lucrative employment, or of receiving a little more homage from the rest of their fellow creatures, framed a system of oppression that must involve in its consequences the misery of their own offspring? There is but one rational way remaining to prevent themselves from being eye witnesses of a dreadful scene, and that is for them to cease immediately every operation that respects the establishing of this plan of government; and then all parties will join heartily in calling another federal convention, and the peace of the country will be preserved. One of the members of the virtuous minority of the convention of Massachusetts . - openly declared in that assembly, that pushing on this accursed system would produce a civil war; the freemen of New-England, the best soldiers on the continent, have had their eyes opened, and begin to see through the conspiracy; that sacred palladium of liberty, the freedom of the press, has dispelled the cloud, and cleared their understandings. In that state, through the influence of the tyrants of Boston, very little information has reached the people the press, generally speaking, was devoted to the well-born and their tools; yet out of near 400 members, of which that convention consisted, only a majority of 19 could be procured, notwithstanding every possible method of overawing, threatening and bribing was practised. I conceive that carrying it by so small a majority, is little better than a rejection; in fact it may prove worse, for the breach is only widened so much the more by it, and truly it was wide enough before. The freemen of Massachusetts will never cowardly surrender their sacred rights and liberties into the hands of one man, or any body of men whatever. They know what freedom is, and they will support it at the risque of their lives and fortunes. Their courage, fortitude, and atchievments in the late war have rendered their character, as friends to liberty, immortal. The amendments proposed by the president will be another source of mischief; the people cannot be so ignorant as to be deceived by so pitiful a manreuvre. Here is a positive acknowledgement made by one of its advocates, who hopes to be appointed the little king if not the big one, that it is objectionable; and his amendments are introduced as a blind; the weighty ones are untouched: not a whimper of the extraordinary powers of the President-general, the standing army, the liberty of the press, &c. No, no! if these glorious parts be lopped off, what would become of the monarchy-men? And respecting internal taxation, is not his amendment a disgrace to himself, and an insult to the understanding of the people? Mr. Hancock knows, or ought to know at least, that the liberties of the citizens of America are not to be trifled with: his schemes are too flimsey not to be seen through. The allegiance of freemen to government will ever be a consequence of protection; the Congress of America withdrew their allegiance from the king of Great-Britain when he changed his protection into acts of cruelty; and on the same account the citizens of these United States will not chearfully bear allegiance to the new government; which, instead of protecting them in their sacred rights and privileges, will be a system of tyranny and oppression. The unlimited powers of the new Congress in respect to taxation, are abundantly sufficient to alarm the people. While the state assemblies retained the right of internal taxation, the country farmers could not be burdened beyond their abilities; these men being the true representatives of the people, would never attempt to levy an oppressive tax; their own feelings and interests being congenial with those of their constituents, their consent must be withheld when a measure was proposed subversive of public good. That the new Congress will not be the immediate representatives of the people, that their number is too small, their powers too great, their accountability to the people not properly secured, and above all the executive dangerously placed in the hands of one man, who is really a king, have been fully illustrated by many able writers, and ably proved in the conventions of this state and Massachusetts by worthy patriots whose names will be revered as long as time shall remain. Upon the whole, my fellow citizens, if the great characters, who are said to advocate this system of government, wish to act consistently, the greatest proof they can give of their love for their country, is to join the rest of their fellow citizens in endeavouring to call another federal convention. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-x-1788-2-20/20130122075813/

December 12, 1787 I SAMUEL iii [viii]. 18-And ye shall cry out in that day, because of your king which ye shall have chosen you: and the Lord will not hear you in that day. My Fellow-Citizens, I do not write to inflame your minds, but to inform them. I do not write with a view to excite jealousies, and exhibit imaginary evils, but to promote your peace: I have no intentions of encouraging you to oppose or alter your present free government; but on the contrary, I advise you, yea, I entreat you, not to change it for one that is worse: if you cannot procure a better, why, be doing with the old bad one. Except you are tired of freedom; except you are determined to entail slavery on yourselves and your posterity, for God’s sake reject with that dignity becoming freemen, that tyrannical system of government, the new constitution. If you adopt it in toto, you will lose every thing dear to freemen, and receive nothing in return but misery and disgrace. Were some additional powers for regulating commerce, and the impost duties for a limited time, granted to the present Congress; this would probably answer all our purposes: but before Congress should be vested with greater powers than they now have, their number ought at least to be tripled-suppose two hundred and sixty; that is, twenty members for each state. But this matter I shall leave for the discussion of our next federal convention; if we should have the good luck to see their high mightinesses once more locked up in the State-house, guarded by captain M’Clean’s old battle-ax battalion. Among the schemes and collusions that the friends of the new constitution have made use of to dupe the people into its adoption, that of making them believe that such a government would raise America to an eminent rank among the nations of the earth, seems to have been one of the most successful. -There is not a writer that I have seen on the subject, that has called the truth of this matter into question; no wonder then, that the less informed should be imposed upon; when men of more enlightened understandings seem even to have swallowed the bait. No people in the world have more of the genuine amor patriœ, than the citizens of the United States; that noble ambition, that laudable love for the dignity and character of his country, is so implanted in the breast of an American, that he is willing not only to contribute generously and largely of his property, but likewise to expend his blood to support that government that should establish the national respectability of his country. -This truly grand principle is so copiously infused into the hearts of our countrymen, that, I really believe, there is scarce an inconvenience to which they would not cheerfully submit, provided this great point could be obtained. On this account then there are many who, although they are thoroughly persuaded, that the new constitution is defective in many striking and material instances, yet, through their national pride, would magnanimously overlook these, to have their country on a respectable footing as a nation. But ah, my fellow citizens, you are even disappointed here! It is a mere delusion! nothing but the basest deception; for, in the adoption of this constitution, we will probably lose that small portion of national character which we now enjoy, instead of gaining an accession to it. What compensation then are you to receive in return for the liberties and privileges belonging to yourselves and posterity, that you are now about to sacrifice at the altar of this monster, this Colossus of despotism. Why really the return you deserve, if you are mean enough to submit to be gulled after this manner, is poverty, slavery and broken hearts. -But probably, you will say, these are groundless conjectures, and we are perfectly convinced, that our new government, however it may be imperfect in some matters of an inferior nature, yet it must and will be powerful; yea, a government that will make its enemies tremble. If you mean by its enemies the helpless widow and orphan, the hardworking husbandman, sunk down by labour and poverty, I grant it; but if you mean a foreign enemy, you insult your understanding. No, my friends, instead of becoming formidable, we will be the scorn and contempt of the whole world during the existence of this contemptible government. Let us take but a rational view of its strength and respectability, and then we shall see that we have really nothing to depend on in this new constitution, that can raise the national character of America, but on the contrary, we will sink into a state of insignificance and misery. The number of inhabitants in the United States is now probably about three millions and an half. -These are scattered over a continent twelve hundred miles long and eight hundred broad. Now to keep such an extensive country in subjection to one general government, a standing army by far too numerous for such a small number of people to maintain, must and will be garrisoned in every district through the whole; and in case of emergency, the collecting of these scattered troops into one large body, to act against a foreign enemy, will be morally impossible. Besides they will have too much business on hand at their respective garrisons, in awing the people, to be spared for other purposes. There is no doubt, but to carry the arbitrary decrees of the federal judges into execution, and to protect the tax gatherers in collecting the revenue, will be ample employment for the military; indeed with all their strength and numbers, I am afraid, that they will find this a job of some difficulty, perhaps more than they will get through decently. Upon the whole I think it is pretty obvious, that our standing army will have other fish to fry than fighting a foreign enemy; there is work enough cut out for them of a domestic nature, without troubling them on other occasions. Moreover, such of them as might be brought into action, could not be depended upon; for they will principally consist of the purgings of the European prisons, and low ruffians bred among ourselves who do not love to work. -And who could suppose that such vile characters as these, should be trusted to protect our country, our wives, our daughters, and our little ones? No, my friends, God deliver us from such protectors! -Their mean souls wanting that amor patriœ, that love of virtue, that noble love for the welfare and happiness of their fellow men, which animates the man of courage, and constitutes him the soldier, would fail them at the approach of an enemy; yea, they would either fly ere the battle commenced, or submit on the first charge; and probably turn their arms against the country that expected their protection. What I advance here, are truths, founded on reason and the nature of things, and the experience of all ages affords ample examples for their illustration. Very little need be said respecting the militia defending the country; perhaps what I have advanced in my last essay, is enough on that head; indeed the thing itself carries its own evidence along with it. A person that has judgment sufficient to compare two ideas together, must see, that an oppressed people, reduced to a state of abject vassalage, by a despotic government, will never voluntarily venture their lives for it. When people are once slaves, it is a matter of little concern to them who are their masters.-The fable of the sensible ass is so pertinent to our purpose, that I cannot forbear reciting it:-“An old fellow was feeding an ass in a fine green meadow, and being alarmed by the sudden approach of the enemy, was impatient with the ass to put himself forward, and fly with all the speed he was able. The ass asked him, whether or no he thought the enemy would clap two pair of panniers upon his back? The man said, no, there was no fear of that. Why then, says the ass, I’ll not stir an inch, for what is it to me who my master is, since I shall but carry my panniers as usual.” There is not the most distant hope, that we shall ever have a navy under this constitution which annihilates the state governments; for, if each state were to retain its sovereignty, I am well convinced, that we might have a considerable fleet in a few years; the larger states might each build a ship of the line every year, and the lesser states would furnish us with frigates; a noble emulation among the states would be the consequence, one state would vie with another, and public spirited individuals would contribute generously to raise the character of their own state. But this consolidation of all the states into one general government, renders this project impossible; the federal government having an unlimited power in taxation, which, no doubt, they will exercise to the utmost; leaves the states without the means of building even a boat. But had they money, they dare not use it for that purpose, for, Congress are to have an absolute power over the standing army, navy, and militia; so that it is out of the question, whether a particular state be, or be not, able to build a ship of war; she must meddle with no such matter; it only belongs to the emperor and our well born Congress to build and maintain a navy. Now, if we give ourselves time to think but for a moment, we must be convinced in our minds, that Congress having a large national debt already accumulated, the emperor, themselves, their judges, lawyers, revenue-collectors, dependants, flatterers, &c. &c. and above all, the standing army, at least double officered, to provide for, will find themselves at their wit’s end, to devise ways and means for all these purposes. In short, the industry of three millions of people, were it all applied to this use, would be little enough. -Where then will the navy come from? Where will Congress find money even to build and maintain cutters to prevent smuggling on the extensive coast of America? No where, truly: such a supposition is farcical indeed; and should the new constitution be established, a federal navy is a mere finesse, an absolute nonentity. The Congress must procure money to pay the standing army punctually, come of other matters what will; their very existence depends on this. For a neglect of payment might and really would cause a mutiny in the military, and then, down tumbles the federal constitution, whose mighty basis was said to be at the centre of the earth. The standing army will be its grand support-now, if this give way, the building itself will be instantly levelled to the ground. And heaven grant that Columbia may never see such another erected again on her domain. Amen. Source: https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/philadelphiensis-iv/

(January 23, 1788) "This is true liberty; when freeborn men, Having to advise the public, may speak free; Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise; Who neither can, nor will, may hold his peace- What can be juster in a state than this?" Hail, immortal genius!–hail, thou friend of freedom, and of thy fellow-men, whose patriotic pen first wrote this divine sentiment, "Let it be impressed upon your minds, let it be instilled into your children, that the liberty of the press is the palladium of all civil, political and religious rights of freemen." This is the scourge of tyrants, oppressors, villains, and blood-suckers; the bulwark of freedom, that causes the haughtiest lordling to tremble; an inestimable jewel, that places the poorest citizen on a level with the richest demagogue. In America the freedom of the press is peculiarly interesting: to a people scattered over such a vast continent, what means of information or redress have they, when a conspiracy has been formed against their sacred rights and privileges? None but the press. This is the herald that sounds the alarm, and rouses freemen to guard their liberty. From this scourge, the parricide, the knave of power and his cringing sycophants have every thing to fear; it hurls fury on the guilty heads of such base characters, and drags them to the public altar–And through the medium of the press, the good and the patriotic citizen receives the thanks of his grateful countrymen. The sons of freedom who framed the constitution of Pennsylvania, expresly declared this to be one of the unalienable rights of the people, and therefore it ought not to be restrained. That some evils attend an unrestrained press, is obvious; but these are infinitely overbalanced by its advantages. The very salvation of America, I trust, will be wrought out by it; and the conspirators be taken by their own snares, which they so artfully set to seize the liberties of their fellow citizens, to their extreme mortification and disgrace. In my first number, I took notice of some attempts, made by some of the well born or their parasites, to destroy the freedom of the press. A scheme was then proposed, that every writer, for or against the constitution, should leave his name with the printer, to be published if required. This plan was first set on foot in Boston, and adopted by some of the printers there; in consequence of which, a gentleman under the signature of A Pennsylvania Mechanic, recommends a similar conduct to the printers of Philadelphia–And few days after, another, under the signature of Galba, carries the system something higher; for he must have the villains only who wrote against the new government to leave their names for publication, while the patriotic gentlemen who wrote in favour of it, might walk at large. Either through my reply, the terrors of a guilty conscience, or probably both, we heard no more of these press-fettering gentlemen until Monday last, when a writer in the Independent Gazetteer, under the signature of One of the whigs of 1776, comes forthwith an improvement upon the original plan. As he says "he has been bred a mechanic," I conceive he is the identical Pennsylvania Mechanic, who, we formerly observed, must be a blacksmith, employed in the service of the well born to construct chains for confining to perpetual slavery the rest of his fellow-citizens. As his method of obtaining the names of the patriotic writers is tolerably clever, it deserves our particular notice. He says that he has left his name with the printer, and hopes the opposite writers will have no objections to do the same, to the end that he may have a private interview with them, and probably they may then make a convert of him. This is a pretty decent kind of a trap of the blacksmith's construction; but let him recollect the old proverb, There is no catching old birds with chaff; and then, I think, he will soon find that his interviews and conversions are rather visionary. Tyrannical men are generally cunning, and hence they use deceitful arguments, with all the appearance of plausible equality. The author of a piece, say they, ought to give his name, for no man should write what he is ashamed to own. There is an appearance of candour in this argument, which renders it dangerous; but if we consider the thing more attentively, we shall find, that such a system would be subversive of truth and free enquiry, and eventually annihilate the freedom of the press. When a political writer gives his name with his piece, he then shews where the opposite party may aim their shafts of malice, falshood, and scurrility, with certainty and success. Will a man, for his own sake–or if he has friends, family and endearing connections in life, still more for their sake; venture to expose his interest, his property, and perhaps his life, to the mercy of a revengeful, and probably powerful party? He certainly will not, if he has common sense; and yet if he gives his name, this would necessarily be the consequence–All investigation of the subject would cease; the whole attention would be drawn off to another object; reason and argument must give place to personal invective and scurrility. When a person writes upon a national subject, he appeals to the public, who have nothing to do with the man himself, but with his sentiments: If his arguments and illustrations are well founded, they ought by all means to be published, as they tend to promote the general good; but if they are of a false or dangerous nature, let them be refuted. The friends of the new constitution have used every method and device, that their power, their cunning, or their influence could have access to, in order to restrain the liberty of the press respecting that despotic scheme of government; but to their confusion be it remembered, that there were printers in Philadelphia beyond their influence or corruption: No city in the Union has afforded such illustrious instances of independence and patriotism among printers. While such a noble spirit exists among these men, there is little danger of the new government ever being established. The despots and their parasites are well aware, that if they could restrain the freedom of the press, all would be their own; hence they have pursued the object with unremitting zeal, and have in some measure succeeded. They have, I am told, by threats and by withdrawing subscriptions, stopt the publication of the debates of the Convention in the Pennsylvania Herald, and otherwise injured that paper so far, that the printer must cease publishing. If such conduct as this be not sufficient to rouse the people of America to a sense of their duty, they must become the scorn of the whole world–a mere bye-word of contempt. The advocates of this government say, that if nine states come into it, they will proceed to organize and put it in operation. They hug themselves up in the idea, that its enemies will cease their opposition and submit peaceably. How they came to make such a silly conclusion, is to me matter of surprise, as I never have observed the smallest change of sentiment among the patriotic gentlemen with whom I have conversed. From some of the writings of its friends, it seems probable, that this idea sprang from the circumstance of the Declaration of Independence. That measure was carried by a bare majority in some of the states, yet the minority gave way and joined cordially in it.–If there were any similarity between the circumstances of the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the proposed Constitution, this argument would have some weight; but the premises are widely different, and consequently the inference inconclusive. The whole body of the people were determined to defend their liberties, at the hazard of their lives and fortunes, against the tyranny of the British government; so that there was a union of sentiment in respect of the great object, the only difference was in the means of obtaining it; in this case, then, common sense must have pointed out the expediency of the minority accommodating their private sentiments to those of the majority. But the matter now in debate has no relation to that: the men opposed to the new constitution have the same cause to defend, that the people of America had during the period of a seven years war. Who is he so base, that will peaceably submit to a government that will eventually destroy his sacred rights and privileges? The liberty of conscience, the liberty of the press, the liberty of trial by jury, &c. must lie at the mercy of a few despots–an infernal junto, that are for changing our free republican government into a tyrannical and absolute monarchy. These are what roused the sons of America to oppose Britain, and from the nature of things, they must have a similar effect now. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-viii-1788-1-23/20130122081716/

(April 9, 1788) My Fellow-Citizens, The essays under the signature of Philadelphiensis are represented as without argument, and their prime object is said to be to involve this devoted country in a civil war. But time, the discoverer of future events, will certainly shew that the calling another Federal Convention is the only rational way to prevent it. Heaven grant that these eyes may never behold that dreadful scene. The writer of these essays was actuated by the purest motives, namely, to defend the liberty and advance the happiness of his fellow-citizens. These he conceived insecure, or rather destroyed, if the proposed constitution should be established, and hence he laboured to procure another Convention. The expediency of this measure was demonstrated by illustrating the principal defects in the proposed system;—defects did I say—the expression is too soft—the ruin that must follow its adoption. If pointing out the unlimited powers of the new Congress over the lives and property of their fellow-citizens, which may and certainly would be abused, be not an argument against it, there remains no fixed determinate idea to be annexed to the term argument; indeed, on such principles right and wrong, freedom and slavery have no essential difference, and the human mind is a mere chaos. Some feeble attempts have been made by the advocates of this system of tyranny, to answer the objections made to the smallness of the number of representatives and senators, and the improper powers delegated to them; but, as far as I recollect, no one has been found bold enough to stand forth in defence of that dangerous and uncontrouled officer, the President-General, or more properly, our new KING. A few pieces under the signature of An American Citizen were published immediately after the Constitution broke the shell, and the hydra made its way from the dark conclave into the open light; in the first number of which the writer, in touching on the President, endeavoured to conceal his immense powers, by representing the King of Great Britain as possessed of many hereditary prerogatives, rights and powers that he was not possessed of; that is, he shews what he is not, but neglects to shew what he really is; but so flimsey a palliative could scarce escape the censure of the most ignorant advocate for such an officer; and since we hear of no further attempts to prove the necessity of a King being set over the freemen of America. The writer of these essays has clearly proven, that the president is a King to all intents and purposes, and at the same time one of the most dangerous kind too—an elective King, the commander in chief of a standing army, &c.; and to these add, that he has a negative over the proceedings of both branches of the legislature:1 and to complete his uncontrouled sway, he is neither restrained nor assisted by a privy council, which is a novelty in government. I challenge the politicians of the whole continent to find in any period of history a monarch more absolute. Who is so base as not to burn with resentment against the conspirators, who have dared to establish such a tyrant over his life, his liberty and property? Is the flame of sacred liberty so entirely extinguished in the American breast as not to be kindled again? No; you mistaken despots, do not let such a preposterous thought madden you into perseverance, lest your persons fall sacrifices to the just resentment of an injured country. Stop at once, and join the rest of your fellow-citizens. Let another Convention be immediately called, and let a system of government fitted to the pure principles of the Revolution, be framed. Then a general amnesty among all ranks and degrees of your fellow-citizens must succeed, and America become the seat of liberty, peace, friendship and happiness; and her government have ample energy and respectability among the nations of the earth; yea, she will thereby be rendered the great arbiter of the world. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-xii-1788-4-9/20130122080544/

(January 10, 1788) Common sense said, that, in case America became an independent nation, neutrality would be a safer convoy than a man of war: Probably Mr. Paine thought so, when he wrote; but if he did he thought wrong: For the position ought to be reversed.— A man of war is a safer convoy than neutrality; or at least, without a naval convoy there is no safety in neutrality. If America is to be a commercial neutral power, she ought to have some naval strength to intitle her to the appellation.1 We all know that the armed neutrality of the northern European powers injured the trade of Britain more, during the late war, than the combined fleets of her open enemies. If a war should now commence between Britain and France or any of the nations who have possessions in America; can America remain a neutral power, or join in an armed neutrality for the protection of her commerce? No. Neutral she may be, and neutral she must be, and nothing else; and as for her being called a power it is a mere solecism, as long as she has no navy: Her trade may be destroyed with impunity; her seamen taken to man the fleets of her enemies, without the possibility of redress; and her government insulted and her cities laid in ashes by her enemies ships riding triumphant in her rivers and harbours, without being able to help herself, or retaliate. But however necessary a fleet may be for the protection of our seamen, commerce, and national honor, it is pretty plain, that as long as the proposed government would exist, (if ever it should be established) we must do without one; That government must at least for some years be administred by a standing army.2 Nothing short of despotism can reduce the disaffected part of the people to submit to it, who are the friends to liberty and the rights of human nature. Those who say that its enemies are a few insignificant individuals, talk something like the British ministry at the commencement of the war, who represented the American discontents, as a parcel of cowardly paltroons, whom they would soon bring to obedience, by a handful of military; but a short time convinced them of their mistake. As the spirit of the new constitution admits of a standing army, and the opposition absolutely must be crushed by strength, every nerve of power must be strained, and every way and means of collecting money devised, for raising an efficient army for this purpose, in the first instance. This is a system of procedure that the despots must pursue, if they have any hopes of success. Either moderation or delay would effectually defeat them. I question whether all the hard money, that the well born can procure at this juncture, will be sufficient to support their government and army for six months; without expending a single shilling on building a federal navy.3 The greater part of that junto are extremely poor; and have their hopes of agrandizement on the new government; now if a part of the people refuse to pay taxes to that government, as they certainly will, how will they provide for the national debt; how will these poor gentlemen make their fortunes; how will they pay their standing army, to whom they owe their existence; a few interogatives of this sort must shew clearly, that a single ship of war will never be built while this great government is in operation. It is generally said, that the present distresses of America are in consequence of the want of the states delegating sufficient powers to congress: This is right in part, for the powers of congress were certainly too limitted to promote the general good of the union; but little power as that body had, they have not managed it well; indeed if they had had anymore and the number of members so small, we would have had a tyrannical aristocracy established long ago; and the country involved in more misery. That body never attempted to build a navy; but, on the contrary, to complete our disgrace, sold the only ship of war we had, the Alliance frigate, for a mere song: They have found money however, to pay their well born ambassadors at the different European courts, and squandered away money on guilded swords, presents to Baron, &c. &c. &c. and they have even had credit to negociate loans lately; but not a farthing could be spared to employ our poor mechanics to build a few frigates, by which a thousand honest families might have been saved from starving, and prevented from emigrating from the country, and our commerce and national respectability preserved. This is a specimen of the plan of our new system of government. When the present peddling and limited congress have taken such arbitrary steps, so diametrically opposite to the interest of the public good, what may we not expect from the friends of the new constitution? The poor working-man is not to be thought of, except his work will add to the character and dignity of the lordling nobility. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-vii-1788-1-10/20130122075631/

(March 8, 1788) My Fellow Citizens, Every day opens a new scene of the baseness of the conspirators, their intentions of screening themselves from rendering an account of the public money so fraudulently detained, will rank them among the meanest traitors, that ever dishonoured the human character. How must their consciences condemn them, when avarice and lust of dominion are suffered for a moment to subside, and reason and reflection take their place? Let these men but cooly consider the misery that must inevitably befal millions of their countrymen, in consequence of their treachery in framing this system of fraud and oppression; and remorse and deep anguish of soul must await them! Humanity brings a tear of sympathetic pity from the eye of their fellow men, whose ruin they had secretly projected. As our holy religion expressly enjoins it as a duty, not to return evil for evil, but to overcome evil with good; consequently our resentment against these ungrateful men should be moderated by christian charity: Yet as freemen and citizens, determined to hand down to posterity sacred liberty unimpaired, we are solemnly bound, at the hazard of our fortunes and lives, to oppose this base attempt of theirs to enslave our country. If on the broad basis of equity and justice, crimes and punishments have their proper proportion: What punishment then, on the scale of moderation, could counterpoise, or atone, for a crime so aggravated as that charged to the majority of the members of the late federal convention? I assert roundly, that another assembly of men never met in this, or any other country, possessing so fully the confidence of so many freemen: and to their shame be it said, they abused this confidence; their own private interest, private emolument, and hopes of dominion, overcame every consideration of duty, honor, and gratitude. The citizens of Pennsylvania have nobly shown their love for liberty, and attachment to the true interests of the union, by their generous exertions in favor of public credit. They have rigidly fulfilled their engagements in regard to the general debt; the requisitions of Congress have been strictly attended to, and fully answered. Add to this, that we have sunk a considerable part of the domestic debt, and in fact assumed a larger portion of it than in justice belonged to us. These spirited exertions, while they contributed to the general welfare of the union, and raised the reputation of the state, did not fail however to distress our farmers and every other class and description of citizens, very sensibly indeed. But what is the result of their unshaken loyalty to the cause of liberty, and the honor of their country? What recompence will the honest and industrious Pennsylvanians receive for their patriotism, if the new government be established? Such a return as perhaps history does not afford a single instance similar to. So base a violation of public justice and plighted faith, is certainly a novelty in politics, and begins a new epoch in history. Pennsylvania, instead of receiving credit for the immense sums she has paid into the general treasury, will be placed on a footing with the most delinquent state in the union; and which is highly probable she and all the other states will be taxed hereafter in an exact ratio of the sums they have hitherto raised. Consequently our former acts of generosity, in support of public faith, is to terminate in a two-fold loss to our citizens. In the first place we have nearly ruined ourselves already, through our punctuality in paying our quota of the public debt; and secondly, to complete the scene, our future quotas of continental revenue will be apportioned to the exertions we have heretofore made: That is in plain terms, Pennsylvania will be much worse under this cruel system of tyranny in consequence of her fidelity and honor, than she would have been had she never attempted to pay a shilling of public debt; or if she be not worse, the uniformity of internal taxation through the union, which is expressly stipulated by the constitution, necessarily places her citizens on a parallel with those of that state which has not paid a shilling of public debt since the peace. The people of the delinquent states might inconsiderately be induced to triumph in the new system of government; for they may conclude, now our public debts are paid as far forward as those of any other state, but attentive consideration will soon convince them of their mistake. Although the new constitution advances them as high in the public scale as if they had strictly and honorably made good the requisitions of the old Congress; yet the unbounded powers of the new Congress in respect to internal taxation, must eventually fleece them of their all; and from their inability heretofore to pay their just quotas as levied by Congress, we may rationally conclude, that, even the states of Pennsylvania and New-York, which are in advance at present, will still be above them, supposing the extra payments of these two states not to be carried to the credit of their account, which they certainly will not, on the principles of this constitution. The truth of this matter is simply this; the taxes will hereafter be uniform in all the states, and as oppressive as tyranny can make them. In every state the face of the poor must be ground to dust; and where any appearance of prosperity or wealth is observed, an additional tax will be devised; for so complicated and uncontrouled a government, will find ways and means to apply all the revenue that America can raise; indeed the whole produce of the lands cultivated by three millions and an half of people, could not satiate the desires of such a government. If the lesser, or rather weaker states would moderate their precipitancy, in urging forward the constitution, by reason and the certainty of misery that stares them in the face, I imagine they would find their advantage in the measure. Lenity in the old Congress has in some degree screened them; and besides their fellow citizens in the other states befriend them; but the high hand of power, so completely vested in the new Congress, will exact the uttermost farthing, both from the states and individuals: No excuse will satisfy the demands of a cruel excise-man; we must instantly pay the federal tax, or have our property seized, and ourselves dragged to prison by a federal soldier. That this government, should it be ratified by nine states, will not possess the confidence of the majority of the people, is a truth incontrovertible. I admit, that through fraud and surprise, many have inconsiderately joined themselves to its deceptive standard; but their number is diminishing rapidly; and I sincerely believe, that in a few months the office-hunters, the well born, and their sycophants, will be left alone: The farmer, the mechanic, and even the merchant, would be ruined if it took effect; their interest is to oppose it, and to endeavor to have another convention called immediately. Who is so dimsighted as to suppose that a constitution so essentially differing from the principles of the revolution, and from freedom, and opposed by so respectable a body of freemen, could be established in America; or if it were possible by force or surprise to put it in motion, could it exist any space of time? Nay, the idea is futile, and common sense spurns at it. While it would exist, it must be by the power of a standing army alone; but its warmest advocates know, that all their credit, and influence could not support a standing army, equal to the business, six months. It is admitted, that in Great Britain they are scarce ever without violent factions and parties, and yet no injury is apprehended to the country on that account, but generally much good: But let us attend to this matter seriously, and we must see clearly that factions and parties in America in respect to the present important object, would eventually ruin this country. The parties, factions, and cabals, so frequent in Britain, are not from a dislike to the fundamentals of their constitution, but on account of maladministration: All parties glory in the constitution, and disagree only, when it is infringed, or violated. To infer then, from the example of Britain, that the opposition to the new government would not terminate in our ruin, if it were adopted by a majority in nine states, would be a dangerous mistake; for there is no analogy between the premises, the conclusions are therefore different. The opposition in America is against the fundamentals of the constitution itself; but this is not so in England. No constitution that is not popular can possibly be established in America; or if for a short time it were established, we would have nothing but anarchy and civil war, while it was in existence. Let us not be deceived by delusive tales, that it shall be amended after the meeting of the first Congress; since it is admitted almost universally that it wants amendments; now is the time to have them done, while we are at peace abroad, and among ourselves. A fragment of liberty cannot remain, if we once set it in motion in its imperfect state. How can we suppose, that the president general, being once in full possession of his unlimited powers, would deliver them back again to the people; the supposition is preposterous; he must be more than man if he would; a more dangerous king is not in the world than he will be; liberty will be lost in America the day on which he is proclaimed, and must be recovered by the sword, if ever we are to enjoy it again. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-xi-1788-3-8/20130122075627/

(December 26, 1787) "Distress'd Columbia, must thou lie so low? Must all thy conquests, glories, triumphs, spoils End in thine own disgrace?" My Fellow-Citizens, If America is to become a respectable nation, the people must retain their freedom in the fullest extent possible; this is the sine qua non of our respectability; on this alone must the strength, honor, and national character of this country depend. Indeed, any other system defeats the intention of the revolution; freedom was the ultimate object of the war with Britain, and must, from the nature of things, be the object as long as America remains an independent country. The Turkish empire was established by cruelty and dominion, by the swords of bigotted infidels, whose religion taught them to murder without remorse: probably then, that empire should have been extinct long ago, if the same system of despotism and cruelty had not been preserved; (although there are some authors who affirm that even in Turkey great and valuable privileges have always been enjoyed) but be that as it may, the case is widely different with us; nothing short of pure liberty is consistent with revolution principles; the temple of freedom that was raised in America, was intended by providence to be the asylum of the poor and the oppressed of every nation and every clime. If then we prostitute this hallowed edifice, to purposes for which providence never designed it, our ruin is inevitable. Our national independence will probably not survive the loss of our liberties a single day. As darkness brings the night, so despotism will obliterate the very name of the American empire. It is a principle almost universally confirmed by the joint evidences of reason and experience, that that nation which is most free, is always most victorious; people who enjoy their civil and religious liberty, according to the true sense and meaning of the phrase, are laborious and brave. As the nature of a free government is to protect the lives, liberties, and property of the people, that each may enjoy what he hath by honest industry acquired; so it will be the temper and nature of that people, voluntarily to fight in defence of that government; for its interests and preservation is the same as their own. Hence, under a free constitution which secures the rights and privileges of the people, we will find courage, fortitude, and an unshaken loyalty to that government: but on the contrary, where despotism and tyranny prevail, the people are indolent and pusillanimous, backward to toil and fight in support of a government which their interest must lead them rather to see annihilated than preserved. If we take a view of ancient or modern history, we shall find that freedom and superiority have ever gone hand in hand. The history of England affords us many striking instances to illustrate this truth; the party that fought for their country, in civil broils, has always been victorious over the faction that endeavored to enslave it. But why need I advance examples to prove a point, that the bare mentioning of the American revolution seems to put beyond controversy. If the history of the Turkish empire does not afford an exception to this principle, that freedom and victory are inseparable, there can be none found that I know of, without the conquest of the island of Corsica, by the French, be admitted as one; which certainly ought not, for it rather shows that freemen contending for their liberties are invincible. Since it is obvious from what has been said, that the energy and national strength of America are concomitant with her freedom; it follows then that the adoption of the new constitution which necessarily destroys the latter, must of consequence destroy the former: This constitution, in the first instance, will lop off one half of our sacred rights and privileges, for which we bled and conquered; and the remainder are generally left insecure, and therefore must eventually be lost too; for the cursed lust of dominion can never be satisfied until it is in possession of all power, yea, it even then will be discontent, for it is insatiable. If America is to be great she must be free; freedom is her heart, her very life-blood; and the liberty of the press, like the great aorta, the prime artery, must convey it to the remotest parts of the extremities. That the adoption of this new constitution, in toto, will destroy the freedom of the press, and every other right and liberty that should adorn the freemen of America, has been proved in a clear and masterly manner by many patriotic writers, even before the dissent of the virtuous minority of the convention of Pennsylvania appeared; but this gives the matter a finishing stroke: he who denies the evidence of their positions is either a designing villain, or one who insults his own reason, and declares himself incapable of judging right from wrong, or freedom from slavery, and consequently unworthy of enjoying American liberty. The political alchymist, Dr. Rush, in his fulsome speech, that he has so assiduously published, patched, and re-published in all our newspapers, says, that our adoption of the new constitution will "produce paleness and distress at the court of St. James's." From such a fallacious assertion, one would imagine that the doctor must suppose the people of the United States are already as blind as he would wish to make them, if he thinks they will swallow this his bolus of deceit; such a declaration may probably work upon the prejudices of an American reader, but can never convince his reason. The assertion is false, take it in what sense you will; whether the doctor meant that the adoption of this system of government will produce our misery or prosperity, he is equally wrong. That our establishing despotic government possessed of every necessary power and qualification for annihilating the freedom of the people, and reducing them to the lowest state of slavery and wretchedness, should excite paleness and distress at the court of London is truly paradoxical; the sentiments of that nation must have undergone a great change; a greater change certainly than any man of common sense can credit. I know there are many good men of patriotic hearts and friends of American liberty in Britain, who will feel the most poignant grief when they hear of its adoption; but that these are of the court party, I can scarce believe: and I question much whether we should not doubt the sincerity of a positive and official declaration of that court, sympathizing with us in our sorrow. So that, upon the whole, I think it is pretty obvious, that the court of St. James's will not be much distressed at our misery. And that the British government should be distressed on account of the prosperity that must result to this country from our adoption of this system of government is a sophistical falsehood, that a grain of reason is sufficient to detect: Britain will never be distressed by reason of our prosperity under this constitution; for the truth of the matter is, we cannot prosper under it, but on the contrary, we will sink into misery and contempt, and probably cease to be an independent nation: This is a consequence that every politician will necessarily and quickly draw, and that the British, or any other government, must comprehend in an instant: Neither energy, strength nor respectability can exist a moment in America after the adoption of this tyrannical government. There are several who have imagined that this government will for some time be a moderate aristocracy but end in a despotic monarchy; but this is a mistake; for it must commence in despotism, if ever it has a beginning. A large standing army will be absolutely necessary to set it in motion; I say a large standing army, for a small military force would only excite opposition in its enemies, and encourage them to attempt its destruction, by an appeal to arms. The impolitic conduct of Britain at the commencement of the American war, is a lesson for despotic governments in future; a decisive blow must be struck at once, otherwise liberty may triumph. The advocates of the new constitution must be pretty well convinced by this time, that there are in every state a considerable number of people, perhaps one half of the whole, disaffected to it; now if nine states should really come into the measure, would it be prudent to compel the rest. I think not; although it is already whispered about, that if Virginia, or any of the southern states should not adopt it, that force will certainly be applied; but this is Utopian altogether, nor can I conceive even if every state in the union should adopt it, how this faction can be crushed, and crushed it must be effectually, before this government is firmly established: I even doubt, whether all the military that the well born and their parasites can raise, will complete this piece of business to their satisfaction. Has not America already shown to the world that no power on earth can overcome a phalanx of freemen defending their sacred liberties? Many patriotic writers wishing to compromise matters between the friends and enemies of the proposed government, have imagined that the difference might be amicably settled, if a declaration of rights were prefixed to the constitution, so as to become a part of it; and therefore have recommended this to the parties as a necessary measure to reconcile them again to each other: But these good men did not consider that a declaration of rights would effectually and completely annihilate the constitution; of this however, its advocates were well aware, and consequently could not consent to the amendment. No, no, the haughty lordlings and their sycophants must have no limits set to their power; they alone should rule; yes, and rule as they list too: why should any poor poltroon speak of rights; what are his rights? Why, to work as a slave for his well born master. Ah, my fellow-citizens, this is a trying moment! an awful time indeed! Is it possible that the freemen of America should lose their liberties so soon? I hope not; and I trust, that the Lord, who is the friend of the poor and oppressed, will defeat the purposes, and confound the counsels of their haughty enemies; so that "They shall take them captives, whose captives they were, and they shall rule over their oppressors." Amen. Source: https://www.consource.org/document/philadelphiensis-vi-1787-12-26/20130122080112/